In the Interest of D.C.-C., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0617
Filed July 2, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF D.C.-C.,
Minor Child,

M.C., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Cynthia S. Finley,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three-

year-old son. AFFIRMED.

John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Julie F. Trachta of Linn County Advocate, Cedar Rapids, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz,

JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

A mother, Margaret, challenges the juvenile court order terminating her

parental rights to three-year-old D.C.-C.1 She contends the State failed to offer

clear and convincing evidence that her son could not safely return to her custody.

She also argues that termination was not in D.C.-C.’s best interests because they

share a strong bond. But by Margaret’s own admission, she was not ready to

resume parenting at the time of the termination hearing. And, as for best interests,

the record reveals that Margaret is not a reliable placement for D.C.-C. given her

inability to address her “long-standing issue” with alcohol abuse. After careful

review, we affirm the juvenile court’s well-reasoned order.2

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

D.C.-C. was born in August 2021. In the ten months following his birth, the

Iowa Department of Health and Human Services conducted three assessments

involving the family. Those assessments centered on Margaret’s cognitive ability

to care for the child, as well as domestic violence and substance use in the child’s

presence. As D.C.-C. reached his first birthday, the State successfully petitioned

to adjudicate him as a child in need of assistance (CINA). D.C.-C. remained in his

mother’s care under a safety plan developed by the department. To protect

D.C.-C., the dispositional order directed the parents not to consume alcohol while

caring for the child.

1 The order also terminated the father’s parental rights. He does not appeal.
2 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law

and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R.,
932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). We are not bound by the juvenile
court’s factual findings, but we give them respectful consideration, especially on
witness credibility. Id.
3

After the CINA adjudication, Margaret underwent psychological testing that

showed her level of intellectual functioning, adaptive functioning, and daily living

skills were low. Because of her intellectual disability, she was eligible for support.

But she did not follow through with obtaining available services.

Still, by spring 2023, the department considered closing the CINA case with

a bridge order to give Margaret sole custody of D.C.-C. As the case moved toward

closure, Margaret was worried about losing her daycare funding. Then in

November, she suffered a setback. Daycare providers believed that Margaret was

under the influence when she came to pick up D.C.-C. They asked for a welfare

check, and police officers found D.C.-C. holding a marijuana pipe when they

arrived at his home. Margaret agreed to a breath test, which showed a blood

alcohol content of 0.213. The court ordered removal, and the department placed

D.C.-C with his maternal grandmother, who continued as his placement throughout

this case.3

After the removal, Margaret had a substance-use evaluation, which

diagnosed her with severe alcohol-use and cannabis-use disorders. The report

recommended intensive outpatient treatment; she followed that recommendation.

But she tested positive for alcohol twice in January 2024, despite telling providers

that she had been sober since November 2023. On the positive side, she engaged

in productive visits with D.C.-C.—twice per week, supervised by her mother.

3 Margaret testified that her mother was a positive influence:

She supports me with this whole situation. She rides me hard
when I’m stepping out of line. She applau[ds] me when I’m doing
right. She’s done very well to help me take care of my baby boy
when she doesn’t have to. She stepped in when things got hard, and
she’s still there even when things aren’t hard.
4

That spring, the State petitioned to terminate parental rights. Meanwhile,

Margaret had progressed to semi-supervised visits with D.C.-C. The department

recommended deferring permanency because Margaret was making progress.

Indeed, by July 2024, the department approved unsupervised and overnight visits,

and then a trial home placement with D.C.-C in October.

Unfortunately, the progress was short-lived. In December, Margaret called

the case manager for a ride to pick up D.C.-C. at daycare. Margaret appeared to

be under the influence.4 When the case manager checked the apartment, she

found several packs of beer and THC cartridges in Margaret’s closet. Another

evaluation confirmed the diagnosis of severe alcohol-use disorder, and the

provider made the same recommendation of intensive outpatient treatment that

Margaret had received a year earlier. Margaret later acknowledged that she drank

regularly on weekends when D.C.-C was staying with her mother.

The juvenile court scheduled the termination trial for March 2025. Margaret

testified that after she first started outpatient treatment, she told her counselor that

“when my son is with my mother on the weekends, I would occasionally have a

drink, not every weekend, but here and there, just a little bit, a few drinks.” But

Margaret said she could not maintain moderation—“it just progressed more, and

. . . I became a hot mess.” When examined by the State, Margaret agreed that her

son “can’t come home today.” And she said that she needed sixty days to establish

her sobriety. But when cross-examined by her counsel, she shifted her position,

4 A drug test Margaret provided that day was negative for all substances.
Margaret
testified that she “drank a bunch of coffee and a bunch of energy drinks” before
the case manager picked her up.
5

agreeing that her son “would be safe in [her] care if he were returned to [her]

today.”

