Young v. City of St. George, Utah

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
ADAM YOUNG, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, UTAH, a
government entity,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER
AND JUDGMENT
Case No. 4:25-cv-00016-DN
District Judge David Nuffer
This case was dismissed without prejudice and judgment entered for failure to comply
with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The following day, after entry of the
final judgment, Plaintiff Adam Young filed a Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment
(“Motion”) seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 The Motion has been fully briefed; Defendant City of St. George, Utah (the “City”)
filed a response opposing the Motion, and Mr. Young filed his reply.3 Based upon the analysis
set forth below, the Motion4 is DENIED.
1 Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing the Case Without Prejudice (“Dismissal Order”), docket no. 8, filed
June 20, 2025; see also Judgment in a Civil Case (“Judgment”), docket no. 9, filed June 23, 2025
2 Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment, docket no. 11, filed June 24, 2025.
3 Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment (“Response”), docket no. 16, filed
July 17, 2025; Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment (“Reply”), docket no. 18,
filed July 31, 2025.
4 Docket no. 11.
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1 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Young filed his Complaint on February 23, 2025.5 Service should have been
completed, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, within 90 days, or by May 24, 2025.
After no proof of service had been filed, a Docket Text Order was entered on May 27, 2025
ordering that Mr. Young
[C]omply with Federal Rule of Procedure 4(m), which requires that defendants be
served with 90 days after the complaint is filed. The docket does not show that
summons has been issued, and no proof of service is on file. Mr. Young must file
proof of service by June 13, 2025, or the action will be dismissed without
prejudice.6
Despite this clear instruction, Proof of Service was not filed on June 13, 2025. Two
weeks after the deadline for filing proof of service, Mr. Young requested the summons from the
clerk of court on June 11, 2025.7 This was more than two weeks after the deadline for
completing service. Due to an oversight by Mr. Young in failing to identify the intended
recipient of the summons, issuance was delayed until June 18, 2025.8 Mr. Young requested
service through a process server on June 19, 2025, and service was completed on June 23, 2025,9
nearly one month after the deadline for completing service The proof of service was filed on
June 24, 2025.10 During the month after the Docket Text Order, and despite the Docket Text
Order warning of dismissal of the action, Mr. Young did not request more time to serve or to file
proof of service.
5 Docket no. 1.
6 Docket no. 5, entered May 24, 2025 (“Order to Show Cause”).
7 Motion at Exhibit A.
8 Motion at 2, ¶ 2.
9 Id. at 2, ¶¶ 3–6.
10 Id.
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On June 20, 2025, the Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure “to comply
with Federal Rule of Civil [Procedure] 4(m) and ‘file proof of service by June 13, 2025.’”11 The
matter was closed on June 20, 2025 and Judgment entered June 24, 2025.12 On June 24, 2025,
the following day, Mr. Young’s counsel filed this Motion and took “full responsibility” and
explained that the reasoning for the delay was because:
As a solo practitioner managing multiple active cases, counsel must carefully
space out litigation efforts in order to give each client’s matter the attention it
deserves. Mr. Young’s counsel provides this context only to clarify that the delay
was not the result of inexcusable neglect or disregard for the Court’s order.”13
For the reasons stated below, Mr. Young’s reasoning for the delay does not meet the standard of
good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances that justify the delay.
2 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Federal Civil Rule of Procedure 4(m) if a defendant has not been served, “the
court—on motion or on its own after notice to plaintiff—must dismiss the action . . . or order that
service be made within a specified time.”14 If a party seeks an extension after the deadline has
passed, the court may extend only upon a showing of good cause or one of the reasons listed in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6)
provide that a party may be relieved from a final judgment or order because of “(1) . . . excusable
11 Dismissal Order at 1.
12 Judgment at 1.
13 Motion at 2, ¶ 7.
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
15 Putnam v. Morris, 833 F.2d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); DUCivR 41-2.
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neglect” or “(6) any other reason that justifies relief.”16 The “good cause” and “excusable
neglect” standards are related. Specifically,
[w]ithout attempting a rigid or all-encompassing definition of ‘good cause’ it
would appear to require at least as much as would be required to show excusable
neglect, as to which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the
rules usually does not suffice, and some showing of ‘good faith on the part of the
party seeking the enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance
within the time specified’ is normally required. The district court is clearly not
compelled to accept a lesser “excusable neglect” showing.17
“‘[G]ood cause’ requires a greater showing than ‘excusable neglect.’”18 “Good cause
comes into play in situations in which there is no fault—excusable or otherwise. In such
situations, the need for an extension is usually occasioned by something that is not within the
control of the movant.”19 “It requires the moving party to show the deadline cannot be met
despite the movant's diligent efforts.”20
To justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must show “extraordinary circumstances”
suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay.21 It is within the court's discretion to determine
whether the moving party has established good cause, excusable neglect, or circumstances
justifying relief.
3 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Young seeks to set aside the Dismissal Order and Judgment. Because the relevant
summons issuance deadline had passed, and judgment has been entered, Mr. Young must show
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also Motion at 1 (noting that Plaintiff has only cited “excusable neglect” and not
“mistake” or “inadvertence” for the delay.)
17 In re Kirkland, 86 F.3d 172, 175 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting Winters v. Teledyne Movible
Offshore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 1306 (5th Cir.1985)); see also Putnam v. Morris, 833 F.2d at 905.
