In re Marriage of Flieder

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0896
Filed May 21, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DAWN JEANNINE FLIEDER
AND SCOTT ALLEN FLIEDER

Upon the Petition of
DAWN JEANNINE FLIEDER, n/k/a DAWN JEANNINE COOK,
Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
SCOTT ALLEN FLIEDER,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, James N. Daane,

Judge.

A former spouse appeals from a ruling modifying physical care of the

parties’ two children. AFFIRMED.

John S. Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.

Robert B. Deck, Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

Faced with what it saw as a choice “between the lesser of two evils,” the

district court granted Scott Flieder’s modification petition for physical care of his

two children with Dawn Cook. In doing so, the court balanced Scott’s failure to pay

any child support to Dawn since their dissolution decree, among other faults,

against Dawn’s “calculated, secretive, and long-lasting” decision to leave the

children in her mother’s care while she worked out of state. Dawn appeals,

claiming that her “heavy reliance upon her mother to assist in raising the children

does not make Scott a superior parent.” We affirm the court’s decision upon our

de novo review of this close case.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Scott and Dawn started dating in 2007, shortly after Scott was released from

prison for “statutory rape.”1 Their oldest child, L.F., was born in 2009. Scott and

Dawn married in January 2010, and their second child, K.F., was born in 2011.

The next year, Dawn petitioned for divorce. Following a trial in 2014, the district

court entered a dissolution decree placing the children in the parties’ joint legal

custody and Dawn’s physical care with visitation for Scott. The children are now

fifteen and thirteen years old.

During the marriage, Dawn worked at an airline in Sioux City. Scott was

employed with a pilot-car service, although he lost that job just before the

dissolution trial. The district court imputed an income to Scott in the dissolution

decree and ordered him to pay $527 per month in child support. After the divorce,

1 The record did not contain any details about the exact conviction or convictions

that landed Scott in prison.
3

Scott found a new job as an over-the-road escort for oversized loads. That job

required Scott to travel, so he did not see the children regularly.

Scott testified that in roughly 2015, he became disabled because of various

ailments, including “blood clots, IVC filters, pulmonary embolisms,” and his left

shoulder, which he had “replaced a few times.” He applied for social security

disability benefits a few times but was denied. Even though Scott was not working,

he did not have consistent visits. Scott claimed this was because Dawn told him

that “it was problematic for the children.” Dawn, however, testified that her

relationship with Scott was amicable,2 and she would let him see the children when

he asked—which was sporadically.

In 2017, Dawn accepted a position as a customer service manager with an

airline in Chicago. She moved there in February. The children—who had been

staying with Dawn’s parents at their residence in a small town near Sioux City—

followed the next month. Dawn did not tell Scott they were moving to Chicago

because she “didn’t want a fight.” Scott found out about the move when he went

to pick the children up after school, and they weren’t there. Scott had one visit with

the children while they were in Chicago and minimal phone contact because he

“would call and a lot of times would not get an answer.”

Dawn and the children lived in Chicago until August 2018, when Dawn’s

position was transferred to Philadelphia. She decided to move the children back

2 However, Dawn also testified that Scott was physically abusive after the divorce.

She described an incident in 2016 when he bent her thumb backwards and bruised
her leg and another when he forced his way into her house and held her up against
the wall. Scott did not deny these incidents, testifying: “There was a lot of abuse
between both of us. . . . We were very abusive. Very physical couple.”
4

to Iowa and into her parents’ house while she stayed in Philadelphia to work. Dawn

testified that her schedule in Philadelphia was “very flexible,” so she could fly back

and forth “if not every week, every other week.” In November 2022, Dawn testified

that she obtained a new job with a different airline based out of Denver and flew

back to Iowa every weekend. She remained in Denver until August 2023, when

she left the airline industry for a job as an administrative assistant with a law-

enforcement-training organization in Philadelphia. Since her job in Chicago, Dawn

has stayed at “crash pads” in the cities where she was working, which she

described as places where aviation professionals would rent rooms to stay in while

they were working. Dawn maintained that her permanent residence was in Iowa

with the children.

Dawn did not tell Scott about any of this, including her decision to move the

children back to Iowa to live with her parents. But from 2018 until 2022, Dawn

testified that Scott would see the children “[e]very other weekend if he was

available,” or sometimes “he would do two weekends [in] a row and not two

weekends. It was very amicable as far as what was happening in his life.” Scott

described his visitation with the children during this time as periodic, noting that

until recently, he did not even know where they were going to school because he

“was not placed on any of the school stuff.” When asked how that was possible,

Scott replied, “I didn’t care where they were going to school. I was happy to see

my children.”

