Zhang v. Wu

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
09-JAN-2026
07:55 AM
Dkt. 120 OP

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

–––O0O–––

DAN DAN ZHANG, by and through her managing agent
HONOLULU MANAGEMENT LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DI WU, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
KO#OLAU POKO DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX)

JANUARY 9, 2026

HIRAOKA, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND WADSWORTH AND GUIDRY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WADSWORTH, J.

This appeal stems from a dispute between Defendant-
Appellant Di Wu (Wu) and Plaintiff-Appellee Dan Dan Zhang (Zhang)
regarding the possession of residential property located in
Kailua, O#ahu (the Property), which is registered in the Land
Court of the State of Hawai#i (Land Court). Zhang, the owner of
the Property, filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against
Wu, alleging that he was in possession of the Property without
legal authority or permission. Wu, on the other hand, claimed
that he and Zhang had agreed that Wu would rent and reside at the
Property under the terms of a ten-year lease (Lease). The
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

District Court of the First Circuit1/ (District Court) concluded
that the alleged Lease could not confer any possessory interest
in the Property to Wu because it was not registered in the Land
Court. The District Court entered judgment for possession in
favor of Zhang.
Wu appeals from the Judgment for Possession and Writ of
Possession, both entered on June 6, 2023. Wu also challenges the
June 1, 2023 "Order Granting [Zhang's] Motion for Summary
Judgment, Filed April 5, 2023" (Order Granting MSJ).2/ Wu
contends that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment and entering judgment for possession in favor of Zhang:
(1) based on the court's determination that the alleged Lease
"was 'invalid' and not a 'conveyance' that could bind the parties
under [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)] §§ 501-101 and -121[,]"
quoted infra; and (2) because genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding the existence or non-existence of the Lease. Wu
also contends that the District Court abused its discretion by
refusing to grant a continuance of the hearing on Zhang's motion
for summary judgment (MSJ) pursuant to District Court Rules of
Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 56(f) to allow further discovery.
In her answering brief, Zhang contends that Wu's appeal
is moot because he voluntarily vacated the Property prior to
execution of the Writ of Possession.
At the outset, we hold that Wu's appeal is not moot.
Because the alleged Lease does not expire until July 2031, its
validity is still a "live" and justiciable issue, and it may
still be possible to award Wu effective relief.
On the merits, we hold that the District Court erred in
concluding that the alleged Lease could not confer any possessory
interest in the Property to Wu as a matter of law because it was
unregistered. The plain language of HRS § 501-101 makes clear

1/
The Honorable James C. McWhinnie presided.
2/
In his notice of appeal, Wu also purports to challenge the June 6,
2023 order denying Wu's Ex Parte Motion to Stay Execution of Writ of
Possession. However, Wu's opening brief presents no point of error or
argument regarding the order. Any challenge to the order is thus disregarded.
Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4), (7).

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that an unregistered instrument such as the alleged Lease cannot
effect a conveyance or bind the land, but that it "shall operate
. . . as a contract between the parties[.]"3/ Here, that means
the Lease, if otherwise valid, was an enforceable contract
between Zhang and Wu that could confer a possessory interest in
the Property to Wu. The District Court therefore erred in
granting Zhang's MSJ and entering the Judgment for Possession.
Accordingly, we vacate the Order Granting MSJ, the
Judgment for Possession, and the Writ of Possession.

I. Background

On August 15, 2022, Zhang filed a complaint for
ejectment and damages against Wu in the District Court. Zhang
attached a copy of a warranty deed conveying the Property to her,
recorded in the Land Court on July 3, 2019, and a copy of a
notice to vacate sent by Zhang's attorneys to Wu on August 3,
2022.
On September 1, 2022, Wu answered Zhang's complaint.
He asserted several defenses, including that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction, because "under HRS § 604-5(d),4/ title to

3/
HRS § 501-101 (2018) provides:

Voluntary dealing with registered lands. An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or
otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been
registered. The owner may use forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use
and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. No deed,
mortgage, or other voluntary instrument, except a will and a
lease for a term not exceeding one year, purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties, and as evidence of authority
to the registrar or assistant registrar to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land, and in all cases
under this chapter the registration shall be made in the
office of the assistant registrar in the bureau of
conveyances, during office hours prescribed in section
502-32. The rules of court may provide for forms of
conveyances respecting registered land.
4/
HRS § 604-5(d) (2016) provides:

The district courts shall not have cognizance of real
actions, nor actions in which the title to real estate comes
in question, nor actions for libel, slander, defamation of
(continued...)

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[the Property] is at issue." (Footnote added.) In a declaration
attached to his answer, Wu acknowledged that the deed to the
Property recorded in Land Court was only in Zhang's name, but
asserted that based on an agreement with Zhang, Wu had an
interest in the Property "closer to fifty percent (50%)." Wu's
declaration referred to an attached August 16, 2022 first amended
complaint, filed by Wu against Zhang in the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit (Circuit Court), under which Wu claimed an
ownership interest in the Property.5/ The first amended
complaint, in turn, referred to an alleged agreement between Wu
and Zhang regarding their joint purchase of the Property (Joint
Venture Agreement), and included an attached copy of the
agreement "in Chinese and in English translation." Wu's answer
to Zhang's complaint for ejectment did not allege that he held a
lease to the Property.
On December 30, 2022, Wu filed a motion for leave to
file a counterclaim against Zhang. The proposed counterclaim
alleged that in June 2021, Wu and Zhang agreed that Wu would rent
and reside at the Property under a ten-year lease, i.e., the
Lease, and raised various claims relating to Zhang's alleged
breach of the Lease and the Joint Venture Agreement. The motion
was supported by Wu's declaration authenticating a written

4/
(...continued)
character, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, breach
of promise of marriage, or seduction; nor shall they have
power to appoint referees in any cause.
5/
We take judicial notice of the court records in the related
circuit court proceeding, Wu v. Zhang, Civil No. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX. See Hawaii
Rules of Evidence Rule 201; State v. Abdon, 137 Hawai #i 19, 26, 364 P.3d 917,
924 (2016) ("The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts
is in noticing the content of court records." (quoting State v. Akana, 68 Haw.
164, 165, 706 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1985))).
On November 3, 2022, the Circuit Court entered an order granting
Zhang's motion to partially dismiss Wu's complaint with prejudice ( Partial
Dismissal Order). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting
Defendant Zhang's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Partially Dismiss Complaint with
Prejudice, Wu v. Zhang, Civil No. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX, Judiciary Information
Management System (JIMS) dkt. 43. The court ruled that, because Zhang held a
transfer certificate of title to the Property registered in Land Court, and Wu
took no steps to contest the title within one-year of the registration, as
required by HRS § 501-71, Wu was precluded from asserting any rights to title
to the Property. Wu's claims asserting rights to title were therefore
dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 3-4.

