In re the Marriage of Young

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0399
Filed January 28, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Jeremy B. Young and Devin Marie Young
Upon the Petition of
Jeremy B. Young,
Petitioner–Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

And Concerning
Devin Marie Young,
Respondent–Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County,
The Honorable Myron Gookin, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Diana L. Miller and Katelyn J. Kurt of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Mount
Pleasant and Des Moines, attorneys for appellant.

Edward M. Conrad and Phoebe M. Cooper of Iowa Legal Aid, Ottumwa,
attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

1
CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Jeremy Young appeals and Devin Young cross-appeals the child-
custody provisions of the decree dissolving their marriage. Jeremy seeks sole
legal custody of their children while Devin requests joint physical care.
Jeremy also contends that the visitation schedule, which allows Devin
overnight visitation on weekdays during the school year, is contrary to the
children’s best interests. Because the child-custody provisions and the
visitation schedule set out in the decree serve the children’s best interests,
we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Jeremy and Devin married in 2014. They have four children between
the ages of six and ten. They each obtained an order of protection against the
other in November 2023. The protective orders directed them to follow a
“rotating 3-2-2 visitation schedule,”1 which provided equal parenting time.

In December 2023, Jeremy petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The
main issue at the October 2024 trial was child custody, with each party
requesting sole legal custody and physical care. They agreed that alternating
physical care of the children on a weekly basis was preferrable to the 3-2-2
schedule they had been following. So as an alternative, Jeremy asked the
court to grant joint physical care alternating weekly.

1
Under this schedule, Party A has physical care of the children for three days.
Physical care then transferred to Party B for two days before transferring back to Party A
for two days. The schedule then repeats with Party B having physical care for three days.

2
The district court entered the decree dissolving the marriage in
December 2024. In the fact findings, the court described the parties’
“tumultuous” relationship:
Jeremy admits that both parties know how to “push each other’s buttons.”
Both have been physically aggressive toward each other and Devin admits
they “didn’t know when to stop” their aggressive behavior. She also
admits she is stubborn and never wanted Jeremy to walk away from an
argument thinking he won. Devin’s mom . . . describes the relationship
between Jeremy and Devin as “toxic.”

The court found that Jeremy and Devin “have been mutually
aggressive with each other,” noting that both “have been charged criminally
with assaulting the other,” have obtained protective orders against each
other, and have been charged with violating those protective orders. But it
also found that “this chaos has somewhat subsided since the parties
separated,” “the children are healthy and doing as well as expected under the
circumstances,” and the parties “both love their children and the children
love them.”

The district court granted joint legal custody of the children and
placed them in Jeremy’s physical care. The court granted Devin visitation
on alternating weekends during the school year, beginning at the end of the
school day on Thursday and ending at the start of the school day on Monday.
It also granted Devin more visitation during summer break with the goal of
splitting physical caretaking equally “as near as reasonably possible.” To
effectuate this, the court ordered the parties to alternate physical care in two-
week blocks.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.
We review the child custody and visitation provisions of the parties’
dissolution decree de novo. See In re Marriage of Wang & Ye, 26

3
N.W.3d 145, 149 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). On de novo review, we look at “the
entire record and decide anew the issues properly presented.” See In re
Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). Although we give
weight to the trial court’s findings, they are not binding. In re Marriage of
Larsen, 912 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Iowa 2018).

III. CHILD CUSTODY.
When the district court dissolves a marriage, it must settle disputes
over legal custody and physical care of minor children. In re Marriage of
Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 578–79 (Iowa 2007). On appeal, Jeremy challenges
the court’s determination of the children’s legal custody, which involves the
right and responsibility to make decisions about their “legal status, medical
care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.” Id.
at 579 (quoting Iowa Code § 598.1(3), (5) (2023)). Devin challenges the
determination of physical care, which involves the right and responsibility to
maintain a home and provide routine care for the children. Id. (citing Iowa
Code § 598.1(7)). We address each argument in turn.

