In the Interest of K.P. and L.P., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1214
Filed December 3, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF K.P. and L.P.,
Minor Children,

A.W., Mother.,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Erik I. Howe, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights

to two children. AFFIRMED.

Gina E.V. Burress of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Felicia Bertin Rocha, Urbandale, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

children.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and

Mullins, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
2

MULLINS, Senior Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two

daughters—born in 2020 and 2021—under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f)

and (h) (2025). She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

grounds for termination, emphasizing her recovery from the substance-use

problems that gave rise to these proceedings. She also contends termination is

not in the girls’ best interests.

We do not discount the mother’s success in maintaining her sobriety. But

as her parental shortcomings changed over time, so did the expectations for

improvement. On our de novo review, we find that the mother remained unable to

meet all her children’s needs at the time of termination. We also agree with the

juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in the best interests of these girls.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The Department of Health and Human Services first became involved with

this family in December 2021, when the younger of the two girls at issue was born

with THC in her system. Not long after that, case workers learned that the mother

and her paramour—who is both girls’ father1—were also using methamphetamine.

A safety plan was installed, and the parents cooperated with department

interventions. They showed progress in their sobriety over the following year,

during which time the girls and their two older brothers remained in the

1 The juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights to K.P. and L.P.

Because the father does not appeal, we discuss him only to the extent it is relevant
to the mother.
3

home.2 But by January 2023, the mother and father had fallen back into substance

use. Hair from both girls tested positive for methamphetamine. All four children

were removed from their parents’ custody and declared children in need of

assistance.

The mother set to work correcting her course. She successfully discharged

from outpatient treatment and joined a support group. She also participated in a

mental-health evaluation and attended a few sessions of individual therapy. Her

last positive test for methamphetamine was July 27, 2023. However, she

continued to test positive for THC. Meanwhile, the girls remained in a foster home,

separate from their brothers. The mother had two fully-supervised visits with the

children per week.

In February 2024, the department recommended that the State seek

termination of parental rights for the youngest three children, citing both parents’

ongoing substance use and lingering mental health concerns. Around the same

time, the mother’s THC tests began to come back negative. Following a

permanency hearing in March 2024, the juvenile court entered an order directing

the department to begin providing additional visitation and to reduce the level of

supervision. It simultaneously changed the permanency goal to termination. The

court would later explain that the purpose of this approach was to address the

“extensive length of time the case had been open” while providing the parents a

chance to address some “general parenting concerns” that had also been identified

2 The mother’s two sons—born in 2008 and 2019—were also at issue in the child-

in-need-of-assistance proceedings giving rise to this case. For simplicity, we refer
to both older children as the girls’ brothers, even though the older boy does not
share the same father.
4

by the department. The State filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights

pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h), which was heard in June.

The transcript from the June 2024 termination hearing is not a part of the

record in this appeal. However, the juvenile court would later note that “[t]here

remained little ongoing concern regarding substance use for either parent” at the

time of the hearing. Instead, the focus shifted to “basic parenting issues,” which

the court described as “somewhat minor” by comparison. It denied termination an

August 2024 order, granting a six-month extension for the mother and father to

demonstrate their parental abilities.

Over the next few months, the parents made strides toward reunification.

Reports from that period applaud their increased responsibility, including the

mother’s role in managing appointments and transporting the children to activities.

Soon, the parties began planning to transition all four children back into the home.

Trial placements for the brothers began in September 2024, and the girls began

an extended home visit in December.

Unfortunately, the family was not reunited for long. On December 17, 2024,

a domestic dispute erupted in the presence of the children, and the father

threatened to harm the mother in her sleep. The father was arrested after the

oldest child called 911. During the father’s incarceration, the mother struggled to

care for the children on her own. She relied heavily on the girls’ foster parents for

overnight and weekend relief. And in early January, caregivers and service

providers began reporting concerns about the children’s supervision, the

cleanliness of the home, and the mother’s personal hygiene. For instance, during

a mid-afternoon scheduled visit, a family-centered services worker was greeted at
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the door by K.P. (age four), who reported that her mother was asleep and that

neither she nor her brother (age five) had received their lunch.

