State of Iowa v. Tevontaye Emmannuel Elliott

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0670
Filed May 7, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TEVONTAYE EMMANNUEL ELLIOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tom Reidel, Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions and sentences following a jury trial.

AFFIRMED.

Danielle A. Dunne of Carney & Appleby, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Tevontaye Elliott appeals his convictions and sentences following a jury trial

on third-degree sexual abuse, indecent exposure, and sexual exploitation of a

minor. Elliott challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his sexual-abuse and

indecent-exposure convictions and disputes the admission of a Cellebrite cell

phone extraction report into evidence. He also alleges the district court erred in

sentencing him to prison and ordering his sentences to run consecutive to a

separate sentence imposed for contempt. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

The following evidence was presented during trial. Elliott met M.R. through

an online video-chat platform in August 2022. Elliott was twenty-one years old and

living in Canada. M.R. was fourteen years old and living in Bettendorf with her

parents. Shortly after the two met, M.R.’s mother discovered M.R. on a video call

with Elliott. Because M.R. was prohibited from dating, M.R.’s parents told her she

could not have further contact with Elliott and took away her cell phone.

In September, M.R.’s father awoke to find M.R. talking to Elliott on the

home’s landline telephone after midnight. The call disconnected before M.R.’s

father took the phone. M.R.’s father called the last phone number back and asked

to speak to Elliott’s mother. M.R.’s father expressed concern that Elliott appeared

to be a grown adult and M.R. was only fourteen. But Elliott’s mother was

unreceptive and hung up.

Within minutes, the Bettendorf Police Department received a report from an

unknown caller that M.R. was possibly suicidal. Officers were dispatched to M.R.’s

home and determined M.R. was not suicidal. As a result, the school resource
3

officer at M.R.’s school learned of the concerns about M.R. and her contact with

Elliott. The school resource officer observed M.R. slipping out of class with her

laptop or with borrowed cell phones. M.R.’s parents had removed the landline from

their home.

By late December, M.R. had turned fifteen. Without M.R.’s parents’

knowledge, Elliott drove from Canada to Bettendorf. Beyond his connection to

M.R., Elliott had no personal or professional connections in Bettendorf or other

nearby cities. Elliott stayed for about a week through the beginning of January at

the Sonesta Select hotel and received visits from M.R. there. Elliott later told

Detective Broders of the Bettendorf Police that he “spent a large amount of his

time with [M.R.] while he was in town,” that “their connection for each other

developed,” and “that they exchanged promise rings.” Both M.R. and Elliott wore

their corresponding rings on their left-hand ring finger.

Elliott returned to Bettendorf in May. Elliott checked in to the Clarion Point

hotel on May 13 and checked out on May 14. On the morning of May 15, M.R.’s

neighbor—whose home was on the same side of M.R.’s house as M.R.’s ground-

level bedroom—saw Elliott walking away from M.R.’s house, leaving through the

backyard toward an area with no public egress. The following morning, on May 16,

the neighbor again saw Elliott. Elliott had just crawled out of M.R.’s bedroom

window and was crouched by the window when the neighbor saw him. Elliott again

left through the backyard.

Early in the morning of May 18, M.R.’s father went down to M.R.’s bedroom

to wake up M.R. and her younger sister for school. M.R. had been sharing her

room with her younger sister at the time. In the room, M.R.’s father saw a bottle
4

of liquor and a pair of men’s pants and shoes under M.R.’s bed. M.R.’s mother

joined the ensuing commotion before M.R.’s father found Elliott hiding in the

bedroom closet, wearing only his underwear.

M.R.’s mother called the police. Elliott told officers that he had come

through M.R.’s bedroom window the night before. He denied that any sexual

activity occurred and claimed the two only talked and watched movies. M.R. also

denied any sexual activity. Meanwhile, M.R.’s neighbor noticed the police

presence and recognized Elliott as the man he had observed outside of M.R.’s

window a few mornings earlier. The neighbor reported his observations to one of

the officers at the scene. Faced with this information, Elliott admitted to officers

that May 18 was not the first time he had been to the home. At M.R.’s father’s

request, Elliott was issued a trespass notice that permanently banned Elliott from

returning to the family’s home.

