State of Iowa v. Allysa Marie Luke, n/k/a Allysa Marie Joyce, a/k/a Allysa Marie Larson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0809
Filed August 20, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ALLYSA MARIE LUKE, a/k/a ALLYSA MARIE JOYCE, n/k/a ALLYSA MARIE
LARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,

DeDra Schroeder, Judge.

A defendant appeals her convictions for child endangerment resulting in

death and child endangerment resulting in serious injury. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

Allysa Luke gave birth to twin boys—A.L. and B.L.—in early

December 2020. A.L. died from malnourishment on February 28, 2021. B.L. was

still alive but greatly malnourished. The State charged Luke with two crimes:

(1) child endangerment resulting in death as to A.L.; and (2) child endangerment

resulting in serious injury as to B.L. A jury found her guilty of both crimes, and the

district court sentenced her to concurrent sentences that resulted in an

indeterminate prison sentence not to exceed fifty years.

Luke appeals. She raises four claims: (1) the evidence was insufficient to

support the jury’s verdicts on both charges; (2) the district court abused its

discretion by denying her motion for new trial based on the claim that the verdict

was contrary to the weight of the evidence; (3) the district court abused its

discretion by denying her motion for new trial based on admission of cumulative

autopsy photos; and (4) the district court abused its discretion by denying her

motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.1

Before addressing each issue in turn, we start with some factual background.

1 These are the issues we can discern from Luke’s brief. Throughout her brief,
Luke sprinkles references to various constitutional provisions and other issues
generally related to the four issues we’ve identified. To the extent Luke was
intending to assert additional challenges, we decline to address them because they
were not preserved or are forfeited due to Luke’s failure to properly identify,
develop, or cite authority in support of the issues. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d
298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (finding a party forfeits an issue on appeal when the party
fails to clearly identify it, fails to make an argument in support of it, fails to make
more than a perfunctory argument in support of it, or fails to cite authority in support
of it); see also State v. Wilson, No. 21-1287, 2022 WL 17481348, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 7, 2022) (declining to consider undeveloped issues sprinkled throughout
a brief).
3

I. Factual Background

The boys were born premature. Luke took them to their physician for a one-

month weight and wellness check on January 14. Both were gaining weight and

were noted to be alert, healthy, and meeting developmental milestones. The

doctor reminded Luke that she needed to follow a specified feeding schedule, and

Luke assured the doctor that she was doing so.

About eleven days later, Luke began new full-time employment. Luke’s

mother or aunt typically watched the twins while Luke worked. Luke took the twins

to their doctor for their two-month wellness check on February 16 and reported no

concerns. But the doctor had “moderately high” concerns because the twins had

not gained sufficient weight. In fact, A.L. had lost weight. The doctor told Luke

she needed to increase the twins’ feedings. Because Luke was breastfeeding, the

doctor directed her to pump her breast milk and feed from a bottle so the twins’

intake could be measured. The doctor also told Luke to supplement with formula

if needed to meet the increased intake amount the doctor had set. The doctor

advised that if the twins did not meet that intake amount, they would need to be

hospitalized to ensure sufficient feeding. The doctor also offered to assist Luke

with getting formula through the WIC program.2

When Luke contacted WIC the next day, she was told she qualified to

receive funds that would provide eighteen cans of formula per month. But Luke

only purchased four of the eighteen cans she was eligible to purchase in February.

2 A witness testified that WIC stands for “Women, Infants, and Children” and it is a

supplemental food program designed to help with basic food needs and support
for “women who are pregnant or post-partum, breastfeeding women, infants, and
then children up until the age of five.”
4

The twins’ doctor was so concerned about their lack of weight gain that the

doctor scheduled a follow-up appointment for February 19—only three days after

the prior visit. That appointment took place by phone. During the call, Luke

assured the doctor that the twins were receiving the amount of breast milk and

formula that the doctor recommended. Luke expressed no concerns about the

twins’ health or their feeding. The doctor was “reassured by that information” and

was hopeful the twins could go back to a regular feeding schedule at some point,

but the doctor scheduled an expedited weight check visit for February 26. Due to

an unspecified scheduling conflict, that appointment was rescheduled for March 1.

On February 28, Luke was in the process of moving from one residence to

another. She and a friend were working on the move overnight from February 27

to 28, so the twins stayed with Luke’s mother. Luke and the friend picked the twins

up around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. and took them to Luke’s new residence. Luke left the

twins in their car seats because they were sleeping. She straightened up the

apartment in anticipation of a visit from a service provider affiliated with the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services. When the provider arrived, she saw

the twins in their car seats but did not observe their condition because they were

covered with blankets. One appeared to be asleep. After the provider left, Luke’s

friend ran an errand and returned. About thirty minutes after the friend returned,

Luke left to deal with a situation involving her relatives and was gone for about an

hour. The twins remained in their car seats.

