In the Interest of Z.C., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0572
Filed June 18, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.C.,
Minor Child

P.Q., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Paul G. Crawford,

Judge.

A mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to her seven-

year-old son. AFFIRMED.

Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Mary Cowdrey of Public Defender’s Office, Marshalltown, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court order severing her legal relationship

with Z.C., her seven-year-old son.1 She contends the State failed to offer clear

and convincing evidence that Z.C. could not be safely returned to her custody. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4) (2025). She also argues that the court erred in

denying her “Motion for Active and Reasonable Efforts” in which she sought an

order directing the State to complete the process of determining whether Z.C.

qualified as an Indian child under the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).

See id. §§ 232B.3(8), .5(19).

On the first issue, we find sufficient proof that returning Z.C. to his mother’s

custody would expose him to adjudicatory harm.2 On the second issue, the record

does not show that ICWA applies to Z.C.’s case. Thus, we affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services in March 2023 when the mother was arrested on an outstanding

warrant after a traffic stop. In the car, the arresting officer found drug

paraphernalia, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Z.C. was also in the

car. Later that month, the mother—who was caring for Z.C.—tested positive for

methamphetamine when she met with her probation officer. In April, Z.C. was

removed from the mother’s custody and placed with his father.

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of Z.C.’s father; he does not appeal.
2 Adjudicatory harm means that Z.C. would again qualify as a child in need of

assistance if returned to his parents. See In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL
1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020); see also In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d
812, 814 (Iowa 1992).
3

In May 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated Z.C. as a child in need of

assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.96A(16)(a) (parent “unlawfully

uses, possesses, manufactures, cultivates, or distributes a dangerous substance

in the presence of the child”). The department entered a safety plan with the father

that prevented unsupervised visits between Z.C. and the mother. But the parents

did not follow that plan. During an unannounced visit in June, the social worker

found the mother hiding under a comforter at the home with the father and Z.C.

Because the parents did not maintain boundaries, the department moved Z.C. to

foster care that summer.

Meanwhile, the mother was uncooperative with drug testing. And in August,

she again tested positive for methamphetamine. Another positive test followed in

November. At a review hearing in December, the mother claimed that she had

received a document from Omega Laboratories admitting an error in its drug

testing result. The department doubted the document’s authenticity. The court

made this finding:

November/December 2023—the “Omega letter”. The Court is
empowered to make credibility determinations in any type of case.
Here, the Court finds credible [the social worker’s] concerns about
the letter not being authentic. What is more disturbing to this Court
is mother’s testimony in October 2024 when shown the “Omega
letter.” All she said was she was unsure if she had ever seen that
letter before. A delicate balancing act by mother to avoid implicating
herself in involvement with what was very likely a deceptive
document.

Prospects for reunification did not progress in 2024. In January, the mother

tested positive for methamphetamine from a sweat patch collected in December

2023. Also in January, Z.C.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) moved to temporarily stop

visits because they were “basically chaos. The parents did not model any caring,
4

adult behaviors.” After a hearing, the court declined to suspend visits but warned

that it had the authority to do so if the interactions did not improve. The court also

directed the mother to obtain a new mental-health evaluation and to cooperate with

drug testing and treatment recommendations.

In February 2024, the GAL again stepped up, this time to urge that Z.C.

receive medications prescribed by his doctor for difficulty sleeping. The parents

disagreed with the doctor’s recommendations and refused to authorize the

medications. So the court ordered that the child was allowed to take the

recommended over-the-counter medication at the foster parent’s discretion.

Also in February, the mother informed the department that she had

“ancestry with the Umatilla Tribe of Oregon.” The caseworker contacted the tribe

to see if the child was an enrolled member or eligible for enrollment. The tribe

responded in March that Z.C. was not an enrolled member.

The mother was in jail during April and May. She also failed to complete a

three-session parenting assessment required by the department. Her

recalcitrance prevented the department from formulating meaningful

recommendations for reunification. Neither did she engage in required drug

testing, having six “no shows” recorded that spring and eight more missed tests

between July and September 2024. Her attendance was also hit and miss for

scheduled visits with Z.C. Six times during the summer of 2024, the mother told

service providers that she could not attend visits as scheduled because she was

drug testing. But they later discovered that drug testing was not offered in her

community on those dates. As for Z.C., he was reluctant to attend visits with his

mother, according to the service provider.
5

In July 2024, the State petitioned for termination of parental rights. The

court held a combined permanency review and termination hearing in October. At

that hearing, the department social worker testified that she was concerned about

the mother’s “unmet” substance-use and mental-health issues. The worker

believed that the mother’s inaccurate self-reporting to the Substance Abuse

Treatment Unit of Central Iowa (SATUCI) resulted in unreliable treatment

recommendations. The mother testified that she has been “complying with visits

as much as [she] possibly can” but perceived that the department “acts in a manner

that is directly to target me and to punish me for whatever they feel is going on.”

