State of Iowa v. Daniel Anthony Lang

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0406
Filed October 29, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DANIEL ANTHONY LANG,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John Telleen, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction for sexual abuse in the second

degree, and the State asks this court to overrule State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101

(Iowa Ct. App. 1993). AFFIRMED.

Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered en banc without oral argument. Telleen, S.J., takes no part.
2

BULLER, Judge.

In this appeal by Daniel Lang, we confront a ghost from our court’s past—

State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). There, a divided panel of

our court vacated a jury verdict and reversed Smith’s convictions for sexually

abusing three children based on the panel majority’s view of the child victims’

credibility. Since then, Smith has been routinely criticized by our court and the

supreme court; it has never been followed; and its specter haunts our case law,

perpetuating myths or false beliefs about the dynamics and law surrounding sexual

abuse. Despite this, Lang invokes Smith in a bid for us to once again invade the

province of the factfinder and vacate the guilty verdict resulting from his bench trial.

We take this opportunity to overrule Smith and exorcise the decision from our

precedent. Lang’s convictions were supported by substantial evidence and

multiple credibility findings, so we must affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Z.S.’s mom started dating and moved in with Lang shortly after Z.S. was

born. Lang is not Z.S.’s biological father, but he acted as a self-described “father

figure” to her throughout her childhood during his on-again-off-again relationship

with her mom. Z.S.’s mom and Lang later had their own child, who was raised in

the house with Z.S. Two of Lang’s other children sometimes lived in the house.

And those children grew up with—but did not always live with—Z.S.’s older sister

C.H., who mostly lived with her dad.1

1 Although she was not a charged victim, we refer to C.H. either by initials or as

“Z.S.’s sister” to protect her privacy.
3

In July 2022, then-seven-year-old Z.S. disclosed to then-twelve-year-old

C.H. that Lang was sexually abusing her. The core of Z.S.’s report was that Lang

put his private parts in her “butt area” and her mouth. C.H. recalled that Z.S.

“seemed scared” when she described the abuse, and C.H. told Z.S. she needed

to tell an adult. That same day, Z.S. told her dad and his girlfriend, who called the

police. When telling her dad what happened, Z.S. described abuse involving her

“mouth” and “private parts on private parts.”

Z.S. was forensically interviewed at the child protection center in Muscatine.

Z.S.’s dad testified that he and his girlfriend did not discuss the abuse with Z.S.

before they went to the interview or medical examination, and the district court

believed him—“find[ing] absolutely no support for an argument that [Z.S.’s father]

somehow ginned up or encouraged false allegations by [Z.S.].”

During the forensic interview, Z.S. described and demonstrated what she

meant by “private parts.” She said she had seen Lang’s private part and that “he

does really bad stuff to me.” She said Lang would take his clothes off, take her

clothes off, and put his private part in her mouth. She said this happened more

than once in multiple locations and that this and other abuse started when she was

around three years old. Z.S. described how Lang would use his private part to

“pee” on her private parts and in her mouth. She said he made her “suck on it”

and that sometimes he used “lotion something” on their private parts, which made

them “wet” and “go back and forth smoothly.”2 She said Lang’s private part was

“squishy,” the “pee” and private part tasted “nasty,” and he made her swallow

2 Police later found a bottle of lubricant in Lang’s bedroom, consistent with what

Z.S. described in the forensic interview.
4

“every time he put it in [her] mouth.” She also explained that Lang put his mouth

on the “front” and the “back” of her private parts. He “would like put his tongue and

keep going back and forth” and she could hear “licking” noises. And he would “try

to kiss” her.

As part of the interview, Z.S. circled anatomical locations where Lang would

“pee” or inappropriately touch her: the chest, back, mouth, vagina, and anus. She

said she wanted Lang to stop but he didn’t. She said the abuse happened “a lot

of times.” And she said “it hurt,” both during the acts and when she went to the

bathroom after—both when she went “poop” and “pee.”

In trial testimony, Z.S.—then nine years old, in third grade—identified who

she lived with, when, and where. According to the district court’s fact findings, she

“noticeably g[o]t quieter or stiffen[ed]” when she was questioned about Lang. She

did not know or use adult anatomical terms for her body. She said private part

“number one” was where her “pee” came out and private part “number two” was

where “poop” comes out. And she testified that Lang did something to both of her

private parts.

