Zachary Liddick v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1369
Filed July 24, 2024

ZACHARY LIDDICK,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, Michael Hooper,

Judge.

Zachary Liddick appeals the denial of his application for postconviction

relief. AFFIRMED.

Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Zachary Liddick appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief

(PCR), which claimed he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel and

counsel in his first PCR action. Because we find that Liddick failed to establish

either of his counsel were ineffective, we affirm the denial of his PCR application.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

“Liddick was seventeen years old when he exchanged words with a

sixteen-year-old stranger and then approached the stranger and shot him in the

abdomen.” State v. Liddick, No. 21-0680, 2021 WL 5458506, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 23, 2021). He pled guilty to attempted murder, and the district court accepted

the plea and sentenced him. Liddick appealed his sentence, arguing the court

erred in applying the appropriate juvenile sentencing factors. See State v. Lyle,

854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014) (requiring the court to consider certain

factors before imposing mandatory minimum sentencing scheme on juvenile

offenders). We affirmed Liddick’s sentence in part on direct appeal, vacating only

the portion imposing a fine. Liddick, 2021 WL 5458506, at *4.

In 2022, Liddick applied for PCR, but his application was dismissed. He

applied for PCR again in 2023, and after trial, the PCR court denied his application.

On appeal, Liddick asserts that he received ineffective assistance from both his

sentencing counsel and first PCR counsel.

II. Review.

We generally review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law. See

Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). But because
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ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims implicate constitutional issues, our review

is de novo.1 See Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523–24 (Iowa 2018).

III. Discussion.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Liddick must

show (1) his counsel breached an essential duty and (2) such failure prejudiced

him. Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251. For the first prong, “[w]e begin with the

presumption that the attorney performed competently.” State v. Ledezma,

626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). To overcome this presumption, Liddick must

prove “counsel’s representation falls below the objective standard of

reasonableness.” Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251 (cleaned up) (quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). For the second prong, he “must prove ‘a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694). If Liddick cannot establish either element, his claim must fail. Id.

A. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.

Liddick contends his trial counsel was ineffective for both failing to file a

motion for reconsideration of sentence and not advising him of his right to file such

motion. See Iowa Code § 902.4 (2019) (allowing the court to reconsider a felon’s

sentence). But Liddick was convicted of attempt to commit murder, a class “B”

felony, which is expressly excluded from the statute. See id. §§ 707.11(2)

(designating attempt to commit murder as a class “B” felony), 902.4 (restricting

1 Liddick raises ineffective-assistance claims against both his trial counsel and first

PCR counsel. While there is a statutory, not a constitutional, right to effective
counsel for postconviction proceedings, we still apply a de novo review. See Lado
v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011).
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reconsideration to those “convicted of a felony, other than a class ‘A’ or class ‘B’

felony”). There is no basis under which Liddick’s trial counsel could move for

reconsideration or advise Liddick to file a futile motion. We do not require trial

counsel to “raise an issue that lacks merit.” State v. Doolin, 942 N.W.2d 500, 507

(Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 2017)). And even

if Liddick was afforded reconsideration, he cannot establish a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have changed. See Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251.

Liddick loosely claims that he “would have prevailed on such a motion because of

his youthful age, intellectual disability, and his resultant inability to understand

situations.” But we already determined on direct appeal that the sentencing court

properly considered such factors when imposing Liddick’s mandatory minimum

sentence. Liddick, 2021 WL 5458506, at *3. Liddick provides no additional facts

or considerations not presented at the time of this decision. We therefore find his

trial counsel was not ineffective.2

B. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel.

Liddick also contends that his first PCR counsel was ineffective for several

reasons: (1) failing to resist the State’s motion to dismiss; (2) failing to obtain trial

counsel’s file and communicate with her regarding Liddick’s case; (3) failing to

require Liddick’s presence at the dismissal hearing; (4) failing to require reporting

of the dismissal hearing; and (5) failing to file a notice of appeal. While Liddick

2 Liddick likewise claims his PCR counsel was ineffective for not raising his trial

counsel’s failure to move for reconsideration. Because we have already
determined that Liddick’s trial counsel was not ineffective on this matter, we
similarly find that his PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this
meritless issue. See Doolin, 942 N.W.2d at 507.
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generally claims that these alleged failures constitute “structural error,” see State

v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (presuming prejudice prong of

ineffective-assistance claims when there is a structural defect), we disagree.

Liddick was neither outright denied counsel nor did his counsel concede to the

State’s case. See id. Instead, he argues his counsel’s alleged errors fit a third

category: when the “surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of

ineffectiveness.” See id. When this error occurs, it “renders the entire

postconviction relief proceeding ‘presumptively unreliable.’” Lado, 804 N.W.2d

at 253 (citation omitted). We have recognized two circumstances in which such

presumption was warranted: “actually-conflicted representation of co-defendants

and an appointment to represent a capital defendant in an unfamiliar jurisdiction

with no preparation.” Wright v. State, No. 23-0101, 2024 WL 3050514, at *2 (Iowa

Ct. App. June 19, 2024). Neither situation is applicable to Liddick’s circumstances.

Accordingly, we cannot presume Liddick was prejudiced by any alleged error.

We also do not find that Liddick successfully established prejudice. See

Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251 (placing the burden on the applicant). While Liddick

challenges his counsel’s ineffectiveness on five grounds, each of these

contentions rely on the reasonable probability of his PCR dismissal being

overturned. He cites the PCR court’s reliance on the denial of his further review

application, which he argues was not properly in the record, as the basis for which

his first PCR “would have been reversed on appeal had there been one.” But

whether there was further review of his direct appeal is not material to any issue

on PCR. Liddick’s first PCR counsel testified that he knew the PCR application

would be unsuccessful from the beginning, advising Liddick “he would lose, [the
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application] would be dismissed.” But nothing deterred Liddick from continuing

with his preferred strategy. Liddick’s PCR counsel also could not have disputed

the record before it, which included both Liddick’s failed direct appeal and the

procedendo. See Iowa Code § 822.6A (“automatically” including the underlying

trial record as part of the PCR application). In dismissing the PCR action, the court

noted that Liddick “cannot relitigate in this matter issues decided adversely to him

on direct appeal.” We agree and therefore need not consider whether his counsel

breached any duty on this issue. See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 (“If the claim

lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether

the attorney performed deficiently.”).

IV. Disposition.

Because Liddick failed to establish the ineffective assistance of either his

trial or PCR counsel, we affirm the denial of his PCR application.

AFFIRMED.