State of Iowa v. William Eugene Harris

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0345
Filed December 18, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WILLIAM EUGENE HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County, John M. Sandy,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his two convictions for third-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.

Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,

for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Sandy, J., takes

no part.
2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

William Harris was convicted of two counts of third-degree sexual abuse

after inappropriately touching two patients during their echocardiogram

appointments. He appeals those convictions, alleging the State’s evidence was

insufficient to prove he performed a “sex act” when he touched either patient. But

viewing the circumstances of both acts in the light most favorable to the State,

substantial evidence supports his convictions.

During their appointments, Harris had both patients remove their pants and

he inserted his finger into the first patient’s vagina and touched the second

patient’s vaginal area inside her underwear. The patients were only scheduled to

receive an echocardiogram—there was no reason Harris needed to remove their

pants or touch below their chests. The jury could reject his explanation that he

was performing a deep-vein-thrombosis screen as not credible, particularly given

the lack of medical orders for either patient, his failure to document the screens in

either patient’s medical records, and his other unprofessional statements during

the appointments. We thus affirm Harris’s convictions.

I.

In early 2023, sixty-four-year-old Harris was working as a travel

echocardiogram technician. He accepted a twelve-week contract to perform

echocardiograms at a health facility in Iowa.

The First Patient. An eighty-five-year-old woman was having heart

problems and needed an echocardiogram before receiving a pacemaker. After

arriving for her test, she was taken to a small exam room and asked to remove her

shirt and bra. She was then left alone in the room to change into a hospital gown.
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Harris entered the room and positioned the patient on the exam table so

she was lying down on her side. He lifted the gown and exposed the patient’s left

breast—this was unusual, as the patient had done these tests before and the prior

technicians “pretty much kept [her] covered.” Harris then started telling her he was

lonely in Iowa and he was staying in a nearby motel (and which room he was in).

He asked the patient to visit him for coffee, and when she said she did not drive at

night, he offered to pick her up.

During the exam, Harris commented on the patient’s legs, which appeared

swollen, and asked if he could check her blood flow. He also applied gel to her

chest for the echocardiogram. But as he was applying, he “kept going down

farther” with the gel past her chest and onto her stomach. Harris then unzipped

the patient’s jeans, told her they needed to come off, and pulled off her pants.

Harris continued rubbing the gel “on [her] belly and down in [her] groin.” He asked

the patient if his rubbing hurt, and she said no.

“Then all at once he stuck his finger up in” the patient’s vagina. Harris then

said he needed to do something on the machine and walked away from the table.

The patient started to get off the exam table, and Harris grabbed her jeans and

helped her put them back on. He slipped his business card in her back pocket.

The patient then put her bra and shirt back on—Harris did not leave the room while

she changed. The patient then left the room, exiting so quickly she still had the

echocardiogram patches on her body from the exam.

The patient went back to the waiting room, as she had another appointment

with her treating physician right after the exam. During that appointment, she

reported what happened and the physician observed “an exorbitant amount of gel”
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on the patient’s “lower abdomen, pelvic area, [and] groin.” The physician called

law enforcement to report the abuse.

The Second Patient. After experiencing a heart attack and suffering

ongoing palpitations, a seventy-five-year-old woman was referred for an

echocardiogram. Harris brought the patient back to the exam room and instructed

her to remove all clothing except her underwear. Though she was disrobed

beyond what was necessary for the test, the appointment otherwise continued as

normal. But toward the end of the exam, Harris began working toward her groin.

The patient mentioned a health issue she was experiencing in her vaginal area.

Harris then put his fingers into her underwear and touched her genitals. The

patient never asked Harris to examine or touch her genitals.

The patient told no one. Months later, law enforcement was investigating

the first patient’s abuse and an officer contacted her as another former patient.

The patient then disclosed to the officer that Harris touched her inside her

underwear during the exam.

The Trial. The State charged Harris with two counts of third-degree sexual

abuse. See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.4(1)(a) (2023). During the four-day jury trial,

both patients testified about the abuse, among other witnesses. Harris also

testified in his defense.

