State of Iowa v. Michael Aaron Canady

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0207
Filed December 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL AARON CANADY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Tabitha Turner,

Judge.

Michael Canady appeals the sentences imposed by the district court after

pleading guilty in two cases. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Langholz, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Michael Canady appeals the sentences imposed by the district court after

pleading guilty to domestic abuse assault (third offense), see Iowa Code

§ 708.2A(4) (2024), and possession of cocaine (second offense), see id.

§ 124.401(5). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Michael Canady pled guilty to domestic abuse assault (third or subsequent

offense) and possession of cocaine (second offense) in two separate cases. As

a result of his pleas, Canady’s probation in several other cases was revoked.

The State agreed not to file any alleged violations of the no-contact order in place

protecting the victim of Canady’s current domestic-abuse conviction (the same

victim of two prior domestic abuse assaults by Canady). The parties agreed,

however, that the sentencing court could consider the fact that Canady violated

the no-contact order by calling the victim from jail and asking her to perjure

herself. The court accepted Canady’s pleas and ordered a presentence

investigation report.

At a combined sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Canady to

a five-year term of incarceration with a five-year mandatory minimum in the

domestic-abuse case and a term of incarceration not to exceed two years in the

possession case, to be served consecutively and consecutive to Canady’s

probation sentences in other cases, for a total indeterminate term of incarceration

not to exceed fifteen years with a five-year mandatory minimum. The court

stated the following reasons for the sentence imposed:
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Mr. Canady, I sentenced you back on January 4th,
2023 . . . . That’s the case for which you’re on probation for two
domestic seconds, the burglary in the third degree. And at that
sentencing you told me the same thing that I’m being told today.
And at that sentencing I said, “I am sympathetic to your plight, sir.
Growing up the way that you grew up, that’s really unfortunate.
And I understand those mental health issues. I understand the
substance abuse issues.” And I gave you a chance; right?
The only thing I did think that I thought would have provided
some internal motivation to change was I suspended eight years.
And now we’re back here again on a domestic abuse assault third
or subsequent offense.
You are 34 years old, you have a lengthy history, and as far
as I can tell, from everything that you’ve told me, I believe I said this
to you at the last time I sentenced you, you’ve had a lot of time to
address these issues. You’ve had a lot of time since you have
acknowledged them, and you acknowledge those issues back here
in 2023 when I saw you last time. You’ve had the time to deal with
it, and for whatever reason it has not been dealt with.
So when I sit up here and I have to determine what an
appropriate sentence is for somebody sitting in front of me, there
are a lot of factors I consider, sir. I consider your age. You’re 34.
You certainly know better; right? Your prior record of convictions.
It’s already on the record. It’s lengthy, and it is chock-full of violent
crimes. The nature and the circumstances of the offense
committed while you’ve committed a forcible felony. There really
isn’t a plea agreement in this case.[1]
Aside from those factors, two big ones I consider are
protection of the public from further offenses by you and I consider
your rehabilitation. And is community-based supervision
appropriate? It is not, and you know that because, if it was, you
would not be in this situation again with a domestic abuse assault
third offense. You would have addressed your mental health
things. You would have more thoroughly, if you did at all, address
your substance abuse issues, but none of that is here before the
Court. So as far as whether or not you can be rehabilitated on the
outside, you can’t.
The next is protecting the public from further offenses by
you. It is, I have to say, pretty rare that somebody comes in front of
me with this many domestic offenses convictions because usually
I’ll just say—back when I gave you that sentence in 2023, I would
have sent you to prison, but I didn’t. And so I have to decide how
much time is an appropriate amount of time to send you to prison to
protect the public and you can get the help you need. And the help

1 To the extent Canady challenges the district court’s “reli[ance] on a plea
agreement when none existed,” we find his claim unpersuasive.
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is there. It is in prison. It’s something I’ve been thinking about for
several days as I’ve gone through this presentence investigation
and I’ve gone through this case.
Sir, you are adjudged guilty of domestic abuse assault, third
or subsequent offense in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(4)
and 708.1(2). You were sentenced to a term of incarceration of five
years, and pursuant to 902.3, your minimum sentence would be
five years. And that will run consecutive to your probation matter in
FECR364607, SRCR362485, and it will run consecutive to
SRCR357580 for a total period of incarceration not to exceed 15
years with a mandatory minimum of five. That is based on the
separate and serious nature of these offenses and the fact that you
committed another violent offense while you were on probation for
two violent offenses and the burglary.

Canady appeals.2

II. Standard of Review

“Our review of the defendant’s sentence is for the correction of errors at

law. We will not reverse a sentence unless there is an abuse of discretion or

some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Cole, 23 N.W.3d 231, 236

(Iowa 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Canady claims the district court “failed to provide any reason for imposing

a five-year minimum term of incarceration.” Generally, if a sentence is within the

statutory maximum, as here, we will only interfere if the sentencing court abuses

its discretion. State v. Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa 1979). Canady also

asserts the district court’s written sentencing orders are “wildly inconsistent with

2 Defendants generally do not have a right to appeal after pleading guilty.
See
Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). But because Canady’s appeal challenges the
discretionary sentence imposed on his convictions rather than the guilty plea
itself, he has “good cause” to pursue an appeal. See State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). We therefore proceed to the merits.
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one another . . . to the point of being irreconcilable,” and such prevents appellate

review.

District courts are required to state on the record their reasons for

selecting a particular sentence. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa

2000). A terse and succinct statement may be sufficient, so long as the brevity of

the statement does not impede appellate review of the exercise of the district

court’s sentencing discretion. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa

2015). We give the court’s sentencing decisions “a significant amount of latitude

because of the discretionary nature of judging and the source of the respect

afforded by the appellate process.” State v. Luke, 4 N.W.3d 450, 455 (Iowa

2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, in imposing the

mandatory minimum period of incarceration, the court highlighted what period of

time was needed for rehabilitation and the need for protection of the public.

We further note a lack of “wild inconsistencies” in the written sentencing

orders that prevent meaningful appellate review. The district court provided an

oral explanation for Canady’s sentences. And the boxes checked in the written

sentencing orders were mentioned in the district court’s oral pronouncement. As

our supreme court has previously stated, when there is a discrepancy between

the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written order, “the oral

pronouncement controls.” State v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Iowa 1995). But

here, Canady does not note any inconsistencies. Rather, Canady only points to

the fact that some factors were marked on one sentencing order but not the

other. This does not render the orders inconsistent.
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Applying the above principles, “[w]e find that the reasons given orally by

the district court at the sentencing hearing speak for themselves and

demonstrate that the district court did not abuse its discretion” in imposing a

mandatory minimum sentence of five years. See Luke, 4 N.W.3d at 455. We

affirm the sentences imposed by the court.

AFFIRMED.