Mato v. Kurita

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
22-AUG-2024
08:54 AM
Dkt. 62 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

KADE KURITA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
ANITA MATO, Plaintiff-Apellant,
v.
TYLER R. KURITA AND JEANNE KURITA,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 1CC181000724)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, and Wadsworth, J.,
and Guidry, J., dissenting)

Plaintiff-Appellant Anita Mato (Anita) appeals from the
"Amended Final Judgment" (Amended Judgment), entered in favor of
Defendants-Appellees Tyler R. Kurita (Tyler) and Jeanne Kurita
(Jeanne) on March 12, 2021, in the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit (Circuit Court).1/ Anita also challenges the Circuit
Court's May 29, 2020 "Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
. . . [Tyler's] Motion for Summary Judgment To Entirely Dismiss
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint Filed on August 27, 2018[,]

1/
The Honorable John M. Tonaki presided. Anita's notice of appeal,
filed on August 30, 2020, appealed from the "Final Judgment" entered on
August 12, 2020. On temporary remand from this court, the Circuit Court
entered the Amended Judgment, which is final and appealable pursuant to
Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 58. We construe Anita's appeal as an
appeal from the Amended Judgment. See Hawai #i Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4(a)(2).
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Filed on January 17, 2020."
Anita and her son Kade Kurita (Kade) filed suit against
Tyler, alleging fraud and misuse of funds in connection with
trust accounts established for the benefit of Kade and his sister
Kyra Kurita (Kyra, and together, the Children).2/ Kade and Kyra
were the adult children of Anita and Tyler. Kyra was not a party
to the lawsuit. Tyler filed a motion for summary judgment on
June 27, 2019 (First MSJ), which was heard and orally denied by
the Circuit Court on August 28, 2019.3/ Kade died in October
2019. Tyler filed a second motion for summary judgment on
January 17, 2020 (Second MSJ), which the Circuit Court granted as
to Anita's claims and denied as to Kade's claims.4/
Anita raises a single point of error on appeal,
contending that the Circuit Court erred in granting summary
judgment against her on the basis that she lacks standing to
pursue the claims asserted in the First Amended Complaint. We
review the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment, including
the issue of standing, de novo. See Tax Foundation of Haw. v.
State, 144 Hawai#i 175, 185, 439 P.3d 127, 138 (2019). "In
general, standing is a prudential concern regarding whether the
party seeking a forum has alleged a sufficient personal stake in
the outcome of a controversy as to justify the exercise of the
court's remedial powers on the party's behalf." Id. at 188, 439
P.3d at 140.
Upon careful review of the record and relevant legal
authorities, and having given due consideration to the arguments
advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we resolve Anita's
point of error as follows.
Anita contends that she has standing to assert her
"personal claims" for fraud against Tyler, and that she also
should be permitted to assert the claims of Kade and Kyra,

2/
Tyler's mother, Jeanne Kurita, was also named as a defendant, but
was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties in August 2019.
3/
The Honorable James S. Kawashima presided.
4/
The Circuit Court declined to dismiss Kade's claims in order to
allow for a substitution of party pursuant to Hawai #i Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 25. The parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss Kade's claims without
prejudice. Kade's claims are not at issue in this appeal.

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notwithstanding Kade's death, "as the representative of her
children."
A claim for fraud,

as for other torts, requires proof of duty, breach of duty,
causation, and damages. Specifically, to establish a fraud
claim based on a failure to disclose a material fact, there
must be (1) a representation of a material fact, (2) made
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, (3)
known to be false but reasonably believed true by the other
party, and (4) upon which the other party relies and acts to
his or her damage.

Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 116
Hawai#i 277, 298, 172 P.3d 1021, 1042 (2007) (citations omitted;
format altered) (quoting Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Co., 102 Hawai#i 149, 162, 73 P.3d 687, 700 (2003)).
Here, Anita asserted fraud-based claims on her own
behalf, as well as on behalf of the Children – claims that are
related in part to a prior paternity matter involving the
Children. In 2000, Anita and Tyler separated, and the family
court entered a judgment, in which Tyler was ordered to pay
$1,500 per child each month in child support. It appears that in
2001, Tyler filed a request in the family court seeking a
reduction in his child support obligations, based on his
representations that his income had decreased and that he had
"recently deposited $320,000.00 into irrevocable trusts for his
two children." Prior to filing the request, Tyler opened a trust
account, "The Children of Kurita Trust" (the Trust), that named
his "children bearing the surname 'Kurita'" as beneficiaries.
(Capitalization altered.) It appears that Tyler's request was
granted and his obligation was reduced from $1,500 to $450 per
child by the family court.
In opposing the Second MSJ, Anita submitted her own
declaration and attached exhibits supporting the claims in the
First Amended Complaint. She alleged that in August 2001, Tyler
represented to her that he had placed over $320,000 into an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of Kade and Kyra, and based on
Tyler's representations, Anita agreed to the reduction in child
support that Tyler was requesting and the family court later
ordered. Anita further alleged that after Tyler deposited