At a January 7 emergency meeting with the mother and her attorney, the

department identified several concerns that would need to be immediately

addressed to maintain the girls’ trial placement, including “safe supervision of the

children,” “safety locks and cleanliness in the home,” “regular meals,” and “family

hygiene.” But when the time came for a follow-up visit three days later, the mother

had yet to take action. K.P. told the service provider that she had not eaten

breakfast that day. A child lock had not been installed on the front door. The

mother was struggling with an open leg wound that “drain[ed] down her leg into

her sock.”3 And the apartment was so foul-smelling that the provider had to change

her clothes following the visit.

On January 14, the department ended the girls’ trial placement and returned

them to foster care. It did not remove the boys. Despite noting “significant

concerns” as to their continued placement with the mother, the department

concluded “that parenting two children, rather than all four, will be more

manageable for [the mother].” The guardian ad litem was “reservedly in

agreement” with the six-year-old boy continuing in the mother’s care. A few weeks

later, the mother filed a motion to compel the girls’ return, alleging the department

“had never mentioned” the cleanliness, nutrition, and family-hygiene concerns until

a week before their removal. While that request remained pending, the State filed

a new petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to K.P. and L.P.

3 The mother would later be hospitalized for several days after multiple prompts by

case workers to seek medical attention for her wound.
6

A second termination hearing was held in May 2025. The case manager

testified that, during the intervening months, the mother had stopped attending

appointments for the girls. She also lost her job. At the time of the hearing, she

had been searching for work for more than two months while living off a tax refund

and state benefits.4 The case manager also acknowledged that her ongoing

custody of the older boys raised a “difficult question.” In response, the mother

argued that although she had faced “one thing after another after another after

another since December,” she had never failed to respond to the department’s

recommendations. Throughout her testimony, she expressed frustration with the

department’s evolving expectations, reminding the court that she had been

“methamphetamine-free for two years and marijuana-free for a year.”

In a thoughtful written order, the juvenile court concluded that the “basic

parenting issues” raised in the previous termination hearing had only become

“more pronounced” following a year of additional services. Finding the State had

shown by clear and convincing evidence that the girls could not at the time of the

hearing be returned to their mother’s custody, it terminated the mother’s parental

rights. The mother appeals.

II. Discussion

We review termination proceedings de novo, following a three-step analysis

under Iowa Code section 232.116. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472–73 (Iowa

2018). The first question is whether the State has established a statutory ground

4 Notably, the mother used her April tax refund to buy some clothing for the children

as well as a big-screen television. She explained at the hearing, “I also worked for
that money, so I see no reason why I can’t spend a little bit of it on myself.”
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for termination. Id. If so, we must ask whether termination is in the child’s best

interest. Id. at 473. Finally, we consider whether the parent has proved an

exception to termination under section 232.116(3). Id. at 473, 476. Here, the

mother challenges the juvenile court’s findings at steps one and two. We confine

our discussion to those issues.5 See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

A. Grounds for Termination

The juvenile court found the State proved a statutory ground for termination

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs “f” (as to K.P.) and “h” (as to

L.P.). Paragraph “f” permits termination of parental rights where the following

elements are established by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for
the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has
been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time
the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as
provided in section 232.102.

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). Paragraph “h” provides for termination on nearly

identical grounds, except that it applies to younger children who have been

5 To be sure, the mother’s petition on appeal cites Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c)

in support of her claim that termination is “not in the children’s best interests.” But
following the mother’s lead, we consider her emotional-bond argument under the
best-interests framework alone. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534–35 & n.2
(Iowa Ct. App. 2025). We also decline to address the mother’s cursory assertion
that termination violates her due process and equal protection rights, as that claim
was neither raised nor decided in the juvenile court proceedings. See In re K.C.,
660 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (“Even issues implicating constitutional rights must
be presented to and ruled upon by the district court in order to preserve error for
appeal.”).
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removed for a shorter period of time. The court must find:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or
for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has
been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section
232.102 at the present time.

Id. § 232.116(1)(h).