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Residential Lease Agreement for a ten-year term beginning on
July 1, 2021, with an annual rent of $20,000, payable on the last
day of the year. Zhang's memorandum in opposition to the motion
did not deny the Lease's existence, but instead argued that Wu's
counterclaims were not compulsory and were duplicative of claims
Wu had asserted in the related Circuit Court case. On
January 27, 2023, the District Court entered an order denying
Wu's motion for leave to file a counterclaim, but did not state a
reason for the denial.
On March 9, 2023, Wu filed a motion for leave to file a
counterclaim against Zhang and Zhang's property manager, Honolulu
Management LLC (Second Motion to File Counterclaim). The
proposed counterclaim against Zhang again raised various claims
relating to the alleged breach of the Lease and other wrongful
conduct by Zhang. On April 4, 2023, the District Court entered
an order denying Wu's Second Motion to File Counterclaim, stating
that "[t]he rental agreement made the subject of the proposed
counterclaim, which purports to be for a ten (10) year term, is
invalid because it was not registered with the Land Court of the
State of Hawai#i as required by [HRS] § 501-121."6/ The court
ruled that "[Wu's] proposed counterclaim is therefore futile."
On April 5, 2023, Zhang filed the MSJ. She argued that
based on the Circuit Court's Partial Dismissal Order (see supra
note 5), and the District Court's ruling that the Lease was
invalid, she was entitled to possession of the Property. Wu
opposed the motion, arguing that: (1) genuine issues of material
fact regarding the existence and terms of the Lease precluded
summary judgment in Zhang's favor; (2) the District Court erred
in determining that the Lease was invalid; and (3) alternatively,
the MSJ hearing should be continued under DCRCP Rule 56(f).
Following hearings on April 21, 2023, and May 5, 2023,
the District Court granted the MSJ. After referring to the

6/
HRS § 501-121 (2018) provides:

Leases; registration required. Leases of registered
land for a term of one year or more shall be registered.

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requirements of HRS §§ 501-101 and -121, the court stated:

[W]ith regard to the motion for summary judgment that was
argued earlier filed by the Plaintiffs, and based upon the
statute and the cases, including City and County [of
Honolulu v. A.S.] Clarke, Inc., [60 Haw. 40, 587 P.2d 294
(1978),] the motion for summary judgment by the Plaintiff is
granted.

. . . I believe that the Defendant under the
applicable law, if they can prove that there is a valid
lease, may have a breach of contract claim, but not a claim
that took effect as a conveyance or that bound the land.

The court thus appeared to reason that HRS §§ 501-101 and -121
prevented the alleged unregistered Lease from conferring any
possessory interest in the Property to Wu.
On June 1, 2023, the District Court entered the Order
Granting MSJ, as well as an amended order denying Wu's Second
Motion to File Counterclaim. The amended order concluded that
"[t]he alleged rental agreement made the subject of the proposed
counterclaim which purports to be for a ten-year term shall not
be effective as a conveyance and does not bind the land because
it was not registered with the Land Court . . . as required by
[HRS] §§ 501-101 and 501-121."
On June 6, 2023, the District Court entered the
Judgment for Possession and the Writ of Possession. The next
day, Wu filed his notice of appeal.
On July 26, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation in
the District Court, which, among other things, stated that "under
threat of execution on the Writ of Possession, and on objection
by . . . Wu," Wu and his family had vacated the Property.

II. Standards of Review

A. Summary Judgment

"On appeal, the grant or denial of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo." Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai#i 46, 55, 292 P.3d
1276, 1285 (2013) (quoting First Ins. Co. of Hawai#i v. A & B
Props., Inc., 126 Hawai#i 406, 413, 271 P.3d 1165, 1172 (2012)).

B. Conclusions of Law

A district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de

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novo under the right/wrong standard. State v. Entrekin, 98
Hawai#i 221, 225, 47 P.3d 336, 340 (2002) (citing Child Support
Enf't Agency v. Roe, 96 Hawai#i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70 (2001)).

C. Interpretation of a Statute

"Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo." Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528
P.3d 217, 221 (2023) (quoting State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383,
390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177 (2009)).

III. Discussion

A. Wu's Appeal is Not Moot

We first address Zhang's argument that this appeal is
moot. She asserts that because Wu "voluntarily" vacated the
Property prior to execution of the Writ of Possession, any issues
relating to possession of the Property are now moot.7/
Under Hawai#i law, mootness is an issue of
justiciability. See State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 42, 526
P.3d 558, 567 (2023). The mootness doctrine applies "where
events subsequent to the judgment of the trial court have so
affected the relations between the parties that the two
conditions for justiciability relevant on appeal — adverse
interest and effective remedy — have been compromised." Hamilton
ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Hawai#i 1, 5, 193 P.3d 839, 843
(2008) (quoting Lathrop v. Sakatani, 111 Hawai#i 307, 312-13, 141
P.3d 480, 485-86 (2006)). In short, "a case is moot if the
reviewing court can no longer grant effective relief."
Kaho#ohanohano v. State, 114 Hawai#i 302, 332, 162 P.3d 696, 726
(2007) (emphasis and brackets omitted) (quoting Kemp v. State of
Hawai#i Child Support Enf't Agency, 111 Hawai#i 367, 385, 141 P.3d
1014, 1032 (2006)).
In support of its mootness argument, Zhang relies on
this court's decision in Crown Properties, Inc. v. Fin. Sec. Life

7/
On January 12, 2024, Zhang filed a motion to dismiss this appeal
for mootness, which raised the same argument. On February 8, 2024, this court
entered an order that, among other things, denied the motion to dismiss.

