Findley et al v. North Light Specialty Insurance Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
ELKINS
BRYCE FINDLEY and JENNIFER FINDLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-10
(KLEEH)
NORTH LIGHT SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 57, 58, 59]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	for 	Partial
Summary 	Judgment 	on 	Claims 	for 	Common 	Law 	Bad 	Faith 	and 	UTPA
Violations 	[ECF 	No. 	57]; 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motion 	for 	Partial 	Summary
Judgment 	on 	Substantially 	Prevailing 	Claims 	[ECF 	No. 	58]; 	and
Defendant 	North 	Light 	Special 	Insurance 	Company’s 	Motion 	for
Partial Summary Judgment on Extra-Contractual and Punitive Damages
Claims 	[ECF 	No. 	59]. 	For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	herein, 	Plaintiffs’
partial 	motions 	for 	summary 	judgment 	[ECF 	No. 	57, 	58] 	are 	DENIED
and 	Defendant’s 	partial 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	[ECF 	No. 	59]
is GRANTED IN PART.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs 	Bryce 	Findley 	and 	Jennifer 	Findley 	(“Plaintiffs”
or 	“the 	Findleys”) 	filed 	suit 	against 	Defendant 	North 	Light
Specialty Insurance Company (“Defendant” or “North Light”) in the
Circuit Court of Barbour County, West Virginia on May 6, 2024. ECF
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 1 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
No. 1-1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446, North Light
removed the case to this Court on June 13, 2024, invoking diversity
jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Defendant filed its Answer to Plaintiffs’
Complaint on June 18, 2024. ECF No. 2.
On 	May 	2, 	2025, 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	two 	motions 	for 	partial
summary judgment, asking the Court to find that Defendant breached
its 	common 	law 	duty 	of 	good 	faith 	and 	fair 	dealing 	and 	violated
the 	West 	Virginia 	Unfair 	Trade 	Practices 	Act 	(UTPA”) 	and 	to 	also
find 	Plaintiff 	substantially 	prevailed 	on 	their 	insurance 	claim,
to 	warrant 	their 	recovery 	of 	attorneys’ 	fees. 	ECF 	Nos. 	57, 	58.
Defendant 	responded 	in 	opposition 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	Motions 	on 	May
23, 2025 [ECF No. 61] and Plaintiffs replied in further support of
their Motions on June 5, 2025 [ECF No. 63].
Defendant additionally moved for partial summary judgment on
May 	2, 	2025, 	asking 	the 	Court 	to 	find 	that 	Plaintiffs 	did 	not
substantially prevail in their insurance case and that Plaintiffs
failed to put forth sufficient facts to show North Light acted in
bad 	faith, 	violated 	the 	UTPA, 	or 	acted 	with 	actual 	malice 	to
warrant 	punitive 	damages. 	ECF 	No. 	59. 	Plaintiffs 	responded 	in
opposition 	to 	Defendant’s 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	motion 	on 	May
22, 	2025 	[ECF 	No. 	60] 	and 	Defendant 	filed 	its 	reply 	briefing 	on
June 3, 2025 [ECF No. 62].
The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for review.
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 2 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 19, 2023, a fire occurred at Plaintiffs’ home at
112 Gladeview Drive, Philippi, West Virginia (the “property”). ECF
No. 	57-1 	at 	p. 	1, 	ECF 	No. 	59 	at 	p. 	2. 	Bryce 	and 	Jennifer 	Findley
were not home at the time of the fire, but their son, Austin, was
on 	their 	property 	working 	outside 	and 	reported 	the 	fire 	to
emergency 	services. 	Insurance 	Claim 	Diary, 	ECF 	No. 	57-2 	at 	p. 	4.
The fire originated in Plaintiffs’ living room. Id.; 	West Virginia
State Fire Marshal Incident Report, ECF No. 59-2 at p. 22.
At 	the 	time 	of 	the 	fire, 	the 	property 	was 	insured 	by 	North
Light, 	which 	provided 	$514,000 	in 	dwelling 	coverage, 	$256,000 	in
personal property coverage, and twelve months of additional living
expense (“ALE”) coverage. North Light Policy Declarations, ECF No.
57-4; 	ECF 	No. 	59-3. 	Jennifer 	Findley 	notified 	North 	Light 	of 	the
fire 	on 	September 	20, 	2023, 	and 	North 	Light 	opened 	a 	claim 	the
same day. ECF No. 57-2 at p. 4; Insurance Claim Diary, ECF 59-4 at
p. 2. Originally, the claim for dwelling coverage was assigned to
adjuster 	Kevin 	Mullins, 	the 	claim 	for 	personal 	property 	coverage
was 	assigned 	to 	Staci 	Miller, 	and 	the 	claim 	for 	ALE 	was 	assigned
to 	Charmaine 	Smith. 	Dep. 	of 	Kevin 	Mullins, 	ECF 	No. 	57-5; 	Dep 	of
Staci Miller, ECF No. 57-6, and Dep. of. Charmaine Smith, ECF No.
57-7.
On 	September 	21, 	2023, 	Mullins 	received 	a 	phone 	call 	from
Assistant 	Fire 	Marshall 	Ayersman, 	in 	which 	he 	informed 	Mullins
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 3 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
that 	he 	was 	concerned 	about 	the 	fire 	and 	reported 	the 	Plaintiffs
had 	experienced 	prior 	fire 	losses. 	ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	6; 	ECF 	No.
57-2 	at 	p. 	26. 	Based 	upon 	this 	development, 	Mullins 	referred
Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	to 	North 	Lights 	Special 	Investigation 	Unit
(“SIU”) and Jeffrey Daniels was assigned as the SIU investigator.
ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	4; 	Dep. 	of 	Jeffrey 	Daniels, 	ECF 	No. 	57-8. 	The
purpose 	of 	an 	SIU 	referral 	is 	for 	the 	SIU 	investigator 	to 	“take
control 	of 	the 	file 	and 	the 	investigation,” 	and 	either 	deny 	the
claim 	for 	fraud 	or 	return 	the 	claim 	to 	the 	claim 	office 	to 	be
adjusted 	and 	paid. 	ECF 	No. 	57-8 	at 	pp. 	37-38. 	On 	September 	25,
2023, 	Daniels 	spoke 	with 	Ayersman 	and 	learned 	that 	the 	fire
originated 	within 	a 	sectional 	couch 	and 	that 	the 	fire 	spread
through 	a 	cold 	air 	return 	under 	the 	couch. 	ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	6;
ECF No. 57-2 at p. 38. Ayersman also told Daniels that Plaintiffs
had been involved in six prior property fires and recommended North
Light 	engage 	an 	engineer 	to 	determine 	the 	cause 	of 	the 	fire. 	Id.
