Strauss v. Dierdorff

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
28-MAR-2024
08:33 AM
Dkt. 69 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STEVEN D. STRAUSS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUSAN DIERDORFF, Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(FC-D No. 08-1-0360)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Wadsworth and Nakasone, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant Steven D. Strauss (Strauss)
appeals from the (1) January 30, 2018 "Findings of Facts [sic]
and Conclusions of Law; Order and Exhibit A"; and (2) March 12,
2018 "Decree Granting Absolute Divorce" (Divorce Decree), both
filed and entered by the Family Court of the Third Circuit
(Family Court), ordering Strauss to make an equalization
payment of $47,724.50 to Defendant-Appellee Susan Dierdorff
(Dierdorff).1
On appeal, Strauss contends2 that the Family Court
erred by failing to credit him for payments he made during his

1 The Honorable Peter Bresciani presided.
2 Strauss's four points of error have been consolidated and
restated for clarity.
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separation from Dierdorff and by adjusting the equalization
payment accordingly;3 and he also challenges findings of fact
(FOFs) 8, 9, and 10, and conclusions of law (COLs) 5 and 6 in
this regard.4

3 Strauss seeks credit for payments made toward the "mortgage,"
"maintenance, repairs, and improvements" to the marital home; payments made
toward "marital debts"; "advances of the marital estate assets"; and "child
support and educational expenses" for their daughter.
4 The challenged FOFs and COLs state:

FINDINGS OF FACTS: [sic]

. . . .

8. There is no court order or agreement between the
parties as to the [sic] any credit or offset for the debts
paid by [Strauss] after separation and prior to the date
of trial.

9. There was no court order or agreement between the
parties as to any credit or offset for moneys given to
[Dierdorff] by [Strauss] after separation and prior to the
date of trial.

10. There was no court order or agreement between the
parties as to any credit or offset for the support and
educational expenses provided to the the [sic] parties
[sic] daughter after separation and prior to the date of
trial.

. . . .

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

. . . .

5. None of the post separation debt paid by [Strauss],
none of [sic] post separation money given to [Dierdorff]
after separation and none of the support and educational
expenses provided by [Strauss] to the parties' daughter
shall be offset against the equalization payment due the
[sic] [Dierdorff]. Myers v. Myers[,] 70 Haw. 143 (1988)[;]
Gordon v. Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i 340 (2015).

6. Per the Muroaka [sic] worksheet, Exhibit A, the court
awards an equalization payment of $47,724.50 to
[Dierdorff].

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Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve
Strauss's contentions as follows, and vacate and remand.
"We review the family court's final division and
distribution of the estate of the parties under the abuse of
discretion standard, in view of the factors set forth in Hawai‘i

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580-47 and partnership principles."
Selvage v. Moire, 139 Hawai‘i 499, 506-07, 394 P.3d 729, 736-37
(2017) (cleaned up). A family court's FOFs "are reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard, while the court's [COLs] are
reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard." Gordon v.
Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i 340, 348, 350 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2015)

(citation omitted).
The Family Court did not deviate from the partnership
model.
Strauss argues that "[u]nder the partnership model"
applied by Hawai‘i courts, "a partner is entitled to appropriate
credit for payment of marital debts such as mortgages, debts,
and credit cards." Strauss contends that the Family Court
"fail[ed] to identify or provide any basis and/or analysis to
deviate" from the marital partnership model, with regard to the
credits sought by Strauss.
"Hawai‘i case law follows a framework based on
partnership principles that provides guidance for family courts
in dividing marital partnership property." Id. at 349, 350
P.3d at 1017 (citations omitted). Hawai‘i courts use five

categories to assign values to marital partnership property to
determine the equitable division and distribution of property
between spouses, and Category 5 is at issue here. Id.
"Category 5 includes the net market value of the remaining

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marital estate at the conclusion of the evidentiary part of the
trial." Id. (citation omitted). "The value of Category 5,
which is the net profit or loss of the marital partnership
after deducting the other four categories, is to be divided
equally unless equitable considerations merit deviation." Id.
at 350, 350 P.3d at 1018 (citation omitted). "In other words,
the value[ ] of . . . Category 5 [is] awarded one-half to each
spouse absent equitable considerations justifying deviation
from a 50/50 distribution." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the record reflects that the Family Court used
a "Muraoka" Chart,5 to show how the equalization payment was
calculated. The chart reflects that the Family Court treated
all assets and debts in the chart as Category 5 marital
partnership property.6 The Family Court calculated the net
market value of the marital partnership to be $167,285.01, and
divided that amount in half to $83,642.51. The Family Court
calculated Strauss's net worth as $131,357.00, and Dierdorff's
net worth as $35,928.01, resulting in Strauss owing an
equalization payment of $47,724.50. There was no evidence
presented, and Strauss does not point to any on appeal, that
any agreement existed between the parties regarding the
payments Strauss made during the separation. "[I]f there is no
agreement between the [spouses] defining the respective
property interests, partnership principles dictate an equal
division of the marital estate 'where the only facts proved are
the marriage itself and the existence of jointly owned

