USA v. McKinley

IN THE UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN 	DISTRICT 	OF 	WEST 	VIRGINIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CRIMINAL 	NO. 	1:21-CR-59
(KLEEH)
RANDY DEAN 	MCKINLEY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant’s 	pro 	se 	motion 	for
compassionate 	release 	[ECF 	No. 	74]. 	For 	the 	reasons 	discussed
below, the 	motion is 	DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On 	November 	16, 	2021, 	Defendant 	Randy 	Dean 	McKinley
(“Defendant”) 	pleaded 	guilty 	to 	a 	one-count 	Information 	charging
him 	with 	Possession 	of 	Child 	Pornography, 	which 	involved 	a 	pre-
pubescent minor 	and a 	minor who 	had 	not 	attained 	12 	years 	of 	age,
in violation of 	18 U.S.C. §§ 	2252A(a)(5)(B) 	and 	2252A(b)(2). 	See
ECF No. 14. 	On April 11, 2022, the Court sentenced him to a period
of 	incarceration 	of 	168 	months, 	to 	be 	followed 	by 	a 	lifetime 	of
supervised release. 	See ECF No. 24. 	On March 30, 2026, Defendant
filed a 	pro se motion 	for compassionate 	release. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	74.
The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. 	See ECF Nos. 77,
79. 	Defendant 	is 	currently 	incarcerated 	at 	FCI 	Loretto 	with 	a
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USA V. MCKINLEY 	1:21-CR-59
MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
2
projected release date of March 	15, 	2034.1
II. 	DISCUSSION
The district court is authorized to reduce a defendant’s term
of 	imprisonment 	if 	“extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	warrant
such a reduction[.]” 	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 	Upon receiving
a 	motion for compassionate 	release, 	the 	district 	court
may 	reduce 	the 	term 	of
imprisonment . . . 	after 	considering 	the
factors 	set 	forth 	in 	section 	3553(a) 	to 	the
extent 	that 	they 	are 	applicable, 	if 	it 	finds
that . . . extraordinary 	and 	compelling
reasons 	warrant 	such 	a 	reduction 	. 	. 	. 	and
that 	such 	a 	reduction 	is 	consistent 	with
applicable 	policy 	statements 	issued 	by 	the
Sentencing Commission[.]
Id.
Prior 	to 	the 	First 	Step 	Act 	of 	2018 	(the 	“First 	Step 	Act”),
“district 	courts 	could 	only 	reduce 	a 	term 	of 	imprisonment 	under
§ 	3582(c)(1)(A) 	‘upon 	motion 	of 	the 	Director 	of 	the 	Bureau 	of
Prisons.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Kibble, 	992 	F.3d 	326, 	329–30 	(4th
Cir. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2002)). 	In the First
Step 	Act, 	Congress 	allowed 	federal 	inmates 	to 	file 	motions 	for
compassionate release 	directly 	with 	the 	district 	court 	after 	they
have 	exhausted 	their 	administrative 	remedies. 	See 	Pub. 	L. 	No.
115–391, § 	603(b), 132 Stat. 	5194, 	5239 	(2018).
1 	See 	https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 	(last 	visited 	June 	25, 	2026).
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MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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A 	defendant 	filing 	a 	motion 	for 	compassionate 	release 	must
have “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure
of 	the 	Bureau 	of 	Prisons 	to 	bring 	a 	motion 	on 	the 	defendant’s
behalf,” or there must be a “lapse 	of 	30 	days 	from 	the 	receipt 	of
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever
is 	earlier[.]” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3582(c)(1)(A). 	The 	exhaustion
requirement 	is 	non-jurisdictional 	“and 	thus 	waived 	if 	it 	is 	not
timely 	raised.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Muhammad, 	16 	F.4th 	126, 	129–30
(4th 	Cir. 2021) 	(citation omitted) 	(finding 	the 	district 	court 	in
error by sua sponte dismissing 	a 	motion 	for 	compassionate 	release
based on the threshold requirement).2
In 	assessing 	a 	motion 	for 	compassionate 	release, 	the 	Court
undertakes 	a two-step 	analysis. 	“First, 	the 	court 	must 	determine
that 	the prisoner is eligible for 	a 	sentence 	reduction 	because 	he
has 	shown 	‘extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons’ 	for 	release.”
