Aubin Reed, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Marietta Muchow v. Lisa Muchow-King

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1565
Filed January 7, 2026
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Aubin Reed, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of
Marietta Muchow,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Lisa Muchow-King,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,
The Honorable Christopher Foy, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Nathan J. Schroeder (argued) of JSC Legal, PLC, Cedar Falls,
attorney for appellant.

Brian W. Foddrill (argued) of Unbundled Legal Services of Iowa,
Clear Lake, attorney for appellee.
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Heard at oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

1
LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Near the end of her life, 85-year-old Marietta Muchow gave her Clear
Lake house to one of her four remaining children, Lisa Muchow-King. This
suit—filed by Marietta’s granddaughter Aubin Reed against Muchow-
King—seeks to set aside that transfer based on a claim of undue influence.
After a bench trial, the district court found that Reed had proved that
Marietta and Muchow-King were in a confidential relationship, thus
establishing a presumption of undue influence and shifting the burden to
Muchow-King to rebut that presumption. But the court also found that
Muchow-King met her burden to show the transaction was free from undue
influence. And so, the court denied Reed’s claim.

Reed appeals. And the sole question before us is whether Muchow-
King rebutted the presumption of undue influence by proving with clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that (1) Marietta acted freely,
intelligently, and voluntarily in transferring the house and (2) Muchow-King
acted in good faith throughout the transaction.

On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that she did.
The evidence shows that Marietta acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily.
She had the mental capacity to intelligently transfer the house, did so with
the independent advice of her attorney, and acted consistent with her wish to
keep the house in the family. And Muchow-King’s limited involvement in the
transaction—driving Marietta from Oklahoma to Clear Lake to let her meet
alone with her attorney, at Marietta’s insistence—was all in good faith, even
if some of Muchow-King’s actions with other transactions may be troubling.
We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Reed’s undue-influence claim.

2
I.

In 1994, Marietta and her husband purchased a house in Clear Lake—
the subject of this dispute. When her husband died in 2008, Marietta became
the sole owner of the Clear Lake house. Later that year, shortly before turning
seventy-five, Marietta executed a will that left any remaining property in her
estate to her five children in equal shares. Her will also provided that if any
child predeceased her, that child’s share would go to his or her children or, if
that child had no children, would be split among the other surviving siblings
of that child. And the will named Marietta’s brother Ron as the executor.

Marietta lived alone in the Clear Lake house year-round for a few years
after her husband’s death. But that first summer of 2008, Muchow-King’s
daughter, who was then twelve, stayed with Marietta for June and July. And
from then on, Muchow-King and Muchow-King’s daughter would generally
spend all summer break staying with Marietta at the house—Muchow-King
worked at an Oklahoma elementary school with summers off, the same as her
daughter. Muchow-King’s daughter even had her own room, right next to
Marietta’s. Other members of Marietta’s family would also visit for a few
days or a week but generally stayed in a hotel rather than at the house.1

Then in 2010, Marietta began spending winters in Oklahoma, where
two of her children—Muchow-King and her son Jim—lived. During her first
winter in Oklahoma, Marietta lived in her own apartment. But after she
tripped on concrete, breaking her shoulder, she started staying with Jim
instead. For a few years, Marietta would live with Jim in Oklahoma for about
five months and spend the rest of the year in Clear Lake.

1
For example, Reed testified that she had not stayed at the house since sometime
before 2008 and in total had stayed there “just a handful of times.”

3
In September 2013, Mariette had another fall while staying alone in the
Clear Lake house. When her daughter Carolyn could not reach her by phone
for a couple hours, the daughter called 911, and a deputy sheriff discovered
her in the basement shower bruised and without enough strength to get up.
After this fall, Marietta began staying in Oklahoma for nearly ten months of
the year with only a short summer stay in the Clear Lake house so that she
was never away from a family member for any extended time. When school
was out for the summer, Muchow-King and her daughter would drive
Marietta to Clear Lake, where they all stayed until school resumed in the fall.