Harris explained that he was qualified to screen patients for certain medical

conditions, including deep vein thrombosis (“DVT”). Part of that screening entails

pushing or compressing areas near the patient’s pelvis, upper thigh, and knee. He

asserted that the facility knew he was performing these DVT screenings, even

though they were outside of his assigned duties. For both patients, Harris denied
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any contact with their vaginal areas. Instead, he testified that he observed

symptoms of DVT in both women, they gave consent for him to perform a screen,

and any touching or removing of clothing was limited to those screens. And he

explained he did not document the screens in either patient’s medical records

because both screens were negative.

The jury convicted Harris on both counts of third-degree sexual abuse. He

was sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms of incarceration. Harris now

appeals both convictions.

II.

Harris disputes that sufficient evidence supported convicting him of third-

degree sexual abuse for either patient. We review his challenge for correction of

errors at law. See State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa 2011). “In doing

so, we examine whether, taken in the light most favorable to the State, the finding

of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. “Substantial

evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa

2021). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different

conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually

made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Id. (cleaned

up).

To convict Harris of third-degree sexual abuse, the jury must have found—

as it was instructed—that he “performed a sex act” with each patient “by force or

against the will” of each patient. And a “sex act” was defined to include “any sexual

contact . . . [b]etween the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or anus of
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another person.” See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, 709.4(1)(a); see also State v. Mathis,

971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022) (explaining unopposed jury instructions become

the law of the case when reviewing whether sufficient evidence supports a

conviction).

Harris disputes whether the State proved he performed a “sex act” on either

patient, arguing the State’s evidence only showed incidental and nonsexual

contact. “The sexual nature of the contact can be determined from the type of

contact and the circumstances surrounding it.” State v. Pearson, 514 N.W.2d 452,

455 (Iowa 1994) (en banc). A jury may consider, for example, “whether the contact

was made to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of” Harris, though “the lack of

such motivation would not preclude a finding of sexual abuse where the context in

which the contact occurred showed the sexual nature of the contact.” Id. Other

considerations could include Harris’s relationship with the patients; “whether

anyone else was present; the length of the contact; the purposefulness of the

contact; whether there was a legitimate, nonsexual purpose for the contact; where

and when the contact took place; and the conduct of [Harris] and [the patients]

before and after the contact.” Id.

Viewing the circumstances of both patient encounters in the light most

favorable to the State, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Harris

performed sex acts on the patients. Both patients testified about their abuse—that

Harris inserted his finger into the first patient’s vagina and touched the second

patient’s vaginal area inside her underwear. See State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d

1, 10–11 (Iowa 2021) (“A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may be sufficient

evidence for conviction.”). Harris conceded during trial there would be no medical
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purpose for that kind of contact during a DVT screen. Cf. In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d

342, 349 (Iowa 1989) (reasoning that the defendant’s conduct—including inserting

a finger in the minor victim’s anus—“belies his implication that he was just checking

to see if [the victim] had spoiled his pants” and that “the circumstances reveal the

sexual purpose for which [the defendant’s] finger was used”), overruled on other

grounds by State v. White, 9 N.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Iowa 2024). So the jury, crediting

the patients’ testimonies, could find Harris performed sex acts on both patients.

What’s more, Harris far exceeded the scope of his duties by touching the

patients’ legs, groin, and vaginal areas. An echocardiogram is an ultrasound of

the heart—Harris had no legitimate reason to touch any other area of the patients’

bodies. Harris also undressed both of them beyond what was necessary to

perform an echocardiogram. The jury was free to reject Harris’s DVT-screen

explanation as not credible, particularly given his concessions that those screens

were outside his job duties and he never documented the screens in the patients’

medical records. See Pearson, 514 N.W.2d at 455 (“The fact that no nonsexual

purpose for the contact was discernible also demonstrated the sexual nature of the

contact.”). And Harris’s conversations with the patients further supports finding

that his conduct was unrelated to any medical purpose.1

Substantial evidence thus supports the jury’s finding that Harris performed

a sex act against the will of each patient. And so, we affirm his convictions.

AFFIRMED.

1 During trial, the State called another of Harris’s patients as a witness, who
testified Harris also gave her his card and told her she “can call [him] but don’t tell
anyone.” This evidence corroborates the patients’ accounts and shows that Harris
often flouted professional boundaries.