Schoch, Mateya v. Bisignano, Frank

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MATEYA D. SCHOCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
OPINION and ORDER
25-cv-151-jdp
Plaintiff Mateya D. Schoch seeks judicial review of a final decision of defendant Frank
J. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, finding that Schoch was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Schoch asserts multiple objections to
administrative law judge (ALJ) Michael Schaefer’s decision, all grounded in a contention that
the ALJ did not adequately explain his reasoning. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, and Schoch has not identified any legal errors, so the court will affirm the decision.
BACKGROUND
Schoch applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income, originally
alleging that she had been disabled since December 1, 2020, but later amending her alleged
onset date to July 1, 2018. R. 16.2 Her claim was denied at the initial level, and it was also
denied at the reconsideration level. Id. Schoch requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. The ALJ
1 The court has amended the caption to reflect Frank J. Bisignano’s appointment as
Commissioner. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 Record cites are to the administrative transcript located at Dkt. 5.
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found that Schoch suffered from the following severe impairments: depressive disorder, anxiety
disorder, autism spectrum disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and fibromyalgia. R. 19.
The ALJ ascribed to Schoch the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with
additional limitations. R. 22. The ALJ found that Schoch had no past relevant work. R. 26.
Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Schoch was not disabled
because she could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such
as housekeeping cleaner, marker, and routing clerk. R. 27.
Schoch now appeals to this court. On appeal, the court’s role is to review the ALJ’s
decision for legal errors and to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. See Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 2020). The substantial evidence
standard is not high and requires only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). But the ALJ’s decision must
identify the relevant evidence and build a “logical bridge” between that evidence and the final
determination. Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Schoch raises multiple objections to the ALJ’s decision, all of them grounded in a
contention that the ALJ failed to articulate reasons for his conclusions. Schoch is challenging
only the ALJ’s findings related to her mental health limitations. Dkt. 6, at 3 n.4. Schoch’s
primary objection relates to the ALJ’s handling of her subjective symptoms and treatment
history. She also objects to the ALJ’s RFC assessment and his decision to discount her
therapist’s opinion.
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A. Subjective symptoms and treatment history
Schoch asserts that the ALJ failed to adequately explain his reasons for discounting her
subjective symptoms and treatment history. Dkt. 6, at 7–13. When an ALJ gives specific
reasons supported by the record for discounting a claimant’s subjective symptoms, a court will
not overturn the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is patently wrong. Deborah M. v. Saul,
994 F.3d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 2021). The ALJ partially credited Schoch’s self-reported symptoms
of panic attacks, social anxiety, being easily overwhelmed, poor concentration, and difficulty
following instructions and completing tasks. R. 24. But the ALJ found that the intensity and
limiting effects reported by Schoch were unsupported based on three types of evidence in the
record: (1) the objective medical evidence; (2) Schoch’s daily activities; and (3) Schoch’s
conservative treatment. See R. 23–24.
1. 	Objective medical evidence
The ALJ concluded that Schoch’s subjective report of her symptoms was not supported
by the objective medical evidence, including mental status exams, which showed that Schoch
generally had an appropriate mood and affect, and her cognitive function was generally within
normal limits, even though she was occasionally anxious and depressed. R. 24 (citing R. 303,
307, 318, 379, 450, 456, 459, 475, 558, 573, 580, 584, 595, 597, 708, 816, 1091, 1192,
1143, 1512, 1523, 1542, 1607, 1628, 1714). Schoch contends that the ALJ erred in two ways:
(1) the ALJ simply included a lengthy string citation without explaining why the cited evidence
supported his conclusion; and (2) the ALJ cited evidence other than Schoch’s mental status
exams. Dkt. 6, at 7–10; Dkt. 12, 1–4.
First, the ALJ’s use of a string citation to support his conclusion was not reversible error.
The court agrees that string citations are not substitutes for analysis. See Ninedorf v. O’Malley,
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No. 23-cv-998, 2024 WL 3070175, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 20, 2024); Niles v. Berryhill,
No. 1:16-cv-02214, 2017 WL 4160922, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2017). But ALJs are “subject
to only the most minimal of articulation requirements.” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050,
1053 (7th Cir. 2024). Still, they must explain how they reached their conclusions so that courts
can trace their paths of reasoning and meaningfully review their findings. Moore v. Colvin,
743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 874 (7th Cir. 2000).
Simply put, ALJs can’t just provide the dots; they must connect them too.
In this case, the court can trace the ALJ’s reasoning for rejecting Schoch’s subjective
report of her symptoms. The ALJ concluded that Schoch’s social and cognitive functions were
“essentially intact.” R. 24. To reach this conclusion, the ALJ relied on two psychological
evaluations of Schoch: one from October 2021, R. 1712–20, and the other from June 2022,
R. 448–53. The October 2021 evaluation found that Schoch’s mood was normal and that her
thought processes were “logical, coherent, and without gross distortion.” R. 1714. Schoch’s
cognitive functioning and social aptitude were determined to be within the average range.