A. Legal Custody.

We begin with legal custody. The court granted the parties joint legal
custody, meaning that “both parents have legal custodial rights and
responsibilities toward the child and under which neither parent has legal
custodial rights superior to those of the other parent.” Iowa Code § 598.1(3).
Jeremy contends he should be granted the sole right to make custodial
decisions.

To the extent it is reasonable and serves the children’s best interests,
the court should grant custody in a manner that provides the children
maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with the parents and

4
encourages the parents to share custodial rights and responsibilities. Id.
§ 598.41(1)(a). But there is an exception to this general rule if contact with
one parent is likely to cause “direct physical harm or significant emotional
harm” either to the children or a parent. Id. Thus, section 598.41 exempts
parents who are victims of domestic abuse perpetrated by the other parent
from consequences that would otherwise flow from certain acts undertaken
for protection. Id. § 598.41(1)(c) (stating that the court may find that a parent
who has been the victim of domestic abuse has just cause to deny the children
the opportunity for maximum contact with the other parent), (d) (stating that
the court shall not consider a parent’s relocation or absence from the home
as a factor against that parent in awarding custody if there is a history of
domestic abuse and the parent fears acts or threats of domestic abuse
perpetrated by the other parent). It also provides a rebuttable presumption
against awarding joint legal custody if the court finds there is a history of
domestic abuse. Id. § 598.41(1)(b).

Iowa Code section 598.41(3) outlines the criteria for deciding legal
custody.2 The factors include each parent’s suitability as legal custodian, the
children’s psychological and emotional needs and development, the parents’
communication, and their ability to support the other parent’s relationship
with the children. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(a)–(c), (e). The court must also
consider whether one or both parents are opposed to joint legal custody, the
safety of the children and the other parent, and the existence of a history of
domestic abuse. Id. § 598.41(3) (g), (i)–(j).

2
If the parents agree to joint legal custody, the court need not consider the factors
in section 498.41(3). Iowa Code § 598.41(4).

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1. Whether the court was authorized to grant joint legal custody.

Jeremy first contends that the court lacked authority to award joint
legal custody because both parents requested sole legal custody. He cites
Iowa Code section 598.41(2)(a), which states, “On the application of either
parent, the court shall consider granting joint custody in cases where the
parents do not agree to joint custody.” In Jeremy’s view, the statute requires
at least one parent to request joint legal custody before the court can grant it.
In support of his argument, he cites an unpublished opinion interpreting the
physical-care provisions of Iowa Code section 598.41 to require that at least
one parent request joint physical care before the court can award it. See In re
Marriage of Cerwick, No. 12-1188, 2013 WL 2370722, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 30, 2013) (interpreting Iowa Code section 598.41(5)(a), which allows
the court to award joint physical care “upon the request of either parent,”
and noting that “[t]he legislature could have provided that the district court
may consider joint physical care whenever the best interest of the children so
required—rather than upon the request of either parent”).

The interpretation of section 598.41(5)(a) set out in Cerwick cannot be
applied to section 598.41(2) based solely on the use of a similar phrase. We
start with the history of section 598.41(2), which provides important context.
The language that now appears in section 598.41(2)(a) was added in 1982,3
when the legislature amended the law to provide explicit guidelines for
granting joint legal custody. See In re Marriage of Weidner, 338
N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1983) (discussing the history of section 598.41, which
originally stated only that “[t]he court may provide for joint custody of the

3
In contrast, legislative amendments addressing joint physical care appeared first
in 1997 and again in 2004. See In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Iowa 2007)
(discussing the legislative history of what is now section 598.41(5)).