Beginning in 2022, Scott started taking a more active role in the children’s

lives. He talked to them every day, picked them up from school, and met with their

teachers and principals. He also had regular conversations with Dawn’s mother,
5

Lott, about the children, who Scott said were becoming more than she could

handle. He testified that at Dawn’s parents’ house, K.F. “is given electronics to

babysit him or to subdue” his attention deficit disorder,3 while L.F. “is being placed

in a motherly role that is unacceptable for any child her age.” Scott explained that

L.F., who was fourteen at the modification trial,

is responsible to pick up Dawn’s mail and make sure that it gets put
into the mail to Philadelphia. [She] is responsible for making sure
that [K.F.] gets up for school. [She] is responsible to make sure that
[K.F.] takes his medicine. [She] is responsible for every aspect that
a mother or a father should be responsible for.

Scott testified that L.F. called him every morning to help get K.F. out of bed

because he would not wake up for his grandmother. The children also called him

when they were fighting with one another or their grandparents.

It was one of those fights that led to Scott’s petition to modify the dissolution

decree. L.F. called him crying in April 2023 because of an argument between K.F.

and their grandmother. Scott drove to their house, and Lott agreed to let him take

the children for the weekend to give her a break. But because he was concerned

about Lott’s ability to continue parenting the children in Dawn’s absence, Scott kept

them in his care and applied to modify the dissolution decree at the end of April.

In mid-May, Dawn flew back to Iowa, picked the children up early from school, and

returned them to her parents’ house.

During the three weeks when the children were in Scott’s care, Dawn said

that K.F. had behavior problems at school: “He was getting into physical

altercations with other students, he made a racist comment to another student, and

3 K.F.’s medical records show that he was diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, but Dawn insisted that he “never had any hyperactivity.”
6

he was talking about inappropriate things.” Dawn, who is Asian, blamed the racist

comment on Scott, testifying that he “will make derogatory statements towards

anybody . . . that wasn’t white.” Scott acknowledged that he had made racially

derogatory comments in the past, which he attributed to his time in prison before

he and Dawn started dating in 2007. Scott explained that he “carried a very large

chip on [his] shoulder” from that “very racially divided” prison environment. In the

years since his release, Scott testified that he tried “very hard not to have that

issue, especially in front of the kids.”

Dawn also testified that when K.F. was in Scott’s care, he brought a knife

to school. Scott admitted that he had given the twelve-year-old child a Swiss Army

knife as a “utilitarian tool.” But Scott testified that was not the knife that K.F.

brought to school. Instead, it was one K.F. found on the ground by the school bus.

Dawn was additionally concerned about Scott’s stance on K.F.’s attention deficit

disorder, testifying that he was resistant to giving K.F. medicine when he was first

diagnosed in 2021. Scott, however, testified that after Dawn asked him to help

pay for K.F.’s medication, he started picking it up from the pharmacy for him. But,

as Dawn pointed out, Scott forgot to give K.F. his medication one day and called

the school to see if they could give him a “placebo.”

In any event, Dawn and Scott agreed that K.F.’s attention deficit disorder

caused problems at school. He has been on an individualized education plan since

first grade because of “difficulty with comprehension.” Dawn attributed that to his

disorder, but she waited to have him evaluated because she “didn’t feel that

medication was good for children until they get a little bit older.” Dawn’s mother,

Lott, brought K.F. to his initial evaluation for the disorder, like she did for most of
7

the children’s routine medical appointments. Dawn would schedule those

appointments and participate by telephone, but she did not tell Scott about them.

The patient history section of K.F.’s medical records notes: “Grandma is the

primary caretaker. Mom in Philadelphia, speaks to everyday. Dad lives here and

sees on weekends, talks to often also.”

Lott confirmed that she had been raising the children, testifying: “I’m the

grandmother and the kids live with me and they go to school in my house.”

According to Lott, Dawn only flew back to see the children about every three weeks

and stayed for three days and two nights—much less than what Dawn testified to.

When Dawn was in town, she would go grocery shopping and take the children out

to eat. She would also give Lott “a couple hundred dollars” to use if the children

needed to buy birthday presents for their friends, but nothing for them living with

her. When asked whether the children were harder for her to watch as they got

older, Lott answered, “Not really.” But she testified they should be living with one

of their parents, preferably Dawn.

