State of Iowa v. Richard Lee Shogren

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2085
Filed June 18, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RICHARD LEE SHOGREN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, John Haney,

Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his convictions for domestic abuse assault

and harassment. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

Leah Patton (argued) of Patton Legal Services, LLC, Ames, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
2

BULLER, Judge.

“No face, no case.” With that street-slang rhyme, Richard Shogren bragged

to his mother in a recorded jail call about his plan to dissuade his girlfriend, S.J.O.,

from testifying against him in an upcoming domestic-abuse trial. S.J.O. ultimately

recanted, but Marshall County jurors disbelieved S.J.O.’s recantation and instead

credited her emotional description of Shogren threatening and assaulting her—as

captured by a 911 call and a responding police officer’s body camera. Shogren

challenges evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence, the colloquy for his

stipulation to multiple previous domestic-abuse convictions, and the fine and

surcharge. We affirm Shogren’s convictions but, accepting the State’s

concessions on appeal, remand for additional proceedings on the sentence

enhancement and fine issues.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In December of 2022, S.J.O. called 911 and, with tears in her voice, told the

dispatcher: “I need officers . . . please, I’ve been abused . . . I was just kicked out

of a car and almost ran over . . . .” Over the next four minutes, S.J.O. described

how Shogren—who she described as her “ex-boyfriend”—hit her head against the

car window, “choked”1 her, and threatened to kill her and himself. With a wavering

voice, she said near the end of the call: “I’ve never been so scared in my whole

life.”

1 We use the word “choked” because that is the language S.J.O. used. However,
we note the correct terminology would be “strangled” given S.J.O.’s description of
the act. See Mary Pat Gunderson, Gender and the Language of Judicial Opinion
Writing, 21 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 11 (2019) (on how language matters and noting
that describing acts of strangulation as “choking” can minimize or mitigate the
perpetrator’s actions).
3

A Marshalltown police officer responded to the gas station from which

S.J.O. had called 911. She had to use the gas station phone because Shogren

drove off with hers. The officer arrived “a couple minutes” after the 911 call and

observed S.J.O. “was very emotional” and “crying.” The officer also observed and

documented with photographs that S.J.O. had “some blood on the edge of her

mouth and some mild redness to her neck.”

In a conversation recorded on the officer’s body camera, S.J.O. again

identified Shogren as her “ex-boyfriend” and described how he “started yelling” at

her in the car, then “escalated” when he got mad about who she was talking to and

demanded to see all of their text messages. S.J.O. said she tried to roll down her

car window to yell for help, but Shogren rolled it back up and grabbed her seat belt.

Then he started “choking” her with his hand around her neck, “bashed [her] head

into the window,” “yanked” her hair, and threatened to kill her and himself. The

officer asked S.J.O. how she felt when she was being “choked,” and she said she

started getting lightheaded, had trouble breathing, and was scared. According to

S.J.O., she jumped out of the car after Shogren attacked her, and that’s when he

“almost ran [her] over.” She declined medical attention, explaining to police that

she “just want[ed] to be safe.” And the officer opined that the injuries he observed

were consistent with the assault reported by S.J.O.

S.J.O. told the officer that she and Shogren had been dating for around a

year but had broken up a couple weeks earlier after living together for a number of

months. And she said that day “ain’t the first time” Shogren had abused her,

specifically citing an instance of abuse two weeks before.
4

Police tried to follow up with S.J.O. after their initial contact to gather more

information and take updated photos of her injuries. Officers went to S.J.O.’s

residence, but she wouldn’t answer the door. And they called her cell phone, but

she wouldn’t return their calls.

In a recorded phone call between S.J.O. and Shogren before trial, he told

her: “I’m so sorry for everything I did wrong.” She told him she loved him, and he

responded with the same. He told her that he wanted her to “prove [him] wrong,”

and she responded that she was “not going anywhere.” And he raised his voice

at her when he learned she registered for the jail-call system with her real name,

exclaiming “they’re gonna know” he and S.J.O. were in contact, which violated a

no-contact order. Shogren told her: “You’ve gotta contact them. Call the police

station. Get it dropped.” He asked if she would “do that” for him, and she agreed.

Then he said: “Ask them to drop all the charges. Say you lied or something, I don’t

care what.” When S.J.O. expressed concern about getting “in trouble” for lying,

Shogren yelled at her, said she wasn’t “gonna get in trouble because [she] was a

fucking white female,” and told her to just “tell them.”

In a different recorded jail call with his brother, Shogren remarked “hopefully

she still knows what’s up about depositions and all that” and “you know what I’m

gettin’ at.” He told his brother: “Just tell her to help me,” and his brother

responded: “I will.”