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children by the parties”). The supreme court found it “instructive” that the
legislature added language encouraging joint legal custody a few months after
a published decision denied joint custody based on one parent’s objection.
Id. at 356 (citing In re Marriage of Castle, 312 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1981)). Although the supreme court found there is no presumption in
favor of joint legal custody, it held the statute showed a clear preference for
joint legal custody. 4 Weidner, 338 N.W.2d at 356. It also found that the
amended statute “do[es] not allow one-party vetoes” to a grant of joint legal
custody. Id. From this context, the phrase “[o]n the application of either
parent” is less a prerequisite for granting joint legal custody than a signal that
parental agreement is not needed. We also note that if one parent requests
joint legal custody and the court rejects it, the court must cite clear and
convincing evidence supporting its finding that it is unreasonable and not in
the children’s best interests.5 Iowa Code § 598.41(2)(b). In other words, “A
parent seeking sole legal custody must provide clear and convincing evidence
that joint legal custody is unreasonable and not in the child’s best interest, to
the extent that the legal relationship between the other parent and child
should be severed.” In re Marriage of Hammermeister, No. 25-0354, 2025
WL 3471124, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2025).

In any case, a request was made for joint physical care. Although
Jeremy primarily sought physical care of the children, his petition and
request for relief include alternative requests for joint physical care with

4
Section 598.41(5) includes no such preference in favor of joint physical care.
Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 692.
5
There is no similar requirement that the court cite clear and convincing evidence
when denying a request for joint physical care, Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 692, further
distinguishing determinations of joint legal custody under section 598.41(2)(a) from
determinations of joint physical care under section 598.41(5)(a).

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weekly exchanges. The court can only grant joint physical care if joint legal
custody is awarded. Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a). To reconcile this conflict, we
interpret Jeremy’s alternative request to include a request for joint legal
custody. The court was thus able to consider granting joint legal custody.

2. Whether the factors in section 598.41(3) support joint legal
custody.

Jeremy also argues that he should be granted sole legal custody based
on evidence of domestic abuse. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(j). An unrebutted
finding of a history of domestic abuse “shall outweigh consideration of any
other factor specified in subsection 3 in the determination of the awarding of
custody under this subsection.” Id. § 598.41(2)(c).
In determining whether a history of domestic abuse exists, the court’s
consideration shall include but is not limited to commencement of an
action pursuant to section 236.3, the issuance of a protective order against
the parent or the issuance of a court order or consent agreement pursuant
to section 236.5, the issuance of an emergency order pursuant to
section 236.6, the holding of a parent in contempt pursuant to
section 664A.7, the response of a peace officer to the scene of alleged
domestic abuse or the arrest of a parent following response to a report of
alleged domestic abuse, or a conviction for domestic abuse assault
pursuant to section 708.2A.

Id. § 598.41(3)(j).

The district court found a history of domestic abuse exists but was
rebutted by Jeremy’s and Devin’s “mutual aggression.” See In re Marriage of
Barry, 588 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (stating that
section 598.41(2)(c)’s intended purpose is “to protect victims from their
aggressors,” so it should not be used by either party to gain an advantage at
trial when the parents “are mutually aggressive, both verbally and
physically”). The court noted that “the record supports, and both parties

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admit, they are very proficient at pushing each other’s ‘buttons’ and they do
not know how or when to stop their violent behavior toward each other.”
Although the court denounced their “past negative, abusive behavior toward
each other,” it found they “share[d] the blame in much, if not all” of it, which
rebutted the presumption against joint legal custody. The record shows that
regardless of how events unfolded, Devin is the one who sustained significant
physical injuries from their conflict.6 The district court also found that the
discord between the parties has subsided “somewhat” since their separation.
We agree that any presumption against joint legal custody is rebutted.

Jeremy also argues that joint legal custody is inappropriate because the
parties cannot communicate. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(c). But Jeremy’s
testimony conflicts with his claim on appeal.

