State of Iowa v. Eugene Octavius Love Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1836
Filed April 23, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EUGENE OCTAVIUS LOVE Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel Dalrymple,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell (argued),

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kevin Cmelik (argued), Special

Counsel, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer, Schumacher, Langholz,

and Sandy, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

Eugene Love Jr. appeals his conviction of first-degree murder, arguing the

district court wrongly denied his Batson challenge1 and his subsequent motion for

mistrial related to that claim. Love also argues the court erred when it denied his

motion to admit hearsay evidence about the victim, Courtney Harris, under the rule

of completeness. Finally, Love contends the court abused its discretion when the

court found his expert’s testimony to be irrelevant to the factual questions reserved

for the jury.

After reviewing each of Love’s arguments, we affirm his conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Love and Harris were once good friends but, in the year before Harris’s

death, had a falling out. They ran into each other on January 2, 2022, at a local

gas station. The interaction was tense, with Harris allegedly threatening Love and

his girlfriend, Chylea Brown, even aggressively following her after she had dropped

off Love. On January 8, Love directed Brown to drive him to a convenience store.

Harris’s car was stopped in the drive-through lane. Love exited the vehicle, walked

to the side of Harris’s car, and fired several rounds from a gun he borrowed from

a friend, Kalani Moore, into Harris’s vehicle. Harris was struck in the arm and the

head; he died at the scene.

Love returned to Brown’s vehicle and told her to drive, fleeing the scene. In

the aftermath of the shooting, Love attempted to cover his tracks by bleaching the

1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986) (addressing the three-step inquiry

required when a party challenges the State’s use of a peremptory strike that is
alleged to be improperly motivated by racial discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause).
3

doorhandles of Brown’s car, burning his clothes on the side of the road, and

burying the weapon in Minnesota. Along with video evidence of the scene,

investigators relied on physical evidence and cell phone data to piece together the

locations and movements of the various participants. After an investigation, Love

was charged with murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.2

(2022).

Before trial commenced, Love gave notice of his intent to offer evidence of

self-defense. Prior to trial, Love provided Dr. Frank DiCataldo’s expert report,

which disclosed the expert’s opinions on Love’s “developing adolescent or

emerging adult brain and trauma history” in the context of self-defense. The State

resisted. After the court listened to the parties’ arguments at a pre-trial conference,

the court reserved judgment on the matter until “further record and an offer of proof

from the defense.” Both parties moved in limine. The State’s motion focused on

the evidentiary basis for Love’s potential self-defense claim. The court found no

nexus between Love’s behavior at the time of the shooting and self-defense,

although the court left the door open for Love to lay a proper foundation. At trial,

Love abandoned his purported self-defense claim and pivoted to proving a theory

of the lesser-included charge of voluntary manslaughter. The court and the parties

discussed Love’s request for a voluntary-manslaughter instruction before Dr.

DiCataldo’s offer of proof. After hearing the offer of proof, the court excluded the

testimony of Dr. DiCataldo and ultimately refused to instruct on the crime of

voluntary manslaughter.

After a seven-day trial, a jury found Love guilty of first-degree murder. In a

subsequent sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to life in prison without the
4

possibility of parole and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $150,000. Love

appeals.

II. Discussion.

On appeal, Love raises four arguments. The first two arguments concern

the composition of the jury—he argues the district court wrongly denied his Batson

challenge to Juror 35, who identified as African American, and erred in denying his

motion for mistrial after every African American juror was struck during jury

selection. Love raises one evidentiary argument, contending the district court

erred when it did not admit the whole of a reported conversation under Iowa’s rule

of completeness. Finally, Love argues the district court abused its discretion when

it did not allow his expert, Dr. DiCataldo, to testify to the subjective components of

voluntary manslaughter. We evaluate each argument in turn.

A. Batson Challenge.

Love alleges the State’s use of a peremptory strike during jury selection was

improperly motivated by racial discrimination or bias. Such an allegation invokes

the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. U.S.

Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6; see Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. We review

constitutional issues de novo. See State v. Booker, 989 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Iowa

2023). But we give “a great deal of deference to the district court’s evaluation of

credibility when determining the true motives of the attorney when making strikes.”

State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Iowa 2012).

