Wilson v. Garland et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHRISTOPHER JAMES WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CIVIL NO. 2:25-CV-01
(KLEEH)
PAMELA BONDI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On January 3, 2025, the pro se Plaintiff, Christopher Wilson
(“Plaintiff”), filed a complaint against numerous defendants. 	See
ECF 	No. 	1. 	Pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	636 	and 	the 	local 	rules, 	the
Court referred the action to United States Magistrate Judge Michael
J. Aloi (the “Magistrate Judge”) for initial review. 	See ECF No.
5. 	Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	amended 	complaint 	and 	a 	second 	amended
complaint. 	See ECF Nos. 24, 47. 	He brings discrimination claims
against 	Defendant 	Pamela 	Bondi 	(“Defendant”), 	in 	her 	official
capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, relating to
his 	employment 	with 	the 	Bureau 	of 	Prisons 	(“BOP”). 1 	On 	May 	7,
2025, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	See 	ECF 	Nos. 	49, 	50.
On 	August 	19, 	2025, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	entered 	a 	Report 	and
1 Plaintiff states that he has consolidated his claims against the “head of the
Department as the proper defendant.” 	Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, at ¶ 5.
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
2
Recommendation 	(“R&R”) 	recommending 	that 	the 	Court 	grant 	the
motion to dismiss and dismiss the second amended complaint without
prejudice. 	See ECF No. 63.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 	is 	a 	white 	male 	who 	has 	been 	employed 	by 	the 	BOP
since 	2008. 	See 	Second 	Am. 	Compl., 	ECF 	No. 	47, 	at 	¶ 	3. 	In 	the
second 	amended 	complaint, 	he 	alleges 	that 	he 	experienced
discrimination, 	retaliation, 	and 	a 	hostile 	work 	environment.
Specifically, 	he 	alleges 	that 	he 	applied 	for 	five 	supervisory
positions 	at 	FCI 	Gilmer 	and 	FCI 	Morgantown 	and 	that 	he 	was 	not
selected 	for 	them, 	despite 	his 	superior 	qualifications 	and
extensive 	BOP 	experience. 	See 	id. 	¶¶ 	6–9. 	Plaintiff 	lists 	the
positions:
(1) 	Recreation 	Supervisor 	– 	Vacancy
Announcement MXR-2022-0282 at FCI Gilmer
(“Position #1);
(2) 	Recreation 	Supervisor 	– 	Vacancy
Announcement MXR-2023-0158 at FCI Gilmer
(“Position #2);
(3) 	Recreation 	Supervisor 	– 	Vacancy
Announcement 	MXR-2023-0065 	at 	FCI
Morgantown (“Position #3);
(4) 	Correctional 	Counselor 	– 	Vacancy
Announcement 	GIL-2023-0026 	(“Position
#4”); and
(5) 	Correctional 	Counselor 	– 	Vacancy
Announcement GIL-2023-0055 at FCI Gilmer
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3
(“Position #5”).
Id. 	at 	¶ 	8. 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	“Diversity, 	Equity, 	and
Inclusion” 	policies 	at 	the 	BOP 	“unduly 	influenced 	promotion
decisions.” 	See id. ¶¶ 10, 14.
II. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND OBJECTIONS
The R&R informed the parties that they had fourteen (14) days
from 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	the 	R&R 	to 	file 	“specific 	written
objections 	identifying 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis for such
objection.” 	R&R, ECF No. 63, at 13. 	It further warned them that
the 	“[f]ailure 	to 	timely 	file 	written 	objections . . . shall
constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a
waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.” 	Id.
When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court must review
de 	novo 	only 	the 	portions 	to 	which 	an 	objection 	has 	been 	timely
made. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 	Otherwise, “the Court may adopt,
without 	explanation, 	any 	of 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendations” to which there are no objections. 	Dellarcirprete
v. Gutierrez, 479 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603–04 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (citing
Camby 	v. 	Davis, 	718 	F.2d 	198, 	199 	(4th 	Cir. 	1983)). 	Courts 	will
uphold portions of a recommendation to which no objection has been
made 	unless 	they 	are 	clearly 	erroneous. 	See 	Diamond 	v. 	Colonial
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
4
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff 	has 	filed 	numerous 	documents 	since 	the 	R&R 	was
entered. 	Out 	of 	an 	abundance 	of 	caution, 	the 	Court 	will 	conduct
a de novo review of the R&R.
