In the Interest of D.Q., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0338
Filed May 13, 2026
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In the Interest of D.Q., Minor Child,
D.Q., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Michael Motto, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque,
attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Patricia Rolfstad, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A father1 appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental
rights with respect to D.Q., born in 2021. He argues D.Q. is not “a member
of the same family” as another child to which the father had his parental
rights terminated. Upon our review, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights of the father.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) in June 2023 when allegations were made that
the mother physically assaulted the father in the child’s presence and that the
mother’s paramour was sexually abusing the child. 2 Due to a lack of
cooperation with the investigation, the child was removed from the mother’s
custody and placed with the father, and a safety plan was put into place.

Contemporaneously, the State filed a petition alleging D.Q. to be a
child in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6) and
232.96A (1)–(5), (7) and (14). At the time of the July 2023 adjudication
hearing, the father was mostly compliant with the safety plan. And the
mother had taken steps to address her mental-health needs but was
noncompliant with drug testing. The juvenile court found clear and
convincing evidence to support CINA grounds under Iowa Code
section 232.96A(3)(b) and 232.96A(14). But the juvenile court withheld
adjudication to consider suspending disposition to see if the parents could
demonstrate an ability to successfully address their mental health and any
substance-use issues. Less than two weeks later, the child tested positive for

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The mother’s parental rights were not terminated.
2
The sexual abuse allegations were unfounded.

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methamphetamine while in the father’s care and was subsequently removed
from his custody. Because of this, the State asked the juvenile court to
reverse course and adjudicate the child to be a CINA. The juvenile court,
however, again withheld adjudication and placed the child in relative care.

The child was returned to the mother’s care early 2024 after she made
strides in mental-health, substance-use, and domestic-violence
programming. The mother also began participating in Family Wellness
Court. However, the progress soon encountered obstacles.

While in the mother’s care, the father began having unsupervised
contact with the child. On one occasion, the father used methamphetamine
and allowed the child to ingest a THC gummy. The mother also tested
positive for methamphetamine. As a result, the child, who tested positive for
THC and methamphetamine, was once again removed from both parents’
custody in September 2024.

During these events, the juvenile court adjudicated the child to be a
CINA. The State additionally moved to amend the CINA petition to allege
grounds under Iowa Code section 232.96A(15). The juvenile court granted
the State’s motion to amend and adjudicated the child to be a CINA under
that subsection as well.

Thereafter, the mother’s progress seemed to unravel further. She
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine in September,
October, and December 2024, and January 2025. Noting this lack of
progress, the juvenile court set the matter for permanency.

During the permanency hearing, the juvenile court learned the father
was living in Illinois and did not have an employer. But he was doing work
on his own. Additionally, the father’s parental rights were terminated as to

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another child he had fathered with a different mother. The father’s treatment
progress was inconsistent, and he had not taken a drug test in the several
months before the permanency hearing. The father also is diagnosed with
bipolar disorder and has failed to consistently take his medication.

Ultimately, the juvenile court changed the child’s permanency goal to
termination of parental rights. The juvenile court based this decision on the
minimal progress the mother had made during the CINA case and the total
lack of progress for the father. So, the State filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of both parents in September 2025. The petition alleged
grounds under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(a), (d), (g), (h), (i), (k), and (l).

The juvenile court held a hearing on the State’s petition in
December 2025. After the hearing, the juvenile court found the State proved
grounds under section 232.116(1)(g) as to the father. But the juvenile court
found all other alleged grounds were not proven by the State. So, finding one
ground was proven, and termination was in the child’s best interests, the
juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights. The mother’s parental
rights were not terminated. The father appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Termination proceedings are reviewed de novo. In re Z.P., 948
N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 2020) (per curiam); In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526
(Iowa 2019). Statutory interpretation questions are reviewed for corrections
of errors at law. In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). We give weight
to the factual findings but are not bound by them. In re M.D., 921
N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 2018). The paramount concern in a termination
proceeding is the child’s best interests. Id. The burden is on the State to

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show by clear and convincing evidence that the requirements for termination
have been satisfied. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110–11 (Iowa 2014).

DISCUSSION
The father challenges the grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(g). To sustain this ground for termination, the State had
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child was adjudicated
in need of assistance; (2) the district court terminated parental rights to
another child “who is a member of the same family”; (3) “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that the parent continues to lack the ability or
willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation”; and
(4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period of
rehabilitation would not correct the situation.” Iowa Code §232.116(1)(g).

The father only challenges the second element, arguing that D.Q. and
the other child to whom his parental rights had previously been terminated
were not members of the “same family” because they do not share a mother.
This court has summarily rejected this argument on at least three occasions.
In re C.W., 522 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); In re A.T., No. 06-0562,
2006 WL 1896328, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 12, 2006); In re H.B.,
No. 18-0835, 2018 WL 3913110, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018). But the
father criticizes these cases for their lack of explanation, so we will explain
why these decisions are supported by the statutory text.

While chapter 232 does not define “same family” as used in
section 232.116(1)(g), the definitions within the chapter provide necessary
context to answer the question. First, “Family in need of assistance” means
a “family in which there has been a breakdown in the relationship between a
child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.” Iowa Code § 232.2(23).

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Second, the code defines “relative” to include “the parent of a sibling of the
child if the sibling’s parent’s parental rights were not previously terminated
in relation to the child.” Id. § 232.2(60). And third, a “sibling” is defined as
“an individual who is related to another individual by blood, adoption, or
affinity through a common legal or biological parent.” Id. § 232.2(67). The
throughline that runs through each of these definitions is the relationship
between a child and a singular parent. Because this relationship between a
child and singular parent is tantamount to our analysis under chapter 232, we
find that is the test for whether for whether the children are members “of the
same family.” See Iowa Code §232.116(1)(g).

Moreover, the father’s argument is inconsistent with the purpose of
section 232.116(1)(g)(2). This section is intended to prevent children from
being harmed by a parent’s proven lack of parenting ability absent “the ability
or willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation.” See
In re L.H., 480 N.W.2d 43, 46-46 (Iowa 1992); Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g)(3).
Courts “gain insight into the child’s prospects by reviewing evidence of the
parent’s past performance—for it may be indicative of the parent’s future
capabilities.” In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021) (quoting In re
D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010)).

CONCLUSION
Because we find half-siblings to be a member of the same family for
purposes of this statute, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights of the father with respect to D.Q. under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(g).

AFFIRMED.

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