City of Colfax v. Teamsters Local Union 238

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0014
Filed December 3, 2025

CITY OF COLFAX,
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 238,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Thomas P. Murphy,

Judge.

The City of Colfax appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary

judgement for the Teamsters Union in an employment dispute. AFFIRMED.

Melissa A. Schilling (argued) and Anthony D. Siegrist of Dickinson,

Bradshaw, Fowler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Emily Schott Hood of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, and Jill M.

Hartley (pro hac vice) (argued) of The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee,

Wisconsin, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller and

Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

The City of Colfax appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary

judgement for the Teamsters Union in an employment dispute that went to binding

arbitration. Colfax argues (1) the arbitrator exceeded her authority in sustaining

the union’s grievance, (2) “just cause” is not required to terminate Officer Clark,

(3) due process is not required in the collective bargaining agreement, (4) there is

no progressive discipline requirement, and (5) the district court rewrote the

arbitrator’s findings. We find the district court did not err in finding the arbitrator

acted within her authority, so we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In April 2023, the City of Colfax’s Police Chief recommended Police Officer

Andrea Clark be terminated. The city council approved the termination. The

Teamsters Local Union 2381 filed a grievance on behalf of Clark. The parties

proceeded to binding arbitration.

In January 2024, the arbitrator issued an award sustaining the union’s

grievance and reinstating Clark to her position as a police officer. The arbitrator

found (1) termination was not a proper remedy for the alleged rule violations by

Clark, (2) Clark was not given notice of the allegations against her or an

opportunity to be heard prior to termination, and (3) Colfax did not engage in

progressive discipline as contemplated by the agreement prior to terminating

Clark.

1 Colfax and the union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that
contains a grievance procedure including binding arbitration. The collective
bargaining agreement is referred to as “the agreement” throughout this opinion.
3

Colfax filed an application to vacate the award in April 2024. The parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court issued its order

granting the union’s motion for summary judgment and denying Colfax’s motion

for summary judgment. Colfax now appeals.

II. Review

We review an appeal from a district court’s review of an arbitration award

for correction of errors at law. Ales v. Anderson, Gabelmann, Lower & Whitlow,

P.C., 728 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2007). “However, our review is limited.” Id.; see

also Humphreys v. Joe Johnston L. Firm, P.C., 491 N.W.2d 513, 514 (Iowa 1992)

(“Judicial review of arbitration awards is very limited in Iowa.”). “Our function is not

to determine whether the arbitrator has correctly resolved the grievance.” Ales,

728 N.W.2d at 839. This is because “[o]ur law favors arbitration as an alternative

to civil litigation. Arbitration avoids the expense and delay generally associated

with traditional civil litigation, and draws on experts in the specific area of the

dispute to resolve the matter.” $99 Down Payment, Inc. v. Garard, 592 N.W.2d

691, 694 (Iowa 1999) (internal citation omitted). “Our supreme court has made

clear:

To allow courts to “second guess” an arbitrator by granting a broad
scope of judicial review would nullify the very advantages of
arbitration. Moreover, limited judicial review gives the parties what
they bargain for in agreeing to binding arbitration, not merely
arbitration which is binding if a court agrees with the arbitrator’s
award.

Id. (internal citation omitted). “The fact that the relief awarded could not or would

not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to

confirm the award.” Iowa Code § 679A.12(2) (2024).
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“A refined quality of justice is not the goal in arbitration matters. Indeed

such a goal is deliberately sacrificed in favor of a sure and speedy resolution.”

Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 515 (quoting Reicks v. Farmers Commodities Corp.,

474 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1991) (en banc)). “As long as an arbitrator’s award

does not violate one of the provisions of section 679A.12(1), we will not correct

errors of fact or law.” Ales, 728 N.W.2d at 839.

III. Discussion

Colfax argues the district court erred when it did not vacate the arbitration

award. They argue (1) the district court rewrote the arbitrator’s findings, (2) “just

cause” is not required to terminate Officer Clark, (3) due process is not required in

the collective bargaining agreement, (4) and there is no progressive discipline

requirement. We address each in turn.2

At the core of Colfax’s claim is that the arbitrator exceeded her authority

under Iowa code section 679A.12(1)(c). The arbitrator’s power and authority is

defined by any arbitration agreement between the parties and Iowa Code

chapter 679A. Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 516. In Humphreys, our supreme court

prescribed the role of the arbitrator, stating:

Put most simply, the arbitrator is the parties’ officially designated
“reader” of the contract. He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the
purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to
handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial
agreement. Thus, “misinterpretation” or “gross mistake” by the
arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms. In the absence of fraud
or an overreaching of authority on the part of the arbitrator, he is

2 We assume without deciding error was preserved on each issue. The district

court order stated, “Even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers by examining “due
process” and ‘just cause,’ she had the power to determine if what the officer did
was serious enough to warrant termination.” We do not decide whether that is
sufficient to preserve error and proceed to the merits.
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speaking for the parties, and his award is their contract. That is what
the “final and binding” language of the arbitration clause says. In
sum, the arbitrator’s award should be treated as though it were a
written stipulation by the parties setting forth their own definitive
construction of the labor contract. Absent limitation by the parties to
the contrary, the arbitrator becomes the final judge of the facts and
law. Thus, “[m]istakes of either fact or law are among the
contingencies the parties assume when they submit a dispute to
arbitration.”

