State of Iowa v. Ryan Dean DeRonde

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0683
Filed April 15, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Ryan Dean DeRonde,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Ashley Stewart, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Eric Eshelman, Ankeny, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

1
BADDING, Judge.

Ryan DeRonde pled guilty to assault causing bodily injury—a serious
misdemeanor under Iowa Code section 708.2(2) (2024)—after an altercation
with his wife left her with a bruised arm and missing a clump of hair. The
district court sentenced DeRonde to one year in jail. Despite the parties’
request for a fully suspended term, the court left sixty days for DeRonde to
serve. It also ordered him to complete the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program
(IDAP). DeRonde appeals, challenging his sentence. 1 Our review is for
correction of legal error. State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616 (Iowa 2024).

DeRonde first argues that the court’s sentence was motivated in part
by his wife’s victim impact statement, which alleged a pattern of uncharged
abuse by DeRonde. The court explained at the hearing:
I also had the opportunity to read the victim impact statement. . . . I do
want to say, as it relates to the victim impact statement, I’m not
considering anything that Mr. Deronde was not convicted of or has not
admitted to. So anything outside of what happened in this case and what
happened in [a prior domestic assault conviction], the Court is not really
giving consideration to.

According to DeRonde, the words “not really” suggest the court might have
given some amount of weight to his wife’s allegations. But we do not engage
in that kind of speculation when reviewing a sentence within statutory
bounds. See id. at 619–20 (declining to infer the sentencing court considered
unproven facts absent affirmative evidence to the contrary). Instead, we
“take the district court at its word when it disclaims reliance on an improper

1
We typically lack jurisdiction to resolve an appeal from a misdemeanor conviction
on a guilty plea. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025). But because DeRonde challenges
elements of his sentence that depart from the parties’ joint recommendation, we find good
cause to address his claims. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).

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factor.” State v. Davis, No. 24-0837, 2025 WL 2803725, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 1, 2025). A stray word or two is not enough to shake our trust that the
court did what it said and disregarded the unproven conduct. See id.
(acknowledging extemporaneous statements from the bench are often
imprecise).

DeRonde next contends the district court lacked authority to order his
participation in IDAP. Iowa law allows the court to impose this requirement
when a defendant is convicted of an assault that constitutes “domestic
abuse,” which—as relevant here—means an assault “between persons who
are in an intimate relationship.” Iowa Code §§ 236.2(2)(e)(1), 708.2B(2).
DeRonde says the district court lacked a factual basis to find his assault was
domestic abuse because the written guilty plea did not mention DeRonde’s
marriage to the victim. 2 But the marriage was disclosed in the minutes of
testimony, which DeRonde invited the court to “consider[] . . . in coming to
[its] sentencing decision in this case.” And the court was entitled to rely on
that record in finding the statutory prerequisites fulfilled. See State v. Manser,
626 N.W.2d 872, 874–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (finding the court could infer
an intimate relationship from the minutes of testimony and attached reports
but vacating the domestic-abuse education requirement on other grounds).

That leaves us with DeRonde’s claim that the district court abused its
discretion by rejecting his request for a fully suspended sentence. He argues
the parties’ plea agreement was “fair and reasonable” and that several
mitigating factors—including his longstanding employment, his acceptance

2
DeRonde also asserts that the court erred by failing to “make any written
finding” of an intimate relationship. But nothing in section 708.2B calls for a written
finding, and DeRonde cites no authority suggesting such a requirement exists. So, we
decline to consider that argument further.

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of responsibility, and his performance on pretrial release—favored a more
lenient sentence. Despite these facts, the court gave greater weight to the
nature of the offense and DeRonde’s criminal history:
I will say I found the victim impact statement to be quite persuasive
in what occurred that evening. I’m not sure that I believe what you’re
saying, Mr. Deronde, that it was just a hug and it, you know, lapsed into
you two falling on top of each other. I’m not sure that that is accurate. . . .

I also am concerned that this is a second domestic incident, though
this is not charged as a domestic second offense . . . . [I]t doesn’t feel as
though you were learning a lesson from this behavior. It doesn’t feel like
even though you’ve gone through mental health and substance abuse
evaluation, which I’m sure you did before as well, that you’ve learned
anything from your behavior. So I am not inclined . . . to follow the plea
agreement . . . .

DeRonde might disagree with how the district court balanced the
relevant factors, but we are not at liberty to second-guess its judgment. See
State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023) (“The test for whether a
sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we might have weighed
the various factors differently.”). Whether to suspend any or all of
DeRonde’s jail sentence was for the court to decide. See Iowa Code
§§ 901.5(3), 907.3. And it had no duty to impose the sentence recommended
by the parties. See State v. Dittmar, 239 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Iowa 1976).
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm DeRonde’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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