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$320,000 into the trust account, he wrongfully withdrew and
appropriated the funds. Anita asserted that she did not learn of
the alleged fraud until May 2018, after Kade and Kyra had reached
adulthood and needed funds for college. She further asserted
that she and the Children suffered damages as a result of Tyler's
fraud.
We conclude that Anita raised at least a genuine issue
of material fact that she suffered a legally cognizable injury
sufficient for standing to bring her fraud-based claims on her
own behalf against Tyler. Tyler argues that because Anita was
not a beneficiary of the Trust and would not be able to prove
that she suffered damages individually, she lacks standing to
bring the asserted claims. Anita asserted in her declaration,
however, that she agreed to the reduction in child support based
on Tyler's representations about the Trust, would have asked for
more child support had those representations not been made, and
as a result, had to "scrimp and save to provide for the
[C]hildren for years." Based on the calculations in her
declaration, Anita maintains that her reliance on Tyler's
representations "cost her thousands of dollars over the years."
Anita thus presented sufficient evidence at the summary judgment
stage to support her standing to raise claims on her own behalf,
regardless of whether she is ultimately able to prove her damages
by clear and convincing evidence. The Circuit Court erred in
concluding otherwise.
We reject, however, Anita's contention that she should
be permitted to assert the claims of Kade and Kyra, as their
representative, under a third-party standing theory. Litigants
have a right to bring actions on behalf of third-parties if the
following "three important criteria" are met:

(1) the litigant has suffered an injury in fact, thus giving
him or her a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome
of the issue in dispute, (2) the litigant has a close
relationship to the third party, and (3) there is some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her
own interests.

In re AS, 130 Hawai#i 486, 513, 312 P.3d 1193, 1220 (App. 2013)
(citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).

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Here, Anita did not establish that "there is some
hindrance" to Kade and Kyra's "ability to protect [their] own
interests." Id. Although Kade is deceased, his claims were
dismissed without prejudice, and Anita did not show that the
legal representative of his estate is not able to protect its
interests, or that she is the legal representative of his estate.
See HRS § 663-7; supra note 4. Similarly, Anita did not show
that Kyra is unable to protect her own interests. On this
record, Anita did not raise a genuine issue of material fact so
as to meet the test for third-party standing.5/
Finally, Anita contends that under the law-of-the-case
doctrine, Judge Kawashima's denial of the First MSJ "should not
have been disturbed." Anita argues that the Second MSJ repeated
the standing argument already made in the First MSJ, which Judge
Kawashima had rejected.
In ruling on the Second MSJ, the Circuit Court
considered Judge Kawashima's prior ruling and found that Kade's
death constituted a material change in circumstance – i.e., a
"cogent reason" or exceptional circumstance that warranted
revisiting Judge Kawashima's denial of the First MSJ. See Title
Guaranty Escrow Servs., Inc. v. Wailea Resort Co., 146 Hawai#i
34, 45, 456 P.3d 107, 118 (2019). The record further reflects
that Judge Kawashima's prior oral ruling was not reduced to a
written order, and the transcript of the August 28, 2019 hearing,
at which Judge Kawashima announced that oral ruling, is not part
of the record. The available circuit court minutes of that
hearing provide only that "[the] Court denied Defendants Tyler
Kurita's and Jeanne Kurita's Motion for Summary Judgment," and do
not explain the rationale underlying Judge Kawashima's ruling.
On this record, we cannot conclude that the Circuit Court abused
its discretion in determining that the law of the case doctrine

5/
Anita also argues that she should be able to enforce Tyler's
assurances regarding the funding of the Trust under the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 305. That section provides: "Where specific performance is
otherwise an appropriate remedy, either the promisee or the beneficiary may
maintain a suit for specific enforcement of a duty owed to an intended
beneficiary." However, the First Amended Complaint did not seek specific
performance of such a duty, and Anita's declaration described a claim for
fraud-based damages.