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Ins. Co., 6 Haw. App. 105, 112, 712 P.2d 504, 509 (1985).
There, we stated that "[t]he termination of possession without
the execution of a writ of possession moots all questions about
the validity of the order authorizing the issuance of the writ of
possession and of the writ itself." Id. at 112, 712 P.2d at 509.
It appears, however, that the sublease at issue in Crown
Properties had expired before the sublessee's appeal was decided.
Id. at 106-07, 712 P.2d at 506. There was therefore no basis for
the sublessee to regain possession of the subleased property.
See Smith v. Tubal, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2014 WL 7369634, at *2
(Haw. App. Dec. 29, 2014) (SDO) (concluding that an appeal from a
judgment of possession was moot, in part because the appellant's
lease had terminated, and the appellant had not demonstrated a
basis to regain possession, even if the court vacated the
judgment for possession).
Here, in contrast, the alleged Lease does not expire
until July 2031. The validity of the Lease is therefore still a
"live" and justiciable issue, and it may still be possible to
award Wu effective relief. Because we decide below that the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Zhang, on
remand, Wu may seek to prove the existence of the alleged Lease
and to enforce its terms relating to possession of the Property.8/
Cf. Scholes v. Kiyoshi Kawaguchi, 142 Hawai#i 360, 364, 419 P.3d
1029, 1033 (App. 2017) (ruling that an appeal taken subsequent to
issuance of a writ of possession was not moot where the appellant
still had pending claims raising issues of title to the property
in a separate circuit court action).9/ Accordingly, this appeal
is not moot.

8/
Wu also argues that because the Writ of Possession was served and
"executed" by Zhang's process server on June 6, 2023, Wu never voluntarily
gave up possession of the Property. Given our disposition of the mootness
issue, we need not decide this alternative argument.
9/
We note that the claims currently pending in Wu's Circuit Court
case do not appear to raise the issue of title to the Property; rather, they
relate to the Lease and possession, as well as to the Joint Venture Agreement,
and include claims for specific performance of the Lease and the Joint Venture
Agreement. See Second Amended Verified Complaint, Wu v. Zhang, Civil No.
1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX, JIMS dkt. 236.

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B. The District Court Erred in Granting the MSJ

Wu contends that the District Court erred in granting
the MSJ based on a misreading of HRS §§ 501-101 and -121.
Specifically, Wu argues that the District Court erroneously ruled
that the alleged Lease of the Property was invalid and could not
confer any possessory interest in the Property to Wu because it
was not registered with the Land Court.
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has explained the purpose of
the Torrens Land Act as follows:

The legislature created the Land Court with the passage of
the Torrens Land Act (Act) in 1903, which is today codified
in HRS Chapter 501 as amended. 1903 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 56,
§ 2 at 279. The purpose of the system created by the Act
"is to conclusively establish title to land through the
issuance of a certificate of title." Aames Funding Corp. v.
Mores, 107 Hawai#i 95, 101, 110 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2005). The
holder of a certificate of title holds it "free from all
encumbrances except those noted on the certificate in the
order of priority of recordation" and other statutorily
enumerated encumbrances. HRS § 501-82(a) (Supp. 2016).
Thus, "a land court certificate of title is 'conclusive and
unimpeachable' with regard to 'all matters contained
therein,'" which is "the fundamental difference between a
certificate of title issued by the land court and a
recordation of title at the bureau of conveyances."

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya, 142 Hawai#i 439, 446-47, 420
P.3d 370, 377-78 (2018) (brackets omitted, emphasis added). The
court further stated, "[t]hus, in many instances the statutory
framework essentially renders the State as a guarantor of the
certificate of title issued by the Land Court." Id. at 449, 420
P.3d at 380.
HRS § 501-101, quoted supra, furthers the Act's purpose
of conclusively establishing title to real property by requiring,
subject to exceptions not relevant here, the registration of
instruments conveying an interest in Land Court property.10/ The
operative third and fourth sentences of this section state, in
relevant part:

10/
"Land Court property" refers to real property that has been
registered under the Land Court system established by the Torrens Land Act.
The Land Court system is one of two systems for recording title to real
property in Hawai#i, the other being the Bureau of Conveyances or "regular"
system. Omiya, 142 Hawai#i at 446, 452, 420 P.3d at 377, 383.

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No deed, mortgage, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will and a lease for a term not exceeding one year,
purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate
only as a contract between the parties, and as evidence of
authority to the registrar or assistant registrar to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land . . . .

HRS § 501-101 (emphasis added). The two exceptions to the
registration requirement, conveyances pursuant to a will, and
leases for terms not exceeding one year, are addressed in other
sections of the Land Court statute. See HRS §§ 501-171, 501-
82(5).
Wu does not dispute that the Property is Land Court
property and thus subject to the requirements of HRS Chapter 501.
Nor does he dispute that Zhang is the legal owner of the
Property. Under HRS § 501-121, a lease of "registered land for a
term of one year or more shall be registered" in Land Court. The
alleged Lease was not so registered. Under HRS § 501-101, any
voluntary instrument purporting to convey or affect Land Court
property shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
unless the instrument is properly registered with the office of
the Assistant Registrar. "The ordinary effect of a failure to
register a leasehold interest in Land Court property is that
every subsequent good faith purchaser who takes the certificate
of title for value holds the registered property free from the
unregistered leasehold interest." A.S. Clarke, 60 Haw. at 44-45,
587 P.2d 297 (citing HRS § 501-82 (1976)). However, the plain
language of HRS § 501-101 also mandates that an unregistered
instrument such as the alleged Lease "shall operate . . . as a
contract between the parties." The issue here is whether the
alleged Lease as between Zhang and Wu, if otherwise valid, could
have conferred a possessory interest in the Property to Wu via
contract, which affected Zhang's alleged right to possession.
No reported Hawai#i appellate decision appears to have
determined the nature or extent of the contractual rights
referenced in HRS § 501-101. In two cases discussing HRS § 501-
101, the supreme court has ruled that parties taking title to
Land Court property under registered certificates of title take
the property free from unregistered leases or conveyances of

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title. See A.S. Clarke, Inc., 60 Haw. at 44-47, 587 P.2d at 297-
99 (holding that a lessee under an unregistered long-term lease
was precluded from asserting any interest against the City and
County of Honolulu, which the court treated as a subsequent good-
faith purchaser under HRS § 501-82, in eminent domain
proceedings); Packaging Prods. Co. v. Teruya Bros., 58 Haw. 580,
584-85, 574 P.2d 524, 527-28 (1978) (holding that a good-faith
purchaser taking title to property under a deed recorded in Land
Court could not be divested of title by a prior unregistered bill
of sale conveying the same property).
In City and Cnty. of Honolulu v. F.E. Trotter, Inc., 70
Haw. 18, 757 P.2d 647 (1988), the lessee of a landfill under an
unregistered lease of Land Court property challenged the City's
eminent domain action against the property on the grounds that
the land was already being used for a public purpose, and the
City was required to show that its desired use of the condemned
land was for a superior public purpose. Id. at 20-21, 757 P.3d
at 649-50. The supreme court ruled that the lessee had "a
personal interest in the outcome" under the unrecorded lease
sufficient to give it standing to challenge the condemnation, but
did not otherwise discuss the nature or extent of that interest.
Id.
In construing HRS § 501-101, "our foremost obligation
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language
contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory
language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in
a manner consistent with its purpose." Lingle v. Hawai#i Gov't
Emps. Ass'n, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO, 107 Hawai#i 178, 183,
111 P.3d 587, 592 (2005) (quoting Guth v. Freeland, 96 Hawai#i
147, 150, 28 P.3d 982, 985 (2001)). The plain language of HRS
§ 501-101 makes clear that an unregistered instrument such as the
alleged Lease cannot effect a conveyance or bind the land, but
that it "shall operate . . . as a contract between the parties."
As stated in Omiya, "[t]he purpose of the system created by the
Act 'is to conclusively establish title to land through the
issuance of a certificate of title.'" 142 Hawai#i at 446-47, 420