On 	September 	27, 	2023, 	Daniels 	also 	spoke 	to 	a 	SIU 	investigator
from Erie, Plaintiffs’ prior property insurer, who informed him of
an 	SIU 	investigation 	regarding 	a 	fire 	on 	Plaintiffs’ 	property 	in
2015. 	ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	7; 	ECF 	No. 	57-2 	at 	p. 	239. 	Though 	Erie
paid 	the 	loss 	in 	2015, 	the 	SIU 	investigator 	indicated 	the 	fire
call was undetermined and the circumstances were questionable. Id.
North Light retained NEFCO Fire Investigations to perform an
origin and cause (“O&C”) investigation for the September 19, 2023
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 4 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
fire, 	and 	informed 	Plaintiffs 	of 	its 	plan 	to 	conduct 	an 	O&C
investigation. 	ECF 	No. 	57-2 	at 	pp. 	40, 	232. 	Fire 	Investigator
Timothy 	Iman 	completed 	the 	O&C 	inspection 	at 	the 	property 	on
September 27, 2023, with Plaintiffs present. ECF No. 59-4 at p. 8;
ECF 	No. 	57-2 	at 	p. 	244. 	Iman 	confirmed 	that 	the 	fire 	originated
from the sectional couch in the living room, and that there was a
power strip with items plugged into it behind the couch. Id. Iman
also reported that on September 19, 2023, shortly before the fire,
Jennifer had returned home from a relative’s residence to pick up
food. 	Id. 	The 	fire 	occurred 	shortly 	after 	she 	left 	the 	property.
Id. Daniels completed his investigations into the prior six fires
by late September or early October, learning that each prior loss
claims had been paid. ECF No. 57-8 at p. 72.
Iman 	conducted 	a 	second 	property 	inspection 	in 	October 	and
reported 	to 	Daniels 	that 	he 	secured 	samples 	from 	the 	debris 	to
determine 	if 	an 	accelerant 	was 	used 	to 	cause 	the 	fire. 	ECF 	No.
59-4 at p. 10. He also indicated that more work still needed to be
done, but believed the circumstances were suspicious. ECF No. 57-
2 	at 	p. 	273; 	ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	9. 	In 	November, 	Daniels 	noted 	in
the 	claim 	diary, 	following 	a 	joint 	inspection, 	that 	arson 	nor
accidental ignition sources had been ruled out as the cause of the
fire. 	ECF 	No. 	ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	11; 	ECF 	No. 	57-2 	at 	p. 	305. 	The
electrical 	engineer, 	Robert 	Kimmick, 	did 	not 	believe 	the 	couch
caused the fire and there was no evidence of a rodent act. Id. The
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 5 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
electrical 	engineer 	completed 	his 	inspection 	of 	the 	couch 	around
November 20, 2023, and determined there was no evidence to indicate
it 	caused 	the 	fire. 	ECF 	No. 	59-4 	at 	p. 	12; 	ECF 	No. 	57-2 	at. 	p.
315. Daniels further reported that accidental sources of ignition
had been eliminated, which indicated the possibility that the fire
was set. Id. Daniels proceeded to schedule examinations under oath
“EUOs” 	for 	Plaintiffs 	based 	upon 	the 	given 	exposure 	and 	prior
fires. Id.
While 	Daniels 	completed 	the 	SIU 	investigation, 	North 	Light
continued 	adjusting 	Plaintiffs’ 	fire 	loss 	claim. 	For 	example,
Mullins 	proceeded 	with 	the 	adjustment 	process 	by 	evaluating 	and
preparing an estimate to repair the damage to the Findleys’ home.
ECF 	No. 	57-1 	at 	p. 	4; 	ECF 	No. 	59-1 	at 	p. 	6; 	see 	ECF 	No. 	59-5.
Between October 30, 2023, and April 15, 2024, adjuster Smith sent
periodic 	letters 	to 	Plaintiffs 	advising 	them 	that 	North 	Light’s
investigation was ongoing. ECF No. 58-9.
Represented 	by 	counsel, 	Plaintiffs 	sat 	for 	the 	EUOs 	on
December 13, 2023, and denied any involvement with the fire. Bryce
Findley 	EUO, 	ECF 	No. 	57-10; 	Jennifer 	Findley 	EUO, 	ECF 	No. 	57-11.
During 	her 	EUO, 	Jennifer 	provided 	new 	information 	in 	which 	she
believed 	an 	iPad 	and 	a 	vape 	pen 	may 	have 	been 	plugged 	into 	their
couch’s 	charging 	station 	on 	the 	day 	of 	the 	fire. 	ECF 	No. 	57-10;
ECF 	No. 	59-6 	at 	p. 	3. 	In 	January 	2024, 	the 	transcripts 	from 	the
EUOs 	were 	provided 	to 	electrical 	engineer 	Kimmick 	for 	further
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 6 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
evaluation. Kimmick issued a report dated April 1, 2024, in which
he noted that no iPad or vape remains were found at the scene, or
in the evidence. RDA April 1 Report, ECF No. 59-7 at p. 9. Kimmick
reported, in part:
The 	electrical 	items 	that 	were 	found 	in 	the
area of origin were examined and ruled out as
ignition 	sources. 	Several 	components 	of 	the
sectional couch were not recovered and cannot
be 	ruled 	out 	as 	the 	ignition 	source 	of 	the
fire. 	Ms. 	Findley 	testified 	that 	an 	iPad 	and
a vape pen were located on the couch; however,
no 	remains 	of 	either 	of 	these 	items 	were
recovered. 	Therefore, 	an 	iPad 	or 	vape 	pen
cannot 	be 	ruled 	out 	as 	an 	ignition 	source 	of
the fire.
An 	incendiary 	cause 	of 	the 	subject 	fire 	was
hypothesized 	by 	Mr. 	Iman 	and 	by 	the 	WV 	State
Fire 	Marshall 	Office. 	This 	hypothesis 	cannot
be ruled out.
Because 	multiple 	cause 	hypotheses 	cannot 	be
ruled 	out, 	the 	cause 	of 	this 	fire 	cannot 	be
determined 	to 	a 	degree 	of 	engineering
certainty.