By the modification trial in December 2023, Scott owed Dawn $73,400 in

past-due child support, which she sought to enforce through a contempt action that

she filed after Scott’s modification petition. Scott and his new wife, Melissa,

planned to refinance Melissa’s house in Sioux City and use the proceeds to satisfy

the debt. Scott married Melissa the month before the trial, although they had been

dating since his separation from Dawn and engaged since 2018. Scott lived with

Melissa and her children off and on before they got married, even while he was
8

still on the sex offender registry.4 When he was not living with Melissa, Scott

resided in Sioux City with his mother or friends. Since he became disabled, Scott’s

mother has helped support him, although Scott hoped that his most recent

application for social security disability benefits would succeed.

Dawn testified that she wanted the children to move to Philadelphia with

her, as she requested in her counterclaim to Scott’s modification petition, but she

recognized that she needed to find a residence there. While the children had

expressed some anxiety about moving, Dawn testified it was in their best interest

because “they’ve always been with me, and I support them in seeing their father

and experiencing different cultures, life, and showing them how you can prosper.”

For his part, Scott testified that Dawn “hasn’t lived here in a very long time. She

promised that she would be . . . back every other weekend, yet even her mom says

she’s here every three weeks at best.” Scott did not believe that Dawn was “in any

position to satisfy the needs of the children as far as school, doctors, personal life

situations, all of which Lott and I have been dealing with for a number of years

now.” In the end, Scott bluntly said, “The point is it’s time for one of us to step up

and grow up and be a fucking parent. Excuse my language.”

After hearing this evidence, the district court entered a detailed, forty-five

page ruling that found:

The resolution of the dilemma this couple presents to the court
is not an easy one. It is difficult to condone Dawn’s actions in
secreting the children’s moves from Scott, and actively working to
cover her absences in order to preserve the status quo, but it is also
difficult not to admire how she has worked to survive and to preserve
her family when she was receiving $0 dollars [in] child support. It is

4 Scott testified that he got off the sex offender registry a few years before the

modification trial.
9

equally difficult to condone Scott’s actions . . . although most of
Scott’s mistakes were individual incidental ones, while Dawn’s were
calculated, secretive and long-lasting. It is also difficult to look away
from the fact that Scott has not paid one dollar of child support in
over a decade, which put significant strain on Dawn’s ability to lead
a normal life with their children.

The court framed the decision before it as a choice

between the lesser of the two evils. . . . Is it in the children’s best
interest to permit them to remain living with Lott, with remote
supervision by Dawn and limited involvement by Scott, or to make a
custody change that would permit the children to live on a daily basis
with the parent with whom they have never resided? On its face, the
presumption would be the [former] option, as the law strongly
supports the children living with the parent with whom they have
primarily lived in the past. But here, the children have not actually
[been] residing with Dawn for some time. The decision is then further
complicated by Scott’s history, including his previous transient
lifestyle, his bad choices, and his brand-new marriage with a woman
in whose house he is now living at her pleasure.

(Footnote omitted.)

After weighing these considerations and the factors set out in Iowa Code

section 598.41(3) (2023), the court concluded it was in the children’s best interests

to grant Scott’s petition to modify their physical care.5 The court found the children

should finish the school year with their grandparents before transitioning to Scott’s

care during the summer of 2024. The court entered a liberal visitation schedule

for Dawn that approximated her contact with the children in the years preceding

the modification. In closing, the court stated:

5 Although the court framed the choice before it as a binary one, Dawn did present

a third option in her counterclaim to Scott’s modification petition—allowing her to
relocate the children to Philadelphia. While the court did not expressly address
that option in its ruling, it implicitly rejected Dawn’s request by modifying the
dissolution decree to place the children in Scott’s physical care. See Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 530–40 (Iowa 2002) (assuming “the district court
rejected claims not specifically addressed” when error preservation is not at issue).
10

It is not lost on the court that Scott’s non-payment of support
has contributed to Dawn’s need to try to earn more income to support
herself, which she decided required her to move from Sioux City to a
larger city, but the court’s recognition of that inequity, while it may be
grounds for contempt,[6] is not grounds for Dawn to retain physical
care when she has not been actually exercising primary physical
care for many years.

II. Analysis

Because petitions to modify the physical care provisions of a dissolution

decree lie in equity, our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d

26, 32 (Iowa 2015). “But when we say a case is reviewed de novo, this does not

mean that we decide the case in a vacuum or approach it as though the trial court

had never been involved.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned

up). Instead, “while not bound by the district court’s findings, we give them weight

and defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.”