On June 23, Elliott’s car was parked at Veteran’s Memorial Park in

Bettendorf. Janelle Hansen had driven her kids to the park, a place they regularly

went to play with children attending children’s day camps. As expected, a day

camp with somewhere between thirty and fifty children was taking place at the park

when Hansen and her kids arrived. She parked her car, but before getting her kids

out, she noticed Elliott’s car. Elliott’s car was parked roughly forty feet from the

park pavilion where children were located. Hansen noticed the car “appeared to

be moving and rocking a lot.” Even some of the day camp kids were “pointing and

laughing at [Elliott’s] car.” Inside the vehicle, Hansen could see buttocks and “legs

in the air, arms readjusting, what appeared to be a man . . . holding himself up . . .

on the back of the seat. . . . The legs were bare and exposed, and so were the
5

buttocks.” Hansen explained “it was pretty apparent that they were having sex in

the vehicle.” Hansen reported the incident to the Bettendorf police.

Officer Claussen was the first to arrive. Officer Claussen parked his high-

profile police sports utility vehicle (SUV) perpendicular to Elliott’s car, which had

been backed into the parking spot, so the SUV’s driver’s-side window had a view

into the car. In the front passenger seat, Officer Claussen observed Elliott “moving

his hips, thrusting in at a very hard and fast pace, completely naked.” He saw a

pair of arms and legs wrapped around Elliott.

The couple in the car, Elliott and M.R., did not notice Officer Claussen when

he pulled up in the marked SUV or when he intentionally slammed the SUV door.

Officer Claussen used his knuckles to knock on Elliott’s front passenger window

“four or five times” before Elliott noticed him. Officer Claussen noticed M.R. was

“naked from the waist down.” The two inside the vehicle scrambled to put on

clothes. Officer Hayes, who had arrived on scene, also witnessed the scramble.

The seat of the front passenger seat was upholstered with black fabric. On

the seat, Officer Claussen observed smears of “thick and heavy,” “whitish-type

fluid” that covered “maybe six inches long and maybe two inches wide,” which he

associated with “the type of fluid that gets deposited during somebody having

sexual intercourse with somebody else.”

Elliott was arrested, read his Miranda1 rights, and taken into custody. While

still at the scene, M.R. confirmed they were having sex in the car. M.R. explained

to Officer Hayes that Elliott wore a condom and that she saw Elliott put it on. After

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
6

being informed that Officer Claussen observed the couple engaging in sex when

he arrived, Elliott conceded the act and provided that the sex was consensual.

Elliott claimed June 23 was the first time he had sex with M.R.

Detective Broders interviewed Elliott at the Bettendorf Police station, where

he was again read his Miranda rights. The two discussed the chronology of Elliott’s

relationship with M.R. Elliott discussed his visit in January, confirming that during

the January visit he gave M.R. a promise ring—which Detective Broders had

observed on M.R.’s ring finger earlier that day.

As to Elliott’s visit mid-May, Elliott told Detective Broders that he stayed at

the Clarion Pointe hotel for a week and a half. But the hotel records show Elliott

only stayed for one night from May 13 to May 14. Detective Broders said Elliott

admitted spending most of his time with M.R. and that “on one day he digitally

penetrated [M.R.] The next day he again digitally penetrated [M.R.], which led to

vaginal intercourse. And the following day after that, he had vaginal intercourse

with [M.R.]” According to Elliott, when he was discovered in M.R.’s bedroom closet

it had been approximately two days since his last sexual encounter with M.R.

Elliott also admitted to Detective Broders that he and M.R. were having sex

in his car when Officer Claussen arrived on June 23. Elliott described the physical

mechanics permitting him to engage in vaginal intercourse despite the confined

car space and indicated he did not wear a condom and did not ejaculate.

Officers obtained a search warrant permitting a search of Elliott’s phone and

M.R.’s phone, both of which were collected on June 23.2 To extract the phones’

2 M.R.’s parents had returned M.R.’s cell phone to her sometime after the landline

incident in September 2022.
7

contents for review, Bettendorf Police relied on a program called Cellebrite.