Id. (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). The arbitrator’s authority was

defined by the parties in the agreement. The relevant portion of the agreement

states:

The Arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, subtract from, or in
any manner modify the terms of this Agreement. The decision of the
Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties, and the Arbitrator
shall be requested to issue his/her decision within thirty (30) days
after the conclusion of the hearing.

Here, the terms of the agreement require Colfax to either (1) exhaust all

other forms of discipline or (2) show the seriousness of the offense warrants

termination under the terms of the agreement. The arbitrator found “[e]ven if

Clark’s behaviors as addressed in the city’s enumerations were valid, termination

of employment was too harsh a penalty.” We conclude that finding was within the

authority of the arbitrator and is binding on the parties.

a. Is just cause and due process required to terminate Officer Clark?

Colfax alleges the arbitrator exceeded her authority by finding just cause

and due process is required before Officer Clark may be terminated. The arbitrator

relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill. See 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). In that case, the Supreme

Court addressed the process a public employee is entitled to before termination by

stating:
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The essential requirements of due process, and all that respondents
seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity
to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or
in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental
due process requirement.

Id. The arbitrator expressly did not impose a just-cause requirement on Colfax.

Instead, she found due process is the only component of just cause that is

required. The arbitrator relied on the fact that “Clark was not provided with

advance notice of the charges against her nor was she provided a meaningful

opportunity to respond to the charges.” So, we turn to the agreement to determine

if due process is required.

The agreement states that if an employee’s conduct violates the rules,

the City Administrator or supervisor shall inform the employee
promptly and specifically of such deficiencies. If appropriate and
justified, following a discussion of the matter, a reasonable time for
improvement or correction may be allowed before any further
disciplinary action is initiated. In situations where an oral warning
has not resulted in the correction of the condition or where more
severe initial action is warranted, a written reprimand shall be sent to
the employee and a copy placed in the employee’s personal folder.

There is a requirement that the employee be informed of a violation of the rules

prior to more serious discipline being imposed. Further, the employee is entitled

to invoke the agreement’s grievance procedure but cannot do so without first

having notice of the alleged violations and the opportunity to speak with a city

administrator or supervisor.

Therefore, we find the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in stating that

the agreement required due process before termination.
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b. Is progressive discipline required before termination?

Next, Colfax argues the arbitrator exceeded her authority by finding it was

required to engage in progressive discipline before terminating Clark. While we

agree the words “progressive discipline” do not appear in the agreement, a

progressive discipline structure does.

Article 8 of the agreement governs discipline and termination. Section A

establishes the potential penalties for violations of the rules in the following

manner:

1. Oral Warning
2. Written reprimand
3. Suspension with loss of pay
4. Demotion to a lower pay grade for a period not to exceed ninety (90)
days
5. Discharge

Then section B states that upon a violation, the employee’s supervisor shall inform

the employee and give the employee a reasonable opportunity to improve “before

any further disciplinary action is initiated.” Section C, which covers suspension,

states “where one or more written reprimands have not proven to be effective, or

in those cases where the seriousness of the events or conditions warrant it, an

employee may be suspended.” And finally, section D allows for termination if

“other forms of disciplinary action have proven ineffective or where the seriousness

of the offense or condition warrants.”

We find the agreement establishes a progressive discipline model with

exceptions for serious offenses and the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by

stating that a progressive discipline model existed.

c. Did the district court rewrite the arbitrator’s findings?
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First, Colfax alleges the district court rewrote the arbitrator’s finings to avoid

finding the arbitrator exceeded her authority under Iowa Code

section 679A.12(1)(c). They allege the district court ignored the discussion of “just

cause,” “due process,” and “progressive discipline,” which are not mentioned

anywhere in the agreement. Our review of the record does not support that

conclusion. The district court’s review of the arbitrator’s decision is required to be

extremely deferential. See $99 Down Payment, 592 N.W.2d at 694 (“Our law also

indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of an arbitration

award. Consequently, judicial involvement in arbitration is very limited.” (internal

citation omitted)).

At the outset, we have already resolved Colfax’s arguments regarding just

cause, due process, and progressive discipline. In reviewing whether the arbitrator

exceeded her authority, the district court found:

Even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers by examining “due
process” and “just cause,” she had the power to determine if what
the officer did was serious enough to warrant termination. The
arbitrator specifically found that nothing the officer did warranted the
“too harsh a penalty” of termination. That decision did not “add to,
subtract from, or in any manner modify” the agreement.

We agree with the district court that this decision was within the arbitrator’s

authority, and we find no instance where the arbitrator exceeded her authority. So,

we find the district court conducted a thorough review of the arbitration award and

did not commit any legal error in its review. Accordingly, we affirm.
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IV. Conclusion

Because we conclude the district court correctly found the arbitrator was

within her authority to find the termination was not warranted, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.