Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC v. Iowa Communications Network

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1039
Filed October 30, 2024

INMATE CALLING SOLUTIONS, LLC d/b/a ICSOLUTIONS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK,
Respondent-Appellee,

and

SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Intervenor.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McCallister,

Judge.

A party seeks judicial review of an agency proceeding. AFFIRMED.

Mark A. Schultheis and Patrick B. White of Schultheis White, PLC, Des

Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Andrew E. Steffensmeier (until withdrawal)

and J. Bradley Horn (until withdrawal), Assistant Attorneys General, Patrick C.

Valencia, Deputy Solicitor General, and Breanne A. Stoltze, Assistant Solicitor

General, for appellee.

Micheal R. Reck and Mariah L. Sukalski of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des

Moines, for intervenor.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Langholz, J., takes no

part.
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AHLERS, Judge.

In 2020, the Iowa Communications Network (ICN) issued a request for

proposal seeking bids from companies to provide communication services to the

Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC) for the benefit of incarcerated individuals.

The services sought included giving incarcerated individuals telephone access in

addition to tablets and video visitation. Three companies submitted proposals to

the ICN. Those companies were Inmate Calling Solutions (Inmate Calling), the

company that was then providing the DOC with communication services; Securus

Technologies, Inc. (Securus); and a third company.

The DOC initially issued a notice of intent to award the contract to Securus.

Inmate Calling challenged the notice of intent via agency review with the Iowa

Telecommunications and Technology Commission (ITTC).1 The ITTC rescinded

the initial notice of intent and directed the ICN to rescore the proposals previously

submitted by the companies using different evaluators to avoid the perception of

bias.2 A new set of evaluators rescored the proposals, and again the evaluators

scored the Securus proposal the highest. The director of the DOC then issued

another notice of intent to Securus.

Inmate Calling again sought agency review of the process, this time

challenging multiple aspects of the bid process. Following a hearing, an

administrative law judge issued a proposed decision rejecting Inmate Calling’s

challenges. Inmate Calling appealed that ruling to the ITTC, which adopted the

1 The ITTC’s purpose is “to supervise the management, development, and
operation of” the ICN. Iowa Code § 8D.3(1) (2022).
2 The ITTC clarified that the ICN was also free to cancel the request for proposal

and reissue the procurement.
3

administrative law judge’s proposed decision as the final agency decision. Inmate

Calling petitioned for judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2022). The

district court denied the petition, and Inmate Calling appeals.

I. Scope and Standard of Review

We review district court rulings on judicial review of agency decisions under

Iowa Code chapter 17A. Chavez v. M.S. Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa

2022). We apply section 17A.19(10) to determine whether we come to the same

conclusions as the district court. Ghost Player, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Econ. Dev.,

906 N.W.2d 454, 462 (Iowa 2018). When reviewing the agency’s interpretation of

the Iowa Code, we review for legal error when the legislature has not clearly vested

the agency with the authority to interpret a given chapter. See Chavez, 972 N.W.2d

at 666. “[W]e accept the [agency’]s factual findings when supported by substantial

evidence.” Bluml v. Dee Jay’s Inc., 920 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Iowa 2018). “‘Substantial

evidence’ means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed

sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at

issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are

understood to be serious and of great importance.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1).

II. Discussion

A. Statutory Authority

As part of what the ICN describes as a “kitchen-sink effort” to challenge the

bid process here, Inmate Calling argues the entire request-for-proposal process is

invalid because the ICN lacks authority to issue a request for proposal on behalf

of the DOC. Inmate Calling contends that the ICN’s authority is limited to that

granted by the legislature in the Iowa Code. On that point, we agree. See Iowa
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Code § 17A.23(3) (“An agency shall have only that authority or discretion

delegated to or conferred upon the agency by law and shall not expand or enlarge

its authority or discretion beyond the powers delegated to or conferred upon the

agency.”); Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 522, 533 (Iowa 2017)

(“An agency possesses no common law or inherent powers. The power of the

agency is limited to the power granted by statute.” (internal citation omitted)). But

we disagree with Inmate Calling’s argument that the Iowa Code doesn’t give the

ICN the authority to issue a request for proposal on behalf of the DOC.