United States v. Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024)
(citing 	United States 	v. Hargrove, 	30 	F.4th 	189, 	194–95 	(4th 	Cir.
2022)). 	Then, 	if 	an 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reason 	exists,
the Court evaluates the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
See Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th at 	279.
2 	The 	Government 	is 	not 	challenging 	exhaustion 	here.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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A. 	Extraordinary 	and Compelling 	Reasons
In 	2023, the United States 	Sentencing 	Commission 	amended 	its
policy statement to apply to 	defendant-filed 	motions 	and 	expanded
the 	list 	of 	circumstances 	sufficient 	to 	support 	such 	a 	motion.
See 	U.S.S.G. 	§ 	1B1.13. 	Most 	relevant 	here, 	the 	enumerated
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	Guidelines
include “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse 	. 	. 	. 	when
the 	defendant 	would 	be 	the 	only 	available 	caregiver 	for 	the
spouse[.]” 	See 	id. 	§ 	1B1.13(b)(3)(B). 	They 	also 	include 	the
following 	circumstances 	relating 	to 	a 	defendant’s 	medical
condition:
(A) The defendant is suffering from a terminal
illness (i.e., a serious 	and 	advanced 	illness
with 	an 	end-of-life 	trajectory). 	A 	specific
prognosis 	of 	life 	expectancy 	(i.e., 	a
probability 	of 	death 	within 	a 	specific 	time
period) 	is 	not 	required. 	Examples 	include
metastatic 	solid-tumor 	cancer, 	amyotrophic
lateral 	sclerosis 	(ALS), 	end-stage 	organ
disease, and advanced 	dementia.
(B) The defendant 	is—
(i) 	suffering 	from 	a 	serious 	physical 	or
medical condition,
(ii) 	suffering 	from 	a 	serious 	functional 	or
cognitive 	impairment, 	or
(iii) 	experiencing 	deteriorating 	physical 	or
mental health because 	of 	the 	aging 	process,
that 	substantially 	diminishes 	the 	ability 	of
the defendant to provide 	self-care 	within 	the
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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environment 	of 	a 	correctional 	facility 	and
from 	which 	he 	or 	she 	is 	not 	expected 	to
recover.
(C) The defendant 	is 	suffering 	from 	a 	medical
condition 	that 	requires 	long-term 	or
specialized 	medical 	care 	that 	is 	not 	being
provided and without which the defendant is at
risk 	of 	serious 	deterioration 	in 	health 	or
death.
(D) 	The 	defendant 	presents 	the 	following
circumstances—>
(i) the defendant 	is 	housed 	at 	a 	correctional
facility affected or at 	imminent risk of being
affected 	by 	(I) 	an 	ongoing 	outbreak 	of
infectious disease, or 	(II) 	an 	ongoing 	public
health 	emergency 	declared 	by 	the 	appropriate
federal, state, 	or 	local 	authority;
(ii) 	due 	to 	personal 	health 	risk 	factors 	and
custodial 	status, 	the 	defendant 	is 	at
increased 	risk 	of 	suffering 	severe 	medical
complications or death as a result of exposure
to 	the ongoing outbreak 	of 	infectious 	disease
or 	the 	ongoing 	public 	health 	emergency
described 	in clause (i); 	and
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated
in 	a timely manner.
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1). 	The Guidelines also provide that extraordinary
and 	compelling 	circumstances 	may 	exist 	for 	certain 	“other
reasons”:
The defendant presents 	any 	other 	circumstance
or 	combination 	of 	circumstances 	that, 	when
considered by themselves 	or 	together 	with 	any
of 	the 	reasons 	described 	in 	paragraphs 	(1)
through 	(4), 	are 	similar 	in 	gravity 	to 	those
described 	in paragraphs 	(1) 	through 	(4).
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USA V. MCKINLEY 	1:21-CR-59
MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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See id. 	§ 1B1.13(b)(5).
Here, 	Defendant argues that 	two 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling
reasons support a sentence reduction: (1) he is the only available
caregiver for his wife, who is experiencing health issues, and (2)
he is experiencing his own 	health 	issues. 	As 	discussed 	below, 	he
has not 	met his 	burden with respect 	to 	either 	argument.
