In the Interest of N.G. and C.G., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0858
Filed February 11, 2026
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In the Interest of N.G. and C.G., Minor Children,
S.H., Mother,
Appellant,
N.G., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Kimberly Ayotte, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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Bryan Webber of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines,
attorney for appellant mother.
Teresa Pope of Pope Law, PLLC, Des Moines,
attorney for appellant father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.
Sarah Dewein of Cunningham & Kelso, PLLC, Urbandale,
attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

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TABOR, Chief Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to two daughters. The mother challenges the statutory grounds for
termination. Both parents seek to apply a statutory exception to termination.
The father doesn’t challenge the statutory grounds for termination but
contends termination was not in the children’s best interests. He also
advocates for placing the children in a guardianship with his mother. On our
review, we affirm.1

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

The juvenile court intervened with this family in 2020 when their son
was born with THC in his system. 2 The parents lost their rights to him in
2022. The primary concerns through those child-in-need-of-assistance
(CINA) proceedings were the parents’ substance use, domestic violence,
criminal charges and incarceration, and the parents’ lack of engagement with
services offered by the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services.

In September 2022, N.G. was born, also testing positive for THC. The
department began a new CINA proceeding but custody of N.G. remained
with her mother. In August 2023, that arrangement ended when the mother
tested positive for cocaine. The court ordered N.G. removed from the
mother, and the department placed her with a maternal aunt.

1
“We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law
and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R., 932
N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The juvenile court’s factual findings do not
bind us, but they deserve respectful consideration, especially on witness credibility. Id.
2
Tetrahydrocannabinol is the active component of marijuana.

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C.G. was born in January 2024. Her drug screen was negative, and the
mother seemed to be making progress in complying with the reunification
goals. But just a few months later, her compliance waned, and the department
petitioned to remove C.G. from her custody. When department workers
arrived to remove the child—along with police officers to arrest the mother
on outstanding warrants—they discovered that the maternal aunt had
returned N.G. to her mother without notifying them. A drug screen on N.G.
was positive for six illegal substances. The department then placed both
children together with a foster family, where they have remained since.

Throughout the case, the mother’s engagement with services and
court orders has been inconsistent. She tested positive for illegal drugs
several times, including the month before the termination hearings. She
delayed substance-use evaluations, never completed substance-use
treatment, and was discharged from therapy seven times due to non-
attendance. At the time of the final termination hearing, she had been
attending therapy for a month. And she continued to engage in criminal
behaviors, leaving her retail job because she was charged with theft of items
from the store. She maintained intimate relationships with unsafe people,
including an on-again-off-again relationship with the children’s father.

The father did not engage with services or communicate with the
department until July 2024. He was in and out of jail during the CINA case
and has a long criminal history including convictions for illegal drugs,
domestic assaults, and possession of weapons, as well as probation and no-
contact order violations. The month before the termination hearings, he was
charged with intimidation with a dangerous weapon, felon in possession of a
firearm, willful injury, and two counts of assault while participating in a

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felony. His drug screen that month was positive for K2, a synthetic
marijuana.

The State petitioned for termination of the parents’ rights in
December 2024, and the juvenile court held hearings on February 24,
April 14, and April 22, 2025. At the hearings, the father testified he had no
substance-use problems and had never committed domestic violence. He
added that the mother is a safe parent and he was unaware of her substance
use. He asserted the positive drug tests for himself, his children, and the
mother were inaccurate or falsified. The mother also testified that her drug
screens were inaccurate and denied using illegal substances since 2023. She
also couldn’t explain how the children tested positive for drugs.

The court terminated the parents’ rights under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1) (2024), paragraphs (f ) and (g) as to N.G., (g) and (h) as to
C.G., and additionally the father’s parental rights under paragraph (e) as to
both children. The parents appeal separately.

II. Discussion

Termination involves three steps. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294
(Iowa 2021). First, the State must prove a statutory ground for termination
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. Second, the State must show
termination is in the children’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Id.
Third, parents may rely on exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3).
Id. We only address those steps that the parents dispute. See In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

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We address the mother’s statutory-grounds argument and the parents’
joint statutory-exception argument first. Then we address the father’s best-
interests and guardianship arguments.3

A. Statutory grounds

The mother challenges all three grounds cited in the termination
order. “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one
statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we
find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).
The juvenile court found sufficient grounds to terminate under paragraph (f )
as to N.G. and paragraph (h) as to C.G. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1). The
mother challenges only the common final element of those grounds, which
requires clear and convincing proof that the child cannot presently be
returned to parental custody as provided in section 232.102. 4 See id.

