State of Iowa v. Gregory Antwone Jackson

CourtListener 10612759Iowactapp18 juin 2025

Texte intégral

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1112
Filed June 18, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

GREGORY ANTWONE JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Elizabeth Batey,

Judge.

Gregory Jackson appeals following his jury trial convictions for operating

while intoxicated and possession of a controlled substance. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ.
2

SANDY, Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Gregory Jackson appeals following his jury trial

convictions for operating while intoxicated, first offense, a serious misdemeanor in

violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a) (2023), and possession of a controlled

substance, first offense, a serious misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code

section 124.401(5). Jackson filed a motion for a new trial alleging both insufficient

evidence and a verdict contrary to the weight-of-the-evidence. The district court

denied the motion relative to the sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. On appeal

Jackson claims that the district court failed to apply the proper weight-of-the-

evidence standard when ruling upon his motion for new trial. Because Jackson

never received a ruling on the weight-of-the-evidence challenge and failed to

preserve error, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In April of 2024 Jackson proceeded to trial by jury on two counts: operating

while intoxicated, first offense, a serious misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code

section 321J.2(2)(a), and possession of a controlled substance, first offense, a

serious misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5).

The jury convicted Jackson on both counts. Following trial Jackson filed a

motion for a new trial alleging both insufficient evidence and a verdict contrary to

the weight of the evidence. The district court held a hearing on the motion. At the

hearing, the district court clearly addressed and denied Jackson’s insufficiency-of-

the evidence motion. What is less clear is whether the court employed the correct

standard in addressing Jackson’s verdict-contrary-to-the-weight-of-the-evidence
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motion. Sentencing did not occur for almost two months following the hearing for

new trial.

II. Motion for New Trial—Weight of the Evidence.

A. Standard of Review.

In contrast to a motion for judgment of acquittal brought under the

sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a motion for new trial brought under the

weight-of-the-evidence standard essentially concedes the evidence adequately

supports the jury verdict. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016).

Consequently, a district court may invoke its power to grant a new trial on the

ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence only in the

extraordinary case in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict

rendered. State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2008).

We generally review rulings on motions for new trial asserting a verdict is

contrary to the weight-of-the-evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Shanahan,

712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006). However, we review a claim that the district

court failed to apply the proper standard in ruling on a motion for new trial for errors

at law. State v. Wells, 738 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Iowa 2007) (citing former Iowa Rule

of Appellate Procedure 6.4, now rule 6.907).

B. Did the Court Use the Wrong Standard?

Before getting to the question of whether the district court used the wrong

standard, a more fundamental question must be asked—did the district court even

address the weight-of-the-evidence argument at all? Such an inquiry is not

academic. The answer affects the error preservation analysis.
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In its written order denying the motion for new trial, the court made one

mention of Jackson’s weight-of-the-evidence argument in its second opening

paragraph, grafting language from Jackson’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence

argument.1 A review of the hearing transcript reveals the court stated, “I don’t think

that there is any reason to think the jury verdict was not supported by sufficient

weight of the evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Other than that, no mention was

made to the weight-of-the-evidence argument by the court at the hearing or in its

written order.

When reviewing a motion for new trial claiming the verdict is contrary to the

weight-of-the-evidence, the district court considers “whether more ‘credible

evidence’ supports the verdict rendered than supports the alternative verdict.” Ary,

877 N.W.2d at 706 (citation omitted). “The question for the court is not whether

there was sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict rendered or an

alternative verdict, but whether ‘a greater amount of credible evidence’ suggests

the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting State v. Ellis, 578

N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998)). Here the district court did not do that.

The court’s written order used terms like “substantial evidence” and “in the

light most favorable to the state”. However, neither the written order nor the court’s

comments at the hearing use weight-of-the-evidence standard language such as

“consideration of witness credibility”, “miscarriage of justice”, or “preponderates

1 Paragraph five of Jackson’s written motion asserted a weight-of-the-evidence

challenge, whereas paragraph four asserted a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
challenge. In addressing the weight-of-the-evidence challenge (paragraph five),
the district court grafted language from the sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge
(paragraph four).
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heavily against the verdict”. No indication of an “independent analysis” was

conducted. It is not so much that the district court used the wrong standard as

much as the district court used no standard. And while true Jackson made both

sufficiency-of-the-evidence and weight-of-the-evidence arguments, it is incumbent

on the court to clearly delineate the two in its ruling. Because the court never

addressed the weight-of-the-evidence argument as requested, the question

arises—must Jackson bring such omission to the court’s attention to preserve

error?

C. Was Error Preserved?

The State contests error preservation. The State contends that, even

though Jackson’s motion made a weight-of-the evidence claim, Jackson needed

to call the oversight to the district court’s attention in order to preserve error.

Within the last few years our court, sitting en banc, has dealt with this similar

issue. See State v. Rethwisch, No. 22-0530, 2023 WL 5607147, at *4–6 (Iowa Ct.

App. Aug. 30, 2023). The lead opinion held that criminal defendants must alert the

court in the moment if it applies the sufficiency standard rather than the weight-of-

the-evidence standard. Id. at *5. Our evenly divided court acknowledged that our

prior cases gave mixed messages on how to preserve error when the district court

uses the wrong standard. Id. But the lead opinion sought to clarify the issue and

hold “that, going forward, a defendant will be required to bring the application of

the incorrect standard to the court’s attention in order to preserve error.” Id. at *6.

Although this case is similar to Rethwisch, it is not identical. In Rethwisch

the defendant received a ruling on his weight-of-the-evidence challenge—there

was no omission. Here, the record leads us to the conclusion that, unlike in
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Rethwisch, the court never analyzed Jackson’s specific weight-of-the-evidence

claim. At no time did Jackson bring to the court’s attention that it had not

addressed the merits of his weight-of-the evidence argument. Sentencing

occurred some three months following the hearing and order of the court. Jackson

had plenty of time to bring such an omission to the court’s attention.

It is a fundamental part of our error-preservation doctrine that, to preserve

error on an issue, a party must raise the issue and obtain a ruling on it. See Meier

v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of

appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the

district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). The reason for requiring a

party to not only raise an issue, but to also obtain a ruling on it, is that “it is not a

sensible exercise of appellate review to analyze facts of an issue ‘without the

benefit of a full record or lower court determination.’” Id. (cleaned up). Because

Jackson never received a ruling on his weight-of-the-evidence challenge, he has

not preserved error.

III. Conclusion.

Because Jackson never received a ruling on the weight-of-the-evidence

challenge and failed to bring such to the court’s attention, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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