1. 	Sole 	Caregiver for 	Wife
The Court will first address 	Defendant’s 	argument 	that 	he 	is
the only available caregiver for his wife. 	Defendant asserts that
his 	wife 	is 	71 	years 	old 	with 	a 	“number 	of 	incapacitating 	health
issues,” including “a history of heart problems such as TIA due to
A-fib, type 2 diabetic with A1C issues and several different types
of 	insulin 	shots, 	extreme 	fall 	risk, 	and 	multiple 	injuries 	as 	a
result of falling while living 	alone, 	depression, 	thyroid 	issues,
gallbladder problems, and a survivor of ovarian cancer but at risk
for other cancers.” 	Motion, ECF No. 74, at 3. 	He states that her
siblings 	died 	from 	heart 	attacks 	before 	age 	60. 	Id. 	He 	also
states that his 	wife has no children 	and 	no 	immediate 	family 	that
can 	care 	for 	her. 	Id. 	Defendant 	asserts 	that 	his 	wife’s 	health
issues interfere with her ability to complete daily tasks. 	Id. at
4. 	He represents that she 	is currently 	paying 	people 	to 	complete
tasks 	for 	her, 	but 	she 	is 	experiencing 	financial 	hardship. 	Id.
In 	response, 	the 	Government 	argues 	that 	Defendant 	provides 	no
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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medical records or proof with respect to his wife’s medical issues,
and Defendant, therefore, has not met his burden. 	The Court agrees
with 	the Government.
“While 	it 	is 	true 	that 	family 	caretaking 	obligations 	may
justify 	compassionate 	relief 	in 	certain 	circumstances, . . . the
defendant must generally provide 	concrete 	evidence 	that 	he 	is 	the
‘only 	caregiver 	available[.]’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Spears, 	No. 	06-
CR-340, 	2025 	WL 	66014, 	at 	4 	(E.D. 	Ny. 	Jan. 	20, 	2025) 	(citations
omitted). 	Conclusory assertions that the defendant must now serve
as 	the 	primary 	caretaker 	for 	a 	family 	member 	are 	insufficient.
See United States v. Newman, No. CR 122-031, 2024 WL 812041, at *2
(S.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2024) (citing “conclusory statements” that were
“insufficient to carry his burden of persuasion”); see also United
States 	v. 	Espina, 	No. 	4:19-CR-228, 	2025 	WL 	1688342, 	at 	*5 	(E.D.
Tex. 	June 16, 2025) (same). 	If 	a 	defendant 	argues 	that 	he 	is 	the
sole 	caretaker 	available 	for 	his 	wife, 	he 	“has 	the 	evidentiary
burden, 	. . . and 	his 	failure 	to 	attach 	any 	medical 	evidence 	or
opinions (or similarly competent evidence) leaves the Court unable
to 	make 	the 	necessary 	factual 	findings[.]” 	United 	States 	v.
Romano, 	No. 	22-cr-12, 	2023 	WL 	8735203 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Dec. 	19, 	2023);
see also United 	States v. Isaac, 	No. 	7:17-CR-6-KKC-EBA-1, 	2024 	WL
4376275, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2024) (finding that the defendant
did not 	meet his evidentiary 	burden 	to 	show 	the 	unavailability 	of
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USA V. MCKINLEY 	1:21-CR-59
MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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alternative caretakers for 	his 	daughter). 	Here, 	Defendant 	merely
makes 	conclusory 	statements 	about 	his 	wife’s 	medical 	conditions
and the 	fact that he is the sole 	available 	caretaker, 	and 	has 	not
met 	his 	evidentiary 	burden. 	Accordingly, 	he 	has 	not 	established
extraordinary and compelling 	reasons 	warranting 	release.
2. 	Defendant’s Medical 	Circumstances
The 	Court 	will 	next 	address 	Defendant’s 	medical
circumstances. 	Defendant states that he is 61 years old, has high
blood 	pressure, 	and 	is 	experiencing 	“FLU/COVID 	like 	symptoms,”
which 	are 	“increasing 	his 	risk 	of 	suffering 	severe 	medical
complications.” 	He states that his high blood pressure is causing
his vision to deteriorate and could potentially lead to blindness.
Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	prison 	is 	understaffed 	and 	lacks
resources to address his concerns.
The Government argues that the records submitted by Defendant
do 	not 	show 	that 	he 	was 	denied 	any 	treatment, 	and 	Defendant’s
medical 	conditions 	do 	not 	rise 	to 	the 	level 	of 	extraordinary 	and
compelling. 	The 	Court 	agrees 	with 	the 	Government. 	Defendant 	is
not suffering from a terminal illness. 	The cited conditions 	— 	high
blood 	pressure 	and 	COVID/flu 	symptoms 	— 	do 	not 	constitute 	a
“serious physical or medical 	condition,” 	a 	“serious 	functional 	or
cognitive 	impairment,” 	or 	deterioration 	of 	“physical 	or 	mental
health 	because 	of 	the 	aging 	process” 	that 	“substantially
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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diminishes” 	his 	ability 	to 	“provide 	self 	care” 	and 	“from 	which
he . 	. . is 	not 	expected 	to 	recover.” 	He 	does 	not 	require 	long-
term 	or 	specialized 	medical 	care 	that 	is 	not 	being 	provided.
Moreover, 	he 	is 	not 	housed 	as 	a 	facility 	with 	imminent 	risk 	of
being affected by an infectious disease outbreak or a public health
emergency. 	After 	considering 	Defendant’s 	cited 	medical
conditions, the 	Court 	finds that 	they 	do 	not 	rise 	to 	the 	level 	of
extraordinary and compelling.
B. 	Factors Under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3553(a)
Even 	if 	Defendant 	had 	established 	that 	extraordinary 	and
compelling 	reasons 	supported 	his 	release, 	the 	factors 	under 	18
U.S.C. 	§ 	3553(a) 	necessitate 	against 	his 	release. 	The 	factors
include, 	among 	others, 	the 	“nature 	and 	circumstances 	of 	the
offense,” “the history and 	characteristics 	of 	the 	defendant,” 	and
“the 	need for the sentence 	imposed
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment 	for the 	offense;
(B) to afford adequate 	deterrence 	to 	criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the 	public 	from 	further 	crimes
of 	the defendant; 	and
(D) 	to 	provide 	the 	defendant
with . . . medical 	care, 	or 	other
correctional 	treatment 	in 	the 	most 	effective
manner.”
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18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3553(a). 	This 	Court 	has 	“broad 	discretion” 	in
evaluating the section 3553(a) factors when ruling on a motion for
compassionate release. 	United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 834
(4th 	Cir. 2022).
Here, Defendant states that he is remorseful and regretful of
his actions, and he does not dispute the seriousness of the offense
he committed. 	He argues that he lived a law-abiding life prior to
his 	offense. 	For 	15 	years, 	he 	worked 	as 	a 	middle 	school 	math
teacher. 	He has taken steps to rehabilitate his mental health and
has participated in numerous 	prison 	programs. 	He 	has 	also 	helped
other 	inmates 	pass 	their 	GED 	exams. 	Defendant 	cites 	his 	“solid”
release plan to life at home with his wife of 23 years. 	He argues
that 	he 	has great respect for law 	enforcement 	and 	the 	law, 	and 	he
has 	been 	deterred 	from 	future 	criminal 	conduct. 	He 	asserts 	that
there is no further need to protect the public from him. 	Defendant
argues that his probation officer will be able to assess his needs
and 	assist 	him 	with 	medical 	care 	and 	treatment. 	The 	Government
objects, relying heavily on the 	offense 	conduct 	in 	this 	case, 	and
argues 	that 	the 	section 	3553(a) 	factors 	do 	not 	weigh 	in 	favor 	of
his release. 	The Court agrees 	with 	the 	Government.