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P.3d at 377-78. That purpose is served in these circumstances by
recognizing the Lease, if otherwise valid, as an enforceable
contract between Zhang and Wu, but not as an instrument that
binds the Property as to others.
The supreme court has instructed:

Leases are essentially contractual in nature and are
reviewed under principles of contract law. Cho Mark
Oriental Food v. K & K Int'l, 73 Haw. 509, 519, 836 P.2d
1057, 1063 (1992); Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Dillingham
Corp., 67 Haw. 4, 10, 674 P.2d 390, 394 (1984) (leases
should be analyzed under principles of contract law); Lau v.
Bautista, 61 Haw. 144, 149, 598 P.2d 161[,] 165 (197[9]) ("a
lease is essentially a contractual relationship"); Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969) (a lease
is "more importantly[ ] a contractual relationship").
"Absent an ambiguity, contract terms should be interpreted
according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in
common speech." Cho Mark, 73 Haw. at 520, 836 P.2d at 1064.
Moreover, the "construction and the legal effect to be given
a contract is a question of law freely reviewable by an
appellate court." Id. at 519, 836 P.2d at 1063.

Aickin v. Ocean View Invs. Co., 84 Hawai#i 447, 457, 935 P.2d
992, 1002 (1997) (quoting Hi Kai Inv., Ltd. v. Aloha Futons Beds
& Waterbeds, Inc., 84 Hawai#i 75, 78, 929 P.2d 88, 91 (1996)).
Here, the alleged Lease provides that Zhang leases the
Property to Wu for a 10-year term from July 1, 2021, with an
annual rent of $20,000, payable on the last day of the year.
Under the terms of the alleged Lease, "[b]oth parties agree . . .
[the Property] shall be used and occupied by [Wu] and [Wu's]
family, and other rentals or sublease purpose [sic]." The
alleged Lease thus appears to reflect Wu's contractual bargain
for possession of the Property during the 10-year term. In these
circumstances, we conclude that HRS §§ 501-101 and 501-21 did not
invalidate the alleged Lease as between Zhang and Wu as a matter
of law, merely because it was unregistered, or otherwise prevent
the alleged Lease from conferring any possessory interest in the
Property to Wu via contract.11/ A contrary conclusion would

11/
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
construing that state's analogous Torrens statute in an unlawful detainer
action. See Cook v. Luettich, 252 N.W. 649 (Minn. 1934). There, the
plaintiff Cook received a quitclaim deed for the subject property from the
defendant Luettich, and on the same date leased the property back to Luettich
for a term of eleven and one-half months. After the lease term expired,
Luettich remained on the premises, resulting in Cook's unlawful detainer
(continued...)

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appear to allow any landlord who leases Land Court property to a
tenant for a term of more than one year, where the lease is not
registered, to unilaterally terminate the tenancy and evict the
tenant. Such a result would fly in the face of HRS §§ 501-101,
which expressly protects the contractual rights of the parties to
such a lease.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred
in granting the MSJ based on its determination that the alleged
Lease of the Property could not confer any possessory interest in
the Property to Wu as a matter of law, because it was not
registered with the Land Court. Our conclusion also disposes of
Wu's second contention – that summary judgment should not have
been granted because there remained genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the alleged Lease was valid. The District
Court never considered whether the alleged Lease was otherwise
valid because it determined that the Lease could not confer a
possessory interest to Wu as a matter of law pursuant to HRS §§

11/
(...continued)
action. In defending against the suit, Luettich relied on a Minnesota statute
similar to HRS § 501-101, which stated that unregistered deeds shall not take
effect as conveyances. Luettich argued that because Cook did not have
registered title to the property, she could not sue for possession.

The court rejected Luettich's argument, stating:

The claim is without merit. It is based on section 8293,
Mason's Minn. St. 1927, which reads as follows: 'An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or
otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been
registered. He may use any form of deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument sufficient in law for the purpose
intended. No voluntary instrument of conveyance purporting
to convey or affect registered land, except a will, and a
lease for a term not exceeding three years, shall take
effect as a conveyance, or bind or affect the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the parties, and as
authority to the registrar to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the land.'
252 N.W. at 649 (emphasis added). The court affirmed the lower court's
judgment placing the plaintiff in possession of the property pursuant to the
unregistered deed, stating, "[u]nder that provision, although the unregistered
quitclaim deed did not affect the title nor create any interest in the
premises, it did operate as a contract between the parties." Id. See also
Hacken v. Isenberg, 124 N.E. 306, 311 (Ill. 1919) (construing the Illinois
Torrens Act and concluding that an unregistered lien operated as a contract
and was enforceable between the parties to the lien, but not "as against
subsequent purchasers, creditors, etc." until it was registered under the
Act).

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501-101 and -121.
Given our disposition, we need not reach Wu's remaining
contentions.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the District
Court's: (1) June 1, 2023 "Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Filed April 5, 2023"; (2) June 6, 2023 Judgment
for Possession; and (3) June 6, 2023 Writ of Possession. The
case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.

On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Presiding Judge
Stephanie E.W. Thompson
(Starn O'Toole Marcus & Fisher)
for Defendant-Appellant /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
Yuriko J. Sugimura,
Scott I. Batterman,
Matthew H. Murakami /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
(Clay Iwamura Pulice & Nervell) Associate Judge
and
John P. Manaut,
Kai Wang, and
Steven M. Egesdal
(Carlsmith Ball LLP)
for Plaintiff-Appellee

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
09-JAN-2026
07:55 AM
Dkt. 120 OP

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

–––O0O–––

DAN DAN ZHANG, by and through her managing agent
HONOLULU MANAGEMENT LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DI WU, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
KO#OLAU POKO DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DRC-XX-XXXXXXX)

JANUARY 9, 2026

HIRAOKA, PRESIDING JUDGE, AND WADSWORTH AND GUIDRY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WADSWORTH, J.