Batson set forth a three-step burden-shifting framework to evaluate if a

preemptory strike was improperly rooted in racial discrimination. 476 U.S. at 96–

98. After initiating a Batson challenge, the initial burden lies with the challenging
5

party, in this case, Love. See id. at 96. He “must [(1)] establish a prima facie case

of purposeful racial discrimination in the peremptory strike.” Booker, 989 N.W.2d

at 627. Then “(2) the striking party (here, the State) must proffer a race-neutral

explanation for the strike.” Id. After a sufficient race-neutral explanation is

supplied, the burden then shifts back to Love to (3) “carry the ultimate burden of

proving purposeful discrimination.” Id.

On appeal, neither Love nor the State contests that Love set forth a

sufficient prima facie case of discrimination “by showing that the prosecutor . . .

exercised one or more peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members

of a racial minority and that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an

inference of discrimination”, State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 332 (Iowa 2019), and

that the State offered a race-neutral explanation in response. Love challenges

step three—the district court’s determination Love failed to carry his final burden

of showing purposeful discrimination.

We start with the record made during jury selection. During initial

questioning, Juror 35 reported that she knew individuals involved in this case,

including several witnesses, Love, and Harris. From there, the State asked for

specifics as to Juror 35’s relationship with parties involved in the case. First, the

State inquired about Kalani Moore, a key witness, and Juror 35’s relationship:

Q. How do you know Kalani [Moore]? A. From school.
Q. From East again? A. Yeah. And the friend of a friend.
Q. Is there anything about that relationship that you think
would affect your decision making in this case? A. No.
Q. Do you know, I mean, do you know [Moore’s] reputation or
what do you know about him? A. Oh, I really don’t know much about
him. I just, you know, one of my friends, we hang out together
sometimes.
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The State then inquired about Juror 35’s relationship with Love:

Q. Okay. And then [Love] and you said you knew him from
East? A. (Nodding head).
Q. Is that a yes? Sorry. A. Sorry, yeah.
Q. And were you close with him? A. Hung out a few times.
Q. So outside of school you hung out? A. Yeah, with my
friend.

Then the State explored Juror 35’s relationship with the Harris:

Q. Okay. And you said you knew Courtney Harris? A. Um-
hmm.
Q. What do you know about [Harris]? A. Went to school with
him also.
Q. What do you know about him? A. He—he played football
with my brother. Plus, again, he’s a friend of my friend.
Q. Did you ever hang out with [Harris] outside of school?
A. No.
Q. Do you know anything about his reputation? A. No.

Interspersed between discussions of various relationships, the State asked if these

relationships would prevent Juror 35 from being impartial:

Q. Is there anything about that relationship that you think
would affect your decision? I mean, [Love’s] on trial for murder.
A. Yes. Yes, that’s not something I want to do because . . .
Q. Why not? A. Because I don’t—I don’t know. That’s weird
to have to judge somebody that you know from before and been
around.
Q. Do you think that you, if you were presented with all of the
evidence, that you would not be able to find [Love] guilty of murder?
A. I don’t know.
Q. I mean, if the State presents evidence that shows that he
committed a crime— A. Yeah.
Q. —would you be able to find him guilty? A. Yeah. I think
so.
Q. You think so. What’s making you hesitate? A. Well,
because I think people make mistakes. I don’t know. It’s just the
way I think sometimes.
Q. Do you think that, you know, if the scales are equal in the
case and the State’s over here and [Love] is over here, do you think
that you’re already kind of favoring [Love]? Siding with [Love] a little
bit more or that it would be harder for the State to prove that he was
guilty compared to somebody you didn’t know? A. No.
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(Ellipsis in original.) And, again:

Q. Do you think that you’re going to be a fair juror on this case
considering you know so many of the people involved? A. I don’t—I
don’t know. I feel like people—knowing people makes you more
biased to agree with them. Does that make sense?
Q. Yes. You’re stating that generally. Do you think you
knowing people is going to make you more biased to favor them?
A. Yeah.
Q. And that would be—you think you would be more in favor
of [Love] than somebody else that you didn’t know? A. Yeah.

During Love’s opportunity to question potential jurors, Love asked for
clarification:

Q. I just want to be sure I’m hearing you correctly. So do you
think that you are more likely to find him not guilty just because he’s
Eugene Love than if you were on a different trial? A. No.
Q. All right. It sounds like you also know . . . [Moore]?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. Okay. I don’t have any other questions. Thank you.