Z.S. testified that Lang would take off her clothes, take off his clothes, then

put her stomach-down on the bed with her feet on the ground. She described how

Lang would stand behind her, then his private part where “pee” comes out would

touch her private part that goes “poop.” This happened more than once. And she

testified that, also more than once, Lang would put his “entire body” on top of her

and his “private part that goes number one” (penis) would touch her private part

that goes number one (vagina). Using similar language, she described her hand
5

touching Lang’s penis, again more than once. When asked if her mouth touched

any part of his body, she said at trial: “Not really.”

Z.S. told the court she did not tell her mom about the abuse because she

was afraid Lang would hurt her mom. She explained that Lang was “mean,” and

she had seen Lang hurt her mom before by twisting her body parts and “trying to

choke[3] her.” Z.S.’s mom confirmed the domestic abuse and “toxic” relationship in

her testimony, describing instances of Lang “choking” her and multiple Department

of Health and Human Services (HHS) investigations. So did Z.S.’s dad and C.H.

Z.S.’s mom also testified that Lang spent time alone with Z.S. during the

approximately eight years Lang was in their lives.

Z.S.’s mom confronted Lang after she learned of the abuse, and he denied

it. Lang packed up his things and moved out, leaving the children notes that Z.S.’s

mother understood to be goodbye messages referring to his guilt and the

probability he would not see them again. He soon sent messages to Z.S.’s mother

alluding to his guilt and suggesting he might kill himself, and he created what

appeared to be a suicide cocktail. He told arresting officers that “his life was

crashing down” and he “was contemplating suicide” by poison. The district court

found it “notable” the messages and statements did not include denials of the

abuse.

3 We use the word “choke” and its derivations because those were the words used

by witnesses at trial. However, we note the correct terminology would be
“strangled” given the witnesses’ description of the act. See Mary Pat Gunderson,
Gender and the Language of Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1,
11 (2019) (on how language matters and noting that describing acts of
strangulation as “choking” can minimize or mitigate the perpetrator’s actions).
6

An inmate who was formerly housed with Lang at the county jail testified

that Lang told him he was in jail for sexual assault charges, that Lang described

himself as a “piece of shit” who was “never going to see his kids again,” and that

Lang said he would be facing additional charges if police spoke to his other

children. Lang eventually gave the inmate more details about his victim, including

Z.S.’s name, that she was his girlfriend’s daughter, her age, and that the abuse

had been going on for more than three years. Lang told the inmate he started

abusing Z.S. to get back at Z.S.’s mother. And Lang eventually described specific

sex acts to the inmate, including that he masturbated with Z.S. on top of him,

performed “oral sex” and “penetration,” and that he set up cameras to record her

with the purpose of selling child pornography online. The details were so graphic

and specific the inmate started taking notes with the goal of sharing information

with law enforcement. Although the inmate entered into a cooperation agreement

with the county attorney, he ultimately was sentenced to prison on his pending

charges before trial. The district court credited the inmate’s testimony because the

inmate “had nothing to gain” and “[t]he court believed him when he stated he just

thought it was the right thing to do.” Police also independently corroborated some

of the inmate’s testimony with Lang’s jail calls, which the inmate overheard and

later described.

A pediatrician specializing in child abuse explained at trial that, although no

acute physical injuries were found during a medical examination of Z.S., this was

not inconsistent with Z.S.’s report of sexual abuse.

The defense called a different child protection center employee to testify

that Lang brought a different child to the center based on some sexual behaviors.
7

And HHS workers testified that Z.S. did not spontaneously disclose the abuse

when they were investigating the family for other reasons. Lang testified to conflict

between him and Z.S.’s mother, including his guilty pleas to domestically abusing

her and his uncharged allegation that she domestically abused him. He denied

sexually abusing Z.S., making admissions to the inmate, and that the goodbye

messages were an admission or confession of guilt. And he cast vague aspersions

on other men who might have been around Z.S. during the charged time period.

Lang admitted he was planning to attempt suicide when arrested and that he failed

to show up for a scheduled police interview. He agreed with his attorney that, in

watching the recorded forensic interview, Z.S. appeared to be describing things

that were outside the knowledge of a seven-year-old child. And he agreed with

the assistant county attorney that Z.S. “appeared to be describing things that she

actually experienced and felt with her body.” In Lang’s words, the forensic

interview was “shocking” and “nauseating.”

In resolving conflicting evidence and weighing Z.S.’s and other witnesses’

testimony against Lang’s denial, the district court—in a thirty-four-page written

verdict—credited Z.S. and the inmate’s testimony and did not believe Lang.

