State of Iowa v. Elizabeth Joann Kopish

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1245
Filed April 29, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Elizabeth Joann Kopish,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Mark D. Fisher, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Thomas M. McIntee, Williamsburg, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

You cannot breach a promise you never made. Here, the State made
no promise as to its sentencing recommendation and instead reserved its
position pending the presentence investigation report (PSI). Thus, the
proceeding was open—and the State remained free to advocate accordingly.
And because our review of the record reveals the court considered
appropriate sentencing factors, no abuse of discretion occurred. We affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Elizabeth Kopish with eluding while exceeding the
speed limit by twenty-five miles per hour or more, a class “D” felony, in
violation of Iowa Code section 321.279(2)(a) (2024).

The charge arose from events occurring on the morning of
August 2024. Law enforcement officers—who were attempting to locate
Kopish in connection with a separate investigation—observed a vehicle
registered to her leaving her residence in Cedar Rapids. After confirming the
registration, officers activated their emergency lights to initiate a stop. Rather
than stopping, the vehicle accelerated, proceeded through a red light, and
entered oncoming traffic to pass another vehicle before briefly stopping near
a highway on-ramp. As officers approached on foot, the vehicle fled onto
Highway 30, prompting a pursuit with lights and sirens activated.

During the pursuit, the vehicle exited onto Kirkwood Boulevard and
traveled through an area that included a school. The vehicle reached speeds
significantly above posted limits—approximately 60 miles per hour in a 35-
mile-per-hour zone and at times exceeding 100 miles per hour in a 45-mile-
per-hour zone. The pursuit concluded when the vehicle returned to Kopish’s

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residence, where she pulled into a garage and was taken into custody without
further incident.

In May 2025, Kopish entered a written guilty plea. Relevant to this
appeal, the plea agreement indicated that Kopish would request a deferred
judgment and that the State “would like to see [the] PSI.” The district court
accepted the plea and ordered the preparation of a PSI. The court also
released Kopish pending sentencing under supervision.

The PSI was filed on July 22. The report recommended a suspended
five-year term of incarceration with a period of probation, and identified both
mitigating and aggravating considerations, including Kopish’s personal
circumstances and assessed concerns regarding compliance, substance
abuse, and acceptance of responsibility.

The matter proceeded to sentencing on July 29. The State requested a
suspended prison sentence with probation for a period of five years.
Following the hearing, the district court entered judgment and sentence,
adjudicating Kopish guilty of eluding as charged. The court imposed an
indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years, suspended a
$1,025 fine with applicable surcharge, and ordered restitution, costs, and
other statutory obligations. In determining the appropriate sentence, the
court considered the record, including the PSI, the nature and circumstances
of the offense, and Kopish’s history and characteristics, concluding that the
sentence imposed balanced the goals of rehabilitation and community
protection.

Kopish now appeals, arguing that the State breached the plea
agreement by failing to “earnestly advocate for a suspended sentence and

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supervised probation.” In addition, Kopish contends that the court abused
its discretion by considering improper sentencing factors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of an allegation that the State breached a plea agreement
during sentencing is for errors at law. State v. King, 576 N.W.2d 369, 370
(Iowa 1998). We review a district court’s specific sentencing decision for
abuse of discretion. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999). We will
not disturb a sentence unless the defendant shows an abuse of discretion or a
defect in the sentencing procedure. State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678
(Iowa 1998). “An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on
grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v.
Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
I. Breach of Plea Agreement

When a plea agreement requires the State to recommend a particular
sentence, the prosecutor must do more than merely recite the agreement; the
State must present the recommendation with its approval and indicate it is
worthy of the court’s acceptance. State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 299
(Iowa 1999).

Here it is well worth repeating that the only sentencing-related term
the State agreed to was to “see [the] PSI” while allowing for Kopish to argue
for a deferred judgment. It did exactly that. Seeing the PSI is different than
agreeing to the PSI. The dispositive inquiry is whether the prosecutor failed
to fulfill a promise actually made—whether the State “acted contrary to the
common purpose of the plea agreement” and deprived the defendant of the

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benefit of the bargain. State v. Patten, 981 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Iowa 2022)
(citation omitted). That inquiry resolves this claim.

Unlike cases in which the State expressly agrees to recommend a
specific sentence, the plea agreement here imposed no such obligation. The
agreement permitted Kopish to request a deferred judgment, while the State
expressly reserved its position pending review of the presentence
investigation report. In practical effect, this was an open sentencing, with the
only limitation being that Kopish remained free to argue for a deferred
judgment. Because the State did not promise to recommend a suspended
sentence, probation, or any other particular sentence, there was no shared
“common purpose” as to sentencing and no “justified expectation” that the
State would advocate for leniency. See id. Without a promise, there can be
no breach.

Nothing in this record suggests the State acted contrary to any agreed
limitation. To the contrary, the State did precisely what the agreement
contemplated—it reviewed the PSI and made a recommendation informed
by that report. It is noteworthy that even though the State could have argued
for a prison sentence, it actually recommended a suspended prison sentence.
The plea agreement allowed Kopish to seek a deferred judgment while
leaving the State free to determine its sentencing position after reviewing the
PSI. That reservation rendered the sentencing effectively open. Because the
State was not bound to advocate for any particular outcome, its conduct at
sentencing did not breach the plea agreement. Kopish’s claim of breach fails.

II. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

A sentencing “court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence
imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). The sentencing court weighs “the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and

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propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform” along with the
defendant’s criminal history, family circumstances, and the societal goals of
sentencing. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (citation
omitted). The district court’s statement may be “terse and succinct” if “the
reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and
the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408
(Iowa 2015). The district court “has broad discretion to impose the sentence
it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.”
State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). This discretion “to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a
strong presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

At sentencing, the district court gave an explanation of its decision to
not suspend Kopish’s sentence:
In determining the appropriate sentencing disposition, I have
considered all the sentencing options available in this case in order to arrive
at a sentence that provides maximum opportunity for [Kopish]’s
rehabilitation and at the same time protect the community for further
offenses by [Kopish] and others.

In this case, I’ve considered all the relevant circumstances,
including [Kopish]’s age, prior criminal record, employment history,
family circumstances, health, and the nature of the offense.

I’ve also considered the need to protect the community through
deterrence, not just from future crimes by [Kopish], but also from the
commission of similar crimes by others.

In this case, I do find . . . that the offense is a very serious one.
Going over 100 miles an hour in a school area, people could have been
killed, people could have been severely hurt, and I don’t find that [Kopish]
has taken appropriate note of that. I don’t find her statement here today to
be genuine. I do believe that the PSI accurately reflects a lack of remorse,
a lack of follow-through, and a lack of ability to address what’s happened.

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Therefore, I do find [Kopish] is sentenced to be confined for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years. I will not suspend that
sentence.

Upon our review, we determine that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a carceral sentence. Each of the factors the district
court discussed is a proper sentencing factor. See Iowa Code § 901.5. Given
the sentence is based on proper factors and is sufficiently explained, we
discern no abuse of discretion and will not disturb it. See Formaro, 638
N.W.2d at 724. To the extent that Kopish asks us to reweigh the factors and
grant her probation, we decline to do so on appeal. See State v. Gordon, 998
N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023).

AFFIRMED.

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