5 What the Family Court referred to as a "Muraoka" Chart appears
to be a Property Division Chart. In Muraoka v. Muraoka, 7 Haw. App. 432,
438-39, 776 P.2d 418, 422-23 (1989), this court was unable to review whether
the family court abused its discretion in the division and distribution of
the assets and debts of the parties, and directed that the family court
clearly outline the distribution and division of the property.
6 Strauss does not dispute that there was premarital separate
property or property acquired by gift or inheritance during the marriage.

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property.'" Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i at 350, 350 P.3d at 1018

(quoting Helbush v. Helbush, 108 Hawai‘i 508, 513, 122 P.3d 288,

293 (App. 2005)). Thus, the Family Court did not "deviate"
from the marital partnership model, when it awarded one-half of
the net market value of the partnership property, and found no
agreement between Strauss and Dierdorff regarding the payments
Strauss made during their separation. See id. Thus, FOFs 8,
9, and 10 were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 348, 350 P.3d at
1016.
The Family Court's failure to identify and analyze
whether any equitable considerations existed to
justify a deviation from the partnership model
constituted an abuse of discretion.
Strauss argues that the Family Court "abused its
discretion . . . by failing to credit" Strauss for the
various payments Strauss made when it made "no finding to
deviate from marital partnership principles."
A family court must follow the steps set forth
under the partnership model of property division to
determine whether to grant a deviation:

The partnership model requires the family court to first
find all of the facts necessary for categorization of the
properties and assignment of the relevant net market
values. Second, the court must identify any equitable
considerations justifying deviation from an equal
distribution. Third, the court must decide whether or not
there will be a deviation, and in its fourth step, the
court decides the extent of any deviation.

Selvage, 139 Hawai‘i at 509, 394 P.3d at 739 (emphases added)

(quoting Gordon, 135 Hawai‘i at 350, 350 P.3d at 1018). In

Selvage, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court remanded the case back to the

family court because despite the appellant's request for a
deviation, the record was silent as to whether the family court
considered any equitable considerations that may have justified

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a deviation from the equal distribution. Id. (holding that the
"family court failed to comply with the second part of the
Gordon analysis"). The supreme court explained that when
determining whether a deviation is warranted, a family court
must consider "[t]he respective merits of the parties, the
relative abilities of the parties, the condition in which each
party will be left by the divorce, . . . and all other
circumstances of the case." Id. at 509-10, 394 P.3d at 739-40
(citation omitted); see HRS § 580-47(a) (2018) (court shall
consider the "condition in which each party will be left by the
divorce").
Here, the record reflects that Strauss requested
credits for various categories of payments he made during the
separation, for the marital home, expenses for their daughter,
and to Dierdorff. These credits, if allowed by the Family
Court, would necessitate a deviation from the equal
distribution under the marital partnership model. Dierdorff
argued below that Strauss "has the ability to be a higher wage
earner" and that she "survives month to month in a service
industry that fluctuates." Strauss, however, testified that he
modified his work hours to "half time" due to significant
health issues. According to the Property Division Chart, after
the current equal property division, Strauss would be left with
greater debt, and illiquid assets, namely the house, which
Dierdorff noted has "deferred maintenance issues . . . ." COLs
5 and 6 reflect the Family Court rejected Strauss's request for
a deviation, but do not reflect whether the Family Court
identified and analyzed any equitable considerations to
determine whether a deviation from equal distribution was
warranted. See Selvage, 139 Hawai‘i at 509-11, 394 P.3d at

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739-41; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 138 Hawai‘i 185, 205, 378 P.3d

901, 921 (2016) (remanding where family court "could have found
equitable considerations justifying departure from an equal
distribution of partnership property" where one spouse "had
virtually no assets and would be left without a home"). We
thus conclude that the Family Court abused its discretion in
this regard.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the (1) January
30, 2018 "Findings of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of Law; Order
and Exhibit A"; and (2) March 12, 2018 "Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce," both filed and entered by the Family Court
of the Third Circuit. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, March 28, 2024.
On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Douglas L. Halsted, Acting Chief Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Susan Dierdorff, Associate Judge
Self-represented Defendant-
Appellee. /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Associate Judge

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