At 	the 	time 	when 	Defendant 	committed 	the 	offense 	conduct 	in
this 	case, 	he 	had 	been 	working 	as 	a 	public 	school 	teacher. 	PSR,
ECF No. 22, at ¶ 30. 	Law enforcement, working from a tip, 	searched
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Defendant’s residence 	and seized 	an 	iPad. 	Id. ¶ 	18. 	A 	search 	of
the 	iPad 	demonstrated 	that 	Defendant 	communicated 	with 	unknown
individuals 	about 	child 	pornography. 	Id. 	¶ 	20. 	At 	one 	point,
Defendant wrote 	about 	wanting “to 	be 	a 	kindergarten 	teacher 	so 	he
could 	see 	students 	in 	their 	panties.” 	Id. 	¶ 	21. 	Defendant 	used
Facebook 	to 	trade 	child 	erotica 	and 	talk 	about 	sex 	acts 	that 	he
would perform on children. 	Id. ¶ 22. 	He used his Facebook account
to send 	or 	receive 105 videos of 	child 	pornography, 	some 	of 	which
involved two- to six-year-old females and prepubescent males. 	Id.
¶ 27. 	He also used fake Facebook accounts to distribute or receive
over 	3,205 	video 	files 	and 	4,204 	data 	images 	containing 	child
erotica, 	sexual 	acts 	involving 	minors, 	and 	videos 	of 	bestiality.
Id. ¶ 36.
Although 	Defendant 	now 	claims 	that 	he 	will 	never 	commit 	a
criminal act again, at the 	time 	of 	sentencing, 	Defendant 	asserted
that 	he 	had 	only 	been 	involved 	in 	exchanging 	child 	pornography
through 	social 	media 	for 	five 	years 	and 	that 	any 	chat 	he 	engaged
in 	regarding 	“bestiality, 	incest, 	raping 	girls, 	and 	‘slutting’
young girls” was fantasy talk. 	Id. 	¶ 	81. 	He 	also 	indicated 	then
that 	he 	knew 	what 	he 	was 	doing 	was 	wrong. 	Id. 	During 	the
sentencing 	hearing, the Court emphasized, 	and 	it 	emphasizes 	again
herein, 	the disturbing nature of 	Defendant’s 	behavior:
It’s 	terrifying 	to 	me 	that 	you 	worked 	as 	a
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teacher, 	sir. 	I’m 	going 	to 	be 	honest 	with
you. 	I 	understand 	you’ve 	been 	in 	treatment
and 	seeking 	counseling. 	I 	can’t 	do 	anything
other than acknowledge that. 	It is terrifying
to 	me, 	in 	reviewing 	the 	facts 	and
circumstances 	surrounding 	your 	offense
conduct as detailed in the presentence report.
I 	lack 	the 	vocabulary 	to 	appropriately
describe 	what 	you’ve 	done. 	To 	consider 	it
abhorrent, 	repugnant, 	and 	despicable 	is 	an
understatement to the victims in this case and
the 	danger 	you 	present 	to 	our 	community 	and
those 	kids 	to 	whom 	you 	were 	exposed 	for 	all
those years.
Transcript, 	ECF 	No. 	36, 	at 	15:6–16. 	Defendant 	has 	served
approximately 	50 	months 	of 	a 	168-month 	sentence. 	The 	Court
continues 	to 	believe 	that 	every 	bit 	of 	the 	168-month 	sentence 	is
appropriate under section 3553(a). 	Considering all of the section
3553(a) 	factors 	together, 	the 	motion 	for 	release 	must 	be 	denied.
The offense conduct is horrific. 	Defendant’s personal history and
characteristics 	— which include 	his 	being 	a 	public 	school 	teacher
for over 14 years — also weigh 	against 	release. 	The 	Court 	is 	not
convinced that Defendant is rehabilitated. 	The 168-month sentence
remains 	necessary 	to 	reflect 	the 	seriousness 	of 	the 	offense,
promote 	respect 	for 	the 	law, 	provide 	just 	punishment, 	provide
deterrence 	to Defendant and others, 	and 	protect 	the 	public.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the pro se motion for compassionate
release 	is 	DENIED 	[ECF No. 74].
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USA V. MCKINLEY 	1:21-CR-59
MEMORANDUM OPINION 	AND 	ORDER 	DENYING
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 	RELEASE 	[ECF 	NO. 	74]
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It 	is 	so 	ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	DIRECTED 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Memorandum
Opinion 	and 	Order 	to 	counsel 	of 	record 	by 	email 	and 	to 	Defendant
by certified mail, return receipt 	requested.
DATED: June 	26, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS 	S. 	KLEEH, 	CHIEF 	JUDGE
NORTHERN 	DISTRICT 	OF 	WEST 	VIRGINIA
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