Z.C.’s maternal grandmother also testified remotely from Oregon. She said

that her mother, Z.C.’s great grandmother, was Native American but was adopted

outside the Walla Walla tribe.3 The family was pursuing enrollment but did not

know when the paperwork would be complete. One month after the termination

hearing, the mother filed a “Motion for Active and Reasonable Efforts” seeking a

determination whether ICWA applied to her case. The court denied the mother’s

motion in January 2025.

The court then granted the State’s petition to terminate parental rights,

reasoning:

[The] [m]other’s acts of deception during these cases make it
too hard for this Court to trust her word that [Z.C.] can be safely
returned to her at this time. Her decisions to be defiant and
uncooperative with the court’s orders and [the department’s]
directives deprive the court of scientific support for her word that she
is no longer using methamphetamine. Unresolved drug use is
enough to find that a child cannot be returned to parental custody
under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).

3 The court found that the Walla Walla tribe was a part of the confederated tribes

of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.
6

She appeals.4

II. Analysis

A. Ground for Termination

The mother contends that the State failed to prove the statutory ground for

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f). She asserts the State did not

offer clear and convincing evidence for subparagraph (4)—that Z.C. could not be

returned to her custody at the present time without risk of harm. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4). We interpret “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the

termination hearing.” In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).

The mother objects to the juvenile court describing her as “deceitful and

defiant.” But even if those labels fit, she argues that description does not support

terminating her parental rights. She also argues that the “assessments provided

by [SATUCI,] an agency that specialized in drug abuse,” were more credible than

the department’s view that she was “a dangerous drug user.”

But the department social workers testified they were skeptical about the

mother’s successful discharge from SATUCI because “she continued to tell them

that she wasn’t using when she was testing positive.” In our de novo review, we

find their skepticism warranted. And when we consider the mother’s lack of

4 We review her claims de novo, “examining both the facts and law and
adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R.,
932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The juvenile court’s factual findings
do not bind us, but we give them weight, especially when deciding witness
credibility. Id.
7

candor, together with her many missed drug tests,5 we find ample evidence that

her unresolved methamphetamine use posed a risk to Z.C. if returned to her

custody. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (“We have long

recognized that an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a

parent unfit to raise children.”).

B. Active Efforts under ICWA

The mother next challenges the court’s denial of her motion for active and

reasonable efforts.6 These two standards describe the level of services that the

department must provide a family involved with the juvenile court system. See In

re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Under the non-ICWA framework, the

department must make reasonable efforts; but under ICWA, the department must

make active efforts at reunification. Compare Iowa Code § 232B.5(19) with id.

§ 232.102A. But the mother’s petition on appeal includes no argument about

reasonable efforts. And she offers only this sentence on the ICWA standard:

“Evidence of active efforts was not provided at the hearing.”

The mother then contends that the court mischaracterized her motion as an

attempt to “derail” the termination proceedings. And she objects to what she calls

“flippant attempts” by the department to place the burden on her to demonstrate

that Z.C. may be eligible for tribal enrollment.

5 We have allowed the presumption that missed drug tests would have been
positive. See In re C.F., No. 20-1067, 2020 WL 6482073, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov.
4, 2020) (collecting cases).
6 As its opening response, the State argues that the mother filed her motion in the

CINA case and thus it is outside the record of the termination matter, submitted in
October 2024. We disagree. The court held a combined permanency and
termination hearing. The court then denied the mother’s motion before it ruled on
either question. The mother may challenge that denial in this appeal.
8

The State counters that the department should not be held to an active-

efforts standard because ICWA did not apply in these proceedings. Citing In re

R.E.K.F., the State asserts the ICWA protections are not available until the court

determines that Z.C. is an Indian child, as defined by Iowa Code

section 232B.3(8).7 See 698 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Iowa 2005).

The State is correct. In denying the mother’s motion for active efforts, the

juvenile court noted correspondence between the department and the tribe

showing that Z.C. was not an enrolled member—nor were his mother or

grandmother. The grandmother testified at the termination hearing that her tribal

enrollment was not yet finalized. So the mother’s arguments fail because the

record shows that Z.C. did not fit the definition of “Indian child” at the time of the

hearing. See Z.K., 973 N.W.2d at 35.

Finding no merit to the mother’s claims, we affirm the termination order.

AFFIRMED.

7 An Indian child is one “that an Indian tribe identifies as a child of the tribe’s

community.” Iowa Code § 232B.3(8).