Specifically, the court made detailed credibility findings about Z.S. based on her

trial testimony and her forensic interview. The court found Z.S.’s forensic

“interview as a whole . . . very compelling and credible.” And the court found Z.S.’s

in-person testimony “very credible,” concluding she “did not at all appear to

exaggerate nor was there any questioning to indicate that [an] adult was putting

words in her mouth.” “The court was convinced [Z.S.] knew very well the difference

between a truth and a lie. The court was alert for any signs that her father, mother
8

or anyone else had put her up to telling stories and the court [found] there was no

indication of that.” In sum, the court was “of the very firm opinion” that Z.S.

described sexual abuse and “that sexual abuse in fact happened to this little girl.”

The court found Z.S.’s report of abuse “to be entirely credible” and discerned no

pressure or coercion affecting her testimony.

In weighing Lang’s testimony, “[t]he court did not find his denials remotely

convincing.” And the court expressly rejected defense theories that Z.S. was

coached, that Z.S. shouldn’t be trusted because she didn’t disclose earlier, that

Z.S. confused sexual abuse perpetrated by another offender with acts committed

by Lang, and that the lack of acute physical findings undermined Z.S.’s account.

The court also considered whether allegedly “inconsistent” statements by Z.S.

warranted acquittal, and the court noted it was “not surprised that her testimony in

an intimidating courtroom with a judge in a black robe might be somewhat different

than the details provided to a trained social service worker in a more comfortable

setting.”

The court found Lang guilty of three counts of sexual abuse in the second

degree, class “B” felonies in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b) and (2)

(2022). And the court sentenced Lang to prison. He appeals, challenging only the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

II. Standard of Review

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law.

See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether

the [factfinder]’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and
9

presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record

evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). We do not require corroboration of victim

testimony, nor do we substitute our view of the evidence for that of the factfinder.

State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).

III. Discussion

Lang frames the sole issue on appeal as: “Were [Z.S.]’s testimony and

statements self-contradictory and absurd to the point that they could not convince

a rational fact finder that Lang is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?” The lynchpin

of his argument is State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). In

response, the State of Iowa urges “Smith should be overturned and left in the ash

heap of history: it permits defendants to perpetuate arguments that are both legally

unsound and unsupported by our modern understanding of sexual abuse victims.”

We consider first the vitality of Smith, then Lang’s sufficiency challenge.

A. Revisiting Smith

According to the State’s brief, “Smith has been widely panned” by our court

and the supreme court. We agree.

In recent years, the supreme court has described Smith as “an outlier case”

that “has been criticized in the commentary, and it has not been followed in any

sexual abuse case in Iowa since.” State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518

(Iowa 2022). That court went on to opine that the “primary flaw” in Smith was a

misapplication of the standard of review when this court substituted its judgment

for the jury’s verdict rather than deferring to it by viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to guilt. Id. In another decision, the supreme court repeated this

criticism, describing Smith as “inconsistent with our appellate standard[s].” State
10

v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 436–37 (Iowa 2023). And even in decisions that do not

overtly swing at Smith, the supreme court has employed language irreconcilable

with Smith’s holding. See, e.g., State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2021)

(“[A defendant]’s argument that [the victim]’s testimony is not credible enough to

convince a rational fact finder of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unavailing

for sufficiency of the evidence purposes.”).

The criticism from our court has come from a majority of active and senior

judges. We collected many of these cases in State v. Showers, No. 23-0390, 2024

WL 2317709, at *4–5 & n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024). We observed:

Along with our supreme court’s directive over the ill-advised use of
the Smith case, each decision departing from or declining to follow
Smith is an implicit recognition of the incorrect reasoning employed
in that decision. As our decisions over the last thirty years suggest,
we have not returned to the flawed analysis found in Smith.

Showers, 2024 WL 2317709, at *5. And we highlight just a few observations from

our unpublished decisions that we think are representative of the fundamental

flaws we see in Smith:

• “In the more than thirty years since it was decided, Smith has become an
anomaly in our case law . . . .” State v. Fairchild, No. 23-2090, 2024
WL 5153704, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024).
• “Smith draw[s] on archaic concepts about sexual abuse to support its
decision, but it also glosse[s] over the gatekeeping concepts that must
frame our analysis.” Showers, 2024 WL 2317709, at *5.
• “[O]ur supreme court has flagged Smith as ‘an outlier case’ because it flouts
the deferential appellate review of verdicts and the factfinder’s resolution of
disputed factual issues.” State v. Duran-Sierra, No. 21-1312, 2023
WL 2148743, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2023) (citation omitted).
• “[W]e view any reliance on the limited exception mentioned in . . . Smith to
be shaky at best.” State v. Lopez Escoto, No. 24-0744, 2025 WL 2058047,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025).
11

