Harris v. Purgatory Correctional Facility et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
STEVEN MATTHEW HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WASHINGTON COUNTY,
PURGATORY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY, WASHINGTON COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, KYLE BIGELOW,
GARRET MCKEAN, SGT. LACIE
CROWTHER, DEP. KEVIN M.
LARSON, DEP. BRICE LUBITZ, DEP.
JOHN JACOBS, DEP. LACEY ADAMS,
DEP. ANDREW MILLER, DEP. TYLER
TAIT, DEP. JAY B. CHADWICK, DEP.
CORTNEY CHEEMAN, DEP. BAILEE
W. MABE, DEP. KAITLYN JOHNSON,
WARDEN, AND OFFICER J.
DICKERSON,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT
DICKERSON’S OBJECTION TO
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION
Case No. 4:25-cv-00018-AMA-PK
District Judge Ann Marie McIff Allen
Magistrate Judge Paul Kohler
Before the Court is Defendant Dickerson’s Objection1 to Judge Kohler’s Order2 denying
Defendant Dickerson’s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and to Stay Plaintiff’s Deposition.3
Plaintiff opposed Defendant Dickerson’s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and to Stay
Plaintiff’s Deposition.4 For the reasons below, Defendant Dickerson’s Objection is overruled,
1 ECF No. 102, filed December 29, 2025.
2 ECF No. 101, filed December 23, 2025.
3 ECF No. 99.
4 ECF No. 100.
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Judge Kohler’s Decision is affirmed, and the Motion to Amend Scheduling Order and to Stay
Plaintiff’s Deposition is denied.
BACKGROUND
On February 24, 2025, Plaintiff Steven Matthew Harris initiated this action, bringing
various § 1983 claims against Purgatory Correctional Facility, Washington County Sherriff’s
Office, Kyle Bigelow, Garrett McKean, Sergeant Crowther, Deputy Larsen, Deputy Lubitz, J.
Anderson, Deputy Jacobs, and Purgatory Correctional Facility.5 A Scheduling Order was entered
on August 12, 2025.6 Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, fact discovery closes on January 9,
2026.7
On October 24, 2025, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended
Complaint,8 which Plaintiff subsequently filed on October 30, 2025.9 This Amended Complaint
added, among others, Officer J. Dickerson of the St. George Police Department as a defendant.10
Defendant Dickerson was served the summons and amended complaint on November 25, 2025.11
He then filed his Answer on December 16, 2025.12
On December 2, 2025, a Notice of Deposition was filed indicating that Mr. Mylar,
counsel for all the Defendants other than Defendant Dickerson, will take Plaintiff’s deposition in
West Virginia on January 7, 2026, beginning at 9:30 AM EST.13 Defendant Dickerson’s counsel,
5 ECF No. 1.
6 ECF No. 41.
7 Id.
8 ECF No. 61.
9 ECF No. 62.
10 Id.
11 ECF No. 84.
12 ECF No. 96.
13 ECF No. 93.
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Mr. Young, was notified via email of this deposition on December 9, 2025.14 On December 15,
2025, Mr. Young received a Notice of Hearing setting a hearing in an unassociated matter for
January 7, 2026, at 11:00 AM MDT.15 On December 19, 2025, Defendant Dickerson filed a
Motion to Extend Fact Discovery and Stay Plaintiff’s Deposition.16 In that Motion, Defendant
Dickerson argued that his counsel had not had time to review the disclosures of the other parties
and that his counsel could not attend Plaintiff’s Deposition due to another hearing.17 Plaintiff
filed an opposition that same day,18 asserting that, among other arguments, Defendant’s counsel
had notice of the deposition prior to receiving notice of the hearing and had the ability to
reschedule the hearing.19
The Magistrate Judge denied Defendant Dickerson’s Motion on December 23, 2025.20 In
doing so, the Magistrate Judge denied without prejudice Defendant Dickerson’s request to
extend fact discovery.21
Defendant Dickerson filed the instant Objection on December 29, 2025,22 within fourteen
days of the issuance of the Magistrate Judge’s Order.23
14 ECF No. 102, Ex. 1.
15 Id., Ex. 2.
16 ECF No. 99.
17 Id. at 4.
18 ECF No. 100.
19 Id. at 2.
20 ECF No. 101.
21 Id.
22 ECF No. 102.
23 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a magistrate judge’s order on a nondispositive matter, “[t]he district judge in
the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is
clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”24 “Under this deferential standard, the court will affirm
the ruling unless the court, exercising independent judgment, ‘is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”25
DISCUSSION
Defendant Dickerson’s Objection is two-fold. First, Defendant Dickerson contends that the
Magistrate Judge erred in ruling there was not good cause to amend the scheduling order. Second,
Defendant Dickerson contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in ruling there was not good cause
to reschedule Plaintiff’s deposition. The Court will address each objection in turn.