When Luke returned, she noticed A.L. wasn’t breathing. She screamed and

called 911. The friend attempted CPR at the direction of the 911 operator, but A.L.

was lifeless and nonresponsive.
5

Emergency responders arrived at 1:26 p.m. A.L. was blue or purple in color

and was “limp and lifeless.” One of the responders started CPR but rigor mortis

had already set in, leading the responder to conclude A.L. had died before his

arrival. Nevertheless, responders continued CPR and transported A.L. to the

hospital, where he was determined to be dead at the time of arrival.

Law enforcement officers arrived at the residence and the hospital. Their

investigation revealed that B.L. was not in good condition either. He was pale and

hardly breathing. He was also cold to the touch, and his mouth was crusty and felt

like “hard, dry plastic.” Immediate efforts were taken to try to feed B.L., but after

scouring “the entire apartment, top to bottom, every room, pull[ing] out every

drawer, every cabinet in the kitchen,” a baby bottle could not be found anywhere.

Luke and her mother arrived while the search for a bottle was underway, and Luke

couldn’t produce a bottle either. B.L. was admitted to the hospital and ultimately

diagnosed with severe malnutrition. Officers later searched the old residence, the

new residence, Luke’s vehicle, and the trash for empty formula cans, used breast-

milk bags, and baby bottles, but they did not find any.

The autopsy of A.L. revealed that he had lost weight since his doctor visit

on February 16. The coroner determined the cause of death to be malnourishment

and the manner of death to be homicide.

Criminal charges ensued, resulting in the convictions previously described.
6

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Luke challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions.3

Our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Schwartz, 7 N.W.3d 756, 763

(Iowa 2024). We do not disturb a guilty finding if it is supported by substantial

evidence, which is evidence sufficient to convince a rational juror that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 764. In making this

assessment, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State,

including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably

be deduced from the record evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).

No objections were made to the jury instructions, so they are the law of the

case for purposes of assessing Luke’s sufficiency challenge. Id. The marshaling

instruction for the charge related to the death of A.L. required the State to prove:

1. Between and including the 9th day of December, 2020, and the
28th day of February, 2021, Alyssa Luke was the parent or
guardian of [A.L.].
2. [A.L.] was under the age of fourteen years.

3 Although Luke partly frames her sufficiency challenge as a claim that the district

court erred in denying her motion in arrest of judgment and motion for new trial,
we reject that framework because sufficiency challenges cannot be raised in such
motions. See State v. Mumford, 14 N.W.3d 346, 356 (Iowa 2024) (“A motion in
arrest of judgment may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of evidence.”
(quoting State v. Dallen, 452 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1990))); State v. Stendrup,
983 N.W.2d 231, 246 (Iowa 2022) (noting that the Iowa Rules of Criminal
Procedure allow a defendant to request a new trial when the verdict is “contrary to
law or evidence,” which means “contrary to the weight of the evidence”).
Sufficiency challenges cannot be made by a motion for new trial because the
remedy for insufficient evidence is acquittal, not a new trial. See State v. Ellis, 578
N.W.2d 655, 657–58 (Iowa 1998). So, we do not address Luke’s sufficiency-of-
the-evidence challenge through the lens of reviewing the district court’s denial of
her motions in arrest of judgment or for new trial. By going to trial, Luke is permitted
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal notwithstanding any
rulings on her motions in arrest of judgment or for new trial. See State v. Crawford,
972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022).
7

3. Alyssa Luke knowingly acted in a manner that created a
substantial risk to the physical health or safety of [A.L.] or Alyssa
Luke willfully deprived [A.L.] of necessary food or health care,
Alyssa Luke was reasonably able to provide necessary food or
health care, and this deprivation substantially harmed [A.L.]’s
physical health.
4. Alyssa Luke’s actions resulted in the death of [A.L.].

Other than the name, the marshaling instruction for the charge related to the

serious injury of B.L. was identical, except the fourth element required proof that

Luke’s actions resulted in serious injury rather than death.