Perhaps most telling on Smith’s vitality, we have now been asked to apply Smith

when reviewing convictions more than eighty times, and we have never applied

that case to reverse a conviction. See Showers, 2024 WL 2317709, at *5 n.4

(noting seventy-seven cases declining to follow Smith); see also State v. Davis,

No. 24-0837, 2025 WL 2803725, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025); Lopez Escoto,

2025 WL 2058047, at *2; State v. Sahr, No. 23-1920, 2025 WL 2057913, at *2–3

(Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025); State v. Shogren, No. 23-2085, 2025 WL 1704077

at *5 & n.5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025); State v. Brown, No. 23-2127, 2025 WL

1177589, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2025); State v. Fisher, No. 23-1140, 2025

WL 400511, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025); Fairchild, 2024 WL 5153704, at *4.

Our court has questioned “whether Smith even remains a viable precedent.”

State v. Ross, No. 20-0914, 2022 WL 3440701, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Aug. 17, 2022); accord Davis, 2025 WL 2803725, at *2 (“We doubt Smith is good

law.”). And a commentator recently observed: “The vitality of Smith and cases like

it is doubtful after State v. Trane, in which the [Iowa Supreme] Court noted that it

is within the discretion of the court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” 4A B. John

Burns, Iowa Practice Series: Criminal Procedure § 31:2 (2025 ed.) (internal

footnote omitted).

There is perhaps an argument that the supreme court has implicitly

overruled Smith and our court doesn’t need to take any further action. But in

practice, Smith is causing problems. Even after the supreme court heavily

criticized Smith in Mathis and Trane, criminal defendants continue to “insist[] it

remains controlling law in the absence of an opinion expressly overruling it.”

Fisher, 2025 WL 400511, at *2 (cleaned up); see also State v. Schondelmeyer,
12

No. 14-0621, 2015 WL 1817030, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (noting the

defendant’s “claim relies heavily on this court’s decision in” Smith). And we have

to keep writing qualified statements like “[e]ven assuming Smith remains good

law.” E.g., State v. Veverka, No. 22-0255, 2023 WL 5949004, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.

Sept. 13, 2023). So, we understand why the State keeps asking us to formally

overrule Smith rather than dodge the question.4 Ultimately, we think we should

clean up our own case law rather than letting time continue to erode Smith as a

never-followed and often-criticized decision. We highlight just a few reasons why

it’s time to formally bury Smith and clarify the law going forward.

First and most importantly, the “primary flaw” in Smith is a misapplication of

appellate standards of review. See Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 518; Trane, 984 N.W.2d

at 436–37. “[W]e have never permitted appellate courts to masquerade as jurors.”

State v. Hagenow, No. 22-1958, 2024 WL 2042137, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8,

2024). And credibility questions are reserved for the factfinder, such that we do

not reverse criminal convictions because of disagreements over whether testimony

was believable. See Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 507–08. What this court did in

Smith cannot be reconciled with these fundamental principles of appellate review.

See Trane, 984 N.W.2d at 436–37.

Second, we think the analysis in Smith embraces stereotypes, myths, or

other false beliefs about sexual abuse—including an unreasonable expectation

that victims of sexual abuse will have perfect memory. “Inconsistencies and lack

4 Exemplar cases citing some of the State’s requests include Showers, 2024
WL 2317709, at *1; State v. Atkins, No. 20-0488, 2021 WL 3895198, at *3 n.4
(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2021); and State v. Cardona, No. 19-1047, 2020 WL
1888770, at *2 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).
13

of detail are common in sexual abuse cases and do not compel a [factfinder] to

conclude that the victim is not credible or that there is insufficient evidence to

support a guilty verdict.” Donahue, 957 N.W.2d at 11. Particularly with minor

victims, “uncertainty or lack of detail from a child witness is no surprise.” State v.

Wilde, 987 N.W.2d 486, 495 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). As our supreme court said

fifty-five years ago: “A person should not be able to escape punishment for such a

disgusting crime because he has chosen to take carnal knowledge of an infant too

young to testify clearly as to the time and details of such shocking activity.” State

v. Rankin, 181 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Iowa 1970). And as we observed more recently:

“We do not require victims of child sex abuse to recall every detail with perfect

clarity, and in fact, they rarely do.” Hagenow, 2024 WL 2042137, at *6. We

disapprove of Smith and any of its progeny that embrace myths or stereotypes

about sexual abuse dynamics.

