William Paul Roland v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1167
Filed April 1, 2026
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William Paul Roland,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Paul D. Scott, Judge.
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AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
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James S. Blackburn, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ. Buller, J., takes no part.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

1
LANGHOLZ, Judge.

After entering an Alford plea1 to a misdemeanor charge of assault with
intent to commit sexual abuse, William Roland filed this timely
postconviction-relief (“PCR”) application challenging that conviction. He
asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and an actual-innocence
claim. Following a bench trial, the district court found that Roland failed to
prove his counsel’s performance fell outside the normal range of competency
and thus denied his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. And the court
agreed with the State that Roland was “barred from raising” his actual-
innocence claim because he “entered into a plea agreement pursuant to
Alford and has presented no new evidence that was unavailable during the
initial proceedings.” So the court declined to consider whether the evidence
Roland presented meets the actual-innocence standard. Roland now appeals.

On our de novo review, we agree with the district court’s finding that
Roland failed to prove his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. But we
cannot square the court’s basis for barring Roland’s actual-innocence claim
with the controlling supreme court precedent recognizing such claims even
after a guilty plea. And the State has never argued—on appeal or in the
district court—that the evidence Roland presented fails to meet the actual-
innocence standard, thus justifying either summary disposition or denial
after trial. Nor did the district court decide that merits issue. And so, we
cannot affirm on that potential alternative basis for resolving Roland’s claim.

We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Roland’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, reverse its dismissal of his actual-innocence
claim, and remand for further proceedings on the actual-innocence claim.

1
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).

2
I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In May 2018, Roland was charged with second-degree sexual abuse—
a class “B” felony—based on accusations that on multiple occasions between
2011 and 2014, he touched the genitalia of his special-needs child who was
under the age of twelve. See Iowa Code § 709.3(2) (2011). 2 And the trial
information gave notice that the State would seek to enhance his sentence
because of a prior sexually predatory offense—doubling his maximum
sentence to fifty years in prison. See id. § 901A.2(3). The minutes of
testimony described Roland’s ex-wife’s long-term concerns about Roland’s
behavior with the child based on reports from the child and “nannycam”
footage of Roland in bed with the child while rubbing her abdomen and
engaging in other questionable behavior. The minutes also described
potential testimony of a forensic investigator who found searches and nude
photos of preteen girls on Roland’s computer and other testimony about the
child reporting abuse to her therapist and Roland’s history as a registered sex
offender.

A local public defender office was appointed to represent Roland. He
was assigned an experienced defense attorney in the office to represent him.
The office’s investigator—a former homicide detective with more than thirty
years of experience with the Des Moines Police Department—also assisted
with the case, including reviewing much of the discovery materials. And the
supervisor of the office—who has extensive expertise on sexual offenses and
their collateral consequences, including potential civil commitment as a
sexually violent predator—also consulted with the assigned attorney and
investigator about defense strategy. Based on the evidence in this case and
Roland’s criminal history, the defense team concluded that he had substantial

2
In 2013, the provision was moved to Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b).

3
risks in proceeding to trial—not just for his likely conviction and sentence
but also his potential screening or treatment as a sexually violent predator.

In March 2019, Roland and the State reached a plea agreement. Roland
entered a plea under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), to a
reduced charge of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse—an aggravated
misdemeanor with a maximum prison sentence of two years. See Iowa Code
§§ 709.11(3), 903.1(2). In the plea, he “acknowledge[d] that there is strong
evidence of my guilt and that the Court may consider statements of counsel,
the minutes of testimony and police reports to make an independent
determination that there is strong evidence of my actual guilt.” He also
informed the court of his belief that “it is in my best interest to plead guilty,”
that “I have nothing to gain by going to trial,” and that “I have much to gain
by pleading guilty.” The district court accepted Roland’s plea and sentenced
him to an indeterminate two-year prison sentence to run consecutive to
another conviction.3 The court also ordered Roland’s placement on the sex
offender registry and imposed a ten-year special sentence under Iowa Code
section 903B.2.4

Roland filed this PCR application without the assistance of an attorney
in July 2020. He initially asserted only an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim. But after he was appointed counsel, Roland filed an amended

3
See State v. Roland, No. 18-1917, 2020 WL 7021508, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 30, 2020) (affirming that other conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor); Roland
v. State, No. 23-0671, 2024 WL 4651894, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024) (affirming
denial of his PCR application for that conviction).
4
Roland did not appeal his conviction but did appeal a later order requiring him to
reimburse the Polk County Sheriff for room-and-board fees. See State v. Roland,
No. 19-1434, 2020 WL 4497135, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2020).