And in a third recorded jail call, this one with his mother, Shogren said: “I

don’t even expect to make it to trial, I’m hoping depositions will happen and

hopefully she just doesn’t show up.” His mother remarked, “If that happens, then

they don’t have anything,” and Shogren responded: “No face, no case.”
5

By the time of depositions and then trial, S.J.O. had recanted. When the

State called her as a witness at trial, it limited its questioning to the domestic

relationship between her and Shogren. But she was then called by the defense:

she testified she was under the influence of methamphetamine the day she called

911 and that she and Shogren had a verbal argument that never turned physical

or violent. And she denied that Shogren had influenced her testimony or tried to

do so, but she admitted that they had discussed the incident in the lead-up to trial.

When asked by the prosecutor about specific acts of abuse and specific

statements she made to police, S.J.O. repeatedly said she didn’t remember. By

the time of trial, she said Shogren was back to being her boyfriend and she loved

him “very much.” A police officer testified at trial that victims of domestic violence

were “not always” cooperative with law enforcement, it was “not uncommon” for

victims to decline further interviews or photographs, and they sometimes provided

different information or recanted after the emergent situation had ended.

The jury found Shogren guilty of domestic abuse causing bodily injury—

third or subsequent offense, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code

sections 708.1 and 708.2A(1) and (4) (2022); domestic abuse causing bodily

injury, a serious misdemeanor in violation of sections 708.1 and 708.2A(1)

and (2)2; and harassment in the first degree, an aggravated misdemeanor in

violation of section 708.7(1) and (2). He was sentenced to concurrent prison

sentences. And he appeals.

2 The second domestic-abuse verdict was a lesser-included offense for domestic

abuse assault by strangulation.
6

II. Discussion

Shogren challenges evidentiary errors related to the jail calls, the sufficiency

of the evidence, the enhancement colloquy for the first domestic abuse count, and

the fine and surcharge for the second count. We address each contention

separately, as they concern different standards of review.

A. Jail Calls

Shogren first contests the admission of his statements on the recorded jail

calls, seemingly raising challenges under rules of evidence relating to hearsay,

relevance, and unfair prejudice.3 See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.401, 5.402, 5.403, 5.801.

To the extent the hearsay rules are implicated, we review for correction of errors

at law. State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). Our review

of evidentiary rulings is otherwise for abuse of discretion. See id.

First, as to the hearsay question, we dispel some confusion that pervaded

discussions in the district court and is reprised in Shogren’s appellate brief and

oral argument: whether statements admitted under Iowa Rule of

Evidence 5.801(d)(2) must actually be admissions against the declarant’s interest.

This misunderstanding is so pervasive that Professor Emerita Laurie Doré

addresses it in her book on evidence, noting the “confusing” terminology and how

Iowa litigants sometimes “misleadingly” refer to this exception. See 7 Laurie Kratky

Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence § 5.801:9 (2024). At least some of the

confusion likely stems from the rule’s historical title—“[a]dmission by party

3 The State raises an error-preservation concern, noting the district court made

express findings about some but arguably not all of the snippets of the calls played
at trial. Given our resolution of this issue, we elect to reach the merits.
7

opponent”; but in the modern restyling of the rules, this exemption from hearsay is

more accurately titled “[a]n opposing party’s statement.” Compare Iowa R.

Evid. 5.801(d)(2) (2009), with Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2) (2025). The plain text of

the rule makes clear these statements need not actually be admissions or

statements against interest; they just have to be statements (1) “offered against an

opposing party” and (2) “made by the party in an individual or representative

capacity.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(d)(2)(A). So, in a criminal case, the State can

always offer statements made by a defendant under this rule. With that backdrop,

the portions of the jail calls admitted at trial were not hearsay as a matter of law:

Shogren’s statements are exempted from the rules against hearsay under

Rule 5.801(d)(2)(A).4 The district court correctly applied the law on hearsay.

Second, as to relevance, both the district court and the parties rely on our

unpublished decision in State v. Campbell, No. 10-0117, 2013 WL 4011071 (Iowa

Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2013). There, we affirmed that statements by a defendant

attempting to “dissuade the victim from appearing in court” were relevant as

evidence reflecting consciousness of guilt comparable to fabrication. Campbell,

2013 WL 4011071, at *6–7. So too here. Shogren’s encouragement of S.J.O. to

recant, conspiring with his brother to get S.J.O. to “help” him, and bragging to his

mother about “no face, no case” all reflect consciousness of guilt and were

4 It’s not clear whether Shogren is also challenging admission of statements made

by the listeners on the calls (S.J.O., his brother, his mother). To the extent he
does, they were offered for their responsive context and not for the truth of any
matter asserted. See State v. Canady, 4 N.W.3d 661, 668 (Iowa 2024) (“[The non-
party caller’s] statements also fell outside the hearsay rule. Most were not offered
for the truth of the matter asserted.”); cf. State v. Enderle, 745 N.W.2d 438, 443
(Iowa 2007) (recognizing courts hold police statements during interrogations of
defendants admissible “to provide context for [the defendant’s] responses”).
8

admissible as substantive relevant evidence. See State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d

557, 562 (Iowa 1995) (“Admissions may be implied by the conduct of the defendant

subsequent to a crime when such conduct indicates a consciousness of guilt.”).