In its order terminating parental rights, the juvenile court questioned

Margaret’s credibility. The court doubted her testimony that she reasonably

believed she could drink alcohol as long as D.C.-C. was not in her care. The court

also emphasized that Margaret had “not been able to demonstrate any prolonged

period of sobriety.” The court terminated her parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(h) (2024). Margaret appeals that order.

II. Analysis

We review termination cases in three steps. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280,

294 (Iowa 2021). First, we assess whether the State has proven a statutory ground

for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we examine

whether termination is in the child’s best interests under section 232.116(2). Id.

And third, we decide whether a permissive exception under section 232.116(3)

should apply to preclude termination. Id. We need not address a step if it is not

disputed by the parent. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

A. Statutory Ground

We begin with Margaret’s claim that the State did not prove the fourth

element of section 232.116(1)(h). She contends that D.C.-C. could be safely

returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(h)(4) (requiring clear and convincing proof that the child cannot be

returned to parental custody as provided in section 232.102 at the present time);

see also In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding “at the present time”
6

means the date of the termination hearing). She now insists that she “has

steadfastly and comprehensively addressed her alcohol use.”

But we are more convinced by her frank testimony at the termination trial

that she needed more time to achieve stability before resuming custody of D.C.-C.

No doubt, Margaret has taken steps to address her sobriety. But her incapacity to

safely pick up her son from daycare in December 2024 signaled an ongoing risk

to his welfare if returned to her custody. The juvenile court offered an apt

description of the evidence:

Margaret has participated in substance abuse treatment multiple
times, yet in December 2024, approximately three months before
trial, she had the intention of consuming alcohol without regard to the
warnings of her substance abuse counselor, her AA sponsor, and
[the department]. All while involved in the child welfare system and
in jeopardy of losing custody of her child permanently. Certainly, she
could not be trusted to do better if [D.C.-C.] were returned to her care
and there was no court or [department] oversight.

On this record, termination was proper under paragraph (h).5 See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(h).

B. Best Interests

Margaret next argues that termination was not in her son’s best interests,

citing their “very strong bond.” She asserts that she has been “the sole caretaker

5 Our case law offers two formulations for what it means when a child “cannot be

returned” to parental custody as provided in section 232.102, which discusses
transferring the child’s custody if staying in the home would be “contrary to the
welfare of the child.” Many cases cite In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa
1992), which provides that a child cannot be returned if it would expose them to
“any harm amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication.” But our
supreme court often describes the fourth element as the inability to “safely return”
children to their parents’ care. See, e.g., In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL
1881115, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (collecting cases). Under either
formulation, the State met its burden here.
7

of D.C.-C. most of his life, and during that time she was always a loving, protective,

capable, and nurturing parent.” Moreover, she urges that termination would cause

“incalculable but certain harm to D.C.-C.”

Although Margaret’s argument “conflates a best-interests argument (step

two of the three-step process) with a permissive-exception argument (step three

of the three-step process), we interpret [her] argument as a challenge under the

second step.” See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). When

deciding best interests, we apply the framework of section 232.116(2). P.L., 778

N.W.2d at 37. We give primary consideration to D.C.-C.’s safety, to the best

placement for fostering his “long-term nurturing and growth,” and to his “physical,

mental, and emotional condition and needs.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also

recognize that his “mental and emotional condition and needs” are affected by his

bond with his mother. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 535.

In deciding termination is in D.C.-C.’s best interests, we are persuaded by

his guardian ad litem’s balanced viewpoint:

[A]lthough it is clear that [Margaret] loves her son and that
they have a strong bond, since the time of the removal in 2023, she
has struggled to demonstrate that she is able to maintain her sobriety
on a long-term basis. [D.C.-C.] is only three years old with very
limited ability to self-protect. He needs a sober, stable caregiver at
all times who is capable of meeting all of his care and supervision
needs. When [Margaret] relapses she has historically not been
honest and forthcoming about her struggle until it is evident and out
of control. During her most recent relapse, she continued to provide
care for [D.C.-C.] despite being under the influence and as a result
put [him] at significant risk of harm.

The record shows that D.C.-C. is comfortable in the home of his grandmother, and

she “has expressed that if it came down to it, she would adopt [him].” See Iowa

Code § 232.116(2)(b). Under these circumstances, it is in D.C.-C.’s best interests
8

to move toward permanency and adoption by terminating Margaret’s parental

rights.

AFFIRMED.