Stechauner, Matthew v. Baxter, Matthew, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
MATTHEW C. STECHAUNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW BAXTER, KELLEN STURZ,
ERIC NORMAN, SUE BOOKER, MARC OLTRA,
and KEVIN FROST, 1
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
24-cv-111-jdp
Plaintiff Matthew C. Stechauner, proceeding without counsel, is currently incarcerated
at New Lisbon Correctional Institution. When Stechauner was at Oshkosh Correctional
Institution, another inmate sexually assaulted him by patting his buttocks. Stechauner alleges
that this was caused by a correctional officer telling the other inmate confidential information
that the DOC had assessed Stechauner with a high risk of being sexually victimized by other
inmates. Stechauner also alleges that prison officials kept him and the other inmate housed
together on the same unit following the assault. I allowed Stechauner to proceed on Eighth
Amendment claims about these events.
Both sides move for summary judgment. Because the undisputed facts show that an
officer only negligently disclosed the confidential information to other prisoners, and that
Stechauner was kept housed separately from his attacker, I will deny Stechauner’s motion for
summary judgment, grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and dismiss the case.
1 I have amended the caption to reflect defendants’ names as provided in their filings.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
Plaintiff Matthew Stechauner was housed at Oshkosh Correctional Institution during
the events relevant to this lawsuit. Defendants all worked at Oshkosh Correctional Institution:
Matthew Baxter and Kevin Frost were correctional officers, Marc Oltra was a correctional
sergeant, and Sue Booker, Eric Norman, and Kellen Sturz were supervising officers.
This case concerns Stechauner’s designation as an inmate with a high risk of being
sexually abused by other inmates. The DOC designates certain inmates as having a high risk
of being sexually abused and others as having a high risk of sexually abusing fellow inmates.
These classifications are used to inform staff making housing and bed assignments in an
attempt to keep inmates who are at high risk of being sexually victimized separate from those
who are at high risk of being sexually abusive. These classifications are confidential information
and are not to be shared with the inmates themselves.
On October 7, 2022, defendant Baxter was given instructions to move Stechauner into
a different cell with a new cellmate. But in updating the housing assignments on the DOC’s
computer system, Baxter saw that Stechauner was designated as having a high risk of being
sexually abused, and the proposed new cellmate was designated as having a high risk of sexually
abusing fellow inmates.
Baxter called Stechauner over to the officer station to tell him that he could not room
with 	the 	proposed 	new 	cellmate. 	Twice 	during 	this 	conversation, 	Baxter 	mentioned
Stechauner’s designation as an inmate with a high risk of being sexually abused. According to
Baxter, one of the times he mentioned this designation, another inmate was present at the
officer station; I take him to mean it was the proposed new cellmate. Stechauner says that two
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other inmates, including Ryan Hodge, were also “hanging out right by the officer station” and
overheard Baxter disclose Stechauner’s designation as an inmate with a high risk of being
sexually abused. Dkt. 79, ¶ 15. Baxter’s supervisors later told Baxter that he should not have
disclosed that information.
Stechauner says that this disclosure led to Hodge sexually assaulting him four days later.
Video footage of the dayroom shows that on October 11, 2022, at about 3:53 p.m., Stechauner
was bending over at a table. Hodge approached Stechauner from behind, patted his buttocks,
and walked past him. See Dkt. 61-5 (placeholder docket entry for the footage), at 00:11–00:13.
Hodge then walked back toward Stechauner while saying something (the footage doesn’t
include audio); Stechauner kicked at Hodge, and about ten seconds later he walked away from
Hodge. Id. at 00:14–00:33.
Stechauner says that defendant Oltra witnessed the assault, and that Stechauner told
defendants Oltra and Frost about it immediately afterward. Oltra and Frost deny seeing the
assault or Stechauner telling them about it.
Defendant Sturz started a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) investigation into the
incident at about 5:00 p.m. by interviewing Stechauner. Sturz then viewed the dayroom video
footage. Hodge was placed in temporary lockup; Stechauner says that this occurred at 6:50
p.m.
Stechauner and Hodge were then housed in different units until Stechauner was
transferred out of Oshkosh Correctional Institution on November 15, 2022, except for a period
when both Stechauner and Hodge were housed in the restricted housing unit.
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Stechauner says that during the period that he and Hodge were housed in different
units, Hodge spoke with him once, to gloat about receiving only 30 days in segregation for the
assault.