And beyond this purpose, we independently conclude the calls were relevant to

show the relationship dynamics between Shogren and S.J.O. Cf. State v. Taylor,

689 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa 2004) (“[T]he defendant’s prior conduct directed to the

victim of a crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the emotional relationship

between the defendant and the victim and is highly probative of the defendant's

probable motivation and intent in subsequent situations.”). The district court did

not abuse its discretion in finding Shogren’s statements relevant.

Third, as to Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403, the parties point to another

unpublished case to guide this analysis: State v. Buchanan, No. 17-0695, 2018

WL 3913671 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2018). There, we conducted a Rule 5.403

analysis of similar jail calls in which the defendant attempted to concoct an alibi

defense and dissuade the victim from appearing at trial. See Buchanan, 2018

WL 3913671, at *10–11. We agreed that the statements on the calls were

“prejudicial” in the sense that they were inculpatory, but they were not “unfairly

prejudicial” and therefore the district court was not required to exclude them. Id.

The same analysis applies here. Undoubtedly Shogren’s statements were

prejudicial in the sense they were inculpatory—that’s why the State offered them.

But we find they were not unfairly prejudicial. As part of this analysis, we note

something the jury would not have known in listening to the calls at trial: only

snippets were played. The State originally offered seven nearly-full-length

recorded calls, which were winnowed through a combination of prosecutorial
9

discretion and the district court’s ruling to clips of just three calls, each of limited

duration—one about four minutes, and two around thirty seconds each. We need

not repeat the particulars of the district court’s lengthy analysis here, but we note

the court excised what it perceived as the unfairly prejudicial portions of the calls,

in which Shogren or a caller referred to extraneous information or other-bad-acts

evidence. In our review, we find the district court conducted the appropriate

balancing test in a thoughtful way, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the

court admitting the most probative portions of Shogren’s statements at trial. See

State v. Buman, 955 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Iowa 2021) (“[W]e ordinarily defer to the

district court in doing the balancing under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.”).

We single out one complaint in Shogren’s brief for a little more discussion—

his assertion that some of the inculpatory statements (particularly those made to

his brother) “lacked proper context.” We think this argument is a bit disingenuous.

There was nothing preventing Shogren from exercising his right under Iowa Rule

of Evidence 5.106 to have a broader context from the call played for the jury or

from calling his mother or brother as witnesses to supply context at trial. We

happen to have the full recordings available in the record before us, and we can

see why Shogren’s counsel chose not to make such a request: the surrounding

context for the statement encouraging his brother to have S.J.O. “help” him with

regard to depositions cast him in a decidedly negative light—to put it mildly. On

that call, Shogren discussed his prior domestic-abuse convictions, how the current

charge was a felony, how S.J.O. was “pretty smart” for blocking his calls from the

jail and he wanted his brother to pass on a message that he “loved” her, and how

he had been using drugs. The court’s shortening of the calls and excision of certain
10

portions was overwhelmingly to Shogren’s benefit, and he should not complain

now about a ruling that benefited him below. And in much the same vein, we

summarily reject the complaint in Shogren’s brief that no cautionary instruction was

given, since he never asked for one below and may well have believed it would

draw unwanted attention to his (ultimately successful) witness tampering.

Last, we observe there is a lot of chatter in Shogren’s brief and in the district

court below about forfeiture by wrongdoing. See generally Giles v. California, 554

U.S. 353 (2008) (examining federal constitutional law when a defendant wrongfully

causes the declarant’s unavailability as a witness). We aren’t entirely sure why.

There is no Confrontation Clause issue when a party’s own statements are offered

against that party. E.g., Campbell, 2013 WL 4011071, at *6. And to the extent this

objection was intended to relate to S.J.O.’s statements, there is no Confrontation

issue with regard to her statements because she testified at trial (for both sides, in

fact) and was subject to cross-examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for

cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on

the use of his prior testimonial statements.”). And even beyond these problems

ruling out a Confrontation issue, we don’t think recorded jail calls are generally

testimonial. Cf. id. at 51–52 (identifying considerations for “testimonial”

statements). From our perspective, the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing and

Confrontation analysis was a red herring in this case below and remains so on

appeal.

In sum, we see no error at law nor discern any abuse of discretion in how

the district court handled the recorded jail calls.
11

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and State v. Smith

Shogren next challenges sufficiency of the evidence for his domestic-abuse

and harassment convictions. We review for correction of errors at law. State v.

Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19, 27 (Iowa 2022). “[W]e are highly deferential to the jury’s

verdict. The jury’s verdict binds this court if the verdict is supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021)). “In

determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate

inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the

record evidence.’” Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339 (citation omitted).

For the domestic-abuse charges, Shogren concedes the

domestic-relationship element, contesting only whether he assaulted S.J.O. His

argument on appeal is about credibility, and he points to S.J.O. recanting and her

trial testimony that she was under the influence when she made statements to the

911 dispatcher and police. But the jury reasonably could have credited S.J.O.’s

earlier tearful statements about the assault rather than her subsequent recantation.

And although corroboration is not necessary, S.J.O.’s statements the day of the

assault were supported by the blood on her lip and red marks on her neck, which

the officer opined were consistent with her report. We do not relitigate credibility

on appeal, and Shogren’s claim supplies no basis for relief. Cf. State v.

Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (“A criminal defendant

is not entitled to acquittal merely because he wishes the jury had believed him

instead of the victim.”).
12

Shogren’s challenge to the harassment conviction meets a similar fate.

S.J.O. told police and the 911 dispatcher that Shogren threatened to kill her, and

the jury was free to credit that statement rather than her recantation at trial. That

Shogren wishes the jury had believed different evidence is not a valid rationale for

appellate relief. See id.

In his reply brief, Shogren argues we should order judgment of acquittal

based on our long-criticized and divided panel decision in State v. Smith, 508

N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). We are not persuaded. Assuming without

deciding there is anything left of Smith after it has been repeatedly disapproved of

by our supreme court and this court,5 we find it inapplicable here—just as we have

in every other case since Smith was decided. We have carefully reviewed the 911

call and body-cam footage, and we have little trouble concluding a reasonable jury

could have found those statements established the elements of the offenses and

were more credible than the recantation that followed a rekindling of the

5 As the supreme court has explained,

Smith is an outlier case. It has been criticized in the commentary,
and it has not been followed in any sexual abuse case in Iowa since.
The primary flaw in Smith is that it is inconsistent with the standard
of appellate review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence
be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and which
requires deference to the jury’s resolution of disputed factual issues.
State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022); see also State v. Trane, 984
N.W.2d 429, 437 (Iowa 2023) (declining to follow Smith and calling it “inconsistent
with our appellate standard”); State v. Showers, No. 23-0390, 2024 WL 2317709,
at *5 & n.4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (collecting a wide array of voices from
our court criticizing Smith). For its part, the State’s brief colorfully posits that Smith
“seemingly hangs on only by the thread of tradition.” And in oral argument, the
State stressed that Smith cannot be good law in this context because the opinion
weighed the credibility of the evidence like a motion for new trial rather than
deciding sufficiency like a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Ellis, 578
N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998) (on the difference between the two).
13

relationship between S.J.O. and Shogren. Shogren’s statements on the recorded

calls supply a believable explanation for S.J.O.’s changing story. And there was

nothing about S.J.O.’s statements to 911 or the police that we found so absurd or

unbelievable it precluded conviction (again assuming without deciding we have the

power to set aside a verdict on that basis). We decline to disturb the jury’s verdict

here, under Smith or any other case law.

C. Sentencing-Enhancement Colloquy

Shogren next argues the district court’s colloquy with him about his prior

convictions was insufficient under State v. Harrington, 893 N.W.2d 36, 45–47

(Iowa 2017), and related cases. See also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8)(a). The State

concedes the colloquy was inadequate because Shogren was not informed that

there would be no trial on this issue. We accept this concession given the record

made below. And we note we can reach this issue because Shogren was not

advised of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Smith, 924

N.W.2d 846, 851 (Iowa 2019). We therefore vacate the enhanced sentence

imposed on count one and remand for either a proper stipulation colloquy or trial

on the enhancement, followed by re-sentencing on count one if the enhancement

is proven. See State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 148 (Iowa 2018). We do not

disturb the prison sentences on counts two and three.

D. Fine and Surcharge

Last, Shogren contends that the district court erroneously suspended the

fine and surcharge on count two. The State concedes error and suggests we

remand with directions for the district court to impose the fine. See Iowa Code

§ 903.1(1) (prohibiting the court from suspending the fine for a simple or serious
14

misdemeanor); State v. Abbott, No. 17-1337, 2018 WL 1433807, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Mar. 21, 2018). We agree and so order, noting the surcharge must

necessarily be imposed as well. See Iowa Code § 903.1(4).

III. Disposition

We affirm Shogren’s convictions. We vacate the enhancement on count

one and remand for either a new stipulation colloquy or trial on the prior

convictions. We also vacate the imposition of the suspended fine imposed on

count two and remand with directions to impose the fine and appropriate

surcharge. At re-sentencing, the court should impose sentence on count one if the

enhancement is proven and issue a corrected sentencing order addressing the

fine and surcharge on count two. We do not disturb the prison sentences on counts

two and three.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.