State v. Juanta

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
26-AUG-2025
08:01 AM
Dkt. 103 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DENNIS DAVID MURALLES JUANTA, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, and Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Dennis David Muralles Juanta
(Juanta) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Probation
Sentence (Judgment) entered on July 11, 2022, in the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit.1/ Following a jury trial, Juanta was
convicted of Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree (TT1),
in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-716(1)(e).2/

1/
The Honorable Paul B.K. Wong presided.
2/
HRS § 707-716 (2014) provides in relevant part:

(1) A person commits the offense of terroristic
threatening in the first degree if the person commits
terroristic threatening:
. . . .

(e) With the use of a dangerous instrument
. . . .
HRS § 707-715 (2014) states, in relevant part:
Terroristic threatening, defined. A person
commits the offense of terroristic threatening if the
person threatens, by word or conduct, to cause bodily
injury to another person . . . :
(continued...)
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On appeal, Juanta contends that the Judgment should be
vacated because: (1) the deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA)
committed misconduct in closing and rebuttal arguments; and (2)
the Circuit Court's jury instructions were plainly erroneous as
to TT1 and the proper application of HRS § 703-310(1), quoted
infra.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Juanta's contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) At trial, Juanta asserted that his actions against
complainant Tanea Teixeira-Vierra (Tanea) were justified in
defense of property under HRS § 703-306.3/ On appeal, Juanta

2/
(...continued)
(1) With the intent to terrorize, or in
reckless disregard of the risk of
terrorizing, another person[.]
3/
HRS § 703-306 (2014) states, in relevant part:

Use of force for the protection of property. (1) The
use of force upon or toward the person of another is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary:

(a) To prevent the commission of criminal trespass
or burglary in a building or upon real property
in the actor's possession or in the possession
of another person for whose protection the actor
acts;

(b) To prevent unlawful entry upon real property in
the actor's possession or in the possession of
another person for whose protection the actor
acts . . . .
. . . .

(2) The actor may in the circumstances specified in
subsection (1) use such force as the actor believes is
necessary to protect the threatened property, provided that
the actor first requests the person against whom force is
used to desist from the person's interference with the
property, unless the actor believes that:

(a) Such a request would be useless;
(b) It would be dangerous to the actor or another
person to make the request; or
(c) Substantial harm would be done to the physical
condition of the property which is sought to be
protected before the request could effectively
be made.

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contends that the DPA committed four acts of misconduct in his
closing and rebuttal arguments related to this justification.
Specifically, Juanta contends that the DPA improperly argued that
Juanta's defense-of-property justification was inapplicable
because: (a) Tanea's trespass was irrelevant; (b) Tanea was a
family member of Juanta; and (c) Juanta did not first attempt
non-violent alternatives before using force. Juanta also
contends that the DPA "misled the jury by mixing deadly versus
non-deadly force analysis[.]"
Although Juanta did not object during trial to any of
the challenged statements, in prosecutorial misconduct cases,
"there is no difference between the plain error and harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt standards of review." State v. Hirata,
152 Hawai#i 27, 31, 520 P.3d 225, 229 (2022) (citing State v.
Riveira, 149 Hawai#i 427, 431 n.10, 494 P.3d 1160, 1164 n.10
(2021)). "[O]nce the defense establishes misconduct — objection
or no objection — appellate review is the same: 'After
considering the nature of the prosecuting attorney's conduct,
promptness or lack of a curative instruction, and strength or
weakness of the evidence against the defendant, a reviewing court
will vacate a conviction if there is a reasonable possibility
that the conduct might have affected the trial's outcome.'" Id.
(quoting Riveira, 149 Hawai#i at 431, 494 P.3d at 1164).
We address each of the challenged statements below.

(a) DPA's argument that Tanea's trespass was
irrelevant

In his rebuttal argument, the DPA stated in part:

The big issue really seems to be defense of property. Did
the defendant -- was the defendant justified in using force?
Now, the State agrees with the Defense. This is not
deadly force. He never fired the shotgun at her. So it
doesn't meet that definition of deadly force. It was,
however, force. And it was unjustified because it was not
immediately necessary.
Doesn't matter if Tanea committed trespass or not. It
matters whether or not the force was immediately necessary.
And it wasn't, because this is Tanea. This is, again, not a
burglar rifling through things. This is a stepdaughter.
When she -- when the defendant realized it was Tanea, he
said that there was a bit of a relief. Why didn't he put
the shotgun down at that point?

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Juanta argues that the DPA's statement, "Doesn't matter
if Tanea committed trespass or not[,]" misstated the law because
the alleged trespass "was essential to the justifiability of
[Juanta's] use of non-deadly force to eject the trespasser."
In context, the DPA's statement was not improper. The
DPA did not state that the alleged trespass was not an essential
element of Juanta's defense-of-property justification. He simply
drew the jury's attention to the parties' primary dispute —
whether the force used by Juanta was "immediately necessary."
HRS § 703-306. If the State proved that Juanta's use of force
was not immediately necessary, his justification would fail on
that basis alone, regardless of the alleged trespass.