4
application in May 2023, adding an actual-innocence claim as recognized by
our supreme court in Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 795-98 (Iowa 2018).

Less than a week before trial, the State moved for summary disposition
of the actual-innocence claim on two grounds.5 First, the State argued that
the claim failed because Roland “entered an Alford plea,” “never admitted
his actions and in fact, has maintained his innocence all along,” and none of
his allegations of actual innocence were “new information or [were]
unavailable at the time of the original proceedings.” Second, the State argued
his actual-innocence claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations
because, even though his original PCR application was timely filed, the
actual-innocence claim was not added until an amended application filed
after the limitations period had run. The State did not argue that Roland
failed to satisfy Schmidt’s “clear and convincing standard” for actual-
innocence claims by showing that “no reasonable fact finder could convict
the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant
guilty in light of all the evidence.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797.

In resistance to summary disposition, Roland argued that his amended
actual-innocence claim was timely because it arose out of the same “conduct,
transaction, or occurrence” as his original ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, so it relates back to that original filing date. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(5).
Roland also argued that his Alford plea does not bar an actual-innocence claim
under Schmidt. He highlighted that Schmidt held that punishing an actually
innocent person violates the constitution, even when the person pleads
guilty, and questioned why an Alford plea would be treated any differently

5
The State had also asserted a ground for summary disposition of Roland’s
original ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. But that motion was not ruled on before
Roland amended the application, and the court understood it to be “no longer in play.”

5
than a general plea or someone who goes to trial since “[p]unishment of an
innocent person occurs” in all those circumstances.

The case was tried over two days in February and March 2024. The
court heard evidence on Roland’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—
including testimony from Roland, his counsel, and the public defender
office’s supervisor. Although the court expressed strong reservations about
whether an actual-innocence claim could be asserted after an Alford plea, it
reserved ruling on the State’s summary-disposition motion and the State’s
relevancy objections to all of Roland’s attempts to call witnesses or offer
evidence on his actual-innocence claim. But the court mostly let Roland
submit his documentary evidence and witness testimony as offers of proof.

In its eventual written ruling, the court denied Roland’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim on the merits. The court found that he had failed
to “overcome the presumption that counsel performed his duties
competently.” It reasoned that “Roland knowingly and voluntarily chose to
enter into an agreement with the State and to enter a guilty plea,” and indeed
“reduc[ed] his exposure at the time of sentencing from 25 years to 2.” And
the court found that his counsel had begun preparing for trial, which was still
“more than two months from when Roland and his counsel were finalizing
the plea agreement,” and “[t]hat time could have and would have been used
for trial preparation had Roland chose to exercise his right to trial.”

As for Roland’s actual-innocence claim, the court declined to consider
its merits. The court agreed with Roland that the claim was timely but still
held that “because Mr. Roland entered into a plea agreement pursuant to
Alford and has presented no new evidence that was unavailable during the
initial proceedings, he is barred from raising an actual innocence claim.” The
court seemed to reason that this rule requiring “new evidence that was

6
undiscoverable at the time the initial case was resolved” follows the “same
logic” as in Schmidt. And relying on a critique of Schmidt by one of the
dissenting justices, the court reasoned that “[i]t is irrational to sustain a claim
of actual innocence in a post-conviction relief action when the guilty plea
itself is premised on the defendant maintaining his innocence while entering
his guilty plea.” So the court concluded, “[d]efendants like Mr. Roland do
not get two bites of the apple simply because they regret their decision.” The
court thus denied Roland’s postconviction-relief application.

Roland now appeals, challenging the district court’s rulings that he
failed to prove his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and was barred
from bringing an actual-innocence claim.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10;
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). “A defendant proves
ineffective assistance of counsel when he establishes: (1) his trial counsel
failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.”
Trane v. State, 16 N.W.3d 683, 692 (Iowa 2025) (cleaned up). For the first
element, the claimant must prove “counsel performed below the standard
demanded of a reasonably competent attorney.” Id. (cleaned up). But “[w]e
presume counsel performed competently unless the claimant proves
otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). And to
establish constitutional prejudice, “typically, the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith v. State,
7 N.W.3d 723, 727 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). “This element means criminal
defendants who seek postconviction relief after pleading guilty must establish

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the guilty plea would not have been entered but for the breach of duty by
counsel.” Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2011).

