In re Marriage of Greenfield

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1052
Filed April 9, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF TRENTON JAMES GREENFIELD
AND HALEY MARIE GREENFIELD

Upon the Petition of
TRENTON JAMES GREENFIELD,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
HALEY MARIE GREENFIELD,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Patrick D. Smith,

Judge.

A mother appeals a dissolution decree placing the parties’ children in their

joint physical care. AFFIRMED.

Ryan J. Baumgartner and Elizabeth S. Longcor of Cashatt Warren Family

Law, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Jason Springer of Springer Law Firm, PLLC, Madrid, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

Trenton and Haley Greenfield are the parents of twin children—a boy and

girl born in 2021. In the decree dissolving their marriage, the district court granted

Trenton’s request for joint physical care of the children. Haley appeals, claiming

the children should have instead been placed in her physical care. We affirm upon

our de novo review of the record.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Trenton and Haley met while attending college in 2011. They were married

in 2015 and welcomed their twins six years later. Haley stayed at home with the

children until they were eighteen months old, while Trenton worked as a mechanic

at a local autobody shop. Although he worked during the day, Trenton helped with

changing the twins’ diapers, feeding them, and getting up with them during the

night. He also did the family’s laundry, shared cleaning duties with Haley, and

helped with other household tasks. Haley, however, said that she often felt like a

single parent because Trenton was not around very much. Trenton acknowledged

that he sometimes hung out with friends in their neighborhood when he wasn’t

working.

By August 2022, the parties had decided to divorce, but they kept living

together in the marital home with the children. Trenton moved to the basement,

and Haley stayed upstairs. Around the same time, Haley started working at a

daycare center, although it was not the same one the children attended. Wanting

to work on the marriage, Trenton started participating in a relationship coaching

service through his church. He also began taking medication to help treat his

depression. But at some point, Haley began leaving the house at night—
3

sometimes not coming home at all—without telling Trenton where she was.

Trenton suspected that she was seeing someone else.

In February 2023, Trenton petitioned for divorce. After a mediation in April,

the parties agreed in a temporary stipulation that if one of them moved out of the

marital home, they would share physical care of the children on an alternating two-

day, two-day, three-day schedule. The next month, Trenton and Haley had an

argument about their joint bank account. Trenton texted Haley and asked her to

stay somewhere else that night, but she came home around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.

Trenton packed a bag, woke the children up, and put them in his truck to leave.

Haley went into the garage and tried to stop Trenton from leaving with the children.

She got their son out of the truck, but while she was trying to unbuckle their

daughter, Trenton put the truck into reverse. Haley—who was holding their son—

was hit by the door. Trenton stopped the truck, and the police were called. Neither

Haley nor the children were injured.

Trenton was arrested and charged with domestic abuse assault with a

dangerous weapon. A criminal no-contact order was entered, prohibiting Trenton

from having contact with Haley and the children. Haley also secured a civil

protective order against Trenton. The Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services investigated the incident and issued a founded report for denial of critical

care against Trenton. The department also investigated a report that Haley was

smoking marijuana while caring for the children. After Haley’s drug screen was

presumptively positive for THC, she admitted taking an edible on a weekend when

the children were not in her care. The report was not confirmed.
4

Trenton pled guilty to the domestic abuse assault charge and received a

deferred judgment. He was placed on probation for two years and ordered to

complete the Iowa Domestic Abuse Program, along with a parenting class. At the

beginning of June, Haley agreed to modify the no-contact orders so that Trenton

could visit the children every other Saturday and Sunday from 9:00 a.m. until

6:00 p.m. and Wednesday evenings, to be supervised by his mother or sister. That

arrangement continued until October, when the parties modified the no-contact

orders again so that they could return to the temporary joint physical care

arrangement. They also agreed to communicate through a parenting app.

At the dissolution trial in November 2023, Trenton and Haley agreed on

everything but physical care of their children. Trenton wanted to continue with joint

physical care, while Haley wanted the children placed in her physical care. Haley

testified that although Trenton was a good dad, she had always been the children’s

primary caregiver. She was also worried about whether Trenton could handle the

twins by himself and whether his depression was under control.