6
A photographic exhibit depicts some of Devin’s injuries. One photo shows
extensive bruising around Devin’s left eye, bruising below her right eye, subconjunctival
hemorrhaging in her left eye, and a cut above her left eyebrow. The photo was taken nine
or ten days after Devin sustained the injuries during an argument that began at Jeremy’s
workplace. Jeremy and Devin both testified that Devin followed as Jeremy entered a
secured area and Jeremy smashed both of their cell phones. According to Devin, Jeremy
broke the phones to prevent her from calling the police and “bashed” her with a phone
receiver when she tried to use a landline. Jeremy claims that while Devin was using the
landline, he left and called building security from another phone. He testified that Devin
was uninjured when he left the area and had blood running down her face when he saw
her next, implying that she injured herself to incriminate him. Although the police
investigated the incident, no criminal charges were filed. Jeremy testified that he was
suspended from work while his employer investigated the incident and he was later
terminated, in part, as a result.
Another injury occurred when Jeremy pushed or shoved past her while she tried
to block the bedroom door to keep him from leaving. Although Jeremy testified that he
did not put his hands on Devin, he struck her with enough force that she fell backward
and hit her head on the corner of a wall. A photo of the injury shows twelve staples closing
a bloody wound to her scalp.

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Q. Do you have concerns if the Court keeps the joint physical care
arrangement in place about you and Devin’s ability to communicate
effectively about the children? A. No.

Q. Do you think you would be able to communicate effectively?
A. Yeah.

....

Q. Do you understand or even recognize that even if you’re granted
primary physical care, that that’s a decision that you and Devin would need
to make together? A. Correct.

Q. Are you committed to communicating with her effectively in
order to make that decision? A. Correct.

Because the record supports the finding that joint legal custody is
reasonable and serves the children’s best interests, we affirm.

B. Physical Care.

Devin challenges the court’s determination of physical care. She
contends that joint physical care serves the children’s best interests. Joint
physical care is
an award of physical care of a minor child to both joint legal custodial
parents under which both parents have rights and responsibilities toward
the child including but not limited to shared parenting time with the child,
maintaining homes for the child, providing routine care for the child and
under which neither parent has physical care rights superior to those of the
other parent.

Id. § 598.1(4).

Our overriding consideration in deciding whether to grant joint
physical care is the children’s best interests. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695.
The goal “is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring
them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” Id. In

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making this determination, we consider the factors listed in Iowa Code
section 598.41(3). Id. at 696. We consider whether one parent was the
primary caregiver, the parents’ ability to communicate and show mutual
respect, the degree of conflict between them, and the degree to which they
are in general agreement about their approach to daily matters. Id. at 696–99.
We look at the unique facts and circumstances of the case in deciding which
physical-care arrangement serves the children’s best interests. Id. at 700.

Devin argues that joint physical care serves the children’s best
interests because it allows both parents maximum involvement in the
children’s lives. She claims that Jeremy does not support the children’s
relationship with her family as much as she supports their relationship with
Jeremy’s family. Devin also argues that their issues with communication are
attributable to Jeremy, who benefited from them when the court granted him
physical care. Finally, she claims that despite the marital discord, the
children are doing well and were not harmed by the joint-physical-care
arrangement the parties followed during the proceedings.

The court weighed the pertinent factors and found joint physical care
is not in the children’s best interests. As a positive, the court noted that both
Jeremy and Devin “have provided considerable caretaking duties for the
children and have tried to balance work and home duties in the best interests
of the children.” But the court was concerned about the “high degree of
historical conflict” in the parties’ relationship, noting that they both “have
failed in communicating and showing mutual respect for one another” and
“struggled with demonstrating agreement on daily child rearing issues.” It
also found that the parties lived far enough apart that weekly custody
exchanges would be “taxing” for four children age ten and younger.

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The court found the children’s best interests are served by placing the
children in Jeremy’s physical care. The court noted the decision was “a close
one.” The deciding factors included Devin’s “significant past theft issues,”
which have resulted in criminal charges and two stores banning her from their
premises. The record shows that she exposed the children to some of these
acts, leading to one of the children viewing stealing as an acceptable
alternative to buying when funds are insufficient. The court was also
concerned about Devin’s physical discipline of the children, which included
spanking in addition to hitting or “popping” the oldest in the mouth for
“being defiant and not listening.”7 We share these concerns and agree that
they “tip the scales in Jeremy’s favor.” Because the children’s best interests
are served by placing them in Jeremy’s physical care, we affirm.