I will discuss additional facts as they are relevant to the analysis.
ANALYSIS
I granted Stechauner leave to proceed on the following Eighth Amendment claims:
• 	Defendant Baxter discussed Stechauner’s high risk-of-victimization designation
in front of other inmates, leading to his assault.
• 	Defendants Oltra, Frost, Sturz, Norman, and Booker left Stechauner housed
with Hodge after the assault.
A. Defendant Baxter
I’ll start with Stechauner’s claim that defendant Baxter caused the assault to happen
because 	days 	earlier 	he 	disclosed 	to 	inmates 	Stechauner’s 	high 	risk-of-victimization
designation.
There is a preliminary issue regarding this claim that I must address. In his summary
judgment briefing, Stechauner contends that DOC officials intentionally destroyed video
evidence of Baxter disclosing his designation to other inmates to harm Stechauner’s case, and
he seeks sanctions against defendants. Dkt. 69, at 3.
A sanction for spoliation may be appropriate when the movant shows both that the
opposing party knew or should have known that litigation was imminent and that the party
destroyed the evidence in bad faith. See Fitzpatrick v. Nys, 861 F. App’x 108, 110 (7th Cir.
2021). Stechauner hasn’t made this showing. Stechauner states that he wrote to the security
director a day after Baxter’s disclosure, but that communication doesn’t contain a request to
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preserve the video. Dkt. 72-2, at 1. In the grievance that he later filed about Baxter’s disclosure,
he asked the complaint examiner to review footage that he asked the security director to
preserve, Dkt. 44-3, at 1, but his supporting documents show that the only footage that he
specifically asked the security director to be preserved was the footage of the assault itself (as
well as footage from an unrelated June 2022 incident), Dkt. 72-2, at 3–6.
Defendants’ briefing focuses on Stechauner’s failure to properly request the footage;
they don’t explain why their own duty to preserve evidence wasn’t triggered by Stechauner’s
letter to the security director or his grievance about the issue (although in their discovery
responses they do note that the particular footage would have been recorded over about a week
after the incident. Dkt. 47-1, at 6). Regardless, Stechauner provides no evidence suggesting
that the destruction of this footage was done in bad faith, so I will deny his motion for
sanctions. Stechauner also doesn’t suggest how he is prejudiced at the summary judgment stage,
because defendants concede that Baxter made this disclosure, and I will accept as true
Stechauner’s firsthand account regarding the details of the disclosure for purposes of opposing
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Turning to the substance of Stechauner’s claim against Baxter, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits prison officials from consciously disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “‘Because officials have taken away
virtually all of a prisoner’s ability to protect himself, the Constitution imposes on officials the
duty to protect those in their charge from harm from other prisoners.’” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d
563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001)). To
maintain an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, a prisoner must show that he was
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and that the
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defendant consciously disregarded that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[T]he official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Defendants 	concede 	that 	Baxter 	indeed 	disclosed 	Stechauner’s 	high 	risk-of-
victimization designation to at least one other inmate, but they argue that (1) there’s no proof
that the disclosure caused the assault; and (2) that Baxter’s disclosure was only negligent, which
doesn’t violate the Eighth Amendment.
I disagree with defendants on the first point. Stechauner doesn’t explain precisely how
close Hodge was to Baxter and Stechauner as Baxter disclosed his high risk-of-victimization
designation, but a jury could reasonably infer that Hodge was within earshot and heard that
disclosure. Given that Hodge assaulted Stechauner only days later, a reasonable jury could also
infer that Hodge was motivated to do so at least in part by his knowledge of Stechauner’s high
risk-of-victimization designation; presumably this information is ordinarily kept confidential
in part to avoid inviting assaults upon inmates deemed vulnerable.