Third, one plausible reading of Smith is that it was a thinly veiled attempt at

reviving the corroboration requirement. This is supported by the Smith majority’s

repeated recitations that the “the only evidence against appellant is the statements

and testimony of the three girls,” that there was no “physical evidence of abuse

found in a careful medical examination,” that there were no eyewitnesses “other

than the girls themselves,” and that “no one who was in the room at the time saw

or heard anything.” 508 N.W.2d at 103–05. Yet Iowa law abandoned the

corroboration requirement more than fifty years ago. Iowa Code § 782.4

(repealed 1974). And for good reason: “This requirement for corroborating

evidence ‘plays on long-held myths that rape victims—and women more

generally—cannot be trusted.’” State v. Barnhardt, No. 17-0496, 2018
14

WL 2230938, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (citation omitted). The lack of

corroboration for victim testimony is irrelevant to a sufficiency analysis, which

assumes the jury credited victim testimony absent corroboration. Id.; see also

State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 742 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“The law has

abandoned any notion that a rape victim’s accusation must be corroborated.”);

Iowa Code § 709.6 (2022); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3). And the law neither requires

nor expects evidence of physical injury or resistance. Cf. Iowa Code § 709.5

(“Under the provisions of this chapter it shall not be necessary to establish physical

resistance by a person in order to establish that an act of sexual abuse was

committed by force or against the will of the person.”). We cannot reconcile the

language in Smith with these principles of black-letter Iowa law. And we hold that

the Smith court’s decision to reverse convictions in part based on lack of

corroboration was clearly erroneous under the law then and now.5

Fourth, another plausible reading of Smith is that our court conflated a

weight-of-the-evidence challenge (which considers credibility and can result in a

new trial) with a sufficiency challenge (which does not consider credibility and can

5 We acknowledge some of our unpublished decisions point to corroborating
evidence as a reason to distinguish Smith. See, e.g., State v. Mayes, No. 19-0252,
2020 WL 2060306, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020) (“And, unlike in Smith,
physical evidence corroborated [the victim]’s allegation.”); Schondelmeyer, 2015
WL 1817030, at *4 (rejecting sufficiency challenge in part because “[e]ach girl’s
testimony corroborates the other’s”); State v. Wagner, No. 01-1232, 2002
WL 1758180, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. July 31, 2002) (distinguishing Smith in part
because the victim’s “testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other
circumstantial and direct evidence in the record”). We recognize this kind of
language may have perpetuated the implication that corroborating evidence is
required, which is wrong as a matter of law. So we disavow this and similar
language in our case law to the extent it suggests the testimony of a crime victim
must or should be corroborated to support a conviction.
15

result in acquittal with double jeopardy barring retrial). See State v. Ellis, 578

N.W.2d 655, 657–59 (Iowa 1998) (on the difference between the two); Tibbs v.

Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982) (explaining how weight-of-the-evidence review is

consistent with the Due Process Clause). Or, as the State says more colorfully in

its brief, Smith may be “a weight of the evidence case dressed in sufficiency

clothing.” We have acknowledged this possibility before. Shogren, 2025

WL 1704077, at *5 n.5. And we find this error also supports formally overruling

Smith, given the frequent “recurring issue of criminal appellants conflating motions

for new trial and motions for judgment of acquittal.” See State v. Moore,

No. 24-0341, 2025 WL 1704319, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (Buller, J.,

specially concurring). To the extent Smith has contributed to the confusion, we

add this to the list of reasons Smith should not linger on.

On the other side of the ledger, Lang contends “Smith is an important safety

valve” for cases where testimony is so unbelievable it is “nothing but a nullity.” And

he claims, “[t]he State’s criticism of Smith is exaggerated.” We disagree with both

premises. Taking the second first, we share most or all of the concerns about

Smith advanced by the State, as evidenced by the cases cited above from this

court and our supreme court. We do not think those opinions exaggerate the flaws

in Smith. As for the safety-valve argument, that is the function of a district court

deciding a motion for new trial—not a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State

v. Jones, No. 23-2013, 2025 WL 271942, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2025)

(“Rule 2.24(2)(b)(7) is a safety valve, allowing courts to grant a new trial to avoid

a miscarriage of justice when the evidence preponderates heavily against the

verdict.”); accord Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 658–59. To the extent Lang insists Smith is
16

a “safety valve,” that too supports us disavowing Smith to clarify the safety valve

exists in the form of new-trial motions, not sufficiency review.