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Count One – Racial Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)
Title 	VII 	of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964 	prohibits
“discriminat[ion] 	against 	any 	individual 	with 	respect 	to 	his
compensation, 	terms, 	conditions, 	or 	privileges 	of 	employment,
because 	of 	such 	individual’s 	race . . . .” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e-
2(a)(1). 	To state a prima facie case of racial discrimination by
disparate treatment, a plaintiff must establish “(1) membership in
a 	protected 	class; 	(2) 	satisfactory 	job 	performance; 	(3) 	adverse
employment 	action; 	and 	(4) 	different 	treatment 	from 	similarly
situated employees outside the protected class.” 	Sanders v. Tikras
Tech. Sol. Corp., 725 F. App’x 228, 230 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	found 	that 	the 	standard 	for
proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on
whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. 	See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“Discriminatory
preference 	for 	any 	group, 	minority 	or 	majority, 	is 	precisely 	and
only what Congress has proscribed.”).
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
5
Here, 	as 	to 	the 	first 	element, 	Plaintiff 	has 	sufficiently
pled 	that 	he 	is 	a 	member 	of 	a 	protected 	class. 	Although 	he 	is
white, he is pleading that he has been subjected to discrimination
based 	on 	his 	race. 	Second, 	he 	has 	sufficiently 	pled 	that 	he 	has
performed 	his 	job 	in 	a 	satisfactory 	way. 	Third, 	he 	has
sufficiently 	pled 	that 	he 	was 	subjected 	to 	an 	adverse 	employment
action when the BOP did not hire him for five positions. 	The only
element at issue is the fourth element: whether he has sufficiently
pled 	that 	he 	was 	treated 	differently 	from 	similarly 	situated
employees outside the protected class.
With 	respect 	to 	the 	fourth 	element, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that
Position 	#3, 	Position 	#4, 	and 	Position 	#5 	were 	filled 	by 	white
individuals. 	Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, at ¶ 20. 	Accordingly,
those adverse employment actions cannot form the basis of a racial
discrimination 	claim. 	With 	respect 	to 	Position 	#1, 	Plaintiff
asserts 	that 	David 	Russell 	(“Russell”), 	who 	is 	biracial, 	also
applied and was deemed “unqualified” in a subsequent posting. 	Id.
¶ 	14. 	When 	the 	previous 	Recreation 	Supervisor 	retired, 	Russell
was 	placed 	in 	an 	“acting” 	supervisor 	role. 	Id. 	¶ 	15. 	This
appointment, Plaintiff argues, bolstered Russell’s qualifications.
Id. 	Liberally construing the second amended complaint, the Court
finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that Russell was selected
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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for Position #1 even though he was less qualified than Plaintiff.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Count 	One 	is 	sufficiently 	pled
with respect to Position #1.
As for Position #2, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that
the 	role 	was 	filled 	with 	someone 	outside 	of 	his 	protected 	class.
Aside 	from 	Russell, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	identify 	any 	specific
individuals 	who 	are 	members 	of 	other 	races. 	Plaintiff 	makes
generalized complaints about the BOP’s incorporation of diversity,
equity, and inclusion policies, as well as the “tainted” selection
process 	for 	open 	positions. 	As 	pled, 	with 	respect 	to 	Count 	One,
Plaintiff has only raised his right to relief above the speculative
level 	with 	respect 	to 	Position 	#1. 	The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Count
One 	is 	granted 	in 	part 	and 	denied 	in 	part. 	The 	motion 	is 	denied
with respect to Position #1 but granted with respect to the other
positions. 	The R&R is, therefore, adopted in part and rejected in
part with respect to Count One.