Over these years, Marrietta dealt with a few medical conditions,
including Type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis, and macular
degeneration. When she first started coming to Oklahoma, she brought her
car and would drive herself around town. But by 2015, her macular
degeneration had progressed so much that she was diagnosed legally blind—
although she could still see using her peripheral vision. So she stopped
driving herself. And Marietta’s arthritis had become so severe that writing
legibly was nearly impossible. Due to these physical ailments, Marietta
needed assistance with daily tasks, like driving, cooking, and writing checks.
And it was primarily Muchow-King and Jim—and their respective spouses—
who would help Marietta with day-to-day things because none of their other
siblings lived near them.

In July 2015, Marrietta made the first codicil to her will, naming
Muchow-King as the executor in place of Ron. She used the same Clear Lake
law firm that prepared her will to assist her. The parties disputed the reasons
for this change. Muchow-King and her daughter testified that Ron no longer
wanted to serve as executor since Marietta was now living mainly in
Oklahoma and he was in Wisconsin. Ron claimed Marietta told him that

4
Muchow-King was demanding to be added as a coexecutor before she would
consider letting Marietta move into her home and that he declined to serve
together with Muchow-King—so Marietta replaced him because she “really
didn’t have any choice.”

More than a year later, in October 2016, Marietta moved to live with
Muchow-King. All agree that Jim no longer wanted to care for Marietta,
mainly because of her declining physical condition. And indeed, Marietta
took much attention from Muchow-King. She drove Marietta everywhere
she needed to go, including all her appointments and general errands.
Muchow-King and her daughter cooked all of Marietta’s meals except for
what Marietta could cook in the microwave. And Muchow-King and her
family aided Marietta with many other aspects of her daily life.

Muchow-King was also involved in Marietta’s financial affairs.
Muchow-King was an authorized user on Marietta’s credit card and had been
since 2012. She used the card to pay Marietta’s expenses and sometimes for
her own personal purchases. Muchow-King was also a joint account owner
on two of Marietta’s bank accounts, she aided Marietta in “doing her bills,”
and she would help Marietta write checks. And for all this care, Marietta
insisted on paying Muchow-King $1,000 per month to live with her—as she
had when living with Jim.

Marietta continued to keep in touch with her family—at least for a
while. Her brother Ron would call every week or two and “constantly asked
her to sell” the Clear Lake house. Ron believed selling the house was in
Marietta’s best financial interest since she bore the full cost of its upkeep
despite spending only a short period of each year there. But Marietta grew
tired of being “harped at” by Ron on the subject—sometimes declining to
answer his calls—and repeatedly told him that she did not want to sell.

5
In September 2017, Marietta’s oldest daughter Connie—also Reed’s
mother—died. The family held a memorial in Clear Lake about a year later—
over the Fourth of July 2018—which the whole family attended. This was the
last time Reed, Ron, or Carolyn, would see Marietta in person. Both Carolyn
and Ron testified that despite the decline in her physical health, her mental
capacity was good and that they did not notice any cognitive decline. Reed
also mentioned no mental decline, though she described Marietta as “a lot
more despondent than she previously had and just a lot quieter and not as
talkative.” The family members also testified that during the visit, they saw
Lisa “berate” or “yell” at Marietta about various things.

Later that year, Marietta suffered a seizure initially believed to have
resulted from a stroke. Muchow-King drove her to the emergency room and
it was later determined the seizure was caused by a lack of sodium—not a
stroke. Marietta soon recovered. But because of the incident, her legs were
weak so her doctor suggested she attend rehab. Marietta did so at a rehab
facility that doubles as a long-term care facility. She stayed there for about
three months before moving back in with Muchow-King in late January 2019.

There is more conflicting testimony about whether Marietta wanted
to stay in the long-term care facility or move back in with Muchow-King. A
report from the hospital noted that Marietta “talked about . . . wanting to go
to an [assisted living facility] or [long-term care] because she doesn’t want to
live with her daughter anymore.” Ron also testified that Marietta “said she’d
rather be in a nursing home than going back to live at Lisa’s.” And Carolyn
too testified that Marietta wanted to stay at an assisted living facility but
Muchow-King told her she “didn’t have the money.” But Muchow-King
maintained that Marietta did not want to stay in a long-term care facility. She
said Marietta “didn’t want to pay. She didn’t want to spend $6,000 a month.”