As a final observation, we note our analysis and ultimate conclusion here

do not displace existing supreme court precedent deriving from Graham v. Chicago

& Northwestern Railway Co., 119 N.W. 708, 711 (Iowa 1909), in which a witness

gave blatantly contradictory testimony at two separate trials. It is not within our

power to overrule Graham even if we wanted to, though we recognize a fair

application of cases like Hernandez, Mathis, and Trane may exclude application

of Graham in circumstances other than retrial. But that case’s modern vitality is

for a different court to decide another day.

In short, Smith has long overstayed its welcome as controlling precedent.

It was wrong when it was decided, and it is wrong now. It has never been followed,

and it is irreconcilable with our standards of review as a court for correction of

errors at law. Despite this, its problematic holding has persisted in briefing,

requiring us to distance ourselves from the decision again and again. We therefore

expressly overrule Smith and disavow its reasoning for the reasons set forth in this

opinion.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Having overruled Smith, we are left with a routine challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence. The core of Lang’s complaint is that the factfinder

shouldn’t have believed Z.S. absent corroboration. “The argument we should

reverse because there was no corroborating evidence is a non-starter.”

Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 507. So too for Lang’s complaint that the court should

have believed his denial rather than Z.S.’s account of the abuse (in testimony and
17

the interview) or the inmate’s recitation of his confession. See id. at 507–08 (“A

criminal defendant is not entitled to acquittal merely because he wishes the jury

had believed him instead of the victim.”). We decline to substitute our judgment

for that of the district court, and we defer to that court’s detailed and explicit

credibility findings.

In the interest of completeness, and to respond directly to some of Lang’s

appellate contentions, we observe we would affirm even without the detailed

credibility findings made by the district court. We watched Z.S.’s forensic interview

and find it compelling—as Lang admitted in his trial testimony. The interview is

replete with details beyond the ordinary understanding of a child. And Z.S.’s

description of the abuse includes vivid sensory details. The forensic interview was

more detailed than Z.S.’s trial testimony, and we tend to agree with the district

court’s suggested theory why—the courtroom is a scary place for many adults, let

alone children, and it is no surprise that a child victim would be more forthcoming

in a comfortable room with a trained forensic interviewer than in a sterile,

intimidating courtroom filled with lawyers and a judge.6 And although corroborating

evidence was not required, we observe Z.S.’s testimony was strongly supported

6 In addition to the district court’s comments we quoted earlier in this opinion, it

observed in ruling on the admissibility of the forensic interview that it was not
surprised the recording detailed “far more extensive [sex] acts, different types of
acts, different levels of specificity of the acts” than Z.S.’s in-court testimony. The
court noted:
When you think about it, that type of testimony is simply not
available in court. The courts don’t have time to have a child sit with
markers and pens and papers and playing with Play-Doh and making
the child feel comfortable and allowing all this detail to come out over
a lengthy interview. Courts are not set up for that. This interview—
this interview was.
We agree and think this point well-said.
18

by the confession made to the inmate, as well as Lang’s post-disclosure conduct

that tended to suggest consciousness of guilt. See State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d

557, 562 (Iowa 1995) (“Admissions may be implied by the conduct of the defendant

subsequent to a crime when such conduct indicates a consciousness of guilt.”).

Given the materially consistent disclosures Z.S. made to her sister, her dad,

her dad’s girlfriend, the forensic interviewer, and the court, as well as the

supporting evidence from the inmate and Lang’s admissions and conduct, we

reject Lang’s contention that Z.S.’s testimony should be rendered a “nullity.” We

conclude Lang’s conviction was supported by substantial, if not overwhelming,

evidence.

IV. Disposition

We expressly overrule Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 102, finding this court

misapplied the standards of appellate review and that we cannot permit that

decision to shamble on in our case law. And we affirm Lang’s convictions as

supported by substantial if not overwhelming evidence.

AFFIRMED.

Greer, Chicchelly, and Langholz, JJ., concur; Sandy, J., specially concurs;

Tabor, C.J., specially concurs with Schumacher, Ahlers, and Badding, JJ., joining.
19

SANDY, Judge (specially concurring).

I write separately because I believe the majority analysis should start and

end with the following:

[T]he “primary flaw” in Smith[, 508 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)]
is a misapplication of appellate standards of review. See[ State v.]
Mathis, 971 N.W.2d [514,] 518[ (Iowa 2022)]; [State v. ]Trane, 984
N.W.2d [429,] 436–37[ (Iowa 2023)]. “[W]e have never permitted
appellate courts to masquerade as jurors.” State v. Hagenow,
No. 22-1958, 2024 WL 2042137, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024).
And credibility questions are reserved for the factfinder, such that we
do not reverse criminal convictions because of disagreements over
whether testimony was believable. See [State v. ]Hernandez, 20
N.W.3d [502,] 507–08[ (Iowa 2025)]. What this court did in Smith
cannot be reconciled with these fundamental principles of appellate
review. See Trane, 984 N.W.2d at 436–37.