Cellebrite extracts a cellphone’s contents, “whether it’s photos, videos, text

messages, phone call logs, GPS data, whatever it’s able to grab from the phone.”

The extracted data is then processed through an analyzer, which publishes a

report. Both phones were extracted and processed.

Images extracted from Elliott’s phone included multiple explicit photos of

female genitalia. In the photos was a hand matching M.R.’s distinct physical

characteristics, adorned with the ring given by Elliott. Some also contained the

same bed sheets as those on M.R.’s bed. Though these images were extracted

from Elliott’s phone, data indicated the photos were sent from M.R.

Extracted data from Elliott’s phone placed him in Bettendorf from at least

December 26, 2022, to January 7, 2023. Location data from both phones placed

M.R. and Elliott near the Sonesta Select hotel at the same times during these

dates, among other places, including M.R.’s house.

A series of videos were also uncovered during the extraction. Metadata

indicated the videos were taken on January 3. The distinct design characteristics

of the room in which the videos were taken matched the design of the rooms at the

Sonesta Select hotel. The series appeared to capture the same singular sex act

between Elliott and M.R. over a number of short videos.

At trial, a Bettendorf police detective described one of the videos, which was

also played for the jury. “[M.R.] is pictured in the forefront of the video, lying on the

bed, wearing a blue sweater.” She was nude from the waist down. Elliott was

completely nude. The video “depicts Mr. Elliott approaching from an unknown

space in the back of the room and coming up behind her, manipulating himself,
8

and then moving to an area behind her and beginning, what appears to be,

thrusting motions and movements behind her, as she speaks to him.” In the video,

Elliott says to M.R., “You’re not supposed to be recording this shit.” He then

appears to line up his penis behind her and pushes his hips forward. M.R. winces,

and Elliott repeatedly tells M.R. to “grind on it.”

The State charged Elliott by trial information on seven counts: Counts 1, 2,

3, and 5 charged separate incidences of third-degree sexual abuse in violation of

Iowa Code sections 709.1(2) (2023) and 709.4(1)(b)(2)(d), class “C” felonies;

Count 4 charged indecent exposure in violation of Iowa Code section 709.9, a

serious misdemeanor; Count 6 charged sexual exploitation of a minor in violation

of Iowa Code section 728.12(1), a class “C” felony; and Count 7 charged sexual

exploitation of a minor in violation of Iowa Code section 728.12(3), an aggravated

misdemeanor. A jury convicted Elliott on all counts. Elliott appeals.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

“We review the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law.”

State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018). “We will uphold the

verdict on a sufficiency-of-evidence claim if substantial evidence supports it.” State

v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Iowa 2020). “Evidence is considered

substantial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince

a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). Our view of the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State extends to all available, reasonable inferences.

Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d at 670.
9

B. Counts 1–3: Third-Degree Sexual Abuse

Elliott claims there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for

third-degree sexual abuse on counts 1 through 3. Elliott only argues that for each

count of sexual abuse the State failed to establish that Elliott committed a sex act

with M.R.

The jury was instructed what conduct could satisfy the sex-act element.

See State v. Maldonado, 993 N.W.2d 379, 390 n.8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023)

(“Unobjected-to jury instructions serve as the law of the case when reviewing the

sufficiency of evidence.”).

“[S]ex act” means any sexual contact:
1. By penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus.
....
3. Between the genitals of one person and the genitals or
anus of another.
4. Between the finger or hand of one person and the genitals
or anus of another person.
....
The contact must be sexual in nature. You may consider the
type of contact and the circumstances surrounding it in deciding
whether the contact was sexual in nature. Skin-to-skin contact is not
required in order to establish a sex act. Prohibited contact may occur
even though the specific body parts are covered. Prohibited contact
occurs when the specified body parts or substitutes touch unless any
intervening material would, from objective viewpoint, prevent
perception by participants that body parts have touched.