In response to a question about law enforcement, Juror 35 mentioned that police

do not always help the situation and that a family member previously had a bad

experience with a police officer in the community.

The parties continued questioning other potential jury members, including

Juror 163, identified as a white female juror, who reported having a connection to

Harris and knowing some details about the case:

I have a cousin and a really close friend, friends with [Harris], so
obviously their family is, you know, saying, you know, this happened
or that happened, which I don’t recall specifics at this moment. And
I have mutual friends that know him that, you know, have said this or
that.

After the questioning of potential jury members finished, each party exercised its

strikes. The State struck both Juror 163 and Juror 35. Love made the following

Batson challenge:
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We made a Batson challenge again with regard to the State’s next
strike of number 35. She is a member of a protected class. She is
a Black woman. She is the last remaining Black person on this jury.
They exercised a preemptory challenge for her using their eleventh
strike.
We believe that they have not established a race neutral
reason and I, again, want to state the same thing is that we try to
make all these efforts to get a jury of Mr. Love’s peers but it’s nearly
impossible to do so when the State’s able to strike everyone that we
have on the jury.
The first person we lost I think was because her husband was
being prosecuted by a county attorney here. The next one we lost
had a felony record. Now this one I’m sure the State will say that
she’s had a bad experience with police.
It’s no surprise that a Black person has had a bad experience
with police and that should not count or be considered as a race
neutral reason to strike somebody as a juror in this case. I think if
there are any statistics done on that, you would find that Black people
are far more likely to have negative experiences with police than
white people. And I—and the State will probably also say that she
knows people in the case, but she knows people on both sides of the
case so I don’t know. That’s all. Thank you.

The burden then shifted to the State, where the State conceded Juror 35 was a

member of a protected class and explained its reasons behind the preemptory

strike:

Your Honor, the State is striking Juror Number 35 because of
her relationship with the parties in this case. Specifically her
relationship with Eugene Love. It was her statement when she was
called back to discuss her knowledge of several of the witnesses in
this case, . . . Kalani Moore, Eugene Love, and Courtney Harris. All
people involved in this case. Two of them are State’s witnesses, one
of them is [Love], and one of them is the [Harris] in this case. And
this particular juror knows all of them.
While she said that she had a friend of a friend relationship
with [one other witness], with [Moore], and with [Harris], she was very
specific that with [Love] they would hang out; that they hung out three
or four times outside of school with one of her friends; that she would
be more in favor of [Love]. Those were her statements.
Her ancillary knowledge about what may or may not have
happened, the reputation of Courtney Harris, the reputation of
Eugene Love, is the same reason why the State struck Juror
Number 163 who also came back here and said that she knew both
sides of this incident, that she had heard through other people or
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through word of mouth what happened and the State also struck her.
She’s a white female.
The State does not want jurors who know about the parties to
potentially go back to the jury room and base their decision in the
case on their previous experiences with the parties in the case. And
that is a race neutral reason. It wouldn’t matter to the State whether
Juror Number 35 were Black or white. If they had hung out and spent
time with Eugene Love outside of a school setting in an interpersonal
relationship, that would be the same reason to strike this juror, and it
was the same reason that the State used to strike Juror 163 who was
in the general pool.
So that is the race neutral reason. And while we understand
that that depletes the number of African American people in this
panel, the State also can’t or shouldn’t be forced just based on
Batson to have jurors in the case who know about the facts of the
case, about the parties in the case, whether or not Eugene Love had
a reputation for violence or had a reputation for nonviolence, whether
Courtney Harris had a reputation for violence or nonviolence. Those
are things that these jurors, 163 and 35, could share with the rest of
the jury panel, and the State wants this case tried as the jury
instructions require based on the facts and evidence presented from
the witness stand in this case. So that’s the reason and it is race
neutral.

(Emphasis added.)

Love points to the State’s given reasons for striking Juror 35 and highlights

a misstatement the State made that Juror 35 had knowledge of the incident. In

addition, Love argues that a comparison of the depth and scope of questioning of

Juror 163 and Juror 35 demonstrated “pretextual discriminatory intent.” Questions

directed to Juror 163 went to that potential juror’s statements that some information

about the case from Harris’s family and questions to Juror 35 pinpointed details of

the relationships to Harris, Love, and the witnesses based upon those disclosures.