Id. at p. 15.
On 	April 	5, 	2024, 	Plaintiffs’ 	counsel 	sent 	Defendant’s
counsel 	two 	estimates 	for 	restoration 	and 	rebuild 	of 	Plaintiffs’
property 	and 	requested 	that 	Plaintiffs 	be 	paid 	“the 	benefits 	due
and 	owing 	under 	the 	homeowner 	policy.” 	April 	5, 	2024 	Letter 	from
Traci 	Cook 	to 	Brent 	Kesner, 	ECF 	No. 	57-12; 	ECF 	No. 	59-8. 	Both
estimates 	were 	for 	amounts 	in 	excess 	of 	the 	dwelling 	coverage
limit, 	including 	estimates 	for 	foundation 	repairs: 	Rebuilder
estimate 	for 	$578,71.81 	and 	City 	Window 	& 	Construction 	estimate
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 7 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
for 	$788,484.18. 	Id. 	In 	response 	to 	the 	estimates, 	North 	Light
engaged 	engineer 	Jordan 	Bryan 	to 	complete 	an 	inspection 	of 	the
property 	on 	May 	3, 	2024. 	May 	8, 	2024 	Forte 	Report, 	ECF 	No. 	59-9.
Mr. Bryan concluded in his May 8, 2024, report:
The 	structural 	integrity 	of 	the 	steel 	beams,
steel pipe columns, and the exterior basement
walls 	in 	the 	basement 	living 	room 	were 	not
compromised as a result of the fire.
Id. Thus, the house was repairable.
While 	North 	Light 	was 	waiting 	for 	Mr. 	Bryan’s 	report,
Plaintiffs 	filed 	the 	subject 	lawsuit 	in 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	of
Barbour County, West Virginia on May 6, 2024. North Light continued
investigating 	and 	adjusting 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims. 	On 	August 	26,
2024, 	adjuster 	Smith 	sent 	an 	incorrect 	form 	letter 	directly 	to
Plaintiffs, which inaccurately reported the status of their claim
and repairs, and stated Plaintiffs’ ALE benefits would be ending.
ECF No. 57-14. Mullins submitted his estimate for dwelling coverage
benefits 	for 	approval 	on 	September 	20, 	2024. 	ECF 	No. 	57-5 	at 	pp.
74-75. 	On 	October 	7, 	2024, 	Plaintiffs’ 	counsel 	emailed 	defense
counsel 	demanding 	payment 	of 	benefits 	and 	an 	estimate 	of 	damages
which 	defense 	counsel 	previously 	agreed 	to 	provide. 	October 	2024
email 	from 	Bordas 	to 	Kesner, 	ECF 	No. 	57-17. 	On 	December 	3, 	2024,
Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of “Allstate’s
Summary 	of 	the 	Findley 	Claim 	for 	Loss/Damage 	to 	the 	Unscheduled
Personal Property.” ECF no. 57-18.
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 8 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
Ultimately, 	North 	Light 	paid 	out 	$57,605.72 	for 	Plaintiffs’
personal property claim on November 14, 2024, and $459,963.75 for
the dwelling property claim on December 20, 2024.1 ECF Nos. 59-11,
59-12. Additionally, North Light extended Plaintiffs’ ALE coverage
for an additional 12-month period.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	if 	“there 	is 	no 	genuine
dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to
judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	The movant
“bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on 	file, 	together 	with 	the 	affidavits, 	if 	any, 	which 	it 	believes
demonstrate 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact.”
Celotex 	Corp. 	v. 	Catrett, 	477 	U.S. 	317, 	323 	(1986) 	(internal
quotation marks omitted). 	The burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party 	to 	present 	“specific 	facts 	showing 	that 	there 	is 	a 	genuine
issue 	for 	trial.” 	Blair 	v. 	Defender 	Servs., 	Inc., 	386 	F.3d 	623,
625 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
“When 	the 	moving 	party 	has 	carried 	its 	burden . . . , its
opponent 	must 	do 	more 	than 	simply 	show 	that 	there 	is 	some
1 	These 	dates 	reflect 	the 	dates 	on 	the 	checks 	issued 	to 	Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs received the checks on or about December 3, 2024, and December
30, 2024. 	See ECF No. 57-1.
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 9 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
metaphysical 	doubt 	as 	to 	the 	material 	facts.” 	Matsushita 	Elec.
Indus. 	Co., 	Ltd. 	V. 	Zenith 	Radio 	Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574, 	586 	(1986)
(citations 	omitted). 	Rather, 	the 	Court 	must 	ask 	“whether 	the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.” 	Anderson 	v. 	Liberty 	Lobby, 	Inc., 	477 	U.S.
242, 	251–52 	(1986). 	At 	its 	core, 	the 	summary-judgment 	process
examines 	whether 	a 	trial 	is 	needed. 	See 	id. 	at 	250. 	“Where 	the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party, 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	for
trial.” 	Matsushita, 	475 	U.S. 	at 	587 	(citation 	and 	internal
quotation marks omitted).
“When 	faced 	with 	cross-motions 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	the
court 	must 	review 	each 	motion 	on 	its 	own 	merits 	to 	determine
whether 	either 	of 	the 	parties 	deserves 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law.” 	Rossignol 	v. 	Voorhaar, 	316 	F.3d 	516, 	523 	(4th 	Cir. 	2003)
(citation 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	The 	same
standards 	of 	review 	apply 	when 	both 	parties 	file 	motions 	for
summary judgment. 	See ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d
42, 45 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1983) (“The court is not permitted to resolve
genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	facts 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment — even where . . . both parties have filed cross motions
for summary judgment.”).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 10 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
A. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Common Law Bad Faith
Plaintiffs’ 	and 	Defendant’s 	Motions 	for 	Partial 	Summary
Judgment as to the Common Law Bad Faith claim are DENIED [ECF Nos.
57, 59].
“A 	first-party 	bad 	faith 	action 	is 	one 	wherein 	the 	insured
sues his/her own insurer for failing to use good faith in settling
a claim filed by the insured.” 	Syl. Pt. 2, Loudin v. Nat’l Liab.
& 	Fire 	Ins. 	Co., 	716 	S.E.2d 	696 	(W. 	Va. 	2011). 	An 	insured 	first
party has the right “to bring a bad faith cause of action against
his/her insurer under the common law and the West Virginia Unfair
Trade Practices Act.” 	Id. at 700.