6
Shortly after returning to Muchow-King’s home, Marietta told
Muchow-King that she “wanted to go see her lawyer.” Marietta did not
explain why beyond saying that she had “loose ends to tie up.” Muchow-King
responded that she would get recommendations for a lawyer in the area. But
Marietta insisted that she “go to her lawyer in Clear Lake.” Marietta also
rejected Muchow-King’s suggestion that they wait until spring. So with
Marietta sitting beside her, Muchow-King phoned the Clear Lake law firm
that Marietta had previously used for her will, codicil, and other legal work.
Muchow-King told the legal assistant who answered that Marietta “wanted
to talk to the lawyer, that she had some things she needed to discuss, and I
did not know what that was.” And then in early February—twelve days after
Marietta left the rehab facility—Muchow-King drove her roughly eight hours
from Oklahoma to Clear Lake for the meeting.

Muchow-King waited in the law firm’s lobby while Marietta met with
the attorney alone. Although he had practiced at the firm for more than forty
years, the attorney did not recall previously doing work for Marietta; the
attorney who had prepared her will and codicil was no longer with the firm.
They talked about Marietta’s needs for about thirty minutes. The attorney
agreed that he did not know in advance what Marietta wanted, that nothing
about the meeting made him “feel uneasy” or like “there was something
going on that shouldn’t be,” and that “nothing unusual stood out.” He said
that Marietta “knew what she wanted, and she told me what she wanted very
clearly,” so he had no reservations assisting her with her requests. And
during cross-examination, he rejected the idea that he was merely a
“scrivener, more or less,” explaining his view that “I think it’s more than
that,” and emphasizing, “If I see any alarms go off, I think I have a duty to
further investigate that.”

7
The attorney then prepared a deed transferring the Clear Lake house
to Muchow-King. He also prepared healthcare and general powers of
attorney naming Muchow-King as Marietta’s attorney-in-fact on both.
Marietta signed the deed and powers of attorney in the attorney’s presence.
The attorney recalls that Marietta “was really slow at signing.” But he
reiterated at trial that “she appeared to be alert and understand exactly what
she was doing, and she seemed to understand who she was doing it for.”
Throughout the meeting and the execution of the deed, the attorney “never
visited at all” with Muchow-King.

It was not until they were back in the car that Marietta told Muchow-
King, “I gave you the house.” When Muchow-King tried to clarify whether
Marietta meant that she “put all of the kids’ name on it or . . . put it in a
trust,” Marietta explained to her—according to Muchow-King’s
testimony—“No, I gave it to you and the kids because I want you to enjoy it
since your kids spent their whole entire life up here, and you guys are the only
ones who ever came here and spent time, and I know that you care for that
house as much as I do.”

Back in Oklahoma, Marietta and Muchow-King would still
occasionally talk about the Clear Lake house. For example, Marietta asked
whether she should “move out of her room”—“Absolutely not. It’s your
room” was the response. And despite the transfer of ownership, property
taxes and other expenses related to the house continued to be paid from
Marietta’s joint checking account with Muchow-King. According to
Muchow-King, Marietta requested that the expenses be paid in this way.

Marietta continued living with Muchow-King except for stays in the
hospital and rehabilitation facility again in the summer and fall of 2019. And
again, there is some conflicting evidence about whether Marietta wanted to

8
return to live with Muchow-King or to stay in a healthcare facility. For
example, one hospital report noted that Marietta “wants to go to [assisted
living] a place of her own since her [daughter’s] home is too busy for her.”
But Muchow-King testified that Marietta just “did not want to be a burden”
and never told her that she did not want to live with her anymore. And in any
event, Marietta did move back in with Muchow-King for another year or so.