And, although the State referenced in its reasons that Juror 35 had some “ancillary

knowledge” about what happened, which is a misstatement of the record as the

potential juror was not asked about that, the court found the race-neutral reasons
10

for the strike were found in several responses related specifically to Love, including

that she actually “hung out” with him. And even more, the court stated:

[Juror 35] said, upon being asked by counsel, her response
was I don’t want to be on this jury. And asked why she, in her own
words, articulated that it was weird to have to judge somebody she
knew. Her—one of her responses was she didn’t know if she could
find him guilty. Upon re-examination by [Love] she was—or she did
say if presented with evidence could she do so, her response was,
quote, I think so.
There was a question as to why she did hesitate with that
response and her answer was because people make mistakes,
which really isn’t an issue of whether the State’s proven an element
or not, whether a mistake was made that led to the commission of a
crime. But the State’s articulated her knowledge of [Love], the
State’s articulated her relation to [Love] as well as her knowledge
and relation to other witnesses in this case, which are all race neutral
reasons articulated by the State which is key.
It’s not the Court’s interpretation of her statements. It’s the
State’s position as to why it’s—the State has exercised their strikes.
I do find those to be race neutral. I do find that they have merit.

Parties cannot use a preemptory strike as a vehicle to strike a juror based

on race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the

prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the

assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the

State's case against a black defendant.”). “When a party challenges a peremptory

strike as racially discriminatory, Batson’s burden-shifting framework resolves the

challenge through a three-step inquiry.” Booker, 989 N.W.2d at 627. At step three,

it is both appropriate and necessary for the court to “decide whether to believe the

[attorney’s] explanation for the peremptory challenges.” Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 219

(alteration in original) (citation omitted).

After evaluating these facts on our de novo review to determine “whether,

under the totality of the circumstances, the strike was ‘motivated in substantial part
11

by discriminatory intent,’” and after applying the discretion we afford the district

court, we find the strike was not racially motivated. See Booker, 989 N.W.2d at

630 (citation omitted). Although the State misstated the record as to one of its

reasons for its use of the strike, we do not find the other reasons that the court

relied upon were “merely pretext for racial discrimination.” Id.; accord id. at 630–

31 (noting courts consider if the explanation for the strike is consistent with the

record even though part of the explanation was a misstatement). Consistent with

the district court’s conclusion, we find the State’s concerns over Juror 35’s pre-

existing relationships, along with her hesitation over being able to decide the case

given those relationships, are racially-neutral reasons to exercise a preemptory

strike. Although we acknowledge that the State’s eleventh preemptory strike

removed the last African American juror from the pool, we do not find the strike

was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. The court properly

denied Love’s Batson challenge.

B. Denial of Mistrial Motion.

Immediately after the court denied Love’s Batson challenge, Love moved

for mistrial on the basis that “his right to a fair trial of his peers was violated because

all of the Black jurors were struck from the jury pool.” Our review of a denial of a

motion for mistrial is for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611,

614–15 (Iowa 2024). We review whether the district court applied the proper

standard for errors at law. Cf. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016).

When Love moved for mistrial, he focused on the composition of the jury, arguing:

I would make a motion for a mistrial then. We had this panel
come in. It would have survived anything under State v. Plain[, 898
N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2017)]. We lost two of three Black jurors who
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made it into our thirty-six people. Two of those were due to local
connections.
This case hasn’t been publicized so much in the newspaper
so that a motion for change of venue would have been appropriate.
In fact, I have tried to make a motion for a change of venue on these
grounds before and was told that that’s not the appropriate
mechanism to do it. But not being able to seat a jury of your peers
because of local connections should also be an allowable ground for
a change of venue.
The U.S. Constitution guarantees Mr. Love the right to a fair
trial by a jury of his peers and so does the Iowa Constitution and
there should be a procedure in place to avoid this inevitable issue
and that would be to have a mistrial today and go somewhere else
because we wouldn’t run into [Juror] 35 who knows him and we
wouldn’t run into a person whose spouse is being prosecuted by the
Black Hawk County Attorney’s Office, and it just—it’s going to keep
happening and I move for a mistrial.