We review a PCR applicant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim—like other constitutional claims—de novo. Trane, 16 N.W.3d at 692.
While the district court’s factual findings do not bind us, we give them
weight, especially when based on witness credibility. Id.

The district court and the parties focus on the first prong of Roland’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—whether his counsel “performed
below the standard demanded of a reasonably competent attorney.” Id.
(cleaned up). According to Roland, he entered his guilty plea because he did
not think his counsel would “provide a proper defense for him at, and before,
trial,” and “trial would be hopeless.” Roland claims he provided “over 1,000
pages of information” that he did not think counsel reviewed because of a
busy schedule. He appears to argue that, had his counsel properly
investigated his claim and reviewed the evidence, he would have refused the
plea deal and proceeded to trial.

The State answers that Roland had the burden to prove counsel did
not perform competently yet offered only his own testimony in support. The
State points to his counsel’s testimony, asserting none of counsel’s testimony
demonstrated a breach rendering Roland’s plea unintelligent or involuntary.
The State also highlights Roland’s own testimony about discussions he had
with counsel about the plea offer, the consequences he possibly faced if
convicted, and his decision process in deciding to plead guilty.

Roland offered no evidence that his counsel did not view the
documents he provided. Counsel was working with an investigator from his
office who viewed and listened to the State’s evidence and met with Roland

8
multiple times. Some of the investigatory steps—such as deposing the
child victim—could not be accomplished while maintaining Roland’s ability
to enter into a plea deal. And negotiating a favorable plea offer for Roland to
consider was part of counsel’s duties and required knowledge of the case.
What’s more, if Roland had refused the plea offer, his counsel would have
had sufficient time to further investigate and prepare for trial.

We are thus unconvinced by Roland’s argument that he accepted the
plea deal because counsel did not provide the zealous representation he
needed to proceed to trial. Roland had the duty to prove by a preponderance
of evidence that counsel did not perform competently. His unsubstantiated
opinion that his counsel had not reviewed his evidence and speculation about
the quality of representation he may have received at trial is insufficient to
meet that burden. So we agree with the district court that Roland failed to
prove the first prong of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. And we
affirm the court’s denial of that claim.

III. Actual Innocence

As for Roland’s appeal of the dismissal of his actual-innocence claim,
the sole question before us is whether the district court was correct that a
person who enters an Alford plea “is barred from making an actual innocence
claim unless he presents new evidence that was undiscoverable at the time
the initial case was resolved.” This was the only ground for the district
court’s dismissal of that claim. It is the only ground on which the State
defends that dismissal. And we see no other preserved alternative ground
with merit on which we could affirm.6

6
The only other ground raised by the State in the district court was its argument
that the claim was time-barred because the amended PCR application adding the claim
was filed after the statute of limitations had run. But the district court rejected that

9
On our de novo review of this constitutional claim, we agree with
Roland that the district court’s extra requirement—imposed on Roland
merely because he entered an Alford plea—conflicts with Schmidt. Before our
supreme court’s decision in Schmidt, it was “well established that a
defendant’s guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not
intrinsic to the plea.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (cleaned
up); see also State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (following that
rule to hold that defendant waived defenses to his conviction “by entering an
Alford plea” since such a plea “is a variation of a guilty plea” with the same
effect). But in Schmidt, the court “overrule[d] our cases that do not allow
defendants to attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds when they claim
actual innocence” and held that a defendant’s “pleas do not preclude his
actual-innocence claim merely because he pled guilty to charges.” Schmidt,
909 N.W.2d at 790.

Fleshing out the scope of an actual-innocence claim in Iowa, the court
recognized that “the Iowa Constitution permits freestanding claims of actual
innocence” that “are available to applicants even though they pled guilty.”
Id. at 795. The court reasoned that “punishing an actually innocent person is
disproportionate to the crime (or lack of crime) committed and violates the
cruel and inhuman treatment clause.” Id. at 794 (cleaned up); see also Iowa
Const. art. I, § 17 (prohibiting the imposition of “cruel and unusual
punishment”). It also explained that “[a]n innocent person has a
constitutional liberty interest in remaining free from undeserved
punishment” and so imprisoning such a person “strikes the very essence of

argument, the State does not challenge that ruling on appeal, and we see no error in the
court’s reasoning that the actual-innocence claim “arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth” in Roland’s unrepresented original
PCR application and thus relates back to that timely application. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.402(5).