This appeal stems from a dispute between Defendant-
Appellant Di Wu (Wu) and Plaintiff-Appellee Dan Dan Zhang (Zhang)
regarding the possession of residential property located in
Kailua, O#ahu (the Property), which is registered in the Land
Court of the State of Hawai#i (Land Court). Zhang, the owner of
the Property, filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against
Wu, alleging that he was in possession of the Property without
legal authority or permission. Wu, on the other hand, claimed
that he and Zhang had agreed that Wu would rent and reside at the
Property under the terms of a ten-year lease (Lease). The
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District Court of the First Circuit1/ (District Court) concluded
that the alleged Lease could not confer any possessory interest
in the Property to Wu because it was not registered in the Land
Court. The District Court entered judgment for possession in
favor of Zhang.
Wu appeals from the Judgment for Possession and Writ of
Possession, both entered on June 6, 2023. Wu also challenges the
June 1, 2023 "Order Granting [Zhang's] Motion for Summary
Judgment, Filed April 5, 2023" (Order Granting MSJ).2/ Wu
contends that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment and entering judgment for possession in favor of Zhang:
(1) based on the court's determination that the alleged Lease
"was 'invalid' and not a 'conveyance' that could bind the parties
under [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)] §§ 501-101 and -121[,]"
quoted infra; and (2) because genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding the existence or non-existence of the Lease. Wu
also contends that the District Court abused its discretion by
refusing to grant a continuance of the hearing on Zhang's motion
for summary judgment (MSJ) pursuant to District Court Rules of
Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 56(f) to allow further discovery.
In her answering brief, Zhang contends that Wu's appeal
is moot because he voluntarily vacated the Property prior to
execution of the Writ of Possession.
At the outset, we hold that Wu's appeal is not moot.
Because the alleged Lease does not expire until July 2031, its
validity is still a "live" and justiciable issue, and it may
still be possible to award Wu effective relief.
On the merits, we hold that the District Court erred in
concluding that the alleged Lease could not confer any possessory
interest in the Property to Wu as a matter of law because it was
unregistered. The plain language of HRS § 501-101 makes clear

1/
The Honorable James C. McWhinnie presided.
2/
In his notice of appeal, Wu also purports to challenge the June 6,
2023 order denying Wu's Ex Parte Motion to Stay Execution of Writ of
Possession. However, Wu's opening brief presents no point of error or
argument regarding the order. Any challenge to the order is thus disregarded.
Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(4), (7).

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that an unregistered instrument such as the alleged Lease cannot
effect a conveyance or bind the land, but that it "shall operate
. . . as a contract between the parties[.]"3/ Here, that means
the Lease, if otherwise valid, was an enforceable contract
between Zhang and Wu that could confer a possessory interest in
the Property to Wu. The District Court therefore erred in
granting Zhang's MSJ and entering the Judgment for Possession.
Accordingly, we vacate the Order Granting MSJ, the
Judgment for Possession, and the Writ of Possession.

I. Background

On August 15, 2022, Zhang filed a complaint for
ejectment and damages against Wu in the District Court. Zhang
attached a copy of a warranty deed conveying the Property to her,
recorded in the Land Court on July 3, 2019, and a copy of a
notice to vacate sent by Zhang's attorneys to Wu on August 3,
2022.
On September 1, 2022, Wu answered Zhang's complaint.
He asserted several defenses, including that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction, because "under HRS § 604-5(d),4/ title to

3/
HRS § 501-101 (2018) provides:

Voluntary dealing with registered lands. An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or
otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been
registered. The owner may use forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use
and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. No deed,
mortgage, or other voluntary instrument, except a will and a
lease for a term not exceeding one year, purporting to
convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties, and as evidence of authority
to the registrar or assistant registrar to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land, and in all cases
under this chapter the registration shall be made in the
office of the assistant registrar in the bureau of
conveyances, during office hours prescribed in section
502-32. The rules of court may provide for forms of
conveyances respecting registered land.
4/
HRS § 604-5(d) (2016) provides:

The district courts shall not have cognizance of real
actions, nor actions in which the title to real estate comes
in question, nor actions for libel, slander, defamation of
(continued...)

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[the Property] is at issue." (Footnote added.) In a declaration
attached to his answer, Wu acknowledged that the deed to the
Property recorded in Land Court was only in Zhang's name, but
asserted that based on an agreement with Zhang, Wu had an
interest in the Property "closer to fifty percent (50%)." Wu's
declaration referred to an attached August 16, 2022 first amended
complaint, filed by Wu against Zhang in the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit (Circuit Court), under which Wu claimed an
ownership interest in the Property.5/ The first amended
complaint, in turn, referred to an alleged agreement between Wu
and Zhang regarding their joint purchase of the Property (Joint
Venture Agreement), and included an attached copy of the
agreement "in Chinese and in English translation." Wu's answer
to Zhang's complaint for ejectment did not allege that he held a
lease to the Property.
On December 30, 2022, Wu filed a motion for leave to
file a counterclaim against Zhang. The proposed counterclaim
alleged that in June 2021, Wu and Zhang agreed that Wu would rent
and reside at the Property under a ten-year lease, i.e., the
Lease, and raised various claims relating to Zhang's alleged
breach of the Lease and the Joint Venture Agreement. The motion
was supported by Wu's declaration authenticating a written

4/
(...continued)
character, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, breach
of promise of marriage, or seduction; nor shall they have
power to appoint referees in any cause.
5/
We take judicial notice of the court records in the related
circuit court proceeding, Wu v. Zhang, Civil No. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX. See Hawaii
Rules of Evidence Rule 201; State v. Abdon, 137 Hawai #i 19, 26, 364 P.3d 917,
924 (2016) ("The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable facts
is in noticing the content of court records." (quoting State v. Akana, 68 Haw.
164, 165, 706 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1985))).
On November 3, 2022, the Circuit Court entered an order granting
Zhang's motion to partially dismiss Wu's complaint with prejudice ( Partial
Dismissal Order). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting
Defendant Zhang's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Partially Dismiss Complaint with
Prejudice, Wu v. Zhang, Civil No. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX, Judiciary Information
Management System (JIMS) dkt. 43. The court ruled that, because Zhang held a
transfer certificate of title to the Property registered in Land Court, and Wu
took no steps to contest the title within one-year of the registration, as
required by HRS § 501-71, Wu was precluded from asserting any rights to title
to the Property. Wu's claims asserting rights to title were therefore
dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 3-4.