(b) DPA's argument that Tanea was a family member

In his closing argument, the DPA stated in part:

But this case does not involve a legitimate or legal
defense of property. The defense of property means the use
of force is justified if the defendant reasonably believes
that such force is immediately necessary. Firing your
weapon to shake your five-month pregnant, 20 year-old
stepdaughter, whose mom is right behind you, your one year-
old is in the children's room next to Tanea, immediately
necessary?

. . . .

But it's not about what the defendant thought. It's
what a reasonable person would think. You decide what a
reasonable person would think. Would a reasonable person,
who's trying to get Tanea out of the RV, use a shotgun? No.
That's ridiculous.

If the situation were a homeless burglar, rifling
through your things, through the kitchen cupboards, and
there's no time to call 911, or wait for the police to
arrive, then fire away. A reasonable person would agree you
can fire the shotgun in an effort to scare away the burglar.
But this wasn't a burglar. This was Tanea. His
stepdaughter comes by all the time, to help around the
house, play with her siblings, help her mom with whatever
she needs help with.

In his rebuttal, the DPA again referred to Tanea as Juanta's
"stepdaughter." See supra.
Juanta argues that the DPA's statements "essentially
assert[] that defense of property was inapplicable to [Juanta]
because the trespasser was his pregnant stepdaughter" rather than
a stranger.

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That is not our read of the challenged statements. The
DPA did not state or imply that Juanta's defense-of-property
justification could not apply to a family member. Rather, the
DPA drew attention to evidence of Tanea's pregnancy4/ and relation
to Juanta, as they were arguably factors in deciding whether he
reasonably believed his use of force was immediately necessary
under the circumstances. See State v. Augustin, 101 Hawai#i 127,
128, 63 P.3d 1097, 1098 (2002) ("With respect to the use-of-force
defenses, the defendant's belief must be 'reasonable,' see HRS
§ 703–300 (1993) . . . ."). The challenged statements were not
improper.

(c) DPA's argument that Juanta did not first attempt
non-violent alternatives before using force

In his closing argument, the DPA stated in part:

If the defendant really wanted Tanea out of the home, he
could have taken different steps, nonviolent steps. Maybe
get mom involved earlier. Apparently that worked when
Tanya[, Tanea's mother,] came in and said leave. Or call
the police, and wait. But the defendant did neither of
those two things. There were nonviolent alternatives.

But the defendant chose to terrorize her with a
firearm instead. That wasn't immediately necessary. And
because it wasn't immediately necessary, the defendant was
not justified in using force to defend property.

Juanta argues that the DPA's statements misstated the
law and the jury instructions because the defense-of-property
justification does not require a defendant to employ non-violent
alternatives before using non-deadly force.
In context, the DPA's statements were not improper.
The DPA did not state that the law or the jury instructions
required that Juanta employ non-violent alternatives before using
non-deadly force to protect property. Rather, the DPA was
arguing that a reasonable person in Juanta's circumstances, i.e.,
confronting his stepdaughter who stopped by "all the time[,]"
would not have believed it was immediately necessary to fire a
shotgun when there were other non-violent steps (other than
telling her to get out) he might have taken to get her to leave.

4/
Juanta testified that he knew Tanea was pregnant the morning of
the incident.

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This was permissible argument by the DPA.

(d) DPA's mixing of deadly and non-deadly force
analyses

Juanta contends that the DPA's argument regarding a
hypothetical "homeless burglar," quoted above in subsection (b),
mixed deadly and non-deadly force analyses. Juanta characterizes
the DPA's argument as follows: "[T]he [DPA] argued that [Juanta]
would have been entitled to use deadly force by firing his
shotgun to defend his property if the intruder were a 'homeless
burglar' but contended that he was not entitled to use non-deadly
force to defend against his pregnant stepdaughter's adamant
refusals to leave."
This is not an accurate characterization. Juanta
argued that firing his shotgun was justified in defense of
property, and both the State and Juanta agreed and argued to the
jury that because he did not fire at Tanea, this constituted non-
deadly force. In arguing that Juanta could not have reasonably
believed this use of force was immediately necessary, the DPA
contrasted Tanea's presence in the RV with that of a hypothetical
burglar. The DPA did not argue that a reasonable person could or
should use deadly force to protect property from a burglar.
Rather, he argued that a reasonable person could, if "there's no
time to call 911, or wait for the police to arrive," "fire the
shotgun in an effort to scare away the burglar." (Emphasis
added.) The DPA was not "mixing deadly versus non-deadly force
analyses." This was permissible argument.
(2) Juanta contends that the Circuit Court's jury
instructions were plainly erroneous: "(a) as to TT1 because they
failed to require jury unanimity as to whether [Juanta] acted
intentionally or recklessly in purportedly committing the
[terroristic threatening]; and (b) as to the proper application
of HRS § 703-310(1)."
"When jury instructions or the omission thereof are at
issue on appeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and
considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially
insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading." State v.
Nichols, 111 Hawai#i 327, 334, 141 P.3d 974, 981 (2006) (quoting