10
the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process.” Schmidt,
909 N.W.2d at 793; see also Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 (providing “no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). And
according to the court, because “actually innocent people should have an
opportunity to prove their actual innocence,” their incarceration “implicates
procedural due process” too. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 793–94.

After examining the varied standards for actual-innocence claims in
other jurisdictions, the court adopted a “clear and convincing standard” for
claims under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 797. The court explained that to
succeed under this standard, an “applicant must show by clear and
convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the
conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes
for which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light of all the
evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.” Id. And the court
described this standard as “demanding.” Id. at 793; see also Dewberry v. State,
941 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2019) (elaborating that under Schmidt’s “demanding
standard,” an applicant must show that he is “factually and actually
innocent”).

Finally, the court held that these newly recognized constitutional
actual-innocence claims can be brought under the postconviction relief
statute. Specifically, the court held that both paragraphs “a” and “d” of Iowa
Code section 822.2(1) “provide avenues for freestanding actual-innocence
claims.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 798. Paragraph “a” authorizes claims that
“[t]he conviction or sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution or laws of this state.” Iowa Code
§ 822.2(1)(a) (2020). So it applies to actual-innocence claims because “[a]
conviction of an innocent person violates the Iowa Constitution, specifically

11
the due process clause and the prohibition against infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 798. And paragraph “d”
authorizes claims that “[t]here exists evidence of material facts, not
previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice.” Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d). So this
paragraph too applies since “conviction of an innocent person infringes upon
the ‘interest of justice’ precisely because it violates the Iowa Constitution.”
Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 798.

Mindful of this controlling precedent, we turn to the district court’s
legal conclusion that “because he entered an Alford plea, Roland is barred
from making an actual innocence claim unless he presents new evidence that
was undiscoverable at the time the initial case was resolved.” And we cannot
reconcile this added requirement for asserting an actual-innocence claim
with Schmidt.

For starters, the court’s holding that the “conviction of an innocent
person violates the Iowa Constitution,” applies just as much to a person
convicted after an Alford plea as one convicted after any other guilty plea. Id.
And as a claimed constitutional violation, an actual-innocence claim can be
asserted under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(a), without any statutory
requirement that it be based on newly discovered evidence. See id.; cf. More v.
State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016) (discussing the requirement for
newly discovered evidence under section 822.2(1)(d)). After all, if
“punishing an actually innocent person is” a constitutional violation,
Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 794 (cleaned up), it matters not whether the person
could have found the evidence showing his innocence at the time of the plea
or if it was newly discovered—the person is still actually innocent either way.

12
The court in Schmidt never distinguishes between Alford pleas and
other guilty pleas.7 So when the court overruled all the court’s prior “cases
that do not allow defendants to attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds
when they claim actual innocence,” it did so for all pleas—whether under
Alford or not. Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790. And most of the court’s reasoning
about “the phenomenon of actually innocent people pleading guilty” applies
equally or even more forcefully to a defendant who decides to plead guilty
with an Alford plea. Id. at 786–89.

We thus see no basis in Schmidt for treating an actual-innocence claim
any differently depending on whether it is asserted after an Alford plea or any
other guilty plea. To the contrary, doing so would conflict with many of
Schmidt’s express holdings already discussed—that the “conviction of an
innocent person violates the Iowa Constitution,” that a defendant’s “pleas
do not preclude his actual innocence claim merely because he pled guilty to
charges,” and that such a claim is proper in a PCR proceeding under section
822.2(1)(a). Id. at 790, 798. True, the plea at issue in Schmidt itself was not
an Alford plea. See id. at 782–83. But this was all essential reasoning to the
court’s decision. And we—like the district court—are “inferior to the
supreme court.” Iowa Const. art. V, § 1. So we are not at liberty to ignore or
modify this binding precedent by carving Alford pleas out of the rules
established by Schmidt and creating a heightened standard. See State v.
Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957) (reasoning that inferior courts “are

7
This make sense since an Alford plea is merely “a variation of a guilty plea” and
“[i]n effect, the pleas are the same as the defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a
criminal sentence for the crime charged.” Burgess, 639 N.W.2d at 567; see also id. at 567
n.1 (“There is no material difference between the pleas, however, when a defendant
intelligently concludes his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the State has
overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”).