“There 	is 	undoubtedly 	‘a 	common 	law 	duty 	of 	good 	faith 	and
fair dealing running from an insurer to its insured.’” Shaffer v.
Nat'l Health Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1995525, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 27,
2018) (quoting Elmore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 504 S.E.2d
893, 	96 	(W. 	Va. 	1998) 	(citing 	Hayseeds, 	Inc. 	v. 	State 	Farm 	Fire
& Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986)). “An insurance carrier has a
duty, 	once 	a 	first-party 	policyholder 	has 	submitted 	proof 	of 	a
loss, 	to 	promptly 	conduct 	a 	reasonable 	investigation 	of 	the
policyholder's loss based upon all available information.” Sellman
v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2022 WL 4598571, at *5 (N.D.W. Va. July
25, 2022) (quoting Syl. Pt. 3., Miller v. Fluharty, 500 S.E.2d 310
(W. Va. 1997)) (declining to grant summary judgment on common law
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 11 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
bad 	faith 	claim 	because 	genuine 	issues 	of 	fact 	existed 	as 	to 	the
reasonableness of defendant's offer of settlement, investigation,
negotiations, 	and 	general 	conduct 	during 	the 	handling 	of
plaintiffs' claim).
“[T]he 	common 	law 	duty 	of 	good 	faith 	and 	fair 	dealing 	in
insurance 	cases 	under 	our 	law 	runs 	between 	insurers 	and 	insureds
and 	is 	based 	on 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	contractual 	relationship.”
Grubbs v. Westfield Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (N.D.W. Va.
2006) (quoting Elmore, 504 S.E.2d at 897).
Accordingly, 	“the 	bad 	faith 	claim 	is 	necessarily 	subsumed
within, 	and 	derivative 	of, 	the 	underlying 	contractual 	claim.”
Snodgrass v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2026 WL 103476, at *3
(S.D.W. Va. Jan. 14, 2026). Furthermore, granting summary judgment
on 	a 	bad 	faith 	claim 	would 	be 	improper 	when 	a 	breach 	of 	contract
claim 	survives 	summary 	judgment. 	See 	Id. 	(citing 	Covol 	Fuels 	No.
4, 	LLC 	v. 	Pinnacle 	Min. 	Co., 	LLC, 	785 	F.3d 	104, 	114–15 	(4th 	Cir.
2015).
Here, Plaintiffs assert they are entitled to summary judgment
on 	their 	claim 	for 	common 	law 	bad 	faith 	because 	North 	Light
breached 	its 	duty 	of 	good 	faith 	and 	fair 	dealing 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law. 	ECF 	No. 	57-1 	at 	p. 	12. 	In 	support 	of 	their 	position, 	the
Findleys state the evidence shows (1) North Light took eight months
to 	investigate 	the 	cause 	of 	the 	house 	fire, 	but 	found 	no
affirmative 	evidence 	of 	arson; 	(2) 	North 	Light 	and 	its 	retained
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 12 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
fire investigator waited four months after collecting evidence to
finalize its conclusion that the fire’s cause was undetermined and
it 	could 	not 	show 	the 	house 	fire 	was 	the 	Plaintiffs’ 	fault; 	(3)
SIU 	Investigator 	Daniels 	completed 	his 	investigation 	into 	the
Findleys’ 	prior 	house 	fires 	in 	October 	2023 	and 	did 	not 	find
evidence 	from 	that 	portion 	of 	his 	investigation 	to 	support
Plaintiffs 	were 	involved 	in 	causing 	the 	subject 	house 	fire; 	(4)
North 	Light 	did 	not 	make 	a 	coverage 	determination 	until 	May 	23,
2024; (5) North Light provided little information on the status of
their 	claim 	and 	the 	assessment 	of 	their 	damages, 	while 	the 	fire
was 	being 	investigated; 	(6) 	a 	North 	Light 	adjuster 	sent 	an
incorrect form letter directly to Plaintiffs, after they retained
counsel, with incorrect information about repairs and the duration
of their ALE benefits; (7) Claim Agent Mullins’ investigation into
Plaintiffs’ 	dwelling 	loss 	included 	delays 	and 	mistakes; 	and 	(8)
North 	Light 	was 	not 	sufficiently 	responsive 	to 	Plaintiffs’
attorneys’ 	coverage 	demands 	and 	North 	Light’s 	December 	30, 	2024
payment was not for policy limits. Id. at pp. 12-14.
In contrast, Defendant also argues it is entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiffs cannot establish North Light acted in
bad 	faith. 	ECF 	No. 	59-1. 	First, 	Defendant 	argues 	there 	is 	no
underlying 	breach 	of 	contract 	because 	it 	issued 	payment 	for 	the
Findleys’ 	contractual 	claim. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	11. 	Second, 	North 	Light
argues 	there 	is 	no 	bad 	faith 	claim 	because 	it 	never 	denied
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 13 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
Plaintiffs’ claim, and Plaintiffs filed suit before North Light’s
investigation was complete. Id. North Light retained an expert to
evaluate 	whether 	the 	Findleys’ 	property 	was 	a 	constructive 	total
loss 	because 	Plaintiffs 	submitted 	two 	estimates 	indicating 	the
repairs 	would 	cost 	more 	than 	the 	property’s 	value. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	13.
The 	expert 	inspected 	the 	property 	on 	Friday, 	May 	3, 	2024, 	and
Plaintiffs 	filed 	suit 	on 	Monday, 	May 	6, 	2024, 	before 	North 	Light
finished 	determining 	coverage 	and 	the 	extent 	of 	the 	Plaintiffs’
damages. Id.
Further, 	Defendant 	disputes 	that 	its 	investigation 	was
unwarranted 	or 	delayed 	the 	claim 	payment 	too 	long, 	because
Plaintiffs 	had 	multiple 	prior 	fire 	losses, 	including 	three
separate fire losses at the subject property. Id. Defendant further
supports 	its 	position 	to 	investigate 	because 	the 	West 	Virginia
Fire 	Marshal 	found 	the 	subject 	fire 	to 	have 	been 	intentionally
set. Id. North Light contends it began its investigation quickly,
did 	a 	thorough 	investigation, 	and 	continued 	to 	pay 	Plaintiffs’
additional living expenses while the investigation was underway.