Each count for sexual abuse corresponded to a sex act performed at a

separate time. On Count 1 and Count 2, the State was required to prove Elliott

committed two separate sex acts with M.R. between May 13 and May 18, one sex

act for each count. On Count 3, the State was required to prove Elliott committed

a sex act with M.R. on June 23.
10

Although at trial both Elliott and M.R. denied that any sex act had ever

occurred between them, both made earlier admissions to law enforcement contrary

to their trial testimony. After being interrupted in the park parking lot, both

conceded they had been having sex. During a police interview with Detective

Broders, Elliott detailed four sex acts committed over three days in May between

approximately May 13 and May 18. These admissions were established through

officer testimony at trial. But Elliott argues his admissions are insufficient to

support the convictions because the State failed to present evidence to corroborate

the admissions.

Unless a defendant makes a confession or admission in open court,

confessions and “admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime made after

the alleged crime must be supported with sufficient corroborating evidence.” State

v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Iowa 2011); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(4).

“Corroborating evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. It need not be

strong evidence, ‘nor need it go to the whole of the case so long as it confirms

some material fact connecting the defendant with the crime.’” Meyers, 799 N.W.2d

at 139 (quoting State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 187 (Iowa 1994)). The point of

corroborating evidence is not to provide independent proof beyond a reasonable

doubt that the crime occurred, but rather it is to fortify the truth of the admissions.

State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Iowa 2003).

Contrary to Elliott’s challenge, the State offered evidence to corroborate the

earlier admissions. We turn to the June 23 incident first. Two adult eyewitnesses

testified that it was obvious they were witnessing two people having sex. From as

close as an arm’s length away, Officer Claussen saw Elliott completely naked, hips
11

bouncing, with M.R.’s arms and bare legs wrapped around him. The seat

underneath the two was soiled with what appeared to be bodily fluids produced

during sex. Both M.R. and Elliott lied to officers about M.R.’s identity. This

evidence corroborates Elliott’s admissions that the two were engaged in sexual

intercourse on June 23. See, e.g., Liggins, 524 N.W.2d at 187–88 (determining

the defendant’s admissions were corroborated by eyewitness testimony, physical

circumstantial evidence, and false statements of material facts to investigators).

As to the sex acts in May, evidence clearly established opportunity. A hotel

employee confirmed Elliott’s stay from May 13 to 14. M.R.’s neighbor caught Elliott

sneaking out of M.R.’s bedroom on May 15 and 16. M.R.’s parents found Elliott in

her bedroom on May 18. But Elliott argues the fact that M.R.’s nine-year-old sister

stayed in the same room as he and M.R. shows he did not have an opportunity.

Ignoring the fact that M.R. was a child, he claims he would not engage in sex acts

with children around. And yet the evidence established he did just that at a park

packed with children in June. In short, Elliott had the opportunity in May to engage

in two separate sex acts, whether at the Clarion Point hotel or in M.R.’s bedroom.

And the evidence presented throughout trial indicated Elliott and M.R. were

romantically involved. M.R. defied her parents to be with Elliott. She was slipping

out of classes with computers or cell phones, and she stayed up late at night to

take clandestine calls. The two exchanged rings, which they both wore on the

finger frequently associated with wedding bands or engagement rings. Over a

period of roughly six months, Elliott made multiple road trips from Canada to

Bettendorf for the singular purpose of spending time with M.R. Viewed as a whole,

the evidence corroborates Elliott’s admissions. See State v. Hettinger,
12

No. 21-0458, 2022 WL 1486187, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022) (finding

corroborating evidence when facts showed opportunity and motive).

To be sure, the sex video made in January showed Elliott had a history of

engaging in sex acts with M.R. and further corroborated his admissions to sex acts

that occurred after the video was made. Collectively, there is ample evidence to

corroborate Elliott’s admission that he engaged in more than one sex act with M.R.

between May 13 and May 18. See, e.g., Meyers, 799 N.W.2d at 139–40

(determining corroborating evidence included evidence of opportunity, romantic

demeanor, and prior sexual abuse between the defendant and victim).