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State v. Gonsalves, 108 Hawai#i 289, 292, 119 P.3d 597, 600
(2005)).
Juanta makes no argument regarding the jury unanimity
issue. That point is waived.5/ See Hawai#i Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 28(b)(7). Rather, Juanta argues that the proper
application of HRS § 703-310(1) to his defense-of-property
justification "required the jury to specify whether they found
[Juanta] guilty of TT1 by intentional or reckless conduct."
Juanta's justification, premised on HRS § 703-306, is
subject to the following limitation stated in HRS § 703-310(1)
(2014):

When the actor believes that the use of force upon or
toward the person of another is necessary for any of the
purposes for which such belief would establish a
justification under sections 703-303 to 703-309 but the
actor is reckless or negligent in having such belief or in
acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief
which is material to the justifiability of the actor's use
of force, the justification afforded by those sections is
unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to
establish culpability.

(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Nupeiset, 90 Hawai#i 175, 977 P.2d 183
(App. 1999), this court summarized the above limitation on
justification, as follows:

HRS § 703–310(1) is couched in terms precluding the use of
force defense where the actor is reckless or negligent in
his belief that force is necessary or in acquiring that
belief or knowledge. In such a case, "the actor does not
have a defense of justification for any crime as to which
recklessness or negligence suffices to establish
culpability."

Id. at 186, 977 P.2d at 194 (emphasis added) (quoting Commentary
on HRS § 703–310). "Suffice" in this context means "to be enough
or adequate for; satisfy." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged
Dictionary 1901 (1996 ed.).

5/
In any event, the jury instruction for TT1 properly set forth the
alternative states of mind prescribed in HRS § 707-715, i.e., that Juanta
acted "with the intent to terrorize or in reckless disregard of the risk of
terrorizing Tanea . . . ." See State v. Shinyama, 101 Hawai #i 389, 399, 69
P.3d 517, 527 (2003) (recognizing "the general principle that juries need not
agree on alternative means of establishing the mental state component
possessed by the defendant" (quoting State v. Klinge, 92 Hawai #i 577, 588, 994
P.2d 509, 520 (2000))).

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Recklessness suffices to establish culpability for the
TT1 offense, i.e., a person commits TT1 if they perform the
required act "[w]ith the intent to terrorize, or in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing, another person[.]" HRS
§ 707-715 (emphasis added). Because recklessness is enough to
establish culpability for the TT1 offense, the limitation stated
in HRS § 703-310(1), based on its plain and unambiguous meaning,
applies with equal force to the TT1 offense, whether it is based
on an intentional or reckless act. Thus, HRS § 703–310 precludes
the use of force defense as against TT1 where the actor is
reckless or negligent in their belief that force is necessary or
in acquiring that belief or knowledge.
Consistent with the language of HRS § 703–310(1) and
modeled on HAWJIC 7.18A, the Circuit Court instructed the jury on
the use of force, in relevant part, as follows:

The use of force upon or toward another person in
defense of property is not available for any offense in
which the requisite state of mind is either recklessness or
negligence if the prosecution proves:
(1) The defendant was reckless in believing that he
was justified in using deadly force or force in defense of
property; or
(2) The defendant was reckless in acquiring or failing
to acquire any knowledge or belief which was material to the
justifiability of his use of deadly force or force in
defense of property.

There is no dispute here that Juanta's defense-of-
property justification was subject to the provisions of HRS
§ 703-310(1). Juanta argues, however, that the above instruction
was erroneous or misleading because,

[o]nly if the jury concluded that [Juanta] committed the TT1
with a reckless state of mind AND was reckless in believing
he was justified in using force to eject the trespasser
would the defense-of-property justification be unavailable.
If the jury found that he intentionally committed the TT1,
but was reckless in believing he was justified in using
force to eject the trespasser, then the defense-of-property
justification was available to him and should have absolved
him of guilt. Also, if the jury found that he recklessly
committed the TT1, but found that he intentionally or
knowingly believed he was justified in using force to eject
the trespasser, the justification likewise should have
absolved him of guilt.

This counterintuitive construction of HRS § 703-310(1)
would mean that the defense-of-property justification would be:

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(a) available to a defendant who acts with the intent to
terrorize but not to one who acts only recklessly or negligently;
or (b) available to a defendant who is intentionally or knowingly
wrong in their belief that force is necessary (i.e., knows that
force is unnecessary) but not to a defendant who is only reckless
or negligent in their belief. Juanta's argument finds no support
in the plain language of HRS § 703-310(1), whose limitation
applies to any offense for which recklessness or negligence
suffices to establish culpability. See supra.
On this record, we cannot conclude that "when read and
considered as a whole," the instructions given in relation to
Juanta's defense-of-property justification were "prejudicially
insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading." Nichols,
111 Hawai#i at 334, 141 P.3d at 981 (quoting Gonsalves, 108
Hawai#i at 292, 119 P.3d at 600).
For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment of
Conviction and Probation Sentence, entered on July 11, 2022, in
the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, August 26, 2025.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Phyllis J. Hironaka, Presiding Judge
Deputy Public Defender
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Benjamin Rose, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge

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