Where we disagree with Inmate Calling is its contention that it may question

ICN’s statutory authority to issue a request for proposals on behalf of the DOC at

this point in the proceedings. ICN previously issued a request for proposals on

behalf of the DOC that resulted in Inmate Calling receiving the contract. Inmate

Calling never questioned the ICN’s statutory authority then. And with respect to

the present request for proposal process, Inmate Calling did not challenge ICN’s

statutory authority when ICN issued the request for proposals or when it brought

its first challenge before ITTC. It was only once Inmate Calling failed to secure the

notice of intent for a second time that it claimed a fundamental fault in the process.

We conclude that Inmate Calling’s failure to raise its statutory authority

arguments earlier in the process amounts to waiver on this issue. See, e.g., Blue

& Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We also

hold that a party who has the opportunity to object to the terms of a government

solicitation containing a patent error and fails to do so prior to the close of the

bidding process waives its ability to raise the same objection subsequently in a bid

protest action . . . .”). In reaching that conclusion we find persuasive an opinion
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from the Arizona Court of Appeals, quoted by the administrative law judge. 3 See

Arizona’s Towing Pros., Inc. v. State, 993 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).

In that opinion, the court explained:

Requiring protests related to errors apparent on the face of the bid
to be filed before the bid opening protects the integrity of the bid
process. Otherwise, a bidder may wait until the bids are submitted
and the contract is awarded to another candidate, then protest the
bid solicitation, force another round of bidding, and adjust its prices
and strategies after it has had the opportunity to view its competitors’
bids. Because allowing such belated protests is prejudicial to the
initial winning bidder, bidders should object to mistakes or
ambiguities in a bid solicitation before they bid.

Id. This rationale is sound, and we adopt it as our own. Applying this rationale to

the present case, Inmate Calling was required to bring its statutory-authority

challenges at the beginning of the bidding process and before it submitted a bid.

Because Inmate Calling raised no challenge to ICN’s statutory authority until after

it submitted its bid and after its first challenge to ITTC, it has waived its statutory-

authority claims.

B. Failure to Comply with The Request for Proposal

Inmate Calling also contends the ICN failed to comply with the terms of the

request for proposal itself. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(d) (stating that “[t]he court

shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action . . . if it

determines that substantial rights of the [entity] seeking judicial relief have been

prejudiced because the agency action is . . . [b]ased upon a procedure or decision-

making process prohibited by law or was taken without following the prescribed

3 Because the ITTC adopted the proposed decision of the administrative law judge

as the agency’s final decision, as a practical matter, we are reviewing the
administrative law judge’s work and refer to it accordingly.
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procedure or decision-making process”).4 Inmate Calling argues an evaluation

committee tasked with scoring and evaluating the proposals failed to assess the

costs and pricing contained in the proposals.

The request for proposal explained that “[t]he evaluation committee will

consider all information provided in the proposals when making its

recommendation and the committee may also consider relevant information from

other sources.” The request for proposal went on to explain:

The bid proposals will be evaluated using a scoring system which will
be made available at the time of the Bid Opening. Evaluation of bid
proposals will be based on, but not limited to, the general criteria,
which are listed below in no particular order of importance. It shall
be Vendor’s responsibility to insure that the proposal offered fully
iterates the Vendor ability to perform the [request for proposal]
requirements, and to clearly show how the Vendor would perform the
[Incarcerated Individual Communications Systems] task. The ICN
shall not necessarily award the contract to the Vendor offering the
lowest cost to the State. The ICN may award a contract to the most
responsible Vendor meeting the requirements of this [request for
proposal] and which in the determination of both ICN and DOC
provides the best value to the State after considering price and
compliance with the provisions of this request.
The general evaluation criteria include, but are not limited to
these general areas:
Vendor's Technical Proposal
Background information
Experience
Personnel
Financial information
Business information
Legal/administrative information
Pricing
Product Demonstration / Evaluation
Best and Final Offer—if requested

4 Inmate Calling also cites section 17A.19(10)(h), (i), and (j) as potential bases for

reversal but fails to develop any corresponding arguments. That failure to develop
corresponding arguments amounts to waiver under those bases. See Iowa R.
App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
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The request for proposal clarified,

The ICN shall not necessarily award the contract to the Vendor
offering the lowest cost to the ICN. The ICN may award a contract
to the most responsible Vendor meeting the requirements of this
[request for proposal] and which, in the sole discretion of the ICN,
provides the best value to the State after considering price and
compliance with the provisions of Chapter 3 and 4 [of the request for
proposal].