A. 	AMEND SCHEDULING ORDER
Defendant Dickerson argues that good cause exists to modify the Scheduling Order to
extend fact discovery, and thus the Magistrate Judge erred in declining to do so.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” To establish good cause, the
moving party must show that it could not have met the scheduling order deadline despite the
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Defendant Dickerson brings his
objection pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), which governs a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on dispositive matters. This is in error. The underlying motion was not a
dispositive motion. Rather, it addressed discovery- and scheduling-related issues.
25 Amann v. Off. of Utah Att’y Gen., No. 2:18-cv-00341-JNP-DAO, 2023 WL 8283855, at *2 (D.
Utah Nov. 30, 2023) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)).
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movant’s “diligent efforts.”26 In other words, “good cause requires diligence and a conscientious
attempt to comply with the Court’s scheduling order. When parties have not done so, the Court
has not found good cause.”27
Defendant Dickerson was served with the Amended Complaint on November 25, 2025.28
The Scheduling Order provides that fact discovery closes on January 9, 2026.29 Defendant
Dickerson contends that this is not enough time for him to complete fact discovery. While the
Court sympathizes with Defendant Dickerson and agrees that this is a short period of time,
Defendant Dickerson’s arguments do not set forth anything regarding diligence or conscientious
attempts to comply with the Scheduling Order. Indeed, in his Motion, Defendant Dickerson
simply states that his counsel had not yet had time to review the other Parties’ disclosures but
does not offer any reason why this was so.30
Furthermore, Defendant Dickerson’s arguments ignore a significant element of the
Magistrate Judge’s Order. Although the Magistrate Judge did decline to amend the Scheduling
Order, the Magistrate Judge also ordered that “Defendant Dickerson is free to renew his request
to amend the scheduling order to allow him sufficient time to complete discovery.”31 Thus,
Defendant Dickerson’s opportunity to extend fact discovery has not been foreclosed.
Overall, Defendant Dickerson has failed to establish that the Magistrate Judge’s decision
to decline to amend the Scheduling Order without prejudice is clearly erroneous. Therefore, the
26 Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014).
27 People’s Tr. Fed. Credit Union v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 350 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1145
(D.N.M. 2018).
28 ECF No. 84.
29 ECF No. 41.
30 ECF No. 99 at 4.
31 ECF No. 101.
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Court overrules this objection. If Defendant Dickerson still wishes to extend fact discovery, he
may renew his request by filing another Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
B. 	RESCHEDULE DEPOSITION
Defendant Dickerson argues that good cause exists to reschedule Plaintiff’s deposition,
which is scheduled to occur in West Virgina on January 7, 2026, beginning at 9:30 AM EST,
with an option to attend remotely via Zoom.32 According to Defendant Dickerson, his counsel,
Mr. Young, has a hearing on January 7, 2026, at 11:00 AM MDT, and thus cannot attend the
deposition. Defendant Dickerson asserts that the deposition was scheduled before he was named
a defendant; that he has offered to reschedule in January or February; and, without citation to any
legal authority, that proceeding with the deposition will deprive him of his due process right to
depose Plaintiff.
The docket indicates that Defendant Dickerson is represented by three attorneys,33 yet
Defendant Dickerson provides no explanation as to why his other two attorneys cannot attend the
deposition. Moreover, it seems to the Court that Defendant Dickerson may fail to identify and
ground his arguments in the proper procedural basis for his requested relief. In his Objection, as
well as in the underlying Motion, Defendant Dickerson seems to assume the request falls under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), which governs the modification of a scheduling order.
But this deposition date is not in the Scheduling Order34 nor was it set by the Court; instead, it is
a date upon which the Plaintiff and the other Defendants have agreed.35 Defendant Dickerson
32 ECF No. 93; ECF No. 102, Ex. 1.
33 See also ECF No. 96.
34 See ECF No. 41.
35 ECF No. 93.
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does not offer any argument or authority that Rule 16(b)(4) authorizes the Court to modify the
Parties’ personal calendars and reschedule depositions the Parties have set.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), on the other hand, does give “courts discretion to
enter a protective order establishing the time and place of a deposition.”36 “The court may, for
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . (B) specifying terms, including time and
place . . . for the disclosure or discovery[.]”37 To establish good cause, the party seeking the
protective order must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished
from stereotyped and conclusory statements.”38
Defendant Dickerson did not move for a protective order under Rule 26(c), and neither
his Objection nor his Motion mentions the Rule. And, again, he has only provided that one of his
three attorneys has a conflict with the deposition. Thus, the Court cannot say that the Magistrate
Judge’s decision to deny Defendant Dickerson’s request to stay Plaintiff’s deposition and to
order the deposition to proceed as scheduled is clearly erroneous. Defendant Dickerson’s
objection is overruled.
36 Borsody v. FedEx Ground, No. 24-2073-HLT-ADM, 2024 WL 4692127, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov.
6, 2024).
37 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
38 Borsody, 2024 WL 4692127, at *1 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16
(1981)).
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Defendant Dickerson’s Objection
(ECF No. 102), AFFIRMS Judge Kohler’s Decision (ECF No. 101), and DENIES the Motion to
Amend Scheduling Order and to Stay Plaintiff’s Deposition (ECF No. 99).
DATED this 30th day of December 2025.
Ann Marie McIff Allen
United States District Judge
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