13
under a duty to follow [the law] as expressed by the courts of last resort, as
they understand it, even though they may disagree” and noting that “[i]f our
previous holdings are to be overruled, we should ordinarily prefer to do it
ourselves”).

In reaching its contrary conclusion, the district court relied on a
critique of Schmidt’s majority opinion by one of the dissenting opinions. See
Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 824 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). There, Justice
Mansfield questioned, “After today, does someone who made an Alford plea
now get to raise an actual innocence claim?” and posited “[t]hat seems
strange. After all, nothing has changed. Such a defendant always maintained
he or she was innocent.” But he also alternatively asked, “Or are Alford pleas
now unconstitutional in light of today’s decision?” And regardless, it is the
majority opinion of the court that controls our decision—not the dissent.

The district court further reasoned that “[t]he same logic regarding
newly presented evidence in Schmidt applies here as well.” The court did not
explain what logic from Schmidt it was following. But the only requirement
for newly discovered evidence applied in Schmidt was to satisfy the exception
to the statute of limitations. See id. at 798–99 (majority opinion). Because
Schmidt asserted his actual innocence claim long past three years after his
conviction was final, he could only bring his claim if his claim was based on a
“ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable
time period.” Iowa Code § 822.3; see Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 798–99. This
statute-of-limitations analysis has no bearing on the underlying actual-
innocence claim. And it is inapplicable here since Roland filed this PCR
application within the statute of limitations.

In defending the requirement of newly discovered evidence, the State
also points to Schmidt’s articulation of the clear-and-convincing-evidence,

14
which says that the applicant must show that “no reasonable fact finder could
convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found the
applicant guilty in light of all the evidence, including the newly discovered
evidence.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797 (emphasis added). But this phrase
cannot bear the weight the State places on it. It merely clarifies that “all the
evidence” that must be considered in evaluating the claim “includ[es] the
newly discovered evidence.” It does not say that an applicant must come
forward with evidence that was unavailable at the time of the guilty plea. If
the court were adopting such a heightened requirement, it would have done
so more expressly—as it did with its lengthy analysis of all the other essential
reasoning. And if the State were correct, that requirement would apply to all
actual-innocence claims, not just those after an Alford plea.

What’s more, the State has directed us to no cases after Schmidt where
we or the supreme court have required newly discovered evidence to proceed
with a timely actual-innocence claim. And quite the opposite, our court has
already rejected the State’s argument that such a requirement exists in this
Alford plea context. See Williams v. State, No. 18-0758, 2020 WL 1879631,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020). There, we concluded that limiting
actual-innocence claims to those involving newly discovered evidence
“would contravene Schmidt” and thus “decline[d] to conclude that a free-
standing claim of actual innocence must be premised on newly-discovered
evidence.” Id.; cf. Russell v. State, No. 21-0974, 2022 WL 17481880, at *3
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2022) (avoiding applicant’s claim that the district
court erred in requiring newly discovered evidence for an actual-innocence
claim after a jury conviction by affirming the court’s alternative ruling that
the claim failed on the merits too); Reynolds v. State, No. 24-0904, 2025 WL
3165728, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2025) (analyzing the merits of an
actual-innocence claim after an Alford plea without any consideration of

15
whether the evidence was available at the time of the plea); Taylor v. State,
No. 20-0475, 2021 WL 811170, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021) (same).

And so, we once again decline the State’s invitation to “contravene”
Schmidt by adding a newly-discovered-evidence requirement for actual-
innocence claims. Williams, 2020 WL 1879631, at *3. But here, we cannot
consider whether Roland’s claim fails on the merits because the State has
never argued that it does. Not on appeal. And not in the district court. And
the district court declined to decide that merits question too. So we must
reverse the district court’s dismissal of Roland’s actual-innocence claim and
remand for further proceedings. We express no opinion on the ultimate
merits of that claim or whether it can be decided by summary disposition,
based on the existing trial record, or only after further factual development
by either party at trial.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.

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