We are unpersuaded by Elliott’s argument that evidence used to

corroborate an admission to one act in May cannot be relied on to corroborate his

admission to a second act around the same time. To the extent that his argument

that each count must have distinguishable corroborating evidence may have some

merit, we note that different evidence established multiple opportunities between

May 13 and May 18: the hotel records, the neighbor’s eyewitness testimony, and

the discovery of Elliott in M.R.’s bedroom. This evidence coincides with the

timeline Elliott presented in his admission that he performed digital penetration one

day, digital and vaginal penetration a second day, and vaginal penetration a third

day. In this way, the truthfulness of each admission is fortified by the different

pieces of evidence that match separate portions of the timeline Elliott established.

Based on Elliott’s admissions to officers and the strength of the evidence to

corroborate such, a reasonable jury could find Elliott committed two sex acts on

M.R. between May 13 and 18 and committed a sex act on M.R. on June 23. Thus,

the jury’s verdicts on counts 1, 2, and 3 are supported by substantial evidence.
13

C. Count 4: Indecent Exposure

Elliott claims the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his

conviction for indecent exposure. To find Elliott guilty of indecent exposure, the

jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Elliott “committed a sex act in the

presence or view of a third person”; (2) “with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy”

his or a third person’s sexual desire; (3) “the third person was offended by [Elliott’s]

conduct”; and (4) Elliott “knew or reasonably should have known that the act was

offensive to the third person or to other viewers.”

Elliott argues the State failed to establish the first and third elements, that

he committed a sex act and that a third person was actually offended by the

conduct. Because we determine that sufficient evidence established that Elliott

committed a sex act on June 23, the act relevant to the indecent exposure charge,

we need only address Elliott’s challenge to the actual offense element.

Section 709.9 establishes “essentially a visual assault crime” that protects

unwilling viewers. State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1983) (quoting

Kermit L. Dunahoo, The New Iowa Criminal Code: Part II, 29 Drake L. Rev. 491,

541 (1980)); see Iowa Code § 709.9. “It is up to the State to show the

offensiveness of the conduct.” Bauer, 337 N.W.2d at 212. But “offended” is not

some magic word the viewer must use in testimony for the State to carry its burden.

See, e.g., State v. Brice, No. 19-0863, 2020 WL 3264401, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

June 17, 2020). The State can use circumstantial evidence to show the viewer

was offended, such as evidence the viewer diverted their gaze. See, e.g., id.; In

re C.R., No. 13-1538, 2014 WL 3930460, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug 13, 2014)

(“D.C.’s act of turning away from the exposure is evidence that she was
14

offended.”). But cf. In re C.C., No. 04-0120, 2004 WL 2002603, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Sept. 9, 2004) (determining a viewer’s description of the exposure as “weird”

and not funny was insufficient to show actual offense).

Hansen, a mother of two young children and a former social worker, said

when she saw Elliott and M.R. in the car in the park, “it was pretty apparent that

they were having sex in the vehicle.” She saw Elliott’s buttocks and M.R.’s bare

legs in the air. She testified the behavior was inappropriate, should not be

happening in a public park, and was drawing the attention of some of the kids in

the day camp. The scene caused her “mamma instincts” to kick in. She

intentionally shielded her children from the scene and reported the incident to the

police. And at trial she expressed her disbelief that the sex was happening so

close to the park where so many kids were playing: “it’s not like they were even

parked at the back corner of the parking lot. . . . So I’m like this is not—like this

shouldn’t be happening in front of all these kids.”

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable

jury could find Hansen was offended when she viewed Elliott performing a sex act

on M.R. within close proximity and clear view of a park full of children. Because

we determine the State presented sufficient evidence that Hansen was offended

and Elliott was performing a sex act—the only elements Elliott challenges on

appeal—we find sufficient evidence to uphold the jury’s verdict of guilt on indecent

exposure.

III. Admissibility of the Cellphone Extraction Report

Elliott claims the district court improperly admitted into evidence the

Cellebrite extraction report that detailed the data uncovered from his phone.
15

The State disclosed the Cellebrite report to defense counsel on

November 9, 2023, as an attachment to minutes of testimony filed on the same

date. The State designated the report as an exhibit to be introduced at trial in an

amended exhibit list filed on January 5, 2024. According to Elliott, because of the

date of the exhibit designation, the use of the report as evidence at trial violated

the district court’s own discovery order, which required the State to “turn over all

exhibits to the defense by 4:30 p.m. on January 3, 2024. Any exhibits not turned

over by that time will be excluded from evidence.”