The court gave the State an opportunity to respond. Pointing to Love’s

concession that the jury pool was made up of a fair cross-section of the community,

as outlined in Plain, the State resisted the motion and argued that Love had not

identified any viable ground for a mistrial. The court then offered Love the last

word, where Love reiterated the motion for mistrial based on the compilation of the

empaneled jury and the difficulty of finding people who might not know Love, thus

resulting in an “all-white” jury. The court ruled on the motion for mistrial, stating:

All right. Well, manifest necessity[2] is the doctrine. I don’t
believe, considering all of the circumstances in this case, arguments
of the defense and of the State, that manifest necessity requires
declaring a mistrial.
....
The issue here is we have, frankly, we still have other African
American jurors in the panel that remain. It’s just random that they

2 “Under the doctrine of manifest necessity, a court has a duty to declare a mistrial

when the ends of public justice demand it.” State v. Harrison, 578 N.W.2d 234,
238 (Iowa 1998); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978) (requiring
the prosecutor to “shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the
double jeopardy bar” by “demonstrate[ing] ‘manifest necessity’ for any mistrial
declared over the objection of the defendant”).
13

were not called. That’s the random nature of this. And so the motion
is going to be denied.

On appeal, Love argues that because the court applied an incorrect

standard to its analysis, it did not properly assess whether a mistrial was required

as an appropriate remedy under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.19(5) due to

the composition of the jury. We agree with both parties that the wrong standard

was applied by the court.

The State argues that Love did not preserve error because he did not object

or clarify to the court that an improper standard was applied. But we choose to

consider Love’s challenge as articulated on appeal.

Love only argues that “[h]ad the [d]istrict [c]ourt applied the correct

standard, it would have granted Mr. Love’s motion.” We cannot reach that same

conclusion. When moving for mistrial, Love acknowledged to the court that “[w]e

had this panel come in. It would have survived anything under State v. Plain.” See

898 N.W.2d at 827–29 (outlining the three-part test for establishing the jury pool

violated the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair

cross-section of the community). And although Love would have preferred that an

African American juror sit on the jury, there is no authority requiring that result

when the jury panel meets the standards as set out in Plain. See State v. Mong,

988 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 2023) (“Our cases recognize the fair-cross-section

right extends only ‘to the jury pool’ and not to the jury panel or the petit jury.”).

Love argues the district court did not review the factors in Iowa Rule of

Criminal Procedure 2.19(5)(a)(1),3 but he offers little detail as to how those factors

3 Rule 2.19(5)(a)(1) provides the reasons the court may declare a mistrial:
14

should guide the court’s analysis. Conclusory statements are not arguments.

Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not speculate on the

arguments [the party] might have made and then search for legal authority and

comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”). Without argument from

Love to the contrary, we find that application of the correct standard—“[a] mistrial

is appropriate when ‘an impartial verdict cannot be reached’ or the verdict ‘would

have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial,’”—

would have yielded the same result at the district court. See State v. Newell, 710

N.W.2d 6, 32 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).

C. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.106.

Love lodges an evidentiary argument on appeal, contending the district

court erred when it refused to allow Moore to testify about Harris’s threats to Love

before the shooting. He argues the testimony should have been admitted under

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.106. “District court decisions on whether to admit or

exclude evidence are typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v.

Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2021). But hearsay claims are reviewed

for correction of errors at law. Id.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.106 states:

a. If a party introduces all or part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may
require the introduction, at that time, of any other part or any other

1. Because of any accident or calamity requiring termination
of the trial upon motion of a party for cause shown.
2. When a required continuance would make it impractical to
proceed with the same jury.
3. When the jurors have deliberated until it satisfactorily
appears that they cannot agree.
4. Because of an error resulting in the denial of a fair trial.
15

act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement that in
fairness ought to be considered at the same time.
b. Upon an adverse party’s request, the court may require the
offering party to introduce at the same time with all or part of the act,
declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, any other
part or any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded
statement that is admissible under rule 5.106(a). Rule 5.106(b),
however, does not limit the right of any party to develop further on
cross-examination or in the party’s case in chief matters admissible
under rule 5.106(a).