Judicial minimalism is the judicial philosophy that judges should take the narrowest

possible action necessary to resolve a specific dispute, rather than issuing broad,

sweeping decisions that create unintended consequences. See Cass R. Sunstein,

One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 3–4 (1999). I

agree that Smith should be overruled simply for the reason stated above.
20

TABOR, C.J. (specially concurring).

I agree with the result reached by the main decision because the testimony

of Z.S. provided substantial evidence to support the district court’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

But I disagree with the extra step of overruling a three-decades-old outlier

case. Overruling State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), is

unnecessary to resolve Lang’s appeal. And doing so undermines the due-process

review required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (confirming an

essential element of due process is “that no person shall be made to suffer the

onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence

necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence

of every element of the offense”). Honoring the principle of judicial restraint, I

would reject the State’s request to overrule Smith, as our court has done before.

See State v. Showers, No. 23-0390, 2024 WL 2317709, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 22, 2024).

To be clear, I agree that Smith misapplied the standard and lacked our

modern understanding about child sex abuse victims. See, e.g., State v. Donahue,

957 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2021) (“Inconsistencies and lack of detail are common in

sexual abuse cases and do not compel a jury to conclude that the victim is not

credible or that there is insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.”).

Yet my concern with overruling Smith is two-fold. First, it’s not clear what

we’re overruling. Smith properly recognized that as a rule, “it is for the jury to

determine the credibility of witnesses,” but applied an “exception” that “[t]he
21

supreme court established” in its precedents. 508 N.W.2d at 102–03. As far as I

can tell, Smith doesn’t announce a new rule.

Which brings me to my second concern. Are we overstepping our bounds

in overruling Smith? True, we can overrule our own cases. See, e.g., In re

Marriage of Campbell, 623 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). But so can the

supreme court. See, e.g., State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 210 (Iowa 2013).

And when the State recently asked our supreme court to overrule Smith, the court

declined—instead describing it as “an outlier case” and distinguishing its factual

analysis. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022) (“[U]nlike Smith, there

are no fatal contradictions or deficiencies in either B.T.’s or L.S.’s testimony.”).

Thus, Mathis signals that in the rare case where an appellate court did find

“fatal contradictions or deficiencies” in a witness’s testimony, it could afford the

defendant relief. Id. That reading of Mathis tracks with the observation that Iowa

follows an “inherent improbability” standard for evaluating witness credibility. See

State v. Robbins, 210 P.3d 288, 293−94 (Utah 2009) (listing Iowa among

jurisdictions that have adopted that standard and announcing that “[t]o prevent

unappealable injustice, we hold that the definition of inherently improbable must

include circumstances where a witness’s testimony is incredibly dubious and, as

such, apparently false”).

So, does overruling Smith abandon the “inherent improbability” standard as

a narrow exception to the rule that appellate courts leave credibility determinations

to the factfinder? Assuming it does, is that standard ours to abandon or should

such a significant change be reserved for our supreme court? After all, the bedrock

cases in Smith are supreme court precedents. See Graham v. Chicago & Nw. Ry.
22

Co., 119 N.W. 708, 711 (Iowa 1909) (“This court has gone its full length to protect

the right of jury trial against encroachment by the courts under any guise, and one

of the rights of jury trial is the right to have the credibility of the witness determined

by the jury. Generally speaking there are no limitations upon this rule, but there

are limitations upon the application of it. The testimony of a witness may be so

impossible and absurd and self-contradictory that it should be deemed a nullity by

the court.”); State ex rel. Mochnick v. Andrioli, 249 N.W. 379, 380 (Iowa 1933)

(“The rule that it is for the jury to reconcile the conflicting testimony of a witness

does not apply where the only evidence in support of a controlling fact is that of a

witness who so contradicts himself as to render finding of facts thereon a mere

guess.”). These lingering questions underscore the trouble with overruling Smith.