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Richards, 809 N.W.2d 80, 89 (Iowa 2012). “An abuse of

discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds or for

reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting State

v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997)). A court is granted broad latitude when

it comes to interpreting the court’s own prior order. Gary v. Heritage Nat’l

Healthplan Servs., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); see also

Dairyland, Inc. v. Jenison, 207 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Iowa 1973) (“We give weight to

the fact the court was ascertaining its own intention.”).

A hearing on Elliott’s objection to the admissibility of the report was held

before trial on the morning defense counsel anticipated the report would be offered

into evidence. The State responded to the objection by pointing out the complete

Cellebrite report had been provided to defense counsel months earlier and the

notice of exhibits filed on January 5 was “to make it clear what was to be

introduced.” The actual exhibit admitted into evidence was only one section of the

report—a section included in full in the November disclosure.
16

As the district court stated, “The fact that the Cellebrite report, perhaps,

wasn’t marked as an exhibit does not mean it was not turned over. It was.” The

district court noted that on January 4 the State also filed a summary report of the

Cellebrite report, the summary of which was created for the sole purpose of aiding

the investigator slated to testify regarding the Cellebrite extraction report. Thus,

the district court determined that at a minimum defense counsel was alerted on

January 4 to the specific exhibit the State intended to present at trial. And although

January 4 was one day beyond the discovery-order deadline, the district court

pointed out that the trial date had been pushed back a few days due to delays

since the discovery order had been issued. So the one-day delay did not defeat

the purpose of the district court’s order—which was to ensure both parties and the

court had several days in advance of trial to review exhibits.3

We agree with the district court that just because the report was not marked

as an exhibit by January 3 does not mean the report had not been “turned over.”

The district court order required that the exhibits be provided to opposing counsel

for review before trial, and as the district court noted, “It was.” The district court’s

decision did not defeat the purpose of the discovery order. Given the district court’s

reasonableness and broad latitude in interpreting its own prior order, we find no

abuse of discretion in its decision to admit the Cellebrite extraction report into

evidence. See Dairyland, 207 N.W.2d at 755 (affirming the district court’s

“reasonable rather than hypertechnical construction” of its own order).

3 The jury trial and conviction leading to this appeal occurred after a mistrial was

declared in an earlier proceeding. The mistrial resulted when the State played to
the jury a video that neither defense counsel nor the court had previously seen.
17

IV. Sentencing

Elliott argues the district court failed to adequately consider mitigating

sentencing factors and failed to justify on the record its reasons for imposing a

partial consecutive sentence. He does not dispute that the imposed sentences fall

within the statutory limits.

Criminal sentencing is reviewed for errors of law, and the sentence imposed

will be upheld unless the sentencing procedure was somehow defective or the

district court abused its discretion. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa

2002). A sentence within “the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor.” Id. “In exercising its discretion, the district court is to weigh all

pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the

offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and

propensities or chances for reform.” State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa

1994). “[O]ur task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the

district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable

grounds.” Formaro, 638 N.W. 2d at 725.

A. Sentencing Factors

Elliott argues the district court improperly placed greater weight on the

protection of the community than his need for community-based rehabilitation. He

reasons multiple mitigating factors existed that usually weigh toward leniency in

sentencing.

At sentencing, the district court credited Elliott for his lack of criminal history,

his positive employment record, and his strong family and community support. The

district court also noted that the presentence investigation report (PSI)
18

recommendation, which stated deferred judgment was unavailable and

recommended incarceration, was “based on an incorrect analysis.” So the district

court acknowledged Elliott was in fact eligible for deferred judgment.

