State v. Mestanza

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
20-MAY-2026
07:51 AM
Dkt. 60 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MANUEL F. MESTANZA, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
ʻEWA DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DTC-24-012711)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and Gluck, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Manuel F. Mestanza (Mestanza)
appeals from the April 9, 2025, Amended Notice of Entry of
Judgment entered by the District Court of the First District
(District Court). 1 Mestanza was convicted for leaving the scene
of a collision without exchanging necessary personal
information, as required by Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 291C-13 (Supp. 2024). On appeal, Mestanza contends that the
District Court erred by (1) applying an incorrect "negligent
state of mind" and (2) adjudging him guilty despite insufficient
evidence that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly left
the scene of a collision. Upon careful review of the record and

1 The Honorable Kristine Y. Yoo presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due
consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised,
we agree and reverse the Judgment of the District Court.
Relevant to this appeal, the trial record reflects
that the focus of the parties' dispute was Mestanza's knowledge
or awareness that a collision had occurred. During the bench
trial, complaining witness Ashley Moreno (Moreno) testified that
Mestanza hit her car when merging into her lane. She testified
that at the next light, which was red, she got out of her car
and approached Mestanza's car. She did this "[b]ecause they hit
me, and I wanted to talk to them." She testified as follows:
Q. Can you describe the interaction you had with
the defendant?

A. He asked if I knew how to drive and said that
he had a baby in the car. And I said that I also had my
baby in the car and that I had the right-of-way.

Q. As far as the information provided, were you --
were you granted information for the accident -- for
exchange of information for the accident?

A. I could have, yes.

Q. When you -- so what happened after this
conversation occurs? Does the defendant do anything else?

A. He rolled up his window and drove away when the
light turned green.

Moreno further testified that she did not tell Mestanza why she
came out of her car to talk to him:
Q. All right. Now when you exited the vehicle and
approached the Dodge Challenger and saw the driver.

A. Yes.

Q. Can you kind of briefly describe to me what the
interaction was.

A. He rolled down his window. Asked if I knew how
to drive. Said he had a baby in the car. And I was like,
well, I also have a baby in the car. And I had the right-
of-way.

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Q. Did you ever inform him, like, what the reason
you were coming out of the car for was?

A. No.

Mestanza testified that he was not aware of any collision.
The District Court found as follows:
[C]onsidering the evidence that has been presented
today in court, based on the credible evidence presented,
the Court is going to make a finding that the State has
proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Court will note that [Moreno], who this Court finds
credible, had indicated that the defendant's vehicle hit
her front bumper such that at the stoplight she got out of
the car to approach the defendant's vehicle. And she had
explained how that collision had occurred because the
defendant had merged into her lane from the right while
[Moreno] was in the middle lane. So some of that testimony
is corroborated by the defendant.

. . . [T]he Court will acknowledge that [Moreno]
stated that she had not told the defendant that there was
an accident.

But based on -- based on the fact that she felt the
front bumper being hit and that's why she stopped and she
got out of the car, the Court is going to make a reasonable
inference that the defendant should have known that there
was a collision that required him to pull over and give the
appropriate information as noted in 291C-13.

The Court is going to make a finding that the Court
finds [Moreno] credible and the police officer credible and
even that -- even that exchange about, learn how to drive,
to the Court indicates that something had happened. So
given the credibility of [Moreno] and the reasonable
inferences, the Court is making, based on the totality of
circumstances as well as the testimony of the witness, the
Court is going to find the defendant guilty.

(Emphasis added.)
Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes § 291C-13 requires drivers who
are involved in "a collision resulting only in damage to a
vehicle . . . that is driven or attended by any person," to stop
their vehicle and exchange information before leaving the scene.
The statute is silent as to a defendant's required state of
mind, so to violate the statute, a person must "act[]
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." HRS § 702-204 (2014);

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see HRS § 291C-13. Factfinders can use "'proof by
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from
circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct'" to infer the
defendant's state of mind. State v. Gomes, 117 Hawai‘i 218, 227,
177 P.3d 928, 937 (2008) (quoting State v. Bui, 104 Hawai‘i 462,
467, 92 P.3d 471, 476 (2004)).
To prove that Mestanza intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly left the scene of a collision, the State had to prove
that Mestanza knew there had been a collision; "should have
known" is insufficient because acting "negligently" is not an
element of the offense. HRS § 702-204. At trial, the
prosecution did not introduce any evidence to prove Mestanza
knew that a collision had occurred: Moreno did not testify
about what she heard or felt (and, by inference, what Mestanza
would have heard or felt). 2 Moreno testified that there were
scratches (but not a dent) on her car, and a photograph was
introduced into evidence, but Moreno was not asked whether any
mark(s) shown in the photograph were there before the alleged
collision and the record does not contain any other evidence to
that effect. 3 Moreno testified that Mestanza hit her car – but
she admitted not telling Mestanza a collision had occurred. In
other words, even if the District Court had, in fact, used the
correct state of mind requirement (that is, even if the District
Court had simply misspoken when stating "should have known"),

2 The District Court referred to "the fact that [Moreno] felt the
front bumper being hit," but there is no evidence in the record to this
effect. It is possible that such evidence was introduced in one of the
sections of the transcript marked "inaudible," but there is no evidence in
the record before us.

3 Once again, there is a section of the transcript marked
"inaudible" where this discussion might have occurred (see CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
docket 36 (Transcript of Proceedings 4/9/25) at 21:20-25). As the record
stands, however, there is no evidence that a collision with Mestanza caused
any damage to Moreno's car.
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there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction under HRS
§ 291C-13.
We are mindful that, in reviewing the sufficiency of
evidence used to support a conviction:
[E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to
support a conviction. The test on appeal is not whether
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether
there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of
the trier of fact. Indeed, even if it could be said in a
bench trial that the conviction is against the weight of
the evidence, as long as there is substantial evidence to
support the requisite findings for conviction, the trial
court will be affirmed.

Substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person
of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.

State v. Jing Hua Xiao, 123 Hawai‘i 251, 257, 231 P.3d 968, 974
(2010) (citation modified). Nevertheless, in this case, the
prosecution did not adduce any evidence – let alone substantial
evidence – that Mestanza intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
left the scene of a collision.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the April 9,
2025 Amended Notice of Entry of Judgment of the District Court.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, May 20, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Seth Patek,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge

Loren J. Thomas, /s/ Daniel M. Gluck
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
City and County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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