Inmate Calling argues the evaluation committee was required to consider

pricing and cost to the DOC, the inmates, and the inmates’ family and friends

utilizing the communication services, but the committee failed to do so. The

administrative law judge found the evaluation committee considered all necessary

factors, including cost and pricing, and that finding is supported by substantial

evidence, so we reject Inmate Calling’s challenge. Within the record is the score

sheet evaluating each proposal. That scoresheet showed each member of the

evaluation committee evaluated each proposal’s “cost components and variables,”

which included each prospective vendor’s “‘a la cart’ price list of all services (phone

call, video call, text, streaming, and e-mail) and related equipment . . . applicable

to the offender . . . [and] to those outside the DOC facility as they communicate

with the incarcerated individual.”

Inmate Calling also complains that the director of the DOC did not review

the evaluation committee’s recommendation and select the winning vendor as

required by the request for proposal. Its complaints are rooted in the fact that the

director admitted she did not personally review the documents created by the

evaluation committee and that she did not specifically delegate the task of

reviewing the documentation to a subordinate. But she explained that much of the

request-for-proposal work was delegated multiple levels below her. And when she
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received the evaluation committee’s assessment, she forwarded it to her chief of

staff5 for his review. She “relied on [her] project leader and [her] staff to make the

best choices for this.” Then she discussed the results of the evaluation

committee’s work with her chief of staff who answered her questions. So she took

his guidance and selected Securus as the provider. This evidence constitutes

substantial evidence supporting the administrative law judge’s finding that the

director reviewed the proposals in her discussions with her chief of staff and

decided to adopt the recommendation of the evaluation committee.

However, Inmate Calling contends that the review of the second evaluation

committee’s assessment by the DOC director’s chief of staff was improper

because he served as an evaluator when the proposals were initially reviewed and

scored. It argues his involvement mandates rescission and revocation of the

notice of intent. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(e). We disagree. When the ITTC

ordered the proposals be rescored, it merely required new evaluators to rescore

the proposals. While the chief of staff was an evaluator the first go around, he did

not take any part in the second evaluation process. Instead he simply reviewed

the second evaluation committee’s findings and discussed the findings with the

director. His presentation of the evaluation committee’s recommendation to the

director does not require revocation of the notice of intent.

C. Decision to Award Contract to Securus

Finally, Inmate Calling argues that the decision to award the contract to

Securus was arbitrary and capricious, without a rational basis, and an abuse of

5 This individual was previously the Communications Director and Government

Affairs Liaison for the DOC.
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discretion. “We may reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency

action if we determine that the substantial rights of the petitioner have been

prejudiced because the agency action is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an

abuse of discretion.” Banilla Games, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t. of Inspections & Appeals,

919 N.W.2d 6, 18–19 (Iowa 2018) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(n)). “A decision

is arbitrary or capricious when ‘it is taken without regard to the law or facts of the

case.’ ‘Discretion is abused when it is exercised on grounds clearly untenable or

to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” Id. at 19 (citations omitted).

Inmate Calling contends that Securus was chosen by default—again

arguing that the DOC director did not select the winner as required by the request

for proposal, so the notice of intent simply went to Securus because its bid was

scored the highest by the evaluation committee. As previously discussed,

substantial evidence supports the conclusion that is not what occurred. Instead,

substantial evidence supports the finding that the DOC director tasked her chief of

staff with reviewing the evaluation committee’s summary when she forwarded the

information to him, the two then had a conversation about it, and she then adopted

the evaluation committee’s recommendation. The issuance of the notice of intent

was not made by default.