However, I agree with defendants on the second point. In granting Stechauner leave to
proceed on his claim against Baxter, I stated that Stechauner “alleges that defendant Baxter
did more than ignore a risk of harm; he knowingly introduced it by discussing Stechauner’s
victimization-risk 	designation 	in 	front 	of 	other 	inmates, 	one 	of 	whom 	then 	slapped
Stechauner’s buttocks.” Dkt. 26, at 4. But the parties’ summary judgment materials give more
context to Baxter’s disclosure. It is undisputed that Baxter disclosed that information as part
of his explanation to Stechauner and another inmate for refusing to house them together
because the other inmate was deemed a high risk to assault others. That is, Stechauner’s desire
to avoid a risk of victimization led to Baxter’s disclosure of confidential information. There’s
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no indication that Baxter directly told Hodge this information for the purposes of embarrassing
Stechauner or putting him in danger; rather Hodge overheard it as Baxter was explaining his
decision to Stechauner and another inmate. So while Baxter disclosing this information where
other inmates could hear him violated DOC policies and was clearly ill-advised, a reasonable
jury could conclude only that Baxter was negligent in doing so. Negligence isn’t enough to
violate the Eighth Amendment. See Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2015) (“the
infliction of suffering on prisoners can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that
infliction is either deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law sense” (internal quotation
omitted)). Therefore, I will deny Stechauner’s motion for summary judgment and I will grant
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.
B. Other defendants
Stechauner contends that defendants Oltra, Frost, Sturz, Norman, and Booker left
Stechauner housed with Hodge after the assault. There are two aspects to these claims:
(1) Oltra and Frost waited at least an hour to report Hodge’s sexual assault of Stechauner; and
(2) Sturz, Norman, and Booker kept Stechauner housed in the same unit as Hodge even after
an investigation was started.
The parties dispute whether Oltra and Frost witnessed the assault firsthand and when
whether Stechauner alerted them of the assault later that day. But for purposes of opposing
defendants’ summary judgment motion I will credit Stechauner’s account; he states that Oltra
saw the assault as it happened and he quickly told Oltra and Frost about it, but Sturz’s PREA
investigation wasn’t started for an hour. Nobody separated Stechauner and Hodge until about
three hours after the incident, when Hodge was sent to temporary lockup.
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Stechauner contends that PREA policies required he and Hodge to be separated and an
investigation to be commenced immediately. But the mere fact that an internal prison policy
was violated doesn’t itself prove a constitutional violation. See Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235,
1238 (7th Cir. 1996). Rather, Stechauner must show that Oltra and Frost disregarded a risk
of harm and that he was injured by that disregard. See Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th
Cir. 2020). This is where Stechauner’s claims against Oltra and Frost fail: he provides no
evidence that he was harmed by this one-hour delay in initiating the investigation or the longer
delay in separating him from Hodge. So I will deny his motion for summary judgment and I
will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims.
That leaves Stechauner’s claims against Sturz, Norman, and Booker for keeping
Stechauner in the same unit as Hodge even after an investigation was started. The undisputed
facts contradict Stechauner’s allegations. DOC housing records show that Hodge was sent to
temporary lockup in the restricted housing unit after Sturz started his investigation. Then
Stechauner and Hodge were housed in separate units for the remainder of Stechauner’s time
at the prison, with one exception: there was a portion of time that they were both placed in the
restricted housing unit. But it is undisputed that inmates in that solitary-confinement unit
cannot contact each other. So counter to Stechauner’s allegations, prison officials addressed
the risk of harm by keeping them separated.
It is also undisputed that despite these placements, Hodge made contact with
Stechauner once after their separation: on November 12, 2022, Stechauner reported that
Hodge approached him “outside in front of [Stechauner’s] unit” and told him that “he got
away with slapping [Stechauner] on [his] ass and he only got 30 days in segregation for sexually
assaulting [Stechauner].” Dkt. 80, ¶ 6. Hodge was immediately placed back in temporary
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lockup after Stechauner reported this incident. Defendants state that although inmates may
not enter other units, it is possible for inmates housed in different units to walk past another
inmate’s unit during movements. Stechauner argues that Hodge should not even have been
housed in the same prison with him. But as defendants argue, the Eighth Amendment requires
prison officials only to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Boyce
v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). From these facts,
no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants disregarded the risk of harm to Stechauner
based on a single chance encounter despite officials deliberately housing the two inmates in
separate units. Therefore I will deny Stechauner’s motion for summary judgment and I will
grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on these claims. Because none of Stechauner’s
claims survive summary judgment, this entire case will be dismissed.2
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	The caption is AMENDED as reflected in the caption above.
2. 	Plaintiff’s motion for spoliation sanctions, Dkt. 69, is DENIED.
3. 	Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 57, is GRANTED.
4. 	Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 69, is DENIED.
2 Defendants also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because I am dismissing
Stechauner’s Eighth Amendment claims on the merits, I need not consider defendants’
qualified immunity arguments.
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5. 	The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
Entered March 11, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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