B. 	Count Two – Retaliation
Title 	VII 	also 	prohibits 	unlawful 	retaliation. 	It 	prevents
an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any of its employees or
applicants 	for 	employment . . . because 	he 	has 	opposed 	any
practice 	made 	an 	unlawful 	employment 	practice . . . , 	or 	because
he has . . . participated in any manner in an investigation” under
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Title 	VII. 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e–3(a). 	To 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	case
of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that []he engaged
in protective activity, (2) that [his] employer took adverse action
against [him], and (3) that a causal relationship existed between
the 	protected 	activity 	and 	the 	adverse 	employment 	activity.
Sanders, 	725 	F. 	App’x 	at 	230 	(citation 	omitted 	and 	numbering
changed). 	“In the context of element one of a retaliation claim,
an 	employee 	is 	protected 	when 	[]he 	opposes 	not 	only 	employment
actions 	actually 	unlawful 	under 	Title 	VII 	but 	also 	employment
actions 	[]he 	reasonably 	believes 	to 	be 	unlawful.” 	Id. 	(citation
omitted). 	“However, 	opposition 	activity 	is 	only 	protected 	if 	an
employee’s subjective belief is objectively reasonable in light of
the facts.” 	Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
With 	respect 	to 	the 	second 	element, 	“the 	challenged 	action 	well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” 	Burlington N. v. Stana Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 	548 	U.S. 	53, 	54 	(2006) 	(citation 	and 	internal 	quotation
marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that he engaged in protected activity
in 	2016, 	2019, 	and 	February 	2023, 	precipitating 	retaliatory
actions 	by 	the 	BOP. 	Second 	Am. 	Compl., 	ECF 	No. 	47, 	at 	¶ 	25.
Specifically, 	Plaintiff 	states 	that 	the 	retaliatory 	actions
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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included 	“shift 	changes 	almost 	weekly”; 	reassignment 	to 	“less
desirable 	posts 	such 	as 	housing 	units 	on 	varying
shifts . . . [d]espite being a bus-certified operator and assigned
to 	Medical 	Escorts”; 	and 	frequent 	selection 	“to 	provide 	coverage
on the medical bus.” 	Id. 	Most importantly, Plaintiff also asserts
that 	on 	May 	21, 	2023, 	he 	learned 	that 	he 	was 	not 	selected 	for
Position #2; on May 22, 2023, he learned that he was not selected
for 	Position 	#3; 	on 	June 	20, 	2023, 	he 	learned 	that 	he 	was 	not
selected 	for 	Position 	#4; 	and 	on 	December 	12, 	2023, 	he 	learned
that he was not selected for Position #5. 	Id. ¶ 26. 	Finally, he
asserts 	that 	the 	BOP 	retaliated 	against 	him 	by
“withholding . . . his 	performance 	evaluation”; 	by
“manipulati[ng] and omi[tting] . . . favorable reference checks”;
by 	reassigning 	his 	shift 	without 	justification; 	and 	by 	altering
his 	work 	schedule. 	Id. 	¶ 	31. 	Plaintiff 	has 	also 	alleged 	that 	a
coworker told him that he is “often scared to work with Plaintiff
because 	he 	feels 	that 	the 	executive 	staff 	at 	FCI 	Gilmer 	would
target 	him 	for 	working 	with . . . [him] 	due 	to 	his 	engagement 	in
protected activities.” 	Id. ¶ 23a.
After reviewing the second amended complaint, the Court finds
that 	the 	retaliation 	claim 	is 	sufficiently 	pled. 	At 	this 	stage,
at 	a 	minimum, 	the 	assertion 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	not 	selected 	for
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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positions within a few months of his bringing claims with the EEOC
is sufficient to state a claim of retaliation. 	It is premature to
find 	that 	no 	causal 	connection 	exists. 	The 	allegations 	in 	the
second 	amended 	complaint 	raise 	Plaintiff’s 	right 	to 	relief 	above
the 	speculative 	level. 	The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is 	denied 	with
respect to Count Two, and the R&R is rejected with respect to Count
Two.
C. 	Count Three – Hostile Work Environment
Before 	bringing 	a 	claim 	under 	Title 	VII, 	an 	employee 	must
first exhaust his available administrative remedies. 	Campbell v.