The mother concedes that the age, adjudication, and length-of-removal

elements of paragraphs “f” and “h” are satisfied for both girls. But she disputes the

juvenile court’s conclusion that they could not be returned to her custody at the

time of the termination hearing. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Iowa 2021)

(interpreting the words “present time” to mean “the time of the termination

hearing”). According to the mother, her ongoing sobriety showcases her

commitment to providing a safe environment for her children. And although she

acknowledges “her progress might not have proceeded at the ideal pace,” the

mother contends that the concerns about the safety and cleanliness of her home

were substantially resolved in the months leading up to the hearing.

We do not discount the mother’s efforts. Undeniably, she overcame the

significant problem that first brought her family to the attention of the department.

The juvenile court acknowledged as much when it denied termination in 2024 and

provided the mother with a second chance at reunification. But as time would

show, substance use was not her only barrier to successful parenting. After the

father was arrested, the mother struggled to meet the essential needs of all four
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children. She attributed that shortfall to a temporary loss of motivation, testifying:

“I can’t be sad about it in front of my kids, but the dishes are still going to be there

tomorrow.” We reject the analogy. Unlike dirty dishes, the health, supervision,

and nourishment of young children cannot be put off for a more convenient time.

See In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Parenting cannot be turned off

and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable.”).

We recognize that, by the time of the termination hearing, the mother had

fixed several of the discrete safety and hygienic problems that required the girls’

re-removal in January 2025. Yet, with the resolution of those issues came new

hurdles in the mother’s employment and personal finances, demonstrating to us

that her cycle of instability continues. The case manager described this family as

“the longest ongoing case I have managed in my time at HHS.” Despite nearly

four years of department services, the mother has not been able to provide a safe

and stable home for these two girls while also caring for her two boys. Our

statutory scheme does not contemplate such lengthy intervention. See A.B., 956

N.W.2d at 169 (“The legislature has established a limited time frame for parents to

demonstrate their ability to be parents.” (cleaned up)). The mother’s argument

concerning proof of her commitment to progress has not evolved to evidence of

sufficient actual progress. We agree with the juvenile court that the State proved

the statutory requirements for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f)

and (h).

B. Best Interests

We turn to the question of the children’s best interests, which is our primary

concern in every termination case. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019).
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When deciding what outcome will serve those interests, we consider a child’s

safety, their long-term nurturing and growth, and their physical, mental, and

emotional needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). To that end, a parent’s past

performance “may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is

capable of providing.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (citation

omitted). For children in foster placements, we also consider their integration in

their new environment, Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b), mindful that the “need for a

permanent home” is an essential factor in the best-interests inquiry, see In re H.S.,

805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

The mother contends that termination was not in the girls’ best interests due

to the strength of their relationship with the mother and the detrimental impact of

severing that bond. We question this argument from its starting premise. K.P. has

resided with her current foster family since February 2023. L.P. has shared the

same placement since October 2023. Even during their short-lived trial home visit,

both girls continued to receive overnight and weekend foster care. At this point,

the girls have lived with their foster parents longer than they lived with their mother.

During a visit at the mother’s home in January 2025, K.P. asked a service provider

when her “mom and dad” would come to pick her up and take her home, referring

to her foster family. Simply put, it is not clear from the record that the girls share

the strong emotional attachment their mother asserts.

But even giving the mother the benefit of the doubt, we still cannot conclude

that the emotional hardship of termination outweighs the girls’ long-term need for

constant and capable parenting. They have enjoyed a stable, nurturing
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environment in their foster placement, which is pre-adoptive.6 By contrast,

attempts to preserve the mother’s rights have only served to delay permanency.

“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State

has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to

be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d

at 41. The juvenile court correctly concluded that termination of parental rights is

in the best interests of these children.

III. Conclusion

On our de novo review of the record, we find clear and convincing evidence

that these girls could not be returned to their mother’s custody at the time of the

termination hearing and that termination was in their best interests. We therefore

affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

6 We acknowledge the fact that the girls are not placed with their older brothers.

Although we have said that “wherever possible brothers and sisters should be kept
together,” each child’s best interests remain “the paramount concern.” In re T.J.O.,
527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Here, the guardian ad litem opined
that the benefits of termination outweighed the detriments of separating the girls
from their brothers. We agree, noting the record reflects concerns by some
caregivers that the younger boy’s behaviors have been harmful to the girls.