Next, Inmate Calling challenges the thoroughness of the evaluation

committee and DOC director’s review of costs associated with the Securus

proposal, noting its proposal included provisions for collect calls that would require
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individual consumers to pay taxes and fees.6 First, we reiterate that the evaluation

committee considered cost and pricing when its members scored the proposals

from the competing bidders. And to the extent that Inmate Calling points out the

potential for Securus to charge excessive fees, the amount of those fees can

continue to be negotiated as can the viability of utilizing a collect calling option.

Simply because the Securus proposal includes details that are likely to be

negotiated following issuance of the notice of intent or options that are not likely to

be selected by the DOC in a final agreement does not mean the notice of intent

was awarded arbitrarily, capriciously, without a rational basis, or as a result of an

abuse of discretion.

With respect to the use of the ICN, Inmate Calling argues because the

Securus proposal left open the possibility it would not use the ICN at all if it could

not provide sufficient bandwidth for the requested tablet service, the issuance of

the notice of intent to Securus was arbitrary and capricious, without a rational

basis, and an abuse of discretion. Again, we disagree. The request for proposal

explained,

The ICN will consider exact replacement systems, hybrids or
alternatives to the current System, as long as the offered System
meets or exceeds the requirements listed within this [request for
proposal]. Therefore, Vendors are encouraged to submit proposals
that can offer the State of Iowa savings, better incarcerated individual
communication services, additional revenues and any other benefits
the Vendor may have to offer for consideration.

6 We note the request for proposal stated, “No collect calling in any form is
anticipated during this contract.” This did not bar any proposal from including
options for a collect call program.
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With respect to telecommunication services, the request for proposal included a

clarification, which stated: “The ICN is a FCC recognized common carrier. The

ICN will be the carrier of the local traffic and will use contracted

telecommunications providers for the interstate and international toll services. The

ICN and DOC will work with the vendor to file any state or federal board.”

Nonetheless, the request for proposal contemplated that a different type of

system other than the current ICN may actually be a superior option and permitted

vendors to present various system options in their proposals. Simply because

Securus’s proposal included a provision that it would only use the ICN if it had

sufficient bandwidth for the tablet service did not make the decision to issue the

notice of intent to Securus arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or an abuse of discretion.

The request for proposal sought out services for telephone calls, video visitation,

and tablet usage for incarcerated individuals—more communication options than

previously offered.7 This expansion in communication options would necessarily

require an updated network to function. So it was reasonable for Securus to

condition its use of the ICN on the availability of enough bandwidth, otherwise it

would not be able to provide the services requested in the request for proposal.

In its last complaint, Inmate Calling argues the evaluation committee failed

to assess the potential revenue that could be generated for the state under each

proposal. A purchasing agent for the ICN, who issued this request for proposal,

explained the request for proposal was not intended to identify a revenue

generating communication system for the DOC. He explained that “‘value’ to the

7 Requests for proposal for previous service contracts only covered “phone
systems.”
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state is not revenues. It’s something that operates on a consistent basis that

provides the inmates, the families, and the institutions and the DOC a fair and

reasonable service.” So the DOC’s main goal was not to make money off of the

communication system; it just needed the system to be self-sustaining. And

contrary to Inmate Calling’s claims that the evaluation committee did not consider

potential revenue to the state under each vendor proposal, a member of the

evaluation committee testified that they were aware that Inmate Calling’s proposal

would have provided the state with more revenue than the Securus proposal.

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the evaluation

committee did consider what proposal would generate the most revenue for the

state, but it was just not a deciding factor for the committee when making its

recommendation.

III. Conclusion

We have considered Inmate Calling’s appellate arguments, including those

not specifically discussed herein, and we conclude Inmate Calling has established

no basis for relief upon judicial review.8 We conclude Inmate Calling waived its

statutory-authority challenges. The parties involved did not violate the terms of the

request for proposal. The decision to issue the notice of intent to Securus was not

arbitrary and capricious, without a rational basis, or an abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED.

8 Because Inmate Calling does not identify any error in the bid process, we need

not address its prejudice argument.