Luke challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the third and fourth

elements of both charges. In pared-down form, she contends the evidence of

these elements is insufficient because: (1) the State failed to prove that A.L. died

from malnutrition caused by Luke’s failure to feed him rather than from other

medical conditions; (2) the State failed to prove that Luke willfully failed to properly

feed the twins; (3) other people, including an in-home service provider, failed to

notice that the twins were malnourished, so Luke was not alerted to the need for

medical attention or increased feeding; (4) the State failed to prove that another

caregiver—Luke’s mother—was not responsible for the malnourishment of the

twins; and (5) the inability of law enforcement officers to find evidence that the

twins consumed food does not prove that Luke failed to properly feed them. We

address each claim.

A. Other Medical Conditions. Luke points to evidence that A.L. had

pyloric stenosis and a bacterial infection. She contends the State failed to prove

that these medical conditions did not contribute to A.L.’s death. But, viewed in the

light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could conclude that A.L. died
8

from starvation due to Luke’s failure to feed him rather than from either of the

medical conditions highlighted by Luke.

As to pyloric stenosis, the State introduced evidence that a child with this

condition could not reach a state of severe malnutrition without showing signs or

symptoms of the condition. In particular, if a child had a clinically significant

condition of pyloric stenosis, the child would vomit “every single drop that goes in

them” and the vomiting would be of a projectile nature, which would result in the

child being acutely ill within one or two days. Luke never reported vomiting of such

a severe nature, and she acknowledged in her testimony that A.L. burped up after

feedings, but never projectile-vomited. Further, no evidence was introduced that

B.L. had pyloric stenosis, but he was found in an emaciated, severely

malnourished state the same day A.L. died. From this evidence, a rational juror

could conclude the pyloric stenosis did not cause A.L.’s death.

As to the bacterial infection—the campylobacter germ—the State

introduced evidence that the infection is frequently seen in children and did not

cause A.L.’s death. Such evidence indicated that the infection typically manifests

through effects on the gastrointestinal system, such as diarrhea. But A.L.’s

autopsy revealed that his intestines looked normal with no meaningful signs of

infection, and there was no evidence of A.L. having any gastrointestinal distress.

Furthermore, medical testimony was presented that the infection would not cause

death by itself. Add to this the fact that B.L. was also seriously malnourished with

no such infection, and a rational juror could conclude that any bacterial infection

A.L. may have had did not contribute to his death.
9

B. Failure to Properly Feed. In support of this claim, Luke points to

testimony from various witnesses that the twins appeared healthy, and the

witnesses saw Luke feed them. As the State correctly notes, the State didn’t have

to prove that Luke failed to properly feed the twins, as the third element of the

marshaling instruction would be satisfied by proof that Luke either (1) “knowingly

acted in a manner that created a substantial risk to the physical health or safety

of” the twins, or (2) “willfully deprived [the twins] of necessary food or health care.”

(Emphasis added.) The jury could have rationally concluded that the State met its

burden on this element by proof that Luke willfully failed to obtain necessary health

care given the malnourished condition of the children.

But as to the lack of feeding, jurors did not need to believe Luke’s witnesses,

nor did they have to conclude that Luke adequately fed the twins just because

witnesses who saw Luke sporadically also saw her feed the twins during those

sporadic visits. In contrast to this testimony, the State introduced testimony

describing and photographic evidence showing the emaciated condition of the

twins on February 28. Further, the twins’ doctor was concerned about their

nourishment to the extent that, just a few days before A.L.’s death, the doctor

directed Luke to increase her feeding of the twins to make sure they were

consuming four to five ounces of breastmilk or formula every three hours. A search

of both residences, the trash, and Luke’s vehicle revealed no indications of such

regular feeding. Officers tried to feed B.L. immediately upon discovering his

malnourished condition but could not find a baby bottle in the residence, despite

scouring the whole apartment. When Luke arrived at the apartment, she couldn’t

produce one either. And other evidence established her failure to meet the feeding
10

schedule that day. Luke picked the twins up from her mother that day at about

8:00 a.m. and was told that they had been fed. Yet, by the time Luke called 911

around 1:20 p.m.—nearly five and one-half hours after picking them up from her

mom—Luke had not fed them. Based on the directions from their doctor, Luke

should have fed the twins at least once, if not twice, by then. From all this

evidence, rational jurors could have concluded that Luke “willfully deprived [the

twins] of necessary food.”

C. Failure of Others to Notice Malnourished Condition. Luke

contends that others saw the twins without raising any concerns about their

malnourished condition, so jurors could not reasonably conclude that Luke should

have noticed their condition. Those people included an in-home service provider

who visited the apartment earlier in the day that A.L. died, Luke’s mother, and the

friend who was with her when she picked the twins up from Luke’s mother. We

first note that the service provider was in Luke’s new apartment to check for

babyproofing, not to do a wellness check on the twins, and she could not observe

the twins’ bodies because they were covered in blankets. But more importantly,

the other people Luke identifies were not on trial. Luke was. And Luke was the

twins’ parent responsible for their well-being. Even if jurors were persuaded that

others saw the twins and did not raise an alarm about their condition, reasonable

jurors could still conclude that Luke knew about their condition and willfully failed

to provide them with necessary food or health care.