Beyond those questions, in my view, the main decision too readily discounts

Lang’s perspective that Smith serves as “a safety valve” available to prevent a

miscarriage of justice in rare cases “where a fact-finder convicts on something

other than substantial evidence.”7 Indeed, many jurisdictions recognize such a

safety valve in sufficiency challenges. See, e.g., Hillman v. State, 569 S.W.3d 372,

375–76 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019) (“The victim’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact,

is sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt. Any inconsistencies in the victim’s

7 The main decision suggests that Lang’s safety valve would be to challenge the

denial of a motion for new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds rather than this
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa
1998). But the possibility of a new-trial challenge does not mean sufficiency review
is unavailable where evidence is incredible as a matter of law. See generally
United States v. Larsen, 427 F.3d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Testimony can
indeed be incredible as a matter of law . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); United
States v. Truman, 688 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that motion for
judgment of acquittal may be proper challenge if testimony is “incredible on its
face” or “def[ies] physical realities” (citations omitted)).
23

account of what happened are for the fact-finder to resolve, not our court on

appeal. We will disregard testimony that the fact-finder has found credible only if

it is so inherently improbable, physically impossible, or so clearly unbelievable that

reasonable minds could not differ about it.” (internal citations omitted)); People v.

Young, 105 P.3d 487, 505 (Cal. 2005) (“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence,

a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts.

Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive

province of the trier of fact. Moreover, unless the testimony is physically

impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to

support a conviction.” (internal citations omitted)); People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286,

289 (Colo. App. 2004) (“[T]he fact finder, not an appellate court, determines the

credibility of witnesses, and only when testimony is so palpably incredible and so

totally unbelievable may we reject it as a matter of law. Testimony is incredible as

a matter of law when a witness describes events she could not possibly have seen

or that are not possible under the laws of nature.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)); R.W. v. United States, 958 A.2d 259, 264 (D.C. 2008) (“Although

the determination of credibility is for the finder of fact, and is entitled to substantial

deference, the one exception to this general rule is if the testimony of a witness is

inherently incredible under the circumstances.” (cleaned up)); Patton v. State, 43

S.E. 533, 534 (Ga. 1903) (“In testing the sufficiency of evidence this court cannot

consider the credibility of the witness; that being a matter exclusively for the jury,

who note their manner of testifying, and consider the thousand and one things

transpiring during a trial, and which cannot be photographed or transcribed and

transmitted to this court as a part of the record. But while it cannot consider the
24

credibility of a witness, it must consider the nature and character of his testimony—

whether it is in accord with natural laws, or is improbable, incredible, or seeks to

establish facts which are impossible, or which, if not impossible, must, in their very

nature, be uncertain, vague, indefinite, and insufficient to remove reasonable

doubts.”); Toles v. State, 151 N.E.3d 805, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“We do not

judge witness credibility. There is only one exception to this rule: the incredible-

dubiosity doctrine, under which we can impinge upon a factfinder’s responsibility

to judge the credibility of the witnesses when the testimony is so incredibly dubious

or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Hamdan, 131 So. 3d 197, 204 (La.

Ct. App. 2013) (“In our review, we are highly deferential to the trier of fact. Thus,

we assume that the jury can accept as true the testimony alone of any witness,

even a single witness. We will only tread on a jury’s presumed acceptance of a

witness’ testimony when the testimony is implausible or clearly contrary to

documentary evidence.” (internal citations omitted)); People v. Delamota, 960

N.E.2d 383, 387 (N.Y. 2011) (recognizing that the appellate court can reverse

convictions “in rare cases where the charged crime is established by only one

witness who provides inherently contradictory testimony at trial”); State v. Hornsby,

858 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tenn. 1993) (“The so-called physical facts rule is the

accepted proposition that in cases where the testimony of a witness is entirely

irreconcilable with the physical evidence, the testimony can be disregarded.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Dever, 508 P.3d 158, 165

(Utah Ct. App. 2022) (“Appellate courts are not normally in the business of

reassessing or reweighing evidence, and conflicts in the evidence are typically
25

resolved in favor of the jury verdict. However, because a conviction not based on

substantial reliable evidence cannot stand, our supreme court has carved out a

narrow exception to this general rule, under which a court may disregard witness

testimony as inherently improbable when determining if sufficient evidence exists

to sustain a conviction.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v.

Schmidt, 884 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (“This court will only substitute

its judgment for that of the trier of fact when the fact finder relied upon evidence

that was inherently or patently incredible—that kind of evidence which conflicts

with the laws of nature or with fully-established or conceded facts.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

As all these jurisdictions envision, only the extremely rare case would fall

into the exception. So deference to the factfinder will continue to dominate our

sufficiency reviews, as it has in the decades since Smith.

To sum up, I would affirm because substantial evidence supports the verdict

and Smith can be easily distinguished. But I would leave Smith intact. Whether

to overturn Smith or to disavow the precedents that underlie it is the prerogative of

the supreme court.