R. 1714–15. The June 2022 evaluation found that Schoch’s mood was normal and that she
was able to “maintain a generally adequate stream of mental activity.” R. 450. Schoch doesn’t
dispute that the evaluations constitute substantial evidence or that the ALJ built a logical bridge
between this evidence and his conclusions. The ALJ didn’t err by using a string citation to refer
to additional evidence supporting his conclusion.
Second, the ALJ didn’t commit reversible error by citing evidence other than Schoch’s
mental status exams. Schoch points out that the ALJ rejected her subjective report of her
symptoms based on Schoch’s “longitudinal mental status findings,” R. 24, but the ALJ’s string
citation refers to evidence other than longitudinal mental status findings, including Schoch’s
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self-reported symptoms. Dkt. 12, at 2–3. The court understands Schoch to contend that the
ALJ erred by mischaracterizing the evidence; the ALJ should have used the phrase “evidence in
the record” instead of the phrase “longitudinal mental status findings.” But the law does not
require ALJs to use specific words in their analyses or risk having their decisions remanded.
See Martin, 950 F.3d at 374. And ALJs may consider the entire record, not just objective
medical evidence, when discounting a claimant self-report. See Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597,
601 (7th Cir. 2020). Schoch hasn’t demonstrated that the ALJ’s decision to discount her
subjective symptoms was patently wrong.
2. 	Daily activities
Schoch contends that the ALJ erred by considering Schoch’s daily activities when
determining her ability to work. Dkt. 6, at 10–12. To support her contention, Schoch points
to the ALJ’s statement that “[s]ome of the mental abilities and social interactions required in
order to perform [Schoch’s daily] activities are the same as those necessary for obtaining and
maintaining employment.” R. 23. ALJs may not equate a claimant’s daily activities with her
ability to work. Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016); Bjornson v. Astrue,
671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2012). But they may consider a claimant’s daily activities when
determining whether a claimant’s impairments are credible or exaggerated. Prill v. Kijakazi,
23 F.4th 738, 748 (7th Cir. 2022); Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019).
In this case, the ALJ permissibly considered reports of Schoch’s daily activities to
evaluate her statements concerning the limiting effects of her symptoms. The ALJ observed
that, despite alleging that she struggled with her memory and the ability to follow directions,
Schoch admitted that she prepared meals, cared for pets, and handled her finances. R. 20.
The ALJ also observed that Schoch alleged that she struggled with interpersonal interactions,
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but she acknowledged attending church multiple times a week and maintaining friendships.
R. 21. The ALJ also noted that Schoch alleged that she could only pay attention for about
15 minutes but reported that she occasionally made art with her sister for a few hours. R. 21,
60. The ALJ didn’t err in concluding that Schoch’s ability to participate in her daily activities
“is not completely consistent with [her] allegations of disabling functional limitations.” R. 23.
Schoch resists this conclusion. She argues that, even if the ALJ properly considered her
daily activities, the ALJ did not explain the inconsistencies between those activities and her
symptoms. Dkt. 12, at 5. But Schoch admits that the ALJ discussed those inconsistencies in
the “paragraph B” section of his opinion. Id. ALJs need only conduct an analysis once; they
don’t have to repeat a substantially similar analysis in another section of their opinion.
Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 903 (7th Cir. 2021).
3. 	Conservative treatment
Schoch contends that the ALJ failed to adequately articulate his reasons for discounting
Schoch’s treatment history when he concluded that Schoch’s treatment “has been very
conservative.” R. 24. An ALJ may consider a claimant’s conservative treatment in evaluating
her symptoms. Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 749 (7th Cir. 2022). But the ALJ must do more
than make a passing reference to a claimant’s treatment history; he must explain why the
treatment was conservative or provide record support for his conclusion. Swiecichowski v. Dudek,
133 F.4th 751, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2025).
In this case, the ALJ sufficiently explained why he found Schoch’s treatment to be “very
conservative.” In the “paragraph B” section of his opinion, the ALJ reasoned that Schoch’s
mental impairments were adequately managed because they were “successfully controlled with
psychotropic medications and/or therapy” and she “did not require psychiatric hospitalizations
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or in-patient care.” R. 22. To support his conclusion, the ALJ cited two documents detailing
Schoch’s treatment plan, both of which indicate that Schoch’s mental impairments were
treated with cognitive behavior therapy. R. 434–46, 703–16. Given the deference owed to an
ALJ’s factual determinations, the court declines to second-guess the ALJ’s characterization of
Schoch’s treatment. Liapis v. O’Malley, No. 23-cv-0063-jdp, 2024 WL 4344745, at *5 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 30, 2024).
