Weir v. Darden Restaurants et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
GODFREY WEIR,
Plaintiff,
v.
DARDEN RESTAURANTS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS COMPLAINT AND
DENY MOTION
Case No. 4:26-cv-00001-AMA-PK
District Judge Ann Marie McIff Allen
Magistrate Judge Paul Kohler
This matter is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1 Plaintiff
filed his Complaint2 on January 5, 2026, therein alleging that Defendants had wrongfully withheld
his wages in September of 2014. Following a Memorandum Decision and Order (“M&O”)
directing Plaintiff to remedy issues in his Complaint,3 Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint,4
and a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (“Motion”).5 For the reasons
discussed below, the undersigned recommends the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action as Plaintiff’s
claims do not survive the applicable statutes of limitation. Furthermore, the undersigned
recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that
would show that he is entitled to relief and because the proposed Second Amended Complaint fails
to remedy any of the deficiencies present in the current Amended Complaint.
1 Docket No. 14.
2 Docket No. 1.
3 Docket No. 10.
4 Docket No. 11.
5 Docket No. 12.
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 1
of 8

2
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January 5, 2026, therein alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act6 and fraudulent concealment, and asserting that this Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).7 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on September 12, 2014, his
employer failed to pay him wages and “f[r]audulently concealed and unjustly enriched
themselves” in violation of the law.8 On the civil coversheet for his Complaint, Plaintiff selected
several options for the “Nature of the Suit” section, including checking of boxes in the “Civil
Rights” subsection including “Other Civil rights” and “Employment/Housing,”9 but nowhere in
his Complaint or Civil Cover Sheet did he elaborate upon any violations of that nature.
Additionally, Plaintiff selected diversity jurisdiction as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.
On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff was granted temporary leave to proceed in forma pauperis
without the payment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.10 The undersigned concurrently entered
an Order to Show Cause requiring Plaintiff to explain why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon an amount-in-controversy issue.11
Following the receipt of Plaintiff’s response to the Order to Show Cause,12 the undersigned
issued an M&O directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint remedying several issues with his
initial Complaint and response to the Order to Show Cause.13 Relevant here, the M&O instructed
6 29 U.S.C. §§201–19.
7 Docket No. 1-1, at 1.
8 Docket No. 1, at 4.
9 Docket No. 1-1, at 1.
10 Docket No. 7.
11 Docket No. 6, at 2.
12 Docket No. 9.
13 Docket No. 10.
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 2
of 8

3
Plaintiff to remedy the lack of facts asserted in support of his claim that this Court had federal
question jurisdiction over the case, highlighting Plaintiff’s failure to refute that the statute of
limitations had run on Plaintiff’s claims of wrongfully withheld wages.14 Additionally, the Court
concluded that Plaintiffs allegations under Title VII were lacking in factual basis.15
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint,16 therein claiming that the Court has jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as the alleged wrongful acts
amount to violations under the FLSA, and Plaintiff added that the withholding of wages also
violates the Utah Payment of Wages Act (“UPWA”).17 Plaintiff removed his inadequately pleaded
Title VII claim. Seven days later, Plaintiff has now filed a Motion,18 requesting to, yet again, amend
his complaint to include his assertion that the circumstances surrounding the alleged withholding
of wages amount to violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19
II. DISCUSSION
28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs all cases where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss a cause of action filed IFP at
any time the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or if the litigant seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such a claim. Here, after a review of the Amended Complaint and the Motion and for the
reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s Motion be denied and that this
14 Id. at 4–7.
15 Id. at 7–9.
16 Docket No. 11.
17 Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-1, et seq.).
18 Docket Nos. 12, 12-1.
19 42 US.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 3
of 8

4
action be dismissed. First, Plaintiff’s main cause of action—the wrongful withholding of wages,
as asserted under the FLSA and now under the UPWA—falls victim to a statute of limitations
issue. Secondly, Plaintiff’s allegations of violations under Title VII contained in his Proposed
Second Amended Complaint are not sufficiently pleaded.
A. Statute of Limitations
The Tenth Circuit has explained that “[a] complaint may be dismissed sua
sponte under § 1915 based on an affirmative defense—such as statute of limitations—only when
the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to
be developed.”20 Applicable here, an FLSA cause of action alleging a violation due to an issue of
unpaid wages is time-barred “unless commenced within two years after the cause of action
accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within
three years after the cause of action accrued.”21 Stated another way, “[t]he FLSA generally imposes
a two-year statute of limitations unless the defendant’s violations are shown to be willful, in which
case a three-year period applies.”22
In his Amended Complaint and his proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant withheld wages over ten years ago, in September of 2014. The incident clearly falls
well outside of the permitted time as dictated by FLSA to bring a claim to recoup on these types
of alleged losses. Even reviewing Plaintiff’s claims conservatively, namely assuming without
20 Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
21 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
22 Mumby v. Pure Energy Servs. (USA), Inc., 636 F. 3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 255(a)).
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 4
of 8