Here, 	the 	record 	before 	the 	Court 	clearly 	reflects 	disputes
of 	material 	fact 	regarding 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	Defendant's
investigation, 	negotiations, 	and 	general 	conduct 	during 	the
handling of Plaintiffs' claim. Though Plaintiffs show that it took
over a year for the property claim to be paid, Defendant sets forth
evidence of its investigation and the reasons for its conduct. As
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 14 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
such, 	these 	are 	issues 	for 	a 	jury, 	and 	not 	for 	this 	Court, 	to
resolve. 	Accordingly, 	this 	Court 	declines 	to 	grant 	summary
judgment as to plaintiffs' common law bad faith claim -in favor of
either party.
B. Plaintiffs’ Claim under Unfair Trade Practices Act
An 	insured 	first 	party 	has 	the 	right 	“to 	bring 	a 	bad 	faith
cause 	of 	action 	against 	his/her 	insurer 	under 	the 	common 	law 	and
the 	West 	Virginia 	Unfair 	Trade 	Practices 	Act.” 	Loudin 	v. 	Nat’l
Liab. 	& 	Fire 	Ins. 	Co., 	716 	S.E.2d 	696, 	700 	(W. 	Va. 	2011). 	The
Unfair 	Trade 	Practices 	Act 	(“UTPA”), 	in 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	33-11-4,
sets forth a list of “unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive 	acts 	or 	practices 	in 	the 	businesses 	of 	insurance[.]”
Specifically, 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	33-11-4(9) 	prohibits 	unfair 	claim
settlement 	practices. 	To 	establish 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	under 	§ 	33–
11–4(9), 	a 	plaintiff 	“must 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	insurer 	(1)
violated the UTPA in the handling of the claimant's claim and (2)
that 	the 	insurer 	committed 	violations 	of 	the 	UTPA 	with 	such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” Holloman v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 617 S.E.2d 816, 823 (W. Va. 2005).
“[E]ven 	though 	W.Va. 	Code 	§ 	33–11–4(9) 	requires 	more 	than 	a
single 	isolated 	violation 	in 	order 	to 	show 	a 	general 	business
practice, a claimant may produce sufficient evidence of this in a
single claim.” Elmore, 504 S.E.2d at 902. See Dodrill v. Nationwide
Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	491 	S.E.2d 	1, 	12–13 	(W. 	Va. 	1997) 	(“separate,
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 15 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
discrete acts or omissions, each of which constitute violations of
different 	sub-paragraphs 	of 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	33–11–4(9), 	may 	indeed
demonstrate 	a 	‘general 	business 	practice’ 	in 	the 	handling 	of 	a
single 	claim, 	the 	focus 	of 	which 	would 	tend 	to 	show 	frequent 	and
rather general disregard for the several proscriptions separately
set 	out 	in 	the 	relevant 	statute.”). 	“The 	[West 	Virginia] 	Supreme
Court 	of 	Appeals 	has 	explained 	‘that 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	an
insurance 	company's 	conduct 	[under 	the 	WVUTPA] 	“ordinarily 	is 	a
question of fact for the jury” that should not be determined as a
matter of law by a trial court.’” White v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
651 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	530, 	547–48 	(S.D.W. 	Va. 	2009) 	(quoting 	Hicks 	ex
rel. Saus v. Jones, 617 S.E.2d 457, 465 (W. Va. 2005)).
Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	North 	Light’s 	conduct 	violated
multiple sub-paragraphs of W. Va. Code § 33–11–4(9) along with the
corresponding West Virginia Insurance Commissioner’s Rules, W. Va.
C.S.R. § 114-14-1, et seq. (“ICR”). ECF No. 57-1 at p. 16.
West Virginia Code § 33–11–4(9), in relevant part, states:
(9) 	Unfair 	claim 	settlement 	practices.—No 	person
shall 	commit 	or 	perform 	with 	such 	frequency 	as 	to
indicate 	a 	general 	business 	practice 	any 	of 	the
following:
(a) 	Misrepresenting 	pertinent 	facts 	or
insurance 	policy 	provisions 	relating 	to
coverages at issue;
(b) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably
promptly 	upon 	communications 	with 	respect 	to
claims arising under insurance policies;
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 16 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
(c) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable
standards 	for 	the 	prompt 	investigation 	of
claims arising under insurance policies;
(d) Refusing to pay claims without conducting
a 	reasonable 	investigation 	based 	upon 	all
available information;
(e) 	Failing 	to 	affirm 	or 	deny 	coverage 	of
claims within a reasonable time after proof of
loss statements have been completed;
(f) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate
prompt, 	fair 	and 	equitable 	settlements 	of
claims 	in 	which 	liability 	has 	become
reasonably clear;
(g) 	Compelling 	insureds 	to 	institute
litigation 	to 	recover 	amounts 	due 	under 	an
insurance 	policy 	by 	offering 	substantially
less than the amounts ultimately recovered in
actions 	brought 	by 	the 	insureds, 	when 	the
insureds 	have 	made 	claims 	for 	amounts
reasonably 	similar 	to 	the 	amounts 	ultimately
recovered;
(h) Attempting to settle a claim for less than
the 	amount 	to 	which 	a 	reasonable 	man 	would
have believed he was entitled by reference to
written 	or 	printed 	advertising 	material
accompanying 	or 	made 	part 	of 	an 	application;
and
(n) 	Failing 	to 	promptly 	provide 	a 	reasonable
explanation 	of 	the 	basis 	in 	the 	insurance
policy in relation to the facts or applicable
law for denial of a claim or for the offer of
a compromise settlement.
W.Va. 	Code 	§§ 	33–11–4(9)(a)-(h), 	& 	(n). 	Plaintiff 	relies 	on
the same facts to support the UTPA violations, as those which they
argue give rise to the common law bad faith claim. ECF NO. 57-1 at
p. 18. Plaintiff contends that North Light’s separate and discrete
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 17 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
acts or omissions committed over the span of the claim, represent
the “habit, custom, usage, or business policy” of North Light. Id.
at p. 20 (quoting Dodrill, 491 S.E.2d at 13-14).
Conversely, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the UTPA
claims 	because 	Plaintiffs 	failed 	to 	show 	a 	“general 	business
practice” 	that 	is 	violative 	of 	the 	UTPA. 	ECF 	No. 	59-1 	at 	p. 	19.