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Residential Lease Agreement for a ten-year term beginning on
July 1, 2021, with an annual rent of $20,000, payable on the last
day of the year. Zhang's memorandum in opposition to the motion
did not deny the Lease's existence, but instead argued that Wu's
counterclaims were not compulsory and were duplicative of claims
Wu had asserted in the related Circuit Court case. On
January 27, 2023, the District Court entered an order denying
Wu's motion for leave to file a counterclaim, but did not state a
reason for the denial.
On March 9, 2023, Wu filed a motion for leave to file a
counterclaim against Zhang and Zhang's property manager, Honolulu
Management LLC (Second Motion to File Counterclaim). The
proposed counterclaim against Zhang again raised various claims
relating to the alleged breach of the Lease and other wrongful
conduct by Zhang. On April 4, 2023, the District Court entered
an order denying Wu's Second Motion to File Counterclaim, stating
that "[t]he rental agreement made the subject of the proposed
counterclaim, which purports to be for a ten (10) year term, is
invalid because it was not registered with the Land Court of the
State of Hawai#i as required by [HRS] § 501-121."6/ The court
ruled that "[Wu's] proposed counterclaim is therefore futile."
On April 5, 2023, Zhang filed the MSJ. She argued that
based on the Circuit Court's Partial Dismissal Order (see supra
note 5), and the District Court's ruling that the Lease was
invalid, she was entitled to possession of the Property. Wu
opposed the motion, arguing that: (1) genuine issues of material
fact regarding the existence and terms of the Lease precluded
summary judgment in Zhang's favor; (2) the District Court erred
in determining that the Lease was invalid; and (3) alternatively,
the MSJ hearing should be continued under DCRCP Rule 56(f).
Following hearings on April 21, 2023, and May 5, 2023,
the District Court granted the MSJ. After referring to the

6/
HRS § 501-121 (2018) provides:

Leases; registration required. Leases of registered
land for a term of one year or more shall be registered.

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requirements of HRS §§ 501-101 and -121, the court stated:

[W]ith regard to the motion for summary judgment that was
argued earlier filed by the Plaintiffs, and based upon the
statute and the cases, including City and County [of
Honolulu v. A.S.] Clarke, Inc., [60 Haw. 40, 587 P.2d 294
(1978),] the motion for summary judgment by the Plaintiff is
granted.
. . . I believe that the Defendant under the
applicable law, if they can prove that there is a valid
lease, may have a breach of contract claim, but not a claim
that took effect as a conveyance or that bound the land.

The court thus appeared to reason that HRS §§ 501-101 and -121
prevented the alleged unregistered Lease from conferring any
possessory interest in the Property to Wu.
On June 1, 2023, the District Court entered the Order
Granting MSJ, as well as an amended order denying Wu's Second
Motion to File Counterclaim. The amended order concluded that
"[t]he alleged rental agreement made the subject of the proposed
counterclaim which purports to be for a ten-year term shall not
be effective as a conveyance and does not bind the land because
it was not registered with the Land Court . . . as required by
[HRS] §§ 501-101 and 501-121."
On June 6, 2023, the District Court entered the
Judgment for Possession and the Writ of Possession. The next
day, Wu filed his notice of appeal.
On July 26, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation in
the District Court, which, among other things, stated that "under
threat of execution on the Writ of Possession, and on objection
by . . . Wu," Wu and his family had vacated the Property.

II. Standards of Review

A. Summary Judgment

"On appeal, the grant or denial of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo." Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai#i 46, 55, 292 P.3d
1276, 1285 (2013) (quoting First Ins. Co. of Hawai#i v. A & B
Props., Inc., 126 Hawai#i 406, 413, 271 P.3d 1165, 1172 (2012)).

B. Conclusions of Law

A district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de

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novo under the right/wrong standard. State v. Entrekin, 98
Hawai#i 221, 225, 47 P.3d 336, 340 (2002) (citing Child Support
Enf't Agency v. Roe, 96 Hawai#i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70 (2001)).

C. Interpretation of a Statute

"Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo." Barker v. Young, 153 Hawai#i 144, 148, 528
P.3d 217, 221 (2023) (quoting State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383,
390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177 (2009)).

III. Discussion

A. Wu's Appeal is Not Moot

We first address Zhang's argument that this appeal is
moot. She asserts that because Wu "voluntarily" vacated the
Property prior to execution of the Writ of Possession, any issues
relating to possession of the Property are now moot.7/
Under Hawai#i law, mootness is an issue of
justiciability. See State v. Hewitt, 153 Hawai#i 33, 42, 526
P.3d 558, 567 (2023). The mootness doctrine applies "where
events subsequent to the judgment of the trial court have so
affected the relations between the parties that the two
conditions for justiciability relevant on appeal — adverse
interest and effective remedy — have been compromised." Hamilton
ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Hawai#i 1, 5, 193 P.3d 839, 843
(2008) (quoting Lathrop v. Sakatani, 111 Hawai#i 307, 312-13, 141
P.3d 480, 485-86 (2006)). In short, "a case is moot if the
reviewing court can no longer grant effective relief."
Kaho#ohanohano v. State, 114 Hawai#i 302, 332, 162 P.3d 696, 726
(2007) (emphasis and brackets omitted) (quoting Kemp v. State of
Hawai#i Child Support Enf't Agency, 111 Hawai#i 367, 385, 141 P.3d
1014, 1032 (2006)).
In support of its mootness argument, Zhang relies on
this court's decision in Crown Properties, Inc. v. Fin. Sec. Life

7/
On January 12, 2024, Zhang filed a motion to dismiss this appeal
for mootness, which raised the same argument. On February 8, 2024, this court
entered an order that, among other things, denied the motion to dismiss.