Id. (cleaned up); accord Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32.

Credibility was a factor here, which we keep in mind as we apply the well-

established standard for modifications:

To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the
applying party must establish by a preponderance of evidence that
conditions since the decree was entered have so materially and
substantially changed that the children’s best interests make it
expedient to make the requested change. The changed
circumstances must not have been contemplated by the court when
the decree was entered, and they must be more or less permanent,
not temporary. They must relate to the welfare of the children. A
parent seeking to take custody from the other must prove an ability
to minister more effectively to the children’s well being.

Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32.

6 The court’s ruling noted that a hearing on Dawn’s contempt application was held

in November, and a “decision on that contempt application remains under
advisement.” The resolution of that application is not in the record before us.
11

This standard places a heavy burden on the moving party because of the

fundamental policy that “once custody of children has been fixed it should be

disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.” Id. (citation omitted). The controlling

consideration, however, is the children’s best interests, which “provides the

flexibility necessary to consider unique custody issues on a case-by-case basis.”

Id. (citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Cowern, No. 23-1240, 2024

WL 2045686, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024) (noting “modification petitions rise

and fall on their own facts” and “prior cases have little precedential value” (citation

omitted)).

On appeal, Dawn does not challenge the district court’s finding that there

was a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. Instead, she

claims the court erred in determining Scott “met his burden that he is the superior

parent to minister to the children’s well being” and denying her request to “move

with the children out of state.”

Dawn first points to Scott’s failure to pay “one cent of child support” and

argues that “should be a factor in the determination of physical care.” We agree

Scott wholly neglected that basic obligation of being a parent, which is a factor in

determining physical care. See In re Marriage of Day, 314 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Iowa

1982). The district court wrestled with how that failure impacted its decision but

ultimately determined it was outweighed by Dawn’s subterfuge and absence from

the children’s lives. These were appropriate considerations that tipped the scales

in Scott’s favor, as the court explained in a ruling on Dawn’s post-trial motion to

enlarge or amend:
12

[T]he most salient (and cogent) factors . . . justifying modification of
physical care were the facts that Dawn had not actually been
exercising primary physical care for many years and had been
secreting that fact from Scott, and that Scott had been, for a
substantial recent period, providing near daily emotional and routine
physical care support to the children and to the children’s actual
primary caregiver, Dawn’s mother.

Our statute requires the district court to “consider the denial by one parent

of the child’s opportunity for maximum continuing contact with the other parent,

without just cause, a significant factor in determining the proper custody

arrangement.”7 Id. § 598.41(1)(c). The court must also consider “[w]hether the

parents can support the other parent’s relationship with the child.” Id.

§ 598.41(3)(e). Because of the importance of “‘maintain[ing] meaningful relations

with both parents,’ a parent’s actions showing an intent to ‘separate’ a child from

the other parent, ‘emotionally and physically,’ has often been a strong basis to

modify physical care from one parent to the other.” Shepherd v. Briley, No. 23-

0593, 2024 WL 470356, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024) (quoting In re Marriage

of Leyda, 355 N.W.2d 862, 866–67 (Iowa 1984)); see also In re Marriage of Awe,

No. 24-0055, 2024 WL 4039567, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2024) (affirming

modification of physical care where the mother moved 300 miles away with the

children, lied to the father about where they were, and enrolled them in a different

school without his knowledge). The court’s ruling recognized these principles.

7 “Just cause may include a determination by the court . . . that a history of
domestic abuse exists between the parents.” Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(c); see also
id. § 598.41(3)(j). While Dawn testified that Scott physically abused her after the
divorce, she does not argue on appeal that a history of domestic abuse existed,
that the district court erred in failing to apply these provisions, or that Scott’s
conduct should have precluded placing the children in his physical care. Nor did
she testify that she surreptitiously moved to Chicago with the children because of
Scott’s abuse. Instead, she consistently described their relationship as amicable.
13

Not only did Dawn hide the children’s move to Chicago, their return to Iowa,

and her out-of-state residences from Scott, she failed for many years to notify him

about their medical or educational needs. We acknowledge, as did the district

court, that some of Dawn’s moves may have been motivated by Scott’s failure to

pay child support. Cf. In re Marriage of Lapke, No. 04-1595, 2005 WL 1225939,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2005) (noting the impact of a custodial parent’s move

is of greater concern than the motivations for the move). But Dawn was

contemplating a move even at the dissolution trial, where she sought a provision

allowing her “to move or relocate with the children for her job with the airlines.”