This is referred to as the rule of completeness. State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472,

507 (Iowa 2017). During trial, Love did not alert the court to rule 5.106 by name.4

Moore was first called as a witness by the State. His testimony established

that he gave Love a Beretta gun “for his protection.” Asked if giving Love the gun

was “based on a circumstance that [he] found out involving Courtney Harris,”

Moore answered “yes.” Moore explained “[t]hat [Harris] was threatening [Love]

and his girlfriend and he was following them and I think he also followed his

girlfriend when she was alone.” Moore noted he wanted Love to “be safe in the

situation.” Likewise, when explaining the aftermath of the shooting, Moore testified

that afterward “[Love] was scared about the whole situation and ended up doing

something stupid out of—out of fear.” Love attempted to introduce other evidence

to more fully explain the reasons for his fear, including that Harris might have a

4 The State contends that Love did not preserve error on this issue. But we find
Love’s responses to the State’s objections sufficiently alerted the district court to
Love’s position, which is now being advocated on appeal. In response to the
State’s objection to the introduction of the evidence, Love asserted: “It’s the
complete context of what he was told,” and later, “I understand that it is [hearsay],
but the State opened the door to that specific line of questioning. It just completes
the picture of what these people said to [Moore] about the situation with [Harris] so
I think it is fair for him to testify to it.” These were suitably specific to alert the court
to the substance of Love’s argument even though he did not cite to rule 1.506.
16

gun. On each attempt the State’s hearsay objection was sustained. Ultimately,

Love made this offer of proof with Moore:

Q. So when [Love] and [Brown] told you that [Harris] was
threatening them, was it threats to shoot [Love]? A. Yes.
Q. And did they also tell you that during this incident between
them all that [Harris] was acting like he had a gun? A. Yes.

After that offer of proof, Love articulated his position to the district court as follows:

I guess I just wanted to renew my attempts to get that
information in and I just wanted to be heard a little bit more on
whether it’s hearsay. I understand that it is, but the State opened the
door to that specific line of questioning. It just completes the picture
of what these people said to [Moore] about the situation with [Harris]
so I think it is fair for him to testify to it.

The court excluded the testimony, ruling:

Okay. Well, it’s hearsay, and the objection is it’s hearsay. It’s
an out-of-court statement, particularly of the defendant, offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. There is no real, I mean,
opening the door isn’t a recognized exception to hearsay. It’s—it is
hearsay and it is sustainable so the objection is sustained and will
remain sustained.

The State contends that the court did not wrongly exclude this additional

testimony for several reasons, but one reason is especially compelling in our view.

Because no theory of self-defense was proved, the testimony about a prior threat

or concern that Harris carried a gun was not relevant to the issues the jury had to

decide. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.401 (providing that evidence is relevant when it “has

any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence” and “[t]he fact is of consequence in determining the action”). “Evidence

that is not relevant is not admissible.” State v. Sulivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa

2004); see Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. So the district court was not wrong to exclude the

additional testimony.
17

D. Expert Testimony.

Last, Love argues the district court abused its discretion excluding expert

testimony from Dr. DiCataldo as irrelevant and further that the exclusion of that

testimony deprived him of his right to present a defense under the Due Process

Clause of the Federal and Iowa constitutions. We review the admissibility of expert

testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Schutz, 579 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa

1998). Where a defendant claims infringement of his constitutional right to present

a defense, our review is de novo. State v. Peterson, 532 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa

Ct. App.1995).

Prior to and during trial, Love made several arguments why Dr. DiCataldo’s

testimony was relevant. The evolution of Love’s arguments began with the pretrial

hearing on the motions in limine. But even after Love abandoned his claim of self-

defense, he continued advocating for admission of his expert’s opinions, arguing:

So we do not any longer have a self-defense claim in our case, but
we are asking permission for our expert to testify in other regards. I
mean, generally the information he’s providing is about the same, but
we believe that the mental state of Eugene Love is relevant to the
jury—for the jury to consider in a case for murder in the first degree
as the State must prove that he acted willfully, deliberately,
premeditatedly, and with a specific intent to kill.
I also think that he would aid the jury in terms of a voluntary
manslaughter defense which is what we are seeking. And for me to
get the instruction on voluntary manslaughter we’ve got to show a
couple of things: That the provocation was adequate to inflame a
reasonable person; that the defendant did not have time to cool off
between the provocation and the killing; the provocation actually
impassioned the defendant; and the defendant did not, in fact, cool
off before the killing. And so I think that this expert would be
beneficial in explaining to the jury the subjective components that we
have to show with voluntary manslaughter.