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Ins. Co., 6 Haw. App. 105, 112, 712 P.2d 504, 509 (1985).
There, we stated that "[t]he termination of possession without
the execution of a writ of possession moots all questions about
the validity of the order authorizing the issuance of the writ of
possession and of the writ itself." Id. at 112, 712 P.2d at 509.
It appears, however, that the sublease at issue in Crown
Properties had expired before the sublessee's appeal was decided.
Id. at 106-07, 712 P.2d at 506. There was therefore no basis for
the sublessee to regain possession of the subleased property.
See Smith v. Tubal, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2014 WL 7369634, at *2
(Haw. App. Dec. 29, 2014) (SDO) (concluding that an appeal from a
judgment of possession was moot, in part because the appellant's
lease had terminated, and the appellant had not demonstrated a
basis to regain possession, even if the court vacated the
judgment for possession).
Here, in contrast, the alleged Lease does not expire
until July 2031. The validity of the Lease is therefore still a
"live" and justiciable issue, and it may still be possible to
award Wu effective relief. Because we decide below that the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Zhang, on
remand, Wu may seek to prove the existence of the alleged Lease
and to enforce its terms relating to possession of the Property.8/
Cf. Scholes v. Kiyoshi Kawaguchi, 142 Hawai#i 360, 364, 419 P.3d
1029, 1033 (App. 2017) (ruling that an appeal taken subsequent to
issuance of a writ of possession was not moot where the appellant
still had pending claims raising issues of title to the property
in a separate circuit court action).9/ Accordingly, this appeal
is not moot.

8/
Wu also argues that because the Writ of Possession was served and
"executed" by Zhang's process server on June 6, 2023, Wu never voluntarily
gave up possession of the Property. Given our disposition of the mootness
issue, we need not decide this alternative argument.
9/
We note that the claims currently pending in Wu's Circuit Court
case do not appear to raise the issue of title to the Property; rather, they
relate to the Lease and possession, as well as to the Joint Venture Agreement,
and include claims for specific performance of the Lease and the Joint Venture
Agreement. See Second Amended Verified Complaint, Wu v. Zhang, Civil No.
1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX, JIMS dkt. 236.

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B. The District Court Erred in Granting the MSJ

Wu contends that the District Court erred in granting
the MSJ based on a misreading of HRS §§ 501-101 and -121.
Specifically, Wu argues that the District Court erroneously ruled
that the alleged Lease of the Property was invalid and could not
confer any possessory interest in the Property to Wu because it
was not registered with the Land Court.
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has explained the purpose of
the Torrens Land Act as follows:

The legislature created the Land Court with the passage of
the Torrens Land Act (Act) in 1903, which is today codified
in HRS Chapter 501 as amended. 1903 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 56,
§ 2 at 279. The purpose of the system created by the Act
"is to conclusively establish title to land through the
issuance of a certificate of title." Aames Funding Corp. v.
Mores, 107 Hawai#i 95, 101, 110 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2005). The
holder of a certificate of title holds it "free from all
encumbrances except those noted on the certificate in the
order of priority of recordation" and other statutorily
enumerated encumbrances. HRS § 501-82(a) (Supp. 2016).
Thus, "a land court certificate of title is 'conclusive and
unimpeachable' with regard to 'all matters contained
therein,'" which is "the fundamental difference between a
certificate of title issued by the land court and a
recordation of title at the bureau of conveyances."

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya, 142 Hawai#i 439, 446-47, 420
P.3d 370, 377-78 (2018) (brackets omitted, emphasis added). The
court further stated, "[t]hus, in many instances the statutory
framework essentially renders the State as a guarantor of the
certificate of title issued by the Land Court." Id. at 449, 420
P.3d at 380.
HRS § 501-101, quoted supra, furthers the Act's purpose
of conclusively establishing title to real property by requiring,
subject to exceptions not relevant here, the registration of
instruments conveying an interest in Land Court property.10/ The
operative third and fourth sentences of this section state, in
relevant part:

10/
"Land Court property" refers to real property that has been
registered under the Land Court system established by the Torrens Land Act.
The Land Court system is one of two systems for recording title to real
property in Hawai#i, the other being the Bureau of Conveyances or "regular"
system. Omiya, 142 Hawai#i at 446, 452, 420 P.3d at 377, 383.

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No deed, mortgage, or other voluntary instrument, except a
will and a lease for a term not exceeding one year,
purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate
only as a contract between the parties, and as evidence of
authority to the registrar or assistant registrar to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land . . . .

HRS § 501-101 (emphasis added). The two exceptions to the
registration requirement, conveyances pursuant to a will, and
leases for terms not exceeding one year, are addressed in other
sections of the Land Court statute. See HRS §§ 501-171, 501-
82(5).
Wu does not dispute that the Property is Land Court
property and thus subject to the requirements of HRS Chapter 501.
Nor does he dispute that Zhang is the legal owner of the
Property. Under HRS § 501-121, a lease of "registered land for a
term of one year or more shall be registered" in Land Court. The
alleged Lease was not so registered. Under HRS § 501-101, any
voluntary instrument purporting to convey or affect Land Court
property shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
unless the instrument is properly registered with the office of
the Assistant Registrar. "The ordinary effect of a failure to
register a leasehold interest in Land Court property is that
every subsequent good faith purchaser who takes the certificate
of title for value holds the registered property free from the
unregistered leasehold interest." A.S. Clarke, 60 Haw. at 44-45,
587 P.2d 297 (citing HRS § 501-82 (1976)). However, the plain
language of HRS § 501-101 also mandates that an unregistered
instrument such as the alleged Lease "shall operate . . . as a
contract between the parties." The issue here is whether the
alleged Lease as between Zhang and Wu, if otherwise valid, could
have conferred a possessory interest in the Property to Wu via
contract, which affected Zhang's alleged right to possession.
No reported Hawai#i appellate decision appears to have
determined the nature or extent of the contractual rights
referenced in HRS § 501-101. In two cases discussing HRS § 501-
101, the supreme court has ruled that parties taking title to
Land Court property under registered certificates of title take
the property free from unregistered leases or conveyances of