Rather, North Light contends there is no evidence that it violated
any provision of the UTPA while handling the Findleys’ claim. Id.
at p. 20. Rather, Defendant asserts the evidence shows North Light
properly 	handled 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim, 	conducted 	a 	reasonable
investigation, 	and 	timely 	responded 	to 	all 	pertinent
communications. Id. at p. 19. For example, North Light puts forth
evidence 	that 	it 	promptly 	began 	investigating 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim
and 	sought 	information 	regarding 	the 	damage 	and 	the 	fire’s 	cause
within a few days. Id. 	Defendant further disputes that liability
ever 	became 	clear 	to 	support 	a 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	33-11-4(9)(f)
violation because Plaintiffs filed suit before Defendant completed
its 	investigation, 	or 	that 	it 	ever 	failed 	to 	respond 	in 	a 	timely
fashion. Id.
In 	its 	response 	briefing 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment, 	Defendant 	also 	raises 	the 	question 	of 	Plaintiffs’
standing 	to 	bring 	UTPA 	claims 	under 	subsections 	(b),(c),(d),and
(f) 	of 	§ 	33-11-4(9). 	In 	doing 	so, 	Defendant 	relies 	upon 	cases 	in
the 	Northern 	District 	of 	West 	Virginia 	and 	their 	application 	of
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 18 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

19
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s holdings in State
ex rel. W. Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salango, 866 S.E.2d 74 (2021)
and 	State 	ex 	rel. 	State 	Auto 	Prop. 	Ins. 	Companies 	v. 	Stucky, 	806
S.E.2d 160 (2017). ECF No. 61 at pp. 23-24.
In 	their 	reply 	briefing, 	Plaintiffs 	distinguish 	the 	Stucky
and 	Salango 	holdings 	because 	those 	cases 	regarded 	liability
insurance policies and not a first party property insurance policy.
ECF No. 63 at pp. 62-63. Regardless, Plaintiffs contend their UTPA
claim 	is 	still 	viable 	because 	it 	raises 	violations 	of 	other
subsections of § 33-11-4(9). Id.
“The common thread through sections (b), (c), (d), and (f) is
that they do not create duties for liability insurers toward their
insureds.” Salango, 866 S.E.2d at 82 (finding a first party insured
lacked 	standing 	to 	bring 	UTPA 	claims 	under 	§ 	33-11-
4(9)(b),(c),(d), 	and 	(f)). 	The 	Salango 	holding 	expanded 	upon 	the
holding 	in 	Stucky, 	in 	which 	the 	West 	Virginia 	Supreme 	Court
determined 	a 	first 	party 	insured 	under 	a 	liability 	policy 	lacked
standing 	to 	bring 	a 	UTPA 	claim 	under 	§ 	33-11-4(9)(b) 	and 	(f)
because 	the 	subsections 	were 	“designed 	to 	protect 	plaintiffs 	who
seek 	liability-related 	damages 	from 	an 	insured, 	and 	are 	not
designed to protect the insured.” Stucky, 806 S.E.2d at 166.
Plaintiffs’ 	argument 	that 	these 	holdings 	are 	limited 	to
liability insurance policies has been addressed by Judge Groh and
Judge Bailey in this District. See Woods v. Beazley Ins. Co., 2024
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 19 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

20
WL 4800593 (N.D.W. Va. July 16, 2024); Bonnieview Apostolic Chapel
v. 	Guideone 	Specialty 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	2024 	WL 	4801855 	(N.D.W. 	Va.
June 18, 2024).
In 	Woods, 	Judge 	Bailey 	assessed 	whether 	a 	plaintiff 	had
standing to sue under the UTPA for denials of coverage pertaining
to two health care policies issued to him. 2024 WL 4800593, at *1.
In 	rejecting 	Plaintiff’s 	distinction 	that 	Stucky 	and 	Salango
related 	to 	liability 	insurance 	policies 	rather 	than 	healthcare
policies, Judge Bailey ruled that the alleged violations of unfair
claim 	settlement 	practices 	enumerated 	within 	§ 	33-11-4(9)(b)–(d)
could not survive because the plaintiff lacked standing. Id. at *
5. 	“In 	both 	cases, 	an 	insured 	was 	bringing 	statutory 	first-party
bad 	faith 	claims 	against 	its 	insurer, 	which 	is 	exactly 	what
plaintiff 	is 	doing 	in 	this 	matter.” 	Id. 	(dismissing 	plaintiff’s
claim to the extent it relied on subsections (b), (c), and (d)).2
In 	Bonnieview 	Apostolic 	Chapel, 	Judge 	Groh 	assessed 	whether
plaintiffs had standing to sue under the UTPA for the denial of an
underinsured motorist claim. 2024 WL 4801855, at *1. Therein, Judge
Groh 	was 	similarly 	unpersuaded 	by 	plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	that
2 	The 	Court 	recognizes 	that 	courts 	in 	the 	Southern 	District 	of 	West
Virginia have reach opposite conclusions on this issue. Compare Dickens
v. Ellison, 811 F. Supp. 3d 784, 789–90 (S.D.W. Va. 2025) (finding the
plaintiffs 	lacked 	standing 	to 	allege 	claims 	under 	West 	Virginia 	Code
sections 	33–11–4(9)(b), 	(c), 	(d), 	or 	(f) 	against 	their 	underinsured
motorist insurance provider) with Snodgrass v. Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co., 2026 WL 103476, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 14, 2026)(declining to apply
the holdings in Stucky and Solango to a property insurance dispute).
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 20 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

21
Stucky and Salango were limited to cases involving claims under a
liability 	policy, 	rather 	than 	first-party 	underinsured 	motorist
claims. 	Id. 	at 	* 	2. 	Judge 	Groh 	held 	that 	the 	insurer 	owed 	no
duties to the Plaintiffs under subsections (b), (c), (d), and (f)
and 	thus 	the 	plaintiffs 	lacked 	standing 	to 	assert 	claims 	against
their insurer under § 33-11-4(9)(b), (c), (d), and (f). Id. at *3
(dismissing 	plaintiffs’ 	UTPA 	claim 	to 	the 	extent 	it 	relied 	upon
those subsections of § 33-11-4(9)).
Here 	the 	Court 	agrees 	with 	North 	Light’s 	standing 	arguments
and 	adopts 	the 	reasoning 	of 	its 	sister 	courts 	in 	the 	Northern
District 	of 	West 	Virginia. 	The 	term 	“claim” 	as 	used 	in 	the 	§ 	33-
11-4(9)(b), (c), (d), and (f) refers to an effort by a third party
to 	recover 	money 	from 	the 	insured 	– 	not 	a 	first 	party 	recovering
money from its insurer. Thus, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue North
Light 	under 	§ 	33-11-4(9)(b), 	(c), 	(d), 	and 	(f). 	Accordingly,
Defendant’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgement 	[ECF 	No. 	59] 	is 	GRANTED
IN 	PART 	and 	the 	Court 	DISMISSES 	Plaintiffs’ 	UTPA 	claim 	to 	the
extent the UTPA claim relies upon § 33-11-4(9)(b)-(d), and (f).