The dissolution court denied that request, ruling it was “not inclined to

predetermine” that potential modification issue. Rather than filing a modification

when she moved—or at least telling Scott where she and the children were—Dawn

hid that information from him. As the district court found in its modification ruling,

Dawn “knew that she was not permitted to unilaterally make that decision but did

it anyway.”

Dawn also argues that Scott’s “visitation and interactions with the children

have been sporadic,” and he was “mostly uninvolved with the children’s education.”

That was true up until 2022—although Scott blamed some of that on Dawn. But,

as the district court found, Scott “has recently been much more responsible in

acting as a father for the children. . . . On a day-to-day basis, Scott has, for at least

most of the last several years, been available to the children for guidance and

support.” Dawn, in contrast, has left the children in her mother’s care since 2018.

While our case law “places greater importance on the stability of the relationship

between the child and the primary caregiver over the physical setting of the child,”
14

In re Marriage of Williams, 589 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998), the district

court found the record did not support Dawn’s claim that she was “providing

routine, if not daily, care for the children.” We agree and defer to that credibility

finding.

In doing so, we note that the “deference we pay to trial court findings is

especially strong here” because the case turned “not so much on what was said

and done, as upon the implications of the words and actions of the parties.” In re

Marriage of Udelhofen, 444 N.W.2d 473, 474 (Iowa 1989). “In resolving such a

case a trial court, as first-hand observer of witnesses holds a distinct advantage

over an appellate court, which necessarily must rely on a cold transcript.” Id.;

accord Hora, 5 N.W.3d at 645; In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa

1984). “[T]his advantage ‘greatly help[s]’ the district court ‘in making a wise

decision about the parties’ and their children.” Awe, 2024 WL 4039567, at *2

(quoting Vrban, 359 N.W.2d at 423).

To be sure, Scott has his faults. But as “we focus on the best interests of

the children, we consider the emotional and environmental stability offered by each

parent.” Williams, 589 N.W.2d at 762. “[T]hat which is least disruptive emotionally

to the child should be given greatest consideration in achieving the ultimate goal

of the child’s long-term best interests.” Id. Except for the year-and-a-half when

they lived in Chicago, the children have always resided in the Sioux City area,

where Scott and his family also live. Scott has a good relationship with Dawn’s

parents and, before the modification was filed, was able to communicate well with

Dawn. In this close case, we give weight to the district court’s determination that

the least emotionally disruptive result for the children—and the one that is in their
15

best interests—is transferring physical care to Scott and denying Dawn’s request

to move the children to Philadelphia with her. See In re Marriage of Reed, No. 09-

0029, 2009 WL 4122884, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2009) (“In close cases such

as this, we give careful consideration to the district court’s findings.”). We

accordingly affirm the court’s decision to modify the physical care provisions of the

parties’ dissolution decree.

AFFIRMED.

Ahlers, P.J., concurs; Buller, J., dissents.
16

BULLER, Judge (dissenting).

In my view, the majority affirms a serious mistake in placing custody of these

children with a father who is an unemployed convicted sex offender and admitted

domestic abuser, has limited to no experience meaningfully parenting the children

on his own, and has never paid a dime of child support. I cannot join the majority

opinion and therefore dissent.

First, the record is sparse on the details of conviction, but Scott admits to a

conviction for “statutory rape” and that his placement on the sex-offender registry

complicated living with his new wife while her children were in the house. He

served about a decade in prison for this and a burglary charge and has barely

worked since then. In my reading of the record (and seemingly the district court’s),

Scott only decided to petition for custody once his term of sex-offender registration

had concluded. He then hurriedly married—without telling or inviting the children—

six months after filing for modification and just a week after a contempt hearing

regarding his massive child support arrears, with plans to refinance his new wife’s

home to pay the debt.

Scott also admitted to perpetrating domestic violence against Dawn. She

credibly described how he battered her when she refused to have sex with him

while they were separated. And she convincingly described how he became

jealous and violent whenever she started dating someone new.

