State of Iowa v. Kevin Duane Lockett Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0979
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Kevin Duane Lockett Jr.,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Tamra Roberts, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Allison Linafelter, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

1
CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Kevin Duane Lockett Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. He argues the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because it treated a confidential informant as an
anonymous tipster. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of the motion to
suppress.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In September 2024, the Davenport Police Department’s narcotics unit
received information from a “confidential source”1 about a potential
methamphetamine sale from an individual named “Q.” The confidential
source provided law enforcement with Q’s phone number. Officers
attempted to determine the identity of Q by searching the phone number in
money transfer applications including Cash App. It was on Cash App where
officers found Q was Kevin Lockett based on the account information
associated with the phone number provided by the confidential source.

The confidential source then arranged for Lockett to bring four ounces
of methamphetamine to Davenport. They agreed to meet in the parking lot
of a Motel 6. Lockett’s arrival was delayed because he was stopped by Illinois
police while en route. Davenport police were able to obtain a photograph of
Lockett from narcotics investigators in Illinois.

The confidential source informed officers Lockett would arrive at the
Motel 6 in a maroon sedan accompanied by his sister. But, when he arrived,
Lockett spotted police vehicles and initially left the parking lot, then returned

1
Officers described the confidential source as an individual who was caught
possessing methamphetamine and agreed to serve as an informant for law enforcement in
lieu of being charged with possession of methamphetamine.

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to the lot a short time later. Law enforcement arrived at the parking lot but
was unable to locate the maroon car described by the confidential source, but
they did come upon a blue Buick that had Illinois registration plates and an
individual matching Lockett’s description inside.

Law enforcement stopped the vehicle and ordered the occupants to
exit. One officer smelled marijuana coming from inside the vehicle and
located a green leafy substance later determined to be marijuana. The
officers also located methamphetamine on the woman driving the vehicle.

The Scott County Attorney’ Office charged Lockett with three counts:
count I: possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in violation of
Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2024); count II: failure to affix a drug
tax stamp in violation of Iowa Code section 453B.12; and count III:
possession of marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5)(b). The
State also gave notice of sentencing enhancements alleging Lockett was an
habitual offender under Iowa Code sections 902.8 and 902.9(1)(c) and was
previously convicted of controlled-substance offenses under Iowa Code
section 124.411.

Lockett moved to suppress all evidence located by police during the
stop of the vehicle. He challenged the authority of the police to conduct a
warrantless search of the vehicle based on information obtained from the
confidential source. The district court denied the motion to suppress finding
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and developed probable
cause to search it.

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After the denial of his motion to suppress, Lockett withdrew his plea
of not guilty and entered a conditional 2 guilty plea to the lesser-included
offense of count I, a controlled substance violation in violation of section
124.401(1)(c)(6). The remaining counts were dismissed as part of the plea
agreement. At sentencing, the district court imposed a term of incarceration
not to exceed ten years but suspended the sentence in favor of probation.
Lockett now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review challenges to a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress based on constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Cyrus, 997
N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2023). With de novo review, we examine the record
and “independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citation
omitted). Although we give deference to the district court’s factual findings,
particularly those involving witness credibility, we are not bound by them. Id.

DISCUSSION
Lockett’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court should have
granted the motion to suppress because the confidential source was actually
a confidential informant and the State failed to meet its burden to show the
confidential informant was credible. But first, the State contests error
preservation.

2
As a preliminary matter, the right of appeal is limited for convictions reached
pursuant to a plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). However, because this plea
agreement was reached with the consent of the county attorney and reserved the issue for
appeal, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. § 814.6(3).

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I. Error Preservation

The State argues the issue raised and decided in the district court is
not the same issue raised in this appeal. “It is a fundamental doctrine of
appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the
district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641
N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). While Lockett’s motion to suppress raises the
issue of whether law enforcement can conduct a search based on information
from a “confidential informant,” his motion also concedes, “To the extent
the statement of the ʻconfidential source’ may be considered, it should be
treated [as] that of an anonymous tipster.” The district court appears to have
accepted the invitation to treat the confidential source as an anonymous
tipster and never ruled on whether the source was a confidential informant.
Further, neither party developed the question of the nature of the
confidential source during the motion-to-suppress hearing. While we have
doubts that error is preserved on the issue raised by Lockett in this appeal,
we opt to address the merits of Lockett’s argument.

II. Merits

Lockett argues the evidence gathered from the stop and subsequent
search of his car should have been suppressed because the confidential
source’s reliability was not proven. And Lockett argues the confidential
source was acting as a confidential informant. Upon our review, we find the
confidential source is best characterized as an anonymous tipster and the
State provided sufficient indicia of reliability of the source.

Generally, concerned citizens who are tipsters to the police receive a
presumption of reliability. State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1987).
But “[c]ourts have generally applied higher standards of proof when
weighing the reliability of tipsters who act for money, leniency or some other

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selfish purpose than when considering the reliability of the citizen informer
whose only motive is to help law officers in the suppression of crime.” Id. at
331.

At the motion to suppress hearing, the investigating officer was asked
how the investigation began and testified he “received information from a
confidential source that an individual that goes by the moniker of ʻQ’ was
selling various amounts of crystal methamphetamine and that Q would be . . .
willing to bring said crystal methamphetamine down to Davenport from the
area of Burlington.” The record is insufficient to establish whether the
confidential source was working for “money, leniency or some other selfish
purpose.” See id. So we conclude the confidential source is best
characterized as an anonymous tipster based on the Weir test.

But the supreme court has held the State still must provide some
information on the reliability of an anonymous tipster. In State v. Kooima, the
supreme court reversed a district court decision denying a motion to
suppress evidence because it found the police illegally seized the defendant
because the police relied on an anonymous tip without the requisite indicia
of reliability and reasonable suspicion did not support the investigatory stop.
833 N.W.2d 202, 210–11 (Iowa 2013). But as the district court noted, “This
is no Kooima.”

Here, the tipster’s information had sufficient indicia of reliability and
law enforcement developed reasonable suspicion to stop Lockett. The
investigating officer was provided with a phone number from the confidential
source, which the officer was able to independently verify belonged to

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Lockett through a search of Cash App.3 The officer then learned from the
confidential source that Lockett was pulled over in Galesburg, Illinois. The
officer reached out to the Galesburg Police Department, where they
confirmed the information provided by the confidential source. They also
learned that Galesburg narcotics officers were aware of Lockett and provided
a photograph of him to Davenport officers.

Once Lockett arrived at the motel, the confidential source provided
information that Lockett would be driving a maroon sedan with Illinois
plates, but law enforcement observed no such vehicle in the motel parking
lot. But officers observed a blue sedan with Illinois plates and the person in
the vehicle appeared to be the person in the photograph provided by
Galesburg police.

So, we conclude, unlike Kooima, “here, the anonymous tip was
corroborated by the other facts known by officers.” State v. Baker, 925
N.W.2d 602, 613 (Iowa 2019). And armed with all of this information from
the confidential source, Cash App, and the Galesburg police, the Davenport
police developed reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of
Lockett. See id. at 611 (“Therefore, to justify an investigatory stop, an officer
must have reasonable suspicion, backed by specific and articulable facts, to
believe criminal activity is afoot.”); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22
(1968). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lockett’s motion
to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

3
The officer testified Cash App is an application on your phone that is used to
transfer digital funds from one bank account to another.

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