However, Plaintiffs allege additional violations of § 33-11-
4(9) 	and 	improper 	business 	practices 	to 	support 	their 	statutory
bad 	faith 	claim. 	As 	with 	Plaintiffs’ 	common 	law 	bad 	faith 	claim,
the evidence in the record raises genuine issues of material fact
which 	precludes 	summary 	judgment 	in 	either 	parties’ 	favor
regarding 	the 	alleged 	violations 	under 	W.Va. 	Code 	§§ 	33–11–
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 21 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

22
4(9)(a),(e),(g),(h), 	and 	(n). 	Accordingly, 	the 	reasonableness 	of
Defendant’s 	conduct 	under 	the 	UTPA 	is 	a 	question 	of 	fact 	for 	the
jury. Thus, Plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment as it
pertains to their statutory bad faith claim [ECF No. 57] is DENIED
and 	Defendant’s 	partial 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	[ECF 	No. 	59]
as to the surviving portions of the UTPA claim is DENIED.
C. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs 	move 	the 	Court 	to 	find 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	that
they substantially prevailed on their claim for coverage benefits
and 	thus 	are 	entitled 	to 	recover 	fees, 	expenses, 	and 	general
damages for annoyance, aggravation, and inconvenience. ECF No. 58-
1. 	In 	contrast, 	Defendant 	seeks 	a 	ruling 	from 	the 	Court 	that
Plaintiffs 	are 	not 	entitled 	to 	extra-contractual 	damages 	because
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	substantially 	prevail 	on 	their 	coverage 	claim
and 	failed 	to 	show 	their 	attorneys’ 	fees 	were 	necessary. 	ECF 	No.
59 at pp. 16-17.
“Under 	West 	Virginia's 	Hayseeds 	doctrine, 	a 	policyholder
seeking 	coverage 	under 	an 	insurance 	policy 	who 	‘substantially
prevails’ in a suit against their insurer is entitled to a damages
award for net economic loss and aggravation and inconvenience from
the 	delay 	in 	receiving 	coverage, 	as 	well 	as 	attorney's 	fees.”
Ramaco 	Res., 	LLC 	v. 	Fed. 	Ins. 	Co., 	74 	F.4th 	255, 	264 	(4th 	Cir.
2023) (citing Syl. Pt. 1, Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 74); Sellman v.
Safeco 	Ins. 	Co. 	of 	Am., 	2024 	WL 	2843014, 	at 	*3 	(4th 	Cir. 	June 	5,
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 22 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

23
2024). 	First 	party 	insurance 	claimants 	have 	the 	right 	to 	recover
Hayseed damages. Hadorn v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194, 196 (W. Va. 1995)
“An 	insured 	‘substantially 	prevails’ 	in 	a 	property 	damage
action 	against 	his 	or 	her 	insurer 	when 	the 	action 	is 	settled 	for
an 	amount 	equal 	to 	or 	approximating 	the 	amount 	claimed 	by 	the
insured 	immediately 	prior 	to 	the 	commencement 	of 	the 	action, 	as
well as when the action is concluded by a jury verdict for such an
amount.” 	Syl. 	Pt. 	1, 	Jordan 	v. 	Nat'l 	Grange 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	393
S.E.2d 	647, 	647–48 	(1990). 	“When 	determining 	whether 	a
policyholder has substantially prevailed, ‘a court should look at
the negotiations as a whole from the time of the insured event to
the 	final 	payment 	of 	the 	insurance 	proceeds.’” 	Sellman, 	2024 	WL
2843014, at *3 (4th Cir. June 5, 2024) (quoting Miller v. Fluharty,
500 S.E.2d 310, 322 (W. Va. 1997)). “While insurers may not cause
undue 	delay, 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	some 	time 	to 	investigate 	the
claim.” Id. at *3.
If an insured is found to have substantially prevailed, they
may 	recover 	attorneys’ 	fees 	“as 	long 	as 	the 	attorney's 	services
were 	necessary 	to 	obtain 	payment 	of 	the 	insurance 	proceeds.” 	Id.
As such, “the insured must show that but for his or her attorney's
services such settlement would not have been reached, in light of
the undue delay in investigating the claim.” Jordan, 393 S.E.2d at
652. 	See 	also 	Bristol 	Springs 	Custom 	Homes, 	LLC 	v. 	Argo 	Grp. 	US,
Inc., 	2024 	WL 	5357166, 	at 	*5 	(N.D.W. 	Va. 	Oct. 	31, 	2024) 	(denying
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 23 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

24
summary judgment because a genuine issue existed as to whether the
plaintiff's 	attorney's 	services 	were 	necessary 	to 	obtain 	payment
of the insurance proceeds).
Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to Hayseed damages because
they 	made 	a 	pre-suit 	demand 	“for 	the 	benefits 	to 	which 	they 	were
entitled” 	and 	North 	Light 	did 	not 	pay 	the 	dwelling 	coverage
benefits until December 30, 2024. ECF No. 58-1 at p. 13. Plaintiffs
assert 	there 	is 	no 	dispute 	that 	they 	substantially 	prevailed
because 	(1) 	Defendant 	took 	over 	eight 	months 	to 	investigate 	the
cause of the fire and found no affirmative evidence of arson; (2)
Defendant waited four months after collecting evidence to conclude
it 	could 	not 	fault 	Plaintiffs 	for 	the 	fire; 	(3) 	Defendant 	did
little to adjust Plaintiffs’ property claim while it investigated
the 	fire’s 	cause 	and 	provided 	little 	information 	on 	the 	claim’s
status; 	(4) 	North 	Light 	sent 	a 	form 	letter 	with 	inaccurate
information, which threatened to cut off Plaintiffs’ ALE benefits;
(5) authority was not requested to pay the dwelling coverage until
December 	13, 	2024 	despite 	the 	estimate 	being 	finalized 	no 	later
than 	September 	20, 	2024; 	and 	(6) 	North 	Light 	paid 	Plaintiffs 	the
insurance benefits approximating those demanded pre-suit. ECF Nos.