Marietta contracted COVID-19 and passed away in October 2020—
twenty months after she transferred the Clear Lake house to Muchow-King.
Up to this point, Muchow-King had not told any of Marietta’s other children
about the transfer.2 She testified at trial that she “didn’t want to rub it into
anybody’s face or say anything that sounded like I was rubbing it into
anybody’s face. I’m not that way.” But there was no evidence that any of the
family members had asked her about the house or that Muchow-King ever
lied about—or otherwise affirmatively concealed—the transfer. And the next
month at Thanksgiving, Marietta’s son Jim asked about what would happen
to the Clear Lake house for the first time. Muchow-King told him that
Marietta gave it to her, explaining that Marietta “said that she wanted me to
have it for the kids because they spent their whole life there.” Marietta’s
daughter Carolyn learned of the transfer from Jim in June 2021, and the news
eventually spread to the rest of the family.

In September 2022, Reed sued Muchow-King to set aside the deed
transferring the Clear Lake house. Acting in her individual capacity and as
the administrator of Marietta’s estate, Reed claimed that the transfer was a
result of undue influence.

2
Only three of Marietta’s five children survived her: Muchow-King, Carolyn, and
Jim. Marietta’s other son Scott had passed away earlier in 2020.

9
The district court held a three-day bench trial in October 2023. Reed
testified and called Marietta’s brother Ron, daughter Carolyn, and Muchow-
King as witnesses. In addition to her own testimony, Muchow-King called
her daughter, the Clear Lake lawyer who met with Marietta and prepared the
deed, and one of Marietta’s neighbors. Marietta’s son Jim did not testify.

In its detailed and thoughtful written ruling, the district court agreed
with Reed that Marietta and Muchow-King were in a confidential
relationship at the time Marietta transferred the Clear Lake house—thus
shifting the burden to Muchow-King to prove “by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence that the transfer was not the result of undue influence.”
But the court found that Muchow-King met her burden to rebut that
presumption of undue influence.

The court reasoned that this finding was supported by much evidence
in the record. Focusing first on whether Marietta acted freely, intelligently,
and voluntarily, the court found that “Marietta was still mentally capable of
handling her own affairs” on the day she executed the deed even though “she
suffered from a variety of physical ailments.” The court also relied on the
involvement of the Clear Lake attorney in assisting Marietta with the
transfer, emphasizing that “[e]ven with the benefit of his decades of
experience as a lawyer, [he] did not observe or sense that anything improper
was afoot” and that the attorney “was clear that [Muchow-King] did not
participate in his meeting with Marietta and played no part in the legal work
he performed for Marietta that day.” And the court found that Marietta “had
legitimate, rational reasons for” leaving the Clear Lake house to Muchow-
King—finding that “Marietta wanted to keep the Clear Lake Home in the
family” and that “[b]ased on what Marietta saw and observed of her children,
leaving the Clear Lake Home to [Muchow-King] was the best way to make

10
sure that the property remained in the family and was not sold in the course
of probating her estate.”

As for Muchow-King’s good faith, the court found that Muchow-
King’s choice to “honor[] the wishes of her mother” by taking her to meet
with the Clear Lake attorney “undercuts any claim she was acting with an
improper purpose or intended to unduly influence her mother.” The court
reasoned that if Muchow-King were “the true instigator of the transfer and
Marietta was simply bending to her will, there would be no reason for
[Muchow-King] to use an attorney who was eight hours away to accomplish
her purpose”—“it would have been much simpler and much less physically
demanding on both her and her mother for Lisa to locate an attorney in
[Oklahoma] who was licensed to practice Iowa law and have that attorney
prepare the necessary papers.” And the court pointed to Muchow-King’s
“care of Marietta for nearly four years after her brother Jim gave up his role
as her caregiver because it was too burdensome,” finding that “[t]he time and
energy devoted by [Muchow-King] to caring for her mother belie an intention
to wrongfully procure an improper favor.”

The court also noted that Marietta’s son Jim “was listed as a potential
witness by both parties” but “was never called to testify” or “deposed,”
despite being “in the best position to observe and have personal knowledge”
to support Reed’s theory that Muchow-King “isolated, mistreated, and
manipulated Marietta to get the Clear Lake Home” and having “a personal
interest in helping to set aside the transfer.” So the court reasoned that this
“suggests to the Court that his personal observations would not have
supported the claim of undue influence . . . or that he saw no reason to
challenge” the transfer, and “[e]ither way, the absence of any testimony from
Jim at the trial does not reflect favorably on the” undue-influence claim.