IV. VISITATION.
Finally, Jeremy challenges the visitation schedule the court entered,
which provides Devin visitation on alternating weekends during the school
year and alternating two-week blocks during the summer. The order states
that Devin’s weekend visits during the school year begin after school on
Thursday and end when school begins on Monday. Jeremy claims that Devin
is the cause of the children’s frequent school absences and asks us to change
the visitation schedule to begin after school on Friday and end on Sunday
evenings, eliminating the need for Devin to take the children to school.

When the court grants physical care to one parent, it should provide
liberal visitation to the other parent to “assure the child the opportunity for

7
Devin testified that her primary form of discipline involved time out. She
administers spankings to the younger children when they are defiant because they are
small enough to do so. She testified that the oldest child is too big to spank so she pops
her in the mouth, but she insisted she does not try to inflict pain by doing so.

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the maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents.”
Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a). The visitation schedule must serve the best
interests of the children. In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 718 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2009).

There is insufficient evidence in the record to support Jeremy’s claim
that Devin has caused frequent absences from school. The district court
noted that the children have been doing well overall. While one child has had
some school tardies and unexcused absences, the evidence does not show
that one parent bears more responsibility for them than the other.8

At the time of dissolution, the children were attending school in
Ottumwa. The parties agreed that they should continue their schooling in
Ottumwa. At the time the court entered the decree, Devin lived in Ottumwa
while Jeremy lived thirty minutes away in Albia. Starting visits on Thursday
afternoon and continuing them until Monday gives the children more contact
with Devin, but it also reduces the children’s school commute by one and
one-half hours. We find the visitation schedule set out in the decree serves
their best interests.

AFFIRMED.

Ahlers, P. J. concurs; Sandy, J., specially concurs.

8
Because the record before the court at the time of dissolution does not show
Devin has caused excessive absences or tardies, future evidence of this problem may form
a substantial change in circumstances that calls for modifying the visitation schedule.

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SANDY, Judge (specially concurring).

I agree with the majority that any presumption against joint legal
custody is rebutted, but not because of “mutual aggression.” Degree matters.
See Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 850 (N.D. 1995) (concluding that,
where evidence shows domestic violence was committed by both parents, the
trial court must measure the amount and extent of domestic violence inflicted
by each, and if the violence inflicted by each parent is not “roughly
proportional,” the statutory presumption would apply).

Although the district court characterized the parties’ conduct as
“mutual aggression,” the record does not reflect equivalent degrees of
violence. Rather, the evidence reflects a marked disparity between Jeremy’s
and Devin’s respective conduct and consequences. The record shows that
Jeremy repeatedly inflicted physical violence (e.g., bashing Devin’s face with
the receiver of a landline phone and then claiming Devin inflicted the injury
herself ) resulting in significant bodily injury to Devin. Footnote six in the
majority opinion does a nice job of describing—in detail—the injuries Devin
sustained. But it still falls short of capturing the shock one experiences when
viewing Devin’s bloodied eye and severely bruised face.

However, the rebuttal against joint legal custody is supported by other
best-interest considerations independent of the parties’ physical conflict.
The record establishes concerns regarding Devin’s judgment and stability,
including her theft-related acts, exposure of the children to those acts, and
the use of inappropriate physical discipline against the children. These
factors bear directly on the children’s safety, development, and welfare and
properly informed the court’s custody analysis in rebutting the presumption.
I give great deference to the district court on these factors because it had a
front-row seat to the live testimony, viewing the demeanor of both Jeremy

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and Devin as they testified, whereas we are limited to a sterile transcript. See
Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024). But pictures do not lie.

Equating domestic abuse without regard to the comparative severity
under the auspices of “mutual aggression” is—in my opinion—a great
danger. It is not merely “a wash” when one side escalated the violence far
beyond the other. Not all domestic abuse is the same. I write separately to
highlight that the majority opinion should not be interpreted as suggesting
otherwise.

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