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title. See A.S. Clarke, Inc., 60 Haw. at 44-47, 587 P.2d at 297-
99 (holding that a lessee under an unregistered long-term lease
was precluded from asserting any interest against the City and
County of Honolulu, which the court treated as a subsequent good-
faith purchaser under HRS § 501-82, in eminent domain
proceedings); Packaging Prods. Co. v. Teruya Bros., 58 Haw. 580,
584-85, 574 P.2d 524, 527-28 (1978) (holding that a good-faith
purchaser taking title to property under a deed recorded in Land
Court could not be divested of title by a prior unregistered bill
of sale conveying the same property).
In City and Cnty. of Honolulu v. F.E. Trotter, Inc., 70
Haw. 18, 757 P.2d 647 (1988), the lessee of a landfill under an
unregistered lease of Land Court property challenged the City's
eminent domain action against the property on the grounds that
the land was already being used for a public purpose, and the
City was required to show that its desired use of the condemned
land was for a superior public purpose. Id. at 20-21, 757 P.3d
at 649-50. The supreme court ruled that the lessee had "a
personal interest in the outcome" under the unrecorded lease
sufficient to give it standing to challenge the condemnation, but
did not otherwise discuss the nature or extent of that interest.
Id.
In construing HRS § 501-101, "our foremost obligation
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language
contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory
language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in
a manner consistent with its purpose." Lingle v. Hawai#i Gov't
Emps. Ass'n, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO, 107 Hawai#i 178, 183,
111 P.3d 587, 592 (2005) (quoting Guth v. Freeland, 96 Hawai#i
147, 150, 28 P.3d 982, 985 (2001)). The plain language of HRS
§ 501-101 makes clear that an unregistered instrument such as the
alleged Lease cannot effect a conveyance or bind the land, but
that it "shall operate . . . as a contract between the parties."
As stated in Omiya, "[t]he purpose of the system created by the
Act 'is to conclusively establish title to land through the
issuance of a certificate of title.'" 142 Hawai#i at 446-47, 420

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P.3d at 377-78. That purpose is served in these circumstances by
recognizing the Lease, if otherwise valid, as an enforceable
contract between Zhang and Wu, but not as an instrument that
binds the Property as to others.
The supreme court has instructed:

Leases are essentially contractual in nature and are
reviewed under principles of contract law. Cho Mark
Oriental Food v. K & K Int'l, 73 Haw. 509, 519, 836 P.2d
1057, 1063 (1992); Maui Land & Pineapple Co. v. Dillingham
Corp., 67 Haw. 4, 10, 674 P.2d 390, 394 (1984) (leases
should be analyzed under principles of contract law); Lau v.
Bautista, 61 Haw. 144, 149, 598 P.2d 161[,] 165 (197[9]) ("a
lease is essentially a contractual relationship"); Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969) (a lease
is "more importantly[ ] a contractual relationship").
"Absent an ambiguity, contract terms should be interpreted
according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in
common speech." Cho Mark, 73 Haw. at 520, 836 P.2d at 1064.
Moreover, the "construction and the legal effect to be given
a contract is a question of law freely reviewable by an
appellate court." Id. at 519, 836 P.2d at 1063.

Aickin v. Ocean View Invs. Co., 84 Hawai#i 447, 457, 935 P.2d
992, 1002 (1997) (quoting Hi Kai Inv., Ltd. v. Aloha Futons Beds
& Waterbeds, Inc., 84 Hawai#i 75, 78, 929 P.2d 88, 91 (1996)).
Here, the alleged Lease provides that Zhang leases the
Property to Wu for a 10-year term from July 1, 2021, with an
annual rent of $20,000, payable on the last day of the year.
Under the terms of the alleged Lease, "[b]oth parties agree . . .
[the Property] shall be used and occupied by [Wu] and [Wu's]
family, and other rentals or sublease purpose [sic]." The
alleged Lease thus appears to reflect Wu's contractual bargain
for possession of the Property during the 10-year term. In these
circumstances, we conclude that HRS §§ 501-101 and 501-21 did not
invalidate the alleged Lease as between Zhang and Wu as a matter
of law, merely because it was unregistered, or otherwise prevent
the alleged Lease from conferring any possessory interest in the
Property to Wu via contract.11/ A contrary conclusion would

11/
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
construing that state's analogous Torrens statute in an unlawful detainer
action. See Cook v. Luettich, 252 N.W. 649 (Minn. 1934). There, the
plaintiff Cook received a quitclaim deed for the subject property from the
defendant Luettich, and on the same date leased the property back to Luettich
for a term of eleven and one-half months. After the lease term expired,
Luettich remained on the premises, resulting in Cook's unlawful detainer
(continued...)

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appear to allow any landlord who leases Land Court property to a
tenant for a term of more than one year, where the lease is not
registered, to unilaterally terminate the tenancy and evict the
tenant. Such a result would fly in the face of HRS §§ 501-101,
which expressly protects the contractual rights of the parties to
such a lease.
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred
in granting the MSJ based on its determination that the alleged
Lease of the Property could not confer any possessory interest in
the Property to Wu as a matter of law, because it was not
registered with the Land Court. Our conclusion also disposes of
Wu's second contention – that summary judgment should not have
been granted because there remained genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the alleged Lease was valid. The District
Court never considered whether the alleged Lease was otherwise
valid because it determined that the Lease could not confer a
possessory interest to Wu as a matter of law pursuant to HRS §§

11/
(...continued)
action. In defending against the suit, Luettich relied on a Minnesota statute
similar to HRS § 501-101, which stated that unregistered deeds shall not take
effect as conveyances. Luettich argued that because Cook did not have
registered title to the property, she could not sue for possession.

The court rejected Luettich's argument, stating:

The claim is without merit. It is based on section 8293,
Mason's Minn. St. 1927, which reads as follows: 'An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or
otherwise deal with the same as fully as if it had not been
registered. He may use any form of deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument sufficient in law for the purpose
intended. No voluntary instrument of conveyance purporting
to convey or affect registered land, except a will, and a
lease for a term not exceeding three years, shall take
effect as a conveyance, or bind or affect the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the parties, and as
authority to the registrar to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the land.'

252 N.W. at 649 (emphasis added). The court affirmed the lower court's
judgment placing the plaintiff in possession of the property pursuant to the
unregistered deed, stating, "[u]nder that provision, although the unregistered
quitclaim deed did not affect the title nor create any interest in the
premises, it did operate as a contract between the parties." Id. See also
Hacken v. Isenberg, 124 N.E. 306, 311 (Ill. 1919) (construing the Illinois
Torrens Act and concluding that an unregistered lien operated as a contract
and was enforceable between the parties to the lien, but not "as against
subsequent purchasers, creditors, etc." until it was registered under the
Act).

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501-101 and -121.
Given our disposition, we need not reach Wu's remaining
contentions.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the District
Court's: (1) June 1, 2023 "Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Filed April 5, 2023"; (2) June 6, 2023 Judgment
for Possession; and (3) June 6, 2023 Writ of Possession. The
case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.

On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Presiding Judge
Stephanie E.W. Thompson
(Starn O'Toole Marcus & Fisher)
for Defendant-Appellant /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
Yuriko J. Sugimura,
Scott I. Batterman,
Matthew H. Murakami /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
(Clay Iwamura Pulice & Nervell) Associate Judge
and
John P. Manaut,
Kai Wang, and
Steven M. Egesdal
(Carlsmith Ball LLP)
for Plaintiff-Appellee

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