5
deciding that Defendant did act willfully in withholding any of Plaintiff’s wages, the claim is
time-barred. Therefore, the undersigned recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s FLSA claim.
In addition to his federal claim, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim under UPWA. However,
claims under UPWA are to be brought within three years of alleged bad acts.23 Therefore, Plaintiff’s
state law claim is also time-barred. Alternatively, aside from the fact that Plaintiff’s state-law claim
also suffers from a statute of limitations issue, a “district court[] may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction” over a state-law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.”24 The Tenth Circuit has stated that “[w]hen all federal
claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction
over any remaining state claims.”25 In deciding whether to retain jurisdiction, the Court considers
factors including “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”26 Taking
these factors into consideration, if the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claim it is then
appropriate for the Court to also dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim. Therefore, the undersigned
recommends that the Court dismiss the state law claim as well or, alternatively, decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.
23 See Scholzen v. Scholzen Prods. Co., No. 4:20-cv-00019-DN-PK, 2020 WL 7630801, at
*6 (D. Utah, Dec. 22, 2020) (plaintiff brought a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-9.5, for
which the court concluded that “[a] personal wage claim would appear to be an action afforded
‘for liability created by the statutes of the state,’ for which the three-year statute of limitations
[found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(4)] is applicable.”)
24 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
25 Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. City of
Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998)); see Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (“[A] case properly belongs in state court . . . when the
federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims
remain.”); see also Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 13D Federal Practice & Procedure §
3567.3 (3d ed. 2019) (“As a general matter, a court will decline supplemental jurisdiction if the
underlying [federal] claims are dismissed before trial.”).
26 Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350.
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 5
of 8

6
B. Insufficient Facts Alleged in Proposed Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint fails to remedy the statute of limitations
deficiencies in his Amended Complaint and further fails to allege facts that would establish his
proposed Title VII claims. Though the Court “should freely give leave’” for a Plaintiff to amend
his or her complaint “when justice so requires,”27 “[a] court properly may deny a motion for leave
to amend as futile when the proposed amended complaint would be subject to dismissal for any
reason.”28
The Tenth Circuit has explained that compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
requires a plaintiff to identify “what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it;
how the defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes
the defendant violated.”29 These requirements are designed to provide the opposing party with fair
notice of the claims against it and allow the Court to conclude that, if proven, the allegations show
that Plaintiff is entitled to relief.30 Additionally, the complaint must state more than “labels and
conclusions” and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”31 In other words, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
28 E.SPIRE Commc’ns, Inc. v. N. M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 392 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.
2004) (quoting Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 562 (10th Cir. 1997)).
29 Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007).
30 Id.
31 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 6
of 8

7
that is plausible on its face.’”32 Absent compliance with the requirements, a case faces dismissal.33
Pertinent here, in order to show a prima facie case for racial discrimination in violation of Title
VII, a plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts supporting that “(1) he belongs to a protected class,
(2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse employment action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”34
Plaintiff asserts in his Motion that he has “obtained additional information material to wage
theft and discrimination claims,”35 yet in his Proposed Second Amended Complaint, he proffers
no new “information” beyond conclusory statements that have plagued his complaints and
responses throughout this case.36 For example, in support of his “Discrimination and Retaliation
Claim,” Plaintiff only asserts “that Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices
prohibited by Title VII, including discrimination and retaliation connected to his employment” and
“Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s federally protected rights, resulting in financial injury,
emotional distress, and impairment of professional opportunities.”37 The allegations that Plaintiff
filed a charge of discrimination and received a right to sue letter do not better.38 Even affording
32 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
33 See Freeman v. IRS, No. 24-3038-JWL, 2024 WL 2721764, at *2 (D. Kan., May 28,
2024) (“When a plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 8, this Court is authorized to dismiss the
complaint”) (citing Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1162 n.3).
34 Wilson v. Textron Aviation, Inc., 820 F. App’x. 688, 692 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted).
35 Docket No. 12, at 1.
36 See Docket No. 12-1, at 2.
37 Id.
38 Id.; see also Docket No. 12-2 (“The EEOC is closing this charge because the facts
alleged in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the laws enforced by EEOC.”).
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 7
of 8

8
Plaintiff the leniency entitled to pro se plaintiffs,39 liberal construction “does not relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be
based,”40 and Plaintiff has failed to produce facts that satisfy his required burden. Therefore, based
on this and Plaintiff’s “failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,”41 the
undersigned recommends the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court:
• DISMISS Plaintiff’s cause of action; and
• DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.
The court will send copies of this report and recommendation to Plaintiff who is hereby
notified of his right to object to it. Any objection must be filed within fourteen days of service. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to object may constitute waiver of objections
upon subsequent review.
Signed February 18, 2026.
PAUL KOHLER
United States Magistrate Judge
39 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A pro se litigant’s pleadings
are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”)
40 Id.
41 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Case 4:26-cv-00001-AMA Document 15 Filed 02/18/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 8
of 8