But Love’s reasons for seeking the admission also involved showing his “mental

state,” which he noted was “relevant to murder in the first degree” even though he
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confirmed that he was “not going to have Dr. DiCataldo comment on Love’s actual

state of mind at the time of this incident.” Before making an offer of proof, Love

explained additional reasoning for why Dr. DiCataldo’s testimony should be

admitted:

I think it would aid the jury because this is based on science
to which my expert has a lot of knowledge. This expert has
personally evaluated Mr. Love and is familiar with his situation and
his background and would diagnose Mr. Love with post-traumatic
stress disorder based on things that he’s been through, and we
believe that it would be a violation of his constitutional right to present
a defense in this case if Dr. DiCataldo is not permitted to testify.

That was the only time a constitutional right was mentioned in the record related

to the expert’s testimony.5

The State objected to Dr. DiCataldo’s opinions as hearsay and as an

attempt to have the expert act as a stand-in for Love by testifying about Love’s

history and life without Love having to take the stand. Additionally, the State

contended Love was attempting to “pivot a self-defense justification expert now

into a serious provocation expert” for the benefit of a voluntary-manslaughter claim

without any evidence that would support either stance. The court rejected the

argument that Dr. DiCataldo’s expert report “has a nexus with the history of [Love],

the science behind a youthful brain and self-defense and there’s no reference

whatsoever or connection to this youthful brain and that of the state of mind of

5 Given this limited and imprecise record related to any constitutional challenge,

we do not address it further. See State v. Bauler, 8 N.W.3d 892, 907 (Iowa 2024)
(“Even issues implicating constitutional rights must be presented to and ruled upon
by the district court in order to preserve error for appeal.” (citation omitted));see
also Stammeyer v. Div. of Narcotics Enf’t, 721 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Iowa 2006) (“If
the court does not rule on an issue and neither party files a motion requesting the
district court to do so, there is nothing before us to review.”).
19

[Love] for the purposes of a voluntary manslaughter type of consideration.” After

a lengthy offer of proof, the court questioned Dr. Dicataldo about his proposed

testimony:

Q. All right. I just want to make sure I understand your
testimony in short. Because of Mr. Love’s age, his adolescent or
young brain, coupled with whatever trauma that might have occurred
in his presence by way of psychological or otherwise, or whether in
his personal presence or indirectly I think as you described it, your
conclusion is . . . that he might react differently and that he might be
hypervigilant, I think was the word that you used, or overly sensitive?
A. Your Honor, that is a fair summary, a fair and accurate summary
of my testimony this morning.
Q. And that he might perceive or anticipate more harm than
might objectively be the case? Is that fair— A. Yes. Sorry. Yes, I
agree.
Q. And is that—would you distinguish that then, I think as
[defense counsel] described it, is that different then from a 40-year-
old individual? Just a random 40-year-old individual? I’m sorry. I
interrupted you. That was my fault. But just to be clear, that that
would be distinguished from just a random 40-year-old individual?
A. Yes. In my opinion that would be different than sort of the
average, you know, reasonable 40-year-old person.
Q. And I think you used the key word that I was literally gonna
ask you next, is that that’s different than a quote-unquote reasonable
person. A. I believe a 19-year-old young, late adolescent with a
trauma history is significantly different than a reasonable 40-year-old
man.

After arguments by the parties, the court reasoned:

All right. Well, obviously I think the parties picked up on the
Court’s concern in listening to the testimony of the doctor that this,
as the defense has couched this and indicated its use, when the
issue of voluntary manslaughter is the focus of the Court, the
instruction of the Court is—or the model instruction is governing and
it’s the Court’s focus for the purposes of this ruling and for the
purposes of the relevancy of the proffered testimony.
It's an objective and a subjective standard, and certainly this
witness would offer evidence to the subjective benefit of the
defendant, but clearly, in the words of the expert himself, objectively
it simply isn’t relevant. Objectively this defense does not support a
submission of voluntary manslaughter. Objectively, the defendant in
this particular situation is not, in his own words, the doctor’s own
words, a reasonable person.
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His behavior was not consistent with a reasonable person. It,
by his own words, the trauma, the age, the youthful brain collective
with the trauma is such that causes the defendant to act differently
than a reasonable person. It justifies, at least from the expert’s
position, and explains why they act differently, but the fact remains
is that it is inconsistent with that of a reasonable person. And so
objectively speaking it bears no relevance to the instruction or the
defense as serious provocation is conduct that would excite an
individual, in a reasonable person a sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion. And as he’s testified under these circumstances, he’s not
a reasonable person. And in fact, it’s pretty clear that’s where I was
going.
I was, in fact, going to ask him whether the defendant would
be deemed a reasonable person or whether his behavior would be a
reasonable person. Before I could even ask it the doctor volunteered
it and made the distinction on his own. And so I don’t find the
testimony to be relevant and the Court’s ruling is going to be
consistent with the ruling before regarding the motion in limine, albeit
at this stage of the game an entirely different situation in light of the
pivoting, and the Court takes no fault in the defense making that
pivot, to be clear, but nonetheless, considering that pivot, the ruling
remains the same that the testimony is not relevant to the issue as
couched and the State’s objection to the testimony is going to be
sustained.