Trenton testified that immediately after the assault in May, he started a life

skills course through his church focused on domestic violence. He had completed

phase one of that course by trial and was ready to start phase two once it was

offered. Trenton had also started the classes for the Iowa Domestic Abuse

Program. He said the life skills course in particular had taught him how to handle

stress and deal with his emotions. Trenton testified that he was “very regretful for

what happened that night” and that he was taking “personal steps in [his] life to

make sure it doesn’t happen again.”
5

Although the district court felt this was a close case because of the domestic

abuse incident, it concluded “that maintaining the joint physical care to which the

parties agreed in the Temporary Matters Stipulation is in the children’s best

interests.” The court found that incident did “not tip the balance away from joint

physical care” because it was an isolated event that Trenton accepted

responsibility for and regretted. And while the court found Haley “provided the

lion’s share of day-to-day care for the children,” it concluded the “approximation

rule” should be given little weight because of the children’s young age. Noting both

parties were “capable of immature and selfish behavior,” the court found neither

could “credibly claim they are the better parent.” The court accordingly granted

the parties joint legal custody of the children and placed them in their joint physical

care.

Haley appeals, claiming the district court should not have: (1) overlooked

her role as the children’s primary caregiver; (2) disregarded the parties’ inability to

communicate and agree on daily matters; (3) ignored the domestic abuse; and

(4) based its physical-care decision on “perceived fairness to the parties.”

II. Standard of Review

Our review of dissolution proceedings is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907;

see also In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 537 (Iowa 2022). While we

give weight to the factual findings of the district court, especially when considering

the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. 6.904(3)(g);

In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2007). When considering

child custody, our principal consideration is the best interests of the children. Iowa
6

R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n); In re Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa

1983).

III. Analysis

Where, as here, “joint legal custody is awarded to both parents, the court

may award joint physical care to both joint custodial parents upon the request of

either parent.” Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a) (2023). Physical care determinations

are based on the best interests of children, not “upon perceived fairness to

the spouses.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). “The

objective of a physical care determination is to place the children in the

environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and

to social maturity.” Id.

In making a physical-care determination, we consider the factors set out in

Iowa Code section 598.41(3) and In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–

67 (Iowa 1974).1 We also consider the following nonexclusive factors when

examining whether joint physical care is in a child’s best interest:

(1) “approximation”—what has been the historical care giving
arrangement for the child[ren] between the two parties; (2) the ability
of the spouses to communicate and show mutual respect; (3) the
degree of conflict between the parents; and (4) “the degree to which
the parents are in general agreement about their approach to daily
matters.”

1 “The factors the court considers in awarding custody are enumerated in Iowa

Code section 598.41(3).” In re Marriage of Courtade, 560 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996). “Although Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to
physical care decisions, . . . the factors listed here as well as other facts and
circumstances are relevant in determining” physical care. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at
696.
7

In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (quoting

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697–99).

Starting with approximation, Haley argues that because she was “the

primary caregiver for the children since birth, this factor weighs in favor” of placing

the children in her physical care. But the “fact a parent was the primary caretaker

prior to separation does not assure he or she will be the custodial parent.” In re

Marriage of Decker, 666 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). Trenton agreed

that for much of the marriage, Haley was the primary caregiver. But he testified

that changed shortly after the couple decided to divorce, when Haley “began being

gone most nights,” leaving him to take “care of the kids solely.” Even before that

point, the evidence shows that Trenton was an engaged and involved father. See

Watson v. Ollendieck, No. 22-1350, 2023 WL 3335602, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 10, 2023) (stating the approximation factor “loses significance ‘where the

historically less-involved parent has proven to be a capable caregiver’” (citation

omitted)).

Haley claims otherwise, arguing Trenton “was unable to give any detail

regarding the care he provided for his children.” That argument is not supported

by the record. Trenton testified that he helped with the children’s daily care, and

he participated in their medical decisions. After the parties separated, Trenton

secured a more flexible job and began taking their son to some of his play therapy

appointments to help with his suspected autism diagnosis. He also testified that

when the children are in his care, they play at the park, go to dinner, and attend

local events, with Trenton trying to “spend as much time as [he] can with them.”