Geren, 	No. 	09-1764, 	2009 	WL 	4250582, 	at 	*2 	(4th 	Cir. 	2009)
(unpublished) 	(citation 	omitted). 	“Only 	those 	discrimination
claims 	stated 	in 	the 	initial 	charge, 	those 	reasonably 	related 	to
the 	original 	complaint, 	and 	those 	developed 	by 	reasonable
investigation 	of 	the 	original 	complaint 	may 	be 	maintained 	in 	a
subsequent Title VII lawsuit.” 	Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d
505, 	506 	(4th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(citation 	omitted). 	Here, 	the 	record
indicates that Plaintiff did not raise a hostile work environment
claim 	before 	the 	EEOC, 	and 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	claim 	is 	not
reasonably 	related 	to 	the 	claims 	raised. 	His 	failure 	to 	exhaust
his claim deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over
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WILSON V. BONDI 	2:25-CV-01
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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the claim. 	See Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 138–40
(4th Cir. 1995).
Even if Plaintiff had exhausted his hostile work environment
claim, 	it 	would 	fail 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law. 	To 	succeed 	in 	pursuing
a 	claim 	of 	hostile 	work 	environment, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	that
the 	harassment 	was 	“sufficiently 	severe 	or 	pervasive . . . to
alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive or
hostile 	atmosphere.” 	See 	Perkins 	v. 	Int’l 	Paper 	Co., 	936 	F.3d
196, 	208 	(4th 	Cir. 	2019) 	(citation 	omitted). 	The 	Fourth 	Circuit
has 	described 	how 	“severe 	or 	pervasive” 	should 	be 	assessed 	under
Title VII:
In determining whether the harassment alleged
was sufficiently severe or pervasive, we must
“look[] 	at 	all 	the 	circumstances,” 	including
the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its 	severity; 	whether 	it 	[was] 	physically
threatening 	or 	humiliating, 	or 	a 	mere
offensive 	utterance; 	and 	whether 	it
unreasonably 	interfere[d] 	with 	[the]
employee’s 	work 	performance.” 	Harris, 	510
U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367.
Parker 	v. 	Reema 	Consulting 	Servs., 	Inc., 	915 	F.3d 	297, 	304 	(4th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
Upon review of the second amended complaint, the Court agrees
with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled
facts 	to 	support 	Count 	Three. 	See 	Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 	545.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	grants 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	with 	respect
to Count Three and adopts the R&R with respect to Count Three.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
 	The 	R&R 	is ADOPTED IN PART 	and REJECTED 	IN
PART [ECF No. 63];
 	The 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	second 	amended
complaint 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN
PART [ECF No. 49];
 	Count 	One 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITH 	PREJUDICE 	IN
PART for failure to state a claim;
 	Count 	One 	is 	DISMISSED 	with 	respect 	to
Position 	#2, 	Position 	#3, 	Position 	#4, 	and
Position #5;
 	Count 	One 	is 	not 	dismissed 	with 	respect 	to
Position #1;
 	Count Two is not dismissed;
 	Count 	Three 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE
for lack of jurisdiction;
 	The original motion to dismiss is DENIED AS
MOOT [ECF No. 36];
 	Finding 	no 	good 	cause 	to 	grant 	Plaintiff’s
motions 	to 	supplement 	the 	record 	or 	file 	a
third 	amended 	complaint, 	the 	remaining
pending 	motions 	are 	DENIED 	[ECF 	Nos. 	65,
67, 71, 75, 77];
 	The case shall proceed on the second amended
complaint;
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 	The 	Clerk 	is 	DIRECTED 	to 	TERMINATE 	all
defendants 	except 	Attorney 	General 	Pam
Bondi; and
 	The case is again REFERRED to the Magistrate
Judge 	to 	conduct 	a 	scheduling 	conference
and 	issue 	a 	scheduling 	order, 	for 	written
orders 	or 	reports 	and 	recommendations, 	as
the 	case 	may 	be, 	regarding 	any 	motions
filed, 	and 	to 	dispose 	of 	any 	other 	matters
that may arise.
It is so ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	directed 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Order 	to
counsel of record via email and the pro se Plaintiff via certified
mail, return receipt requested, at the last known address as shown
on the docket.
DATED: March 31, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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