58-1 at pp. 13-15.
Defendant disputes that Plaintiffs substantially prevailed in
the 	underlying 	coverage 	claim. 	ECF 	No. 	59-1. 	Looking 	at 	the
totality 	of 	the 	negotiations, 	Defendant 	points 	to 	the 	fact 	that
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 24 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

25
North 	Light 	completed 	an 	inspection 	to 	determine 	whether
Plaintiffs’ 	property 	was 	a 	constructive 	total 	loss 	three 	days
before 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	suit. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	13. 	Defendant 	further
contends 	that 	Plaintiffs 	fail 	to 	point 	to 	a 	specific 	demand 	that
it 	refused 	to 	pay. 	North 	Light 	justifies 	the 	length 	of 	its
investigation 	and 	the 	delay 	of 	payment, 	in 	part, 	on 	Plaintiffs
prior fire history, including three fires at the subject property,
and the Fire Marshall’s assessment that the fire was intentionally
set. Id. Further, even if Plaintiffs could show they substantially
prevailed, 	Defendants 	argue 	they 	cannot 	prove 	the 	attorney
services 	were 	necessary 	to 	recover 	the 	amount 	received 	because
North 	Light’s 	investigation 	of 	the 	claim 	was 	still 	underway 	when
Plaintiffs filed suit . Id. at pp. 16-17.
As 	with 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	and 	bad
faith, disputes of material facts exist which preclude this Court
from 	determining 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law 	whether 	Plaintiffs
substantially prevailed in their coverage claim or whether it was
necessary 	for 	them 	to 	retain 	their 	attorneys. 	Though 	Plaintiffs
set 	forth 	facts 	that 	they 	were 	not 	paid 	their 	dwelling 	coverage
until they filed suit, Defendants also set forth facts to support
that 	it 	could 	not 	pay 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim, 	before 	the 	subject 	suit
was 	filed, 	because 	the 	claim 	was 	still 	under 	investigation 	and
damages were still being assessed. Accordingly, whether Plaintiffs
are entitled to Hayseed damages is a question of fact for the jury
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 25 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

26
and 	the 	parties 	summary 	judgment 	motions 	[ECF 	Nos. 	58, 	59] 	are
DENIED on this ground.
D. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Punitive Damages
Defendant 	moves 	for 	the 	Court 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim
for 	punitive 	damages 	because 	Plaintiffs 	cannot 	establish 	as 	a
matter of law that North Light acted with “actual malice.” ECF No.
59-1 at p. 21.
Under 	West 	Virginia 	law, 	“punitive 	damages 	for 	failure 	to
settle a property dispute shall not be awarded against an insurance
company unless the policyholder can establish a high threshold of
actual malice in the settlement process.” Hayseeds, Inc. 330, 352
S.E.2d at 80; Raines v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023 WL 5490161, at *9
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 24, 2023); Medley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
2024 WL 4792503, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 14, 2024). “Actual malice”
is defined in these instances as a situation in which “the company
actually 	knew 	that 	the 	policyholder's 	claim 	was 	proper, 	but
willfully, maliciously and intentionally denied the claim.” Id. at
80-81. 	“Unless 	the 	policyholder 	is 	able 	to 	introduce 	evidence 	of
intentional injury—not negligence, lack of judgment, incompetence,
or bureaucratic confusion—the issue of punitive damages should not
be submitted to the jury.” 	Id. at p. 81. The West Virginia Supreme
Court 	intended 	this 	“bright 	line 	standard” 	to 	be 	“highly
susceptible 	to 	summary 	judgment 	for 	the 	defendant.” 	Id. 	Further,
“[t]he Hayseeds ‘actual malice’ standard has been held to apply to
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 26 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

27
punitive 	damages 	sought 	in 	relation 	to 	alleged 	violations 	of 	the
UTPA.” Raines, 2023 WL 5490161, at *9.
Defendant 	asserts 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	presented 	any
evidence that North Light had an improper motive for how it handled
Plaintiffs’ 	claim. 	ECF 	No. 	59-1 	at 	p. 	22. 	Rather, 	Defendant
contends that the record supports it had a valid reason for seeking
to 	investigate 	the 	cause 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	fire 	and 	that 	it 	was
actively 	seeking 	information 	to 	evaluate 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	up
until 	the 	time 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	suit. 	Id. 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	that
genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	exist 	as 	to 	whether 	Defendant’s
conduct rises to the level of actual malice. ECF No. 60 at p. 24.
The Court agrees with the Defendant that Plaintiffs failed to
establish 	an 	entitlement 	to 	punitive 	damages. 	The 	conduct 	which
Plaintiffs 	base 	their 	claims 	falls 	into 	the 	category 	of
“negligence, 	lack 	of 	judgment, 	incompetence, 	or 	bureaucratic
confusion” 	– 	at 	best. 	The 	Court 	finds 	that 	no 	evidence 	has 	been
presented to show that the Defendant’s conduct rises to the level
of actual malice, thereby precluding the Plaintiffs from obtaining
punitive damages. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is thus
GRANTED 	[ECF 	No. 	59] 	on 	this 	ground 	and 	Plaintiffs’ 	claim 	for
punitive damages is DISMISSED.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Plaintiffs’ 	partial 	motions 	for
summary judgment [ECF No. 57, 58] are DENIED. Defendant’s partial
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 27 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>

28
motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 59] is GRANTED IN PART as it
pertains 	to 	punitive 	damages 	and 	Plaintiffs’ 	UTPA 	claim 	to 	the
extent 	it 	relied 	upon 	§ 	33-11-4(9)(b)-(d), 	and 	(f) 	and 	DENIED 	IN
PART on all other grounds. Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages
is DISMISSED and Plaintiff’s claim under the UPTA is DISMISSED to
the extent it relied upon § 33-11-4(9)(b)-(d), and (f).
A new pretrial and trial date will be set by separate order.
The Court further DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO REFILE
the 	pending 	motions 	in 	limine 	[ECF 	Nos. 	70-75]. 	The 	parties 	may
re-file 	or 	file 	new 	pretrial 	motions 	in 	accord 	with 	the 	new
scheduling order and in accord with the Court’s rulings herein.
It is so ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	directed 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF system.
DATED: 	March 31, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
Case 2:24-cv-00010-TSK Document 99 Filed 03/31/26 Page 28 of 28 PageID #:
<pageID>