11
The court thus denied Reed’s petition. And Reed now appeals.

II.

The parties agree that this case was tried in equity, so our review is de
novo. See Geerdes by Jenkins v. Cruz, 7 N.W.3d 22, 28 (Iowa 2024). While we
are not bound by the district court’s factual findings, we give them weight—
especially when based on witness-credibility determinations. See id.; Iowa R.
App. P. 6.904(3)(g). We do so because “the district court has a front-row seat
to the live testimony, viewing the demeanor of both the witness as she
testifies and the parties while they listen, whereas our review is limited to
reading black words on a white page of a sterile transcript.” Hora v. Hora,
5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024).

To set aside a property transfer made during the life of the grantor (an
“inter vivos transfer” in property speak) based on a claim of undue influence,
a plaintiff must ordinarily prove four elements by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing, evidence:
(1) The grantor must be susceptible to undue influence, (2) opportunity on
the part of the grantee to exercise such influence and effect the wrongful
purpose must exist, (3) a disposition on the part of the grantee to influence
unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper favor must be present,
and (4) the result must clearly appear to be the effect of undue influence.

Geerdes, 7 N.W.3d at 28 (cleaned up). But if a confidential relationship exists
between the grantee and grantor, then undue influence is presumed.3 See id.
And the burden of proof instead shifts to the grantee to prove that the

3
“A confidential relationship embraces those multiform positions in life wherein
one comes to rely on and trust another in [her] important affairs. It arises whenever a
continuous trust is reposed by one person in the skill and integrity of another.” Geerdes,
7 N.W.3d at 28–29 (cleaned up).

12
transaction was free from undue influence. See id.; see also Jackson v. Schrader,
676 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Iowa 2003). To meet that burden and “rebut[] the
presumption of undue influence arising from a confidential relationship only
requires the grantee of a transaction to prove by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence that the grantee acted in good faith throughout the
transaction and the grantor acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily.”
Jackson, 676 N.W.2d at 605.

Here, the district court found that a confidential relationship existed
between Marietta and Muchow-King at the time Marietta transferred the
Clear Lake house. Neither party challenges that finding on appeal. Rather,
they dispute whether Muchow-King met her burden to rebut the
presumption of undue influence that arises from that confidential
relationship. See id. Muchow-King defends the district court’s finding that
she met her burden to prove that the transfer of the Clear Lake house was not
the product of undue influence. Reed argues that Muchow-King failed to
meet that burden. On our de novo review, we agree with the district court
that Muchow-King met her burden to prove by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence that Marietta “acted freely, intelligently, and
voluntarily” in transferring the Clear Lake house and Muchow-King “acted
in good faith throughout the transaction.” Id.

Marietta’s Free, Intelligent, and Voluntary Action. Like the district court,
we find that three main pillars support our finding that Marietta freely,
intelligently, and voluntarily transferred the Clear Lake house to Muchow-
King: Marietta’s mental capacity, the independent advice she received from

13
her attorney, and her desire to keep the house in the family. We will address
each in turn.4

First, the evidence shows that Marietta had no diminished mental
capacity when she executed the deed transferring the Clear Lake house to
Muchow-King. The last time that Reed, Ron, or Carolyn saw Marietta was
at Connie’s memorial in 2018. None reported any indication of cognitive
impairment that day. Ron even testified that Marietta’s “mental capacity was
pretty good” the day of the memorial. And Ron spoke with Marietta by phone
once a week—until 2018 when it became less regular—and at no point did he
testify that he noticed any signs of cognitive decline from his frequent
conversations with her. Carolyn too called Marietta often and similarly
offered no testimony that she noticed any such decline. What’s more, the
attorney who was present when Marietta executed the deed testified that
Marietta “knew what she wanted, and she told me what she wanted very
clearly,” and that “she appeared to be alert and understand exactly what she
was doing, and she seemed to understand who she was doing it for.”