Weighing against these positive considerations, however, the district court

noted its community-protection concerns. It found Elliott’s trial testimony to be

“shockingly disingenuous,” reasoning “we had seen videos of you engaged in

sexual acts with [M.R.], and you came in and tried to portray yourselves as just

friends who had never engaged in acts such as that.” Elliott’s repeated failures to

follow legal orders also indicated to the district court that Elliott would fail to

conform to any probation requirements or instructions from officers. But if

incarcerated, the district court noted, Elliott would have access to “moral

reconation therapy,” which the district court believed would benefit Elliott.

In short, the district court stated:

When I look at your inability to follow the rules within the
community, your inability to be honest with the Court and with the
PSI author, it tells me that both a deferred judgment as well as just
straight probation are not going to be satisfactory to maximize your
own opportunity at rehabilitation, to protect our community from this
type of action, and to create a deterrent effect for others.
....
This is one of the rare cases where I give little to no weight to
the victim impact statement, because it is contrary to the evidence—
overwhelmingly credible evidence that was presented at trial of the
fact that you were much more than just friends and that she certainly
considered you as something other than just as a brother.
Based on your inability to be honest with the Court, your
inability to perhaps be honest with yourself about what you have
done and your conduct that led you to sit here today, the Court does
believe that incarceration is warranted.

The court then sentenced Elliott to five ten-year terms of imprisonment, one

for each of the four counts of third-degree sexual abuse and one for the felony
19

sexual-exploitation-of-a-minor conviction, one one-year term of imprisonment for

the indecent-exposure conviction, and one two-year term of imprisonment for the

aggravated-misdemeanor conviction on sexual exploitation of a minor. All seven

sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The district court considered the matters pertinent to sentencing and

sufficiently stated on the record its reasons for the sentences imposed. The district

court did not abuse its discretion in determining the need to protect the community

outweighed the mitigating factors favoring a more lenient sentence.

B. Partial Consecutive Sentences

Lastly, Elliott argues the district court failed to state on the record its reason

for requiring the seven concurrent sentences to run consecutively with a 189-day

sentence he received for twenty-seven violations of a no-contact order, which

prohibited Elliott from having contact with M.R. The order was issued when Elliott

was taken into custody on June 23, and all twenty-seven violations occurred during

the pendency of his criminal proceedings.

Sentencing courts are required to state on the record their reasons for

imposing consecutive sentences. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g).

When considering the sentences on the criminal convictions, the district

stated:

I’m going to run everything concurrent. I would normally be
tempted to run the Sexual Exploitation charge consecutive to the Sex
Abuse, because of such a horrendous crime that I think that is, and
it’s a separate crime from the Sex Abuse in the Third Degree, but
having viewed both trials, it is clear that the person whose it appears
idea it was to take these videos was not yours, but [M.R.]’s, and that
you even at one point in time, if not more than once, tell her she
needs to stop, she’s not supposed to be doing that while you’re
engaging in these sexual acts.
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The fact that they were on your phone does not put you in the
same light as most people and how I would view them for having
sexual videos or photographs of minors. I believe that these were
sent to you by [M.R.] and not necessarily done at your request. So,
accordingly, I’m willing to run those concurrently also.

As to whether to run the sentences with the contempt proceeding, the

district court discussed the twenty-seven violations during the sentencing colloquy:

[T]he Court told you to have no contact with [M.R.] during the
pendency of this matter. And there is a finding . . . that you violated
that on 27 separate occasions. You clearly knew about that No
Contact Order and you violated that No Contact Order.
You were portrayed as a captive audience, but you could have
hung up the phone at any time when your mom decided to bring in a
third party or when a third party entered that call. Once again, you’re
not the victim here. You are the perpetrator of these criminal acts.

After issuing sentences for the seven charges on which the jury convicted

Elliott, the district court stated, “Counts 1 through 7 shall all run concurrently with

each other. They shall be consecutive to the 189-day contempt sentence that was

issued . . . as a result of your 27 separate acts of contempt for violating the No

Contact Order.”

We require a statement of reasons on the record, but “a ‘terse and succinct’

statement may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does

not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.” State

v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted). While the district

court’s reasoning was brief, do not find reversible error under the present

circumstances, as the district court noted the separate nature of the contempt

actions as the reason for the consecutive nature of the sentence.
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V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Elliott’s convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.