Evan Casey Moran v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1280
Filed January 7, 2026
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Evan Casey Moran,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jason Patrick Hallberg of Hallberg Law Firm, P.C., Buffalo Center, attorney
for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines (until withdrawal) and
Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

In January 2020, Evan Moran was charged by trial information with a
controlled-substance violation after tossing a bag containing
methamphetamine out of his SUV while being trailed by law enforcement.
See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(b)(7) (2020). “And then, COVID.” State v.
Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 253 (Iowa 2022). In response to the global
pandemic, our supreme court sought to quell the spread of the novel virus
during judicial proceedings. Id. Relevant here, the supreme court postponed
all jury trials and extended the speedy-trial deadline for defendants charged
before September 14, 2020, setting “September 14, 2020 as Day 1.” Iowa
Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions for
Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services 5 (May 22, 2020). And as
jury trials remained suspended into the fall, the court similarly extended the
speedy-trial deadline in November, setting “February 1, 2021 as Day 1.” Iowa
Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions for
Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services 2 (Nov. 10, 2020).

Moran waived his speedy-trial right on September 29, 2020, and then
again on July 23, 2021. About six weeks later, he filed a handwritten demand
for a speedy trial and asked for a new attorney. The court obliged, setting a
new trial deadline of November 28. A few weeks after that, he reached a plea
agreement with the State. As a result, the district court “remove[d] the
matter from the trial docket” and scheduled a plea hearing. Yet in December,
it appeared the plea agreement had fallen through, so the court reset the trial
to begin on January 18, 2022.

Five days before trial, Moran again agreed to plead guilty. After an
unreported hearing, the district court found Moran “voluntarily and
intelligently entered” his plea to the controlled-substance offense and

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sentenced him to prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty-five
years. He did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

Instead, Moran quickly applied for postconviction relief, arguing his
conviction violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The State moved
for summary disposition, which the district court granted, finding both that
Moran’s speedy-trial right was not violated and that he waived any challenges
by pleading guilty.

Moran now appeals. Because his application alleges a constitutional
deprivation, we review his claim de novo. Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142
(Iowa 2018).

Summary disposition of a postconviction relief application is
appropriate “when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa Code
§ 822.6(3) (2024). When reviewing these dispositions, we are guided by our
familiar summary-judgment standards, examining “the entire record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and granting Moran the benefit
of all legitimate inferences. Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 730 (Iowa 2019)
(cleaned up).

Our constitution guaranteed Moran the “right to a speedy and public
trial.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. And that right is implemented by Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b), which generally requires trial within ninety
days of the filing of a trial information. Moran argues that his speedy-trial
right was violated because the ninety days ran on November 28, 2021. And
he contends that he was unaware of this alleged speedy-trial violation when

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he pleaded guilty and thus did not knowingly waive his speedy-trial right with
his guilty plea.1

But Moran was never deprived of a speedy trial. He expressly waived
his speedy-trial right both in September 2020 and again July 2021. After he
revoked that waiver, the court timely reset his trial for November 2021. See
State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 475–76 (Iowa 1981) (holding ninety-day
deadline to try defendant starts anew after defendant withdraws waiver of
speedy-trial right). He chose to forgo that trial by entering into a plea
agreement with the State. See State v. Warmuth, 532 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995) (discussing restarting the speedy-trial window after a case is
initially “removed from the trial calendar” when “a defendant indicates the
choice to forego trial by entering a guilty plea or advising the State that a plea
of guilty is forthcoming”). While he insists he never asked for a plea hearing
to be scheduled, he does not dispute that he intended to plead guilty then.
And when those plea negotiations broke down in December, the court again
promptly scheduled trial for January 2022. See State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d
532, 535 (Iowa 1984) (holding ninety-day deadline to try defendant starts
anew after defendant withdraws guilty plea).

The undisputed factual record thus shows Moran’s speedy-trial right
was not violated. And so, the rest of Moran’s derivative arguments also fail.
The district court did not error in summarily dismissing his application.

AFFIRMED.

1
On appeal, Moran seems to also claim his counsel was ineffective in failing to
inform him of the alleged speedy-trial violation. Yet he did not assert such a claim in his
application, the district court did not rule on it, and Moran never moved to expand the
ruling to adjudicate an ineffective-assistance claim. So this issue is not before us. See
Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862–64 (Iowa 2012).

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