Because the State’s objection was sustained, Dr. DiCataldo did not testify in the

presence of the jury. Later, after the parties rested, the court ruled that the jury

would not be instructed on the voluntary manslaughter theory, stating “failing to

meet both the subjective standard and the objective standard, voluntary

manslaughter is not going to be submitted.”

Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.702:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Here, Dr. DiCataldo’s opinions would not help the jury. Initially, the expert

testimony was to address Love’s self-defense claim, but that was withdrawn. And
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in his appellate brief, Love indicated the opinions were to support “obtaining an

instruction for voluntary manslaughter.” To warrant a voluntary-manslaughter

submission, the defendant must set forth enough evidence to support voluntary

manslaughter’s legal and factual test. Love did not meet this standard, and the

voluntary manslaughter instruction was not given. Our appellate courts have

described the factual requirements as:

Voluntary manslaughter includes one subjective and two objective
parts. The subjective part is that the defendant must act solely as a
result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion. The first objective
part requires that the defendant’s sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion must result from serious provocation sufficient to excite such
passion in a reasonable person. The second objective part requires
that there is not an interval between the provocation and the killing
in which a person of ordinary reason and temperament would regain
his or her control and suppress the impulse to kill.

State v. Chavez, No. 22-1280, 2023 WL 7014142, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25,

2023) (cleaned up).

Love initially argued that Dr. DiCataldo’s testimony would support both the

subjective and objective components of a voluntary-manslaughter instruction,

whether he acted reasonably based on his age and personal experiences. Love

turned to the subjective component after the court decided that Dr. DiCataldo’s

testimony could not support the objective component; Dr. DiCataldo’s testimony

on what a “reasonable 19-year-old” was explicitly against our caselaw prohibiting

striation of “the reasonable person” based on age when the individual was deemed

an adult. See Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Iowa 2022) (upholding the

“categorical constitutional distinction . . . between juveniles and adults” at age

eighteen and reiterating that “[c]onsiderations of efficiency and certainty require a

bright line separating adults from juveniles” (citation omitted)).
22

And our appellate courts have declined to submit a voluntary manslaughter

instruction to the jury when the objective test was not met. In State v. Thompson,

the “[victim’s] actions in slapping [the defendant] and insulting him with obscene

gestures fell short of the objectively serious provocation required to submit a

voluntary manslaughter instruction.” 836 N.W.2d 470, 478 (Iowa 2013); see also

State v. Sauser, No. 21-0759, 2022 WL 4361723, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 21,

2022) (“[Defendant] said that she sat next to [the victim] with the gun in her lap for

‘fifteen, twenty, twenty-five minutes’ before the shooting. While they were arguing,

she texted a friend that she had been staying with: ‘Ill be home Monday night if I

can get out Lol got my gun loaded he better leave me alone Ill shoot.’ These facts

do not show defendant acted solely as a result of ‘sudden, violent, and irresistible

passion.’” (cleaned up)).

On our review, we find no evidence in the record indicates Love was

adequately provoked and did not have a sufficient period in which “a person of

ordinary reason and temperament would regain his or her control and suppress

the impulse to kill.” Chavez, 2023 WL 7014142, at *2. Provocation without a

cooling-off period is a necessary component of a voluntary manslaughter

instruction. Iowa Code § 707.4; Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 477. Love failed to

show both parts of the objective test.

Because Love did not provide an adequate factual basis to warrant a

voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury, any testimony from Dr. DiCataldo

was improper and irrelevant. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.702. In the absence of additional

argument as to how Dr. DiCataldo’s testimony was relevant to the legal issues the

jury was actually required to decide beyond those already raised and disposed of,
23

we find the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. DiCataldo’s testimony

was irrelevant and subsequently excluding the expert from testifying.

III. Conclusion.

Based upon the reasoning outlined above, we affirm Love’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.