Trenton’s witnesses confirmed that he was active with the children. One of his
8

friends testified that “[i]t’s hard to have conversation” with Trenton when the twins

are there because “he’s pretty much focused on them.” And Trenton’s sister

testified the children “just naturally . . . gravitate to him” and “light up” when he

walks into a room. Given this evidence, we do not find the court improperly

discounted Haley’s historical role as the children’s primary caregiver.

We also disagree with Haley that the district court gave too much weight to

the temporary caretaking arrangement in discussing the approximation factor. It

is true, as Haley argues, that “[t]emporary orders awarding physical custody create

no presumption that parent is the preferred parent in a final custody decision.” In

re Marriage of Swenka, 576 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1998). However, the court did

not place the children in the parties’ joint physical care because of their temporary

stipulation, as Haley suggests. Instead, after considering the relevant factors, the

court found maintaining that arrangement was in the children’s best interests. See

In re Marriage of Short, 373 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (finding the

district court’s “statement that there was ‘no compelling reason’ to change the

[temporary care order] merely reflected its conclusion that [the father] was the

preferred custodial parent”). We agree.

Turning to those other relevant factors, Haley argues that joint physical care

is not in the children’s best interests because the “record shows the struggle the

parties face to communicate and agree on daily matters.” But we don’t see those

struggles in the record. To be significant enough to justify a denial of joint physical

care, “a lack of ability to communicate must be something more than the usual

acrimony that accompanies a divorce.” In re Marriage of Ferguson, No. 21-0952,

2022 WL 1486508, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2022) (quoting In re Marriage of
9

Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)). While the parties’

communication was limited because of the no-contact orders, they later modified

those orders to allow for greater communication about the children. Since then,

Trenton testified that he and Haley have been able to work together to figure out

the custody exchanges “and see what works for us.” They also worked together

to figure out the children’s immunizations and therapies for their son. This is not a

case in which the level of discord and mistrust is so high as to make joint physical

care unworkable, even considering the domestic abuse assault in May 2023. See

Watson, 2023 WL 3335602, at *4.

We recognize, as did the district court, that “[e]vidence of untreated

domestic battering should be given considerable weight in determining custody”

and that it “gives rise to a presumption against joint physical care.” Hansen, 733

N.W.2d at 698. But it’s for the court “to weigh the evidence of domestic abuse, its

nature, severity, repetition, and to whom directed.” In re Marriage of Forbes, 570

N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1997). The court weighed that evidence here, finding

the incident that resulted in Trenton being criminally charged and
subject to no-contact orders was a one-time event that he recognizes
was wrong and regrets. Trenton admittedly acted in anger during a
time when the divorce was pending, the couple was still residing in
the same house, and they were arguing about money. Trenton has
taken steps through the life-skills class to better manage his
emotions. The court finds Trenton was motivated to change and
improve because of the criminal charges, and his desire to maintain
his relationship with his children. No evidence was presented that
Trenton had in the past, or has since, engaged in conduct that would
be considered domestic abuse, nor does the court find Trenton
presents a risk to his children’s well-being or safety.

We agree with the court’s assessment of the domestic-abuse evidence, mindful

that “the district court had the parties before it and was able to observe and
10

evaluate the parties as custodians.” In re Marriage of Roberts, 545 N.W.2d 340,

343 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

Finally, we see no indication that the district court placed the children in the

parties’ joint physical care based on “perceived fairness between the parties,” as

Haley contends. Despite the tumultuous end to their marriage, each party

described the other as a good parent. In fact, Trenton testified Haley was a

“wonderful mother,” and he didn’t want to take time away from her. In his view,

however, the joint physical care arrangement had “been going wonderfully.” The

record supports that assessment. Placing the twins in the joint physical care of

these suitable and devoted parents will assure the children “the opportunity for the

maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents” and “will

encourage the parents to share the rights and responsibilities” of raising the

children, which is in their best interests. In re Marriage of Kunkel, 555 N.W.2d 250,

253 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); accord Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a).

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision to place the parties’

children in their joint physical care.

AFFIRMED.