While Reed is correct that “Mentally Capable is not the same as
Freely, Intelligently, and Voluntarily,” one’s mental capacity and mental
strength is a consideration in undue-influence cases. See In re Est. of Herm,
284 N.W.2d 191, 200 (Iowa 1979) (“Mental strength of the person dominated
has a direct bearing on the issue of undue influence.”). To be sure, the
absence of cognitive decline does not in itself foreclose the possibility of
undue influence. Nor does it establish that the transfer of the Clear Lake

4
The district court also found that “the absence of any testimony from Jim at the
trial does not reflect favorably on the” undue-influence claim. Reed argues that this was
error when Muchow-King had the burden to rebut the presumption of undue influence.
We conduct our de novo review without giving any consideration to absence of this
testimony and thus need not decide that issue.

14
house was executed freely, intelligently, and voluntarily. But “Iowa courts
have viewed the circumstance of the mental strength of the person
dominated as having a direct bearing on the issue of undue influence in a
confidential relationship.” Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. of Cedar Rapids v. Lala, 392
N.W.2d 179, 185 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (collecting cases). And our court has
repeatedly considered the mental capacity of the grantor in rebutting the
presumption of undue influence. See Cich v. McLeish, No. 18-0069, 2019 WL
1056804, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019) (noting the grantee “lacked the
mental capacity to manage her own affairs” as evidence that the transfer was
not made freely, intelligently, and voluntarily); In re Guardianship of Chott,
No. 18-1499, 2019 WL 4297854, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2019) (finding
the grantor’s dementia and Alzheimer’s showed that the transfer was not
made freely, intelligently, and voluntarily). We find that the evidence of
Marietta’s mental capacity provides strong support to rebut the presumption
of undue influence.

Turning to the second—and perhaps most important—pillar, the
evidence shows too that Marietta had the chance to get independent advice
from her attorney who then prepared the deed transferring the house. While
independent advice is “not essential to uphold a transfer,” it remains “an
important consideration” in undue-influence cases. First Nat’l Bank in Sioux
City v. Curran, 206 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Iowa 1973); see also Luse v. Grenko, 100
N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1959) (finding that “independent advice to the
transferor is an important consideration where there is a confidential
relation[ship]” and the transferee is in a position of dominance). In
considering whether a donor had independent advice, we look at whether
the donor had the benefit of conferring fully and privately upon the subject
of [her] intended gift with a person who was not only competent to inform
[her] correctly as to its legal effect, but who was furthermore so

15
disassociated from the interests of the donee as to be in a position to advise
the donor impartially and confidentially as to the consequences to [herself ]
and of [her] proposed benefaction.

Curran, 206 N.W.2d at 323.

It is undisputed that Marietta conferred privately with the attorney
concerning the transfer and the power of attorney documents. And as an
experienced attorney, he was competent to inform Marietta of the deed’s
legal effect. He was also disassociated from the interests of Muchow-King,
whom he had never spoken to. So the attorney was in a position to advise
Marietta “impartially and confidently” as to the consequences of the transfer
of the Clear Lake house. Id.

Still, Reed argues Marietta did not receive independent advice because
she went to the meeting intending to execute a deed. See Herm, 284 N.W.2d
at 200 (finding no independent advice when the transferor “went to the
attorney for the express purpose of having the deed prepared” and there was
“no evidence [the transferor] either sought or received independent advice”
from the attorney). But unlike In re Estate of Herm, on which Reed relies, the
evidence here is that the attorney did give Marietta advice—they met for
nearly thirty minutes before he prepared the deed. And when pressed during
cross-examination by Reed, the attorney rejected the idea that he was merely
a “scrivener, more or less,” explaining that he did “more than that.” So the
facts here fit comfortably with previous cases where our court has found
meetings with an attorney to initiate a transfer amounted to independent
advice. See Natvig v. Natvig, No. 23-1992, 2024 WL 4611522, at *6–7 (Iowa
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024); Lawrence v. Struve, No. 24-0526, 2025 WL 2058232,
at *2–3, 7 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025).

16
Third, the evidence shows that Marietta intended for the Clear Lake
home to remain in the family. Both Ron and Carolyn testified that they urged
Marietta to sell the house many times. Ron said that he called Marietta every
week or so and that he would raise the topic of selling the house—a practice
that got on Marietta’s nerves. Carolyn likewise suggested Marietta sell the
house and use the money to pay the cost of moving into a nursing home. And
some of these conversations occurred prior to Marietta moving in with
Muchow-King. This pattern of Marietta’s refusal to sell is particularly telling
in light of her rare use of the house, especially towards the end of her life.