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Beyond those claims, both parents assert their “fundamental liberty interest” in
the parent-child relationship. The mother asserts termination violates her due process and
equal protection rights. But the parents didn’t raise or obtain a ruling on those claims, so
they are unpreserved. State v. Bauler, 8 N.W.3d 892, 907 (Iowa 2024) (“Even issues
implicating constitutional rights must be presented to and ruled upon by the district court
in order to preserve error for appeal.” (citation omitted)). And even if preserved, the
parents’ petitions on appeal aren’t detailed enough to address the issue. See In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (holding failure to identify error constitutes a waiver).
4
Our caselaw offers two formulations for what it means when a child “cannot be
returned” to parental custody as provided in section 232.102, which discusses transferring
the child’s custody if staying in the home would be “contrary to the welfare of the child.”
In In re M.M., the supreme court held that a child cannot be returned if it would expose
him or her to “any harm amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication.” 483
N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992). Alternately, it means the inability to “safely return” children
to their parents’ care. See, e.g., In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (collecting cases). Under either formulation, the State met its
burden of proof here.

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§ 232.116(1)(f )(4), (h)(4); In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017)
(finding “at the present time” means the date of the termination hearing).

The mother argues there wasn’t clear and convincing proof she
couldn’t meet the children’s needs. True, the mother took some steps toward
stable parenting. She lived with her mother, had a new job, and attended
some therapy. But the same factors that plagued the mother through the case
remained: unaddressed substance use, lack of honesty with the department
and service providers, engagement in criminal activity, and ongoing risks of
domestic violence. The mother continued to deny the existence of those
factors, failed to accept responsibility for them, and didn’t recognize their
effect on her children. Under these circumstances—the same ones leading to
the loss of her parental rights to her older child—there is clear and
convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to her custody.

B. Statutory exception

Next, both parents invoke the statutory exception under Iowa Code
section 232.116(3)(c). That paragraph allows the court to override
termination if it “would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the
closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The
parents bear the burden to show clear and convincing evidence that this
exception applies. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). “Yet the
existence of a bond is not enough.” A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 169. And neither
parent points to evidence that the children “will be harmed by termination”
or “whether that harm overpowers” their inability to provide safe and stable
care. In re I.D., No. 24-2045, 2025 WL 1076625, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Apr. 9, 2025). Thus, the parents did not prove the exception applies.

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C. Best interests

Next, the father argues that termination of his parental rights is not in
his daughters’ best interests. In deciding this step, we give primary
consideration to the children’s safety, to the best placement for fostering their
“long-term nurturing and growth,” and to their “physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also consider
their integration into their foster family. See id. § 232.116(2)(b).

The father engaged in criminal behavior during the CINA case and
denied any substance-use or domestic-violence history. He didn’t work with
the department to improve his parenting until just before the termination
hearing. And, as the juvenile court noted, he only appeared for hearings while
he was in custody. He has not progressed enough to meet the children’s
needs. Meanwhile the children have been together in the same foster home
for many months and all reports are that they are thriving. The home is a
concurrent placement option. So termination of the father’s rights best suits
the children’s long-term best interests.

D. Guardianship

Finally, the father urges placing the children in a guardianship with his
mother, who lives in Missouri. Granted, the paternal grandmother has been
the guardian of the father’s now-fourteen-year-old son since he was an infant.
She completed an interstate home study in late 2024, which was approved.
But she moved in 2025, and an updated study had not been completed. She
also took care of N.G. for a few months in late 2022 to early 2023. But
between March 2023 and December 2024, she had no contact with the
department or N.G. She had yet to meet C.G. in person. Her only contact
with them since March 2023 has been over video calls. She testified she is

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willing to be a placement for N.G. and C.G. and either an adoptive parent or
a guardian. The juvenile court determined a guardianship is not in the
children’s best interests given the paternal grandmother’s age and her lack of
contact with the children.

Our courts disfavor guardianships, especially for very young children
like N.G. and C.G. See, e.g., A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 477–78. In determining what
is in the children’s best interests, safety and the need for a permanent home
are the “defining elements.” In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006)
(Cady, J., concurring specially). N.G. has been out of her parents’ care since
2023, and C.G. since she was a few months old. The father’s circumstances
do not signal that he would be able to resume custody at any time. Indeed, he
testified that he intended to leave the guardianship with his mother in place
until his daughters reach the age of eighteen, just as he has never disturbed
her guardianship of her son.

While we appreciate her willingness to care for her grandchildren, we
agree with the juvenile court that creating a guardianship with the paternal
grandmother is not appropriate. She was absent from the girls’ lives for a long
stretch, has limited contact now, and has not shown that she can care for two
young children long-term. Termination of the father’s rights and future
adoption, perhaps by their concurrent placement, is in their best interests.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

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