B. Residual functional capacity assessment
Schoch contends that the ALJ failed to adequately articulate why the evidence
supported the limitations in his RFC findings. Dkt. 6, at 14–17. The ALJ found that, despite
Schoch’s mental impairments, she was capable of the following:
• 	Understand, remember, or carry out only simple instructions and tasks in a
work environment with few, if any, changes in the work duties or expectations
• 	Perform work with daily, weekly or monthly quotas[,] but [she] is precluded
from work with a specific production-rate pace, such as assembly line work or
work with strict hourly quotas
• 	Occasional contact with the public[,] but [she] is precluded from work involving
direct customer service
• 	Occasional interaction with coworkers or supervisors after a short training
period, but [she] can perform tandem tasks with coworkers on only an
incidental basis (for example, she can work around others, share tools or help
lift or carry items as needed[,] but [she] is precluded from work that routinely
requires additional cooperative effort with other coworkers to complete a
process or create a product)
R. 22. In reaching these RFC findings, the ALJ largely rejected the prior administrative medical
findings and medical opinions as either partially persuasive, less persuasive, or unpersuasive.
R. 25–26. Schoch acknowledges that the ALJ was free to reject these prior findings and medical
opinions, and she doesn’t challenge the ALJ’s handling of that evidence. See Dkt. 6, at 16.
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But Schoch argues that the ALJ erred because, after rejecting the prior findings and
medical opinions, the ALJ didn’t point to other objective medical evidence to support his RFC
findings. See id. at 16–17. ALJs aren’t allowed to “play doctor” by rejecting all the available
medical opinions and substituting their own lay interpretations of the objective medical
evidence in the record. Deborah M., 994 F.3d at 790; see Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. Instead, they
must explain why their RFC findings are supported by other objective medical evidence in the
record. Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 497–98 (7th Cir. 2019); Vang v. Saul, 805 F. App’x
398, 401–02 (7th Cir. 2020).
Schoch contends that the ALJ failed to build a logical bridge connecting the evidence in
the record to his conclusions because the ALJ didn’t conduct a detailed analysis of the evidence
in the RFC section of his decision. Dkt. 6, at 14–15. True, some of the ALJ’s discussion of the
evidence appears in a different portion of his decision (his step two analysis). R. 20–22. But the
court must consider the ALJ’s decision holistically. Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n.5 (7th
Cir. 2004). The question is whether the ALJ weighed the relevant medical evidence and
explained how he determined Schoch’s functional limitations. See Jozefyk, 923 F.3d at 498; Stone
v. Saul, No. 19-cv-435-wmc, 2020 WL 3603775, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 2, 2020).
The ALJ properly explained why his RFC findings were supported by objective medical
evidence in the record. The ALJ based his RFC findings on Schoch’s clinical examinations and
psychological evaluations. See R. 20–24. He also credited some of Schoch’s self-reported
symptoms. See id. For example, the ALJ noted that Schoch alleged she had “problems with her
ability to remember, understand, and follow instructions.” R. 20. The ALJ concluded that
Schoch’s daily activities (preparing simple meals and caring for pets) and her clinical
examinations (tests of her ability to recall information) didn’t support her reported degree of
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limitation. 	See id. 	But 	he 	nevertheless 	tailored 	his 	RFC 	findings 	to 	accommodate 	her
limitations: he found Schoch could “understand, remember, or carry out only simple
instructions and tasks.” R. 22.
Schoch also contends that the ALJ “did not explain why [Schoch] was limited in her
work pace but not restricted in her ability to otherwise concentrate and persist at work tasks,”
given that one medical professional found that she took an excessive amount of time to
complete a test. Dkt. 6, at 16. But the ALJ incorporated concentration- and persistence-related
limitations into his RFC findings by limiting Schoch to simple tasks with few changes in work
expectations and by precluding her from work with production requirements such as strict
hourly quotas. R. 22; see Martin, 950 F.3d at 374. Schoch does not point to any evidence that
additional limitations were needed that the ALJ failed to consider.
C. Medical opinion
Schoch contends that the ALJ didn’t adequately explain why he discounted as less
persuasive the opinion by Tamara Laskowski, a licensed therapist. Dkt. 6, at 17–18. Schoch
argues that the ALJ erred because his reasons for discounting Laskowski’s opinion do not apply
to Laskowski’s finding that Schoch would have “good days” and “bad days,” and would likely
be absent from work more than four days per month. R. 472. But the ALJ rejected Laskowski’s
opinion because it wasn’t consistent with the objective medical evidence, reasoning which
would also apply Laskowski’s absenteeism finding. See R. 26. The ALJ adequately explained
why he found Laskowski’s opinion to be less persuasive.
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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that: the decision of the commissioner is AFFIRMED. The clerk of
court is directed to enter judgment and close the case.
Entered March 27, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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