D. Another Caregiver’s Responsibility. Luke also contends that her

mother was a regular caregiver for the twins, including on the day A.L. died, so her

mother has “some responsibility” for any deficiencies in properly feeding the twins.
11

Whether Luke’s mother bares any culpability is not an issue in this case. Luke’s

culpability is. Even if we assumed for the sake of argument that someone else

may also be responsible, that person’s culpability does not relieve Luke’s.

E. Law Enforcement’s Inability to Find Evidence of Feeding. Luke

contends that the inability of law enforcement officers to find evidence of feeding—

such as empty formula bottles, used breast-milk bags, or baby bottles—does not

establish that she didn’t feed them. That is true. But it helps. Although jurors were

not required to use this evidence to conclude Luke failed to adequately feed the

twins, reasonable jurors could use this evidence to help reach that conclusion.

F. Conclusion as to Sufficiency of the Evidence. Luke’s arguments

amount to her asking us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to her and

to weigh it differently than the jury did. Of course, this is the oppositive of what the

standard of review requires us to do. We are not permitted to weigh the evidence

or resolve conflicts in it, and we must view it in the light most favorable to the State.

State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 517, 518–19 (Iowa 2022). Applying those

standards, reasonable jurors could have concluded that the State met its burden

of proving all elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, so we reject

Luke’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.

III. Weight of the Evidence

It is not clear whether Luke is raising a separate issue that the district court

improperly denied her motion for new trial based on her claim that the verdicts

were against the greater weight of the evidence. Assuming she is, our review

would be for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 60 (Iowa

2021). Even giving Luke the benefit of the doubt that she properly raised this issue,
12

it is essentially just a repackaging of her sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, as

Luke “fails to identify any specific evidence that preponderates so heavily in favor

of acquittal that we can say the district court abused its discretion in denying h[er]

motion for a new trial.” See id. In ruling on Luke’s motion for new trial, the district

court addressed the credibility of witnesses and concluded “there certainly wasn’t

a greater weight of credible evidence that would tip against the jury

verdicts. . . . [T]he weight of the evidence supported the jury verdict.” We discern

no abuse of the court’s discretion in this ruling and reject Luke’s challenge

accordingly.

IV. Denial of New Trial—Admission of Cumulative Autopsy Photos

Luke contends the district court erred by denying her motion for new trial

based on admission of autopsy photos she now claims were cumulative. The State

contends Luke failed to preserve error on this claim, and we agree. When the

photographs at issue were offered, Luke made no objection to their admission.

Luke cannot raise an evidentiary objection for the first time in a motion for new trial.

As our supreme court said nearly one hundred years ago:

A party cannot sit by and permit improper testimony to be introduced
in a case without objection, and then, in the event of an adverse
verdict, predicate error thereon as a ground for new trial or for
reversal in this court. This would be, in effect, gambling on the result
of a verdict, which cannot be tolerated.

State v. Ostby, 210 N.W. 934, 937 (Iowa 1926). The same holds true today. As

Luke failed to preserve error on this issue, we do not address it further.

V. Denial of New Trial—Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing

For her final issue, Luke contends the State committed prosecutorial

misconduct during closing argument by implying Luke was a liar by calling her
13

version of events “excuses.” The State again contests error preservation, and

again we agree. Luke raised no objection to the challenged comments at the time

they were made during the State’s closing argument. She first raised the issue in

her motion for new trial. This is too late. Claims of misconduct in closing

arguments must be “made at the time of the argument,” or “the defendant has

waived [her] right to complain.” State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 552 (Iowa 1996).

When the issue of alleged improper comments during closing argument is raised

for the first time in a motion for a new trial, it is too late, as “a motion for new trial

is not a substitute for objecting at the time of the offending conduct.” Id. That is

what happened here, so error is not preserved, and we do not address the issue

further.

VI. Conclusion

Luke’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence. The district court

did not abuse its discretion by denying Luke’s motion for a new trial after

concluding that the verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence. Luke’s

challenges based on allegedly cumulative autopsy photos and allegedly improper

closing arguments by the State were not preserved for our review. Accordingly,

we affirm.

AFFIRMED.