Even the district court, which ruled in favor of Scott, found he was “largely

absent for most of [the children’s] lives.” And by his own admission, Scott was not

an active parent for most of the last decade. Despite not working, Scott never

sought to exercise the full visitation afforded to him by the divorce decree. And he
17

had virtually no contact with the children for a period of years. Even after they

moved back to Iowa, Scott didn’t ask the children about where they were living or

going to school. And the few occasions Scott provided daily care for the children

were rife with problems, including the repetition of racial epithets spoken by Scott,

acting out, and bringing a knife to school.

The “placebo” incident mentioned by the majority bears some elaboration,

as those circumstances involved Scott forgetting to send the child’s medicine to

school and attempting to enlist the school nurse to lie to the child and give him fake

pills. Though suspect on its own, this interaction takes on a more nefarious patina

when you add that Scott told Dawn he “didn’t believe” the mental-health diagnosis

that required the medication. This is also of a flavor with Scott telling the children

that COVID-19 wasn’t a real virus and that there was something wrong with the

vaccine, which led to the children having panic attacks every time they got a flu

shot. So, while the majority vaguely alludes to Scott becoming a better parent over

some period of time in the immediate lead-up to trial, I am hardly convinced that a

few months of sudden interest in parenting means much. And I place weight on

the fact that Scott’s “change[ of] heart,” as Dawn’s mother put it, only came about

when he learned the children were beneficiaries of a trust fund.

Scott has never paid a cent of child support. Although he claims to be

disabled and unable to work, the federal government disagrees—denying his

multiple applications for disability benefits—and Scott offered no medical evidence

at trial. He has chosen not to financially support himself at any point over the last

decade, instead freeloading off his mother and now his new wife. There is no

evidence in the record that Scott has, or ever will have, any financial means by
18

which he can provide for the children. While married to Dawn, Scott bragged about

how he owed another woman $58,000 in back child support and never planned to

pay it. He owes Dawn at least $73,000 in child support as of trial, and the closest

thing he had to a “plan” for paying this amount was a suggestion that he could do

a cash-out refinance of his new wife’s house and use some of her (now his) money.

These facts speak for themselves. Scott is not a suitable parent, let alone

a superior one to Dawn. In fact, this record would be sufficient to terminate Scott’s

parental rights. See Iowa Code § 600A.8(4) (authorizing termination of parental

rights when “[a] parent has been ordered to contribute to the support of the

child[ren] . . . and has failed to do so without good cause”); In re B.L.A., 357 N.W.2d

20, 23 (Iowa 1984) (applying this section); In re B.C., No. 24-0680, 2024 WL

4965869, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024) (“Making the decision to not provide

your child any financial support is not ‘good cause.’”). We should all be troubled

that facts that could justify termination of parental rights have been spun into a

finding of superior parenting. And it is perverse that perhaps Dawn could have

avoided losing physical care of the children had she petitioned under chapter 600A

to remove Scott from their lives, rather than allowing him visitation and contact to

preserve the father–child relationship.

In this procedural posture seeking modification of the custody decree, it was

Scott’s “heavy” burden to prove he was a superior caretaker compared to Dawn.

See In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). So, what does

the majority consider Dawn’s fatal flaws that materially outweigh Scott’s deficits?

Mostly that Dawn’s mother provided a substantial amount of care while Dawn

worked out of state during the week. But the majority fails to meaningfully
19

acknowledge why Dawn had to stick with her airline job and now her work for an

out-of-state law-enforcement organization. And the answer is that, as a single

mother not receiving a penny of child support from Scott, she had to prioritize her

career to financially provide for the children. Now, the majority has affirmed placing

the children with Scott—who continues to have no plan for financially supporting

them—and moved the children from a stable care arrangement in which they were

thriving, and in which Dawn and her mother managed all of their educational,

medical, and other obligations, to an entirely new home life.

Neither the majority nor the district court have appropriately considered that

Dawn’s sacrifices to provide for the children were directly caused by Scott’s failure

to pay any child support. In other words, neither own up to essentially punishing

Dawn for maintaining her career to fill the financial gap caused by Scott’s deadbeat

approach to child support. See In re Marriage of Brogden, 344 N.W.2d 271, 273

(Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (“The award of custody cannot be used to punish one parent

or reward the other.”). Nor have the majority or district court given serious

consideration to Dawn’s alternative request to move to back to Iowa if the court

was unwilling to let her relocate with the children to Philadelphia. My vote is that

the children are better off under the care arrangement with Dawn (aided by her

mother) than they will be with Scott, regardless of whether Dawn moves with the

children or moves back to Iowa. Scott is not a suitable father, and he certainly did

not meet his heavy burden to prove he could provide superior care. I dissent.