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did not preclude it from revisiting Judge Kawashima's denial of
the First MSJ.
For the reasons discussed above, the Amended Final
Judgment, entered on March 12, 2021, in the Circuit Court of the
First Circuit, is vacated to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff-
Appellant Anita Mato's claims asserted on her own behalf, and
affirmed in all other respects. The case is remanded to the
Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this
Summary Disposition Order.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, August 22, 2024.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
John Rapp Acting Chief Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Blake T. Okimoto /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Defendant-Appellee. Associate Judge

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY GUIDRY, J.
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion "in determining that
the law of the case doctrine did not preclude it from revisiting
Judge Kawashima's denial of the First MSJ." I further concur
with the majority's rejection of "Anita's contention that she
should be permitted to assert the claims of Kade and Kyra, as
their representative, under a third-party standing theory." I
respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion
that "Anita raised at least a genuine issue of material fact
that she suffered a legally cognizable injury sufficient for
standing to bring her fraud-based claims on her own behalf
against Tyler."
I would conclude, on this record, that the circuit
court did not err in granting summary judgment against Mato with
regard to her fraud-based claims. "In general, standing is a
prudential concern regarding whether the party seeking a forum
has alleged a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy as to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers on the party's behalf." Tax Found. of Hawai‘i v. State,
144 Hawai‘i 175, 188, 439 P.3d 127, 140 (2019).
A claim for fraud,
as for other torts, requires proof of duty, breach of duty,
causation, and damages. Specifically, to establish a fraud
claim based on a failure to disclose a material fact, there
must be (1) a representation of a material fact, (2) made
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act, (3)
known to be false but reasonably believed true by the other
party, and (4) upon which the other party relies and acts
to his or her damage.

Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
116 Hawai‘i 277, 298, 172 P.3d 1021, 1042 (2007) (cleaned up).
In order to maintain a claim for relief grounded in
fraud, "the plaintiff must have suffered substantial actual
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damage, not nominal or speculative."1 Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter
Dodge, Inc., 98 Hawaiʻi 309, 320, 47 P.3d 1222, 1233 (2002)
(citation omitted, emphasis in original). The measure of
pecuniary damages to plaintiff is generally confined to either
"out-of-pocket" loss or the "benefit of the bargain." Id.
"[T]he Hawaiʻi appellate courts have continually held that the
desired remedy in fraud cases is to restore the victim to the
position he would have occupied but for the misrepresentation."
Exotics Hawaii-Kona, 116 Hawaiʻi at 291, 172 P.3d at 1035
(cleaned up).
The summary judgment record reflects that Kurita
satisfied his initial burden of production, through his
declaration and exhibits, that Mato had no personal claim to or
personal stake in the Trust moneys, such that she herself
suffered a pecuniary loss.2 Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawaiʻi 46, 60,
292 P.3d 1276, 1290 (2013) ("a summary judgment movant may
satisfy his or her initial burden of production by either (1)
presenting evidence negating an element of the non-movant's
claim, or (2) demonstrating that the nonmovant will be unable to
carry his or her burden of proof at trial").

1 Because a plaintiff is not entitled to recover nominal damages on
a fraud claim, punitive damages must be supported by an award of compensatory
damages. Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 149 Hawaiʻi 457, 465, 494
P.3d 1190, 1198 (2021) ("punitive damages generally must be supported by an
award of nominal or compensatory damages").

2 Mato's alleged injury was the reduction in Kurita's child support
from the original $1,500 a month per child, to $450 a month per child. Child
support is for the benefit of the children, and not for the personal benefit
of the parent to whom the child support payments are remitted. See, e.g.,
HRS § 576D-3 (2018) (setting forth CSEA's authority to "undertake any legal
or administrative action to secure support for a child"); United States v.
Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011) ("As a general rule, a parent's
obligation to pay child support runs to the child, rather than to the other
parent, and the parent, to whom such support is paid, is but a mere conduit
for the disbursement of that support.") (cleaned up).

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The burden then shifted to Mato, and, in my view, Mato
did not meet her burden of establishing that there is a genuine
question of material fact for trial. Id. at 56-57, 292 P.3d at
1286-87 ("Only when the moving party satisfies its initial
burden of production does the burden shift to the nonmoving
party to respond to the motion for summary judgment and
demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general allegations,
that present a genuine issue worthy of trial.") (citation
omitted). Although Mato contends that she "would have asked for
more child support" from Kurita, were it not for Kurita's
allegedly "fraudulent" representation that he was establishing
the irrevocable trust for Kade and Kyra, any additional child
support moneys would have been for Kade and Kyra's benefit,
rather than for Mato's personal benefit.
For the foregoing reasons, I would respectfully affirm
the circuit court's Amended Judgment.
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

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