State of Iowa v. Joshua Todd Busch

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1303
Filed April 29, 2026

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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Joshua Todd Busch,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Debra S. De Jong of De Jong Law Firm, P.C., Orange City,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Joshua Busch appeals his sentence for third-offense possession of a
controlled substance.1 He argues the district court abused its discretion by
failing to explain its reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our
review, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm
Busch’s sentences.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Busch pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance as a third
or subsequent offense, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code section
124.401(5). When he committed that offense, Busch was on probation in two
separate matters. The State and Busch reached a plea agreement where the
parties would jointly recommend a five-year prison term, and they would be
allowed to argue to the district court whether the prison term should be
served consecutively or concurrently with the two probation matters. The
parties also bargained for the dismissal of another simple misdemeanor case
Busch was facing.

At the sentencing hearing, Busch requested the district court grant
him an unsuccessful discharge on one of his probationary sentences and run
the other probation matter concurrent to the sentence imposed in the active
case. Busch noted his struggles with substance use, medical diagnoses, and
his prior performance on probation, and he accepted responsibility for his
actions during his allocution. The State argued for consecutive sentences,
noting several probation violation reports, Busch’s criminal history, and the

1
As a preliminary matter, the right of appeal is limited for convictions reached
pursuant to a plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025). We find there is
good cause for appeal because Busch is challenging his discretionary sentences rather than
the guilty plea. See State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2021).

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seriousness of the offense for which Busch was being sentenced. The district
court agreed with the State and sentenced Busch to a five-year indeterminate
prison term for possession of a controlled substance. And the court ordered
that sentence to be served consecutive to Busch’s two pending probation
matters. Busch appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023).
The district court’s decision “to impose a particular sentence within the
statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task on appeal is not
to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it
was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

DISCUSSION
Busch argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences because the “reasoning that was provided to Busch
was not particular to him individually or to the details of his crimes in any
way.” He also argues the district court gave undue weight to the nature of
the offense and failed to adequately consider mitigating factors. We disagree.

The sentencing “court shall state on the record the basis for the
sentence imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). The sentencing court
weighs “the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age,
character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform” along
with the defendant’s criminal history, employment status, family
circumstances, and the societal goals of sentencing. State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). The district court’s

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statement of its reasons for a particular sentence may be “terse and succinct”
if “the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the
statement and the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d
402, 408 (Iowa 2015). The district court “has broad discretion to impose the
sentence it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect
society.” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). The
decision “to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is
cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for
an abuse of discretion. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court ordered the sentences to
run consecutively “based upon the separate and serious nature of the
offenses and that the crimes were committed while [Busch] was on
probation.” Further, the court noted it had “considered all of the factors for
sentencing, including [Busch’s] age, prior record, family circumstances, his
mental health and physical health, nature of the offenses, and the plea
agreement, and meets the statutory requirements.”

First, we find the district court did conduct sentencing in a manner
individualized to Busch. The court asked Busch’s counsel, “What treatment
programs has he been in?” And when Busch responded discussing his time
at Bridges of Iowa—a substance use disorder treatment program—the court
asked, “How were you performing in the program?” Busch then discussed
his success during the program. This focused back-and-forth with Busch
along with the court’s express consideration of Busch’s “age, prior record,
family circumstances, his mental health and physical health” reflect an
individualized sentencing. That is the exact calibration of factors that is
required at sentencing. See State v. Burke, No. 25-0243, 2026 WL 380738, at
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2026).

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Second, we address Busch’s argument that the district court gave
undue weight to the nature of the offense. Even if the court gave more weight
to that factor, it is not an abuse of discretion if the court considered other
pertinent factors. See State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa
2006). Each factor the district court considered is proper. See Iowa Code
§§ 901.5, 907.5. And it is not our task on appeal to second-guess the district
court’s sentencing decision unless it was untenable or unreasonable.
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. The mere fact that Busch requested a different
sentence, the district court’s sentencing decision does not become an abuse
of discretion. See id. Instead, it reflects “the discretionary nature” of
sentencing. Id. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district
court in fashioning Busch’s sentence.

CONCLUSION
Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Busch, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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