The evidence also shows that Muchow-King assumed the
responsibility of caring for the house and out of all Marietta’s children she
spent the most time there. The persistent pressure to sell the house
combined with the lack of use by other family members could reasonably have
led Marietta to fear that, upon her passing, the home would no longer remain
in the family. Marietta’s decision to transfer the house to Muchow-King thus
aligns with her intent to keep the house in the family, further supporting that
the transfer was made freely, intelligently, and voluntarily.

At bottom, Marietta was mentally capable, she had independent legal
advice, and the transfer was consistent with her desire to keep the Clear Lake
house in the family. Thus, we find Muchow-King has proven by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence that Marietta acted freely, intelligently,
and voluntarily in transferring the Clear Lake house to her.

Muchow-King’s Good Faith. Turning to the other party to the
transaction, we also find that Muchow-King “acted in good faith throughout
the transaction.” Jackson, 676 N.W.2d at 605. In many respects, this is just a
flip side of the same question—focused instead on the grantee’s conduct to
see whether she was acting in good faith or unduly influencing the grantor.

17
So it is perhaps no surprise that Reed has pointed us to no case—and we have
found none—where a court has found that the grantor made the transfer
freely, intelligently, and voluntarily but still found the grantee failed to act in
good faith throughout the transaction.

Here, the evidence shows that Muchow-King had very little to do with
the transaction. She did not execute the transaction herself through a power
of attorney or ownership of a joint account. She did not prepare a deed and
present it to Marietta to sign. She did not pressure Marietta to transfer the
Clear Lake house to her.

Rather, she agreed to Marietta’s request to drive her to meet with her
attorney in Clear Lake without any knowledge as to what Marietta intended
to discuss with the attorney. Muchow-King did not instigate the trip—to the
contrary, she suggested Marietta should see an Oklahoma attorney instead.
But Marietta insisted, and Muchow-King respected that wish. So Muchow-
King took time off work to drive Marietta over sixteen hours round trip so
Marietta could meet with the law firm Marietta desired. She then waited in
the lobby while Marietta met with the attorney privately. Only after the
meeting did Marietta tell Muchow-King about the transfer.

In arguing that the evidence shows a lack of good faith, Reed mainly
points to evidence suggesting that Muchow-King may have acted in bad faith
with respect other financial transactions. And if this case were seeking to
recover funds spent on Marietta’s credit card for Muchow-King's personal
expenses or for those paid from Marietta’s assets on expenses for the Clear
Lake house even after Marietta no longer owned the house, our finding might
be different. But the issue here is whether Muchow-King “acted in good faith
throughout the transaction” being challenged, not in all other transactions.
Jackson, 676 N.W.2d at 605 (considering transactions one-by-one, finding the

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presumption rebutted for some and not others). As we have discussed,
Muchow-King has presented evidence that with respect to the transaction
challenged here—the transfer of the Clear Lake house—she has acted in
good faith throughout.

We are mindful too that our supreme court set this current standard
for rebutting the presumption of undue influence arising from confidential
relationships to ensure that it is not “unreasonably demanding” and thus
improperly causing “the invalidation of bona fide transfers to a dominant
party in a confidential relationship.” Id. at 600. As the court emphasized
then, “notwithstanding the susceptibility of a grantor to undue influence and
the opportunity of a grantee to exercise such influence, it is possible to have
an inter vivos transfer between such parties that is not the product of undue
influence.” Id. at 604; cf. Geerdes, 7 N.W.3d 24 (reiterating that “individuals
are generally allowed to dispose of their property as they see fit” and
cautioning against giving “too much weight to the perceived improvidence of
the transaction”). Such is the case here.

Muchow-King has met her burden to rebut the presumption of undue
influence arising from her confidential relationship with Marietta for
Marietta’s transfer of the Clear Lake house. We thus affirm the district
court’s judgment in her favor.

AFFIRMED.

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