18 Id.
19 Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, 678 F. App'x 697, 700-01 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted).
20 Id. at 701 (quotations and citation omitted).
21 Pioneer Inv. Servs., 507 U.S. at 393.
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good cause, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances justifying setting aside the
Dismissal Order and Judgment. Since good cause requires a greater showing than excusable
neglect, this discussion first considers whether Mr. Young establishes good cause.
3.1 	Young Does Not Show Good Cause
Mr. Young claims good cause in his proposed order setting aside the Dismissal Order and
Judgment. To demonstrate good cause, Mr. Young must “show the deadline [could not] ‘be met
despite movant’s diligent efforts.’”22 The Tenth Circuit “has interpreted the phrase narrowly,
rejecting inadvertence or neglect as ‘good cause’ for untimely service.”23 “Mistake of counsel or
ignorance of the rules also usually do not suffice.”24
Mr. Young learned of the potential for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Rather than
acting, Mr. Young chose to disregard the deadline and warning. Mr. Young’s explanations for
the delay in serving the Complaint stem entirely from his own mistakes—waiting until the last
minute to request issuance of the summons and then failing to include the recipient—as well as
his obliviousness to the applicable rules and the Docket Text Order. Therefore, Mr. Young fails
to establish good cause.
3.2 	Young Does Not Show Excusable Neglect
Mr. Young also seeks relief because his neglect was excusable.25 To determine whether
excusable neglect is shown four factors are considered. In analyzing these four facts “all relevant
circumstances surrounding the party's omission” must be taken into account.26 Those factors are
22 Utah Republican Party, 678 F. App'x at 701 (quoting Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat'l Bank Ass'n, 771
F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014)).
23 In re Kirkland, 86 F.3d at 174.
24 Id.
25 Motion at 3.
26 In re Kirkland, 86 F.3d at 395.
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“[1] the danger of prejudice to the [nonmoving party], [2] the length of the delay and its potential
impact on judicial proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the movant acted in good faith.”27 The Tenth
Circuit has held that the third factor, the fault of delay, is “perhaps the most important single
factor—in determining whether neglect is excusable.”28
Speaking of the third factor, the Tenth Circuit in Putnam v. Morris explained that the trial
court’s findings of fact, which included “no sense of urgency in serving [the defendant]” and “no
effort” to serve the Defendant until after the deadline set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, had not demonstrated excusable neglect.29 “[A]n inadequate explanation for delay,
may, by itself, be sufficient to reject a finding of excusable neglect.”30
Admittedly, here, many of the factors weigh in favor of finding excusable neglect. The
prejudice imposed upon the City is minimal as this case was in its infancy. The length of the
delay is also minimal because the proof of service of the Complaint to the City was filed the day
after the judgment was entered and the case dismissed without prejudice. As to the fourth factor,
there is no evidence that Mr. Young acted in bad faith. Each factor must be met, yet
consideration of the third factor, by itself, undermines the establishment of excusable neglect.
Mr. Young’s explanation for the delay centers on Mr. Young’s counsel’s case load
management and an error in the summons, which delayed the summons issuance from the clerk
of court.31 Counsel acknowledges that he was aware of the Docket Text Order’s deadline and its
27 Id.
28 United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas
Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir.1994)).
29 Putnam v. Morris, 833 F.2d at 905.
30 Perez v. El Tequila, LLC, 847 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 2017).
31 Motion at 4, ¶ 7.
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command to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).32 Counsel does not, however,
offer an explanation on why he did not, at a minimum, file a motion to extend the deadline serve
and to provide proof of service. Instead, Counsel explains that he believed “that the Court would
presume Plaintiff was actively working to effectuate service—which was in fact the case.”33 And
that “once the Court issued the summons on June 18, 2025, Plaintiff reasonably believed that the
Court would presume Plaintiff was actively working to effectuate service—which was in fact the
case.” But the summons issuance was well after the deadline for service and the filing of proof
was well after the ordered deadline.
The Motion reveals that Mr. Young did not email his request for issuance of a summons
to the clerk of court until the eleventh hour, at 5:06 p.m. (after close of business) on June 11,
2025.34 An email to the clerk of court for issuance of a summons is not a part of the court docket.
Counsel further explains that he is “managing multiple active cases” and “must carefully space
out litigation efforts in order to give each client’s matter the attention it deserves.”35 Just as in
Putnam, Mr. Young’s delays are due to a lack of urgency and failed effort to serve the City by
the deadline in Rule 4(k) and file proof before the deadline of June 13, 2025. Mr. Young also had
the ability to request additional time, to explain the delay, and chose not to do so until after
judgment was entered.36 Responsible counsel would have filed a motion to extend time for
service and for filing proof immediately upon receipt of the Docket Text Order.
32 Id. at 1, ¶ 1.
33 Id. at 4, ¶ 7.
34 Id. at Exhibit A.
35 Id.
36 See generally docket no. 5, Docket Text Order; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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Therefore, Mr. Young has failed to establish excusable neglect, so service of process
outside of the 90-day time allowed, and fail to file proof by the deadline given by the Docket
Text Order, was inexcusable.37
3.3 	Young Does Not Show Extraordinary Circumstances Justifying Relief Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)
“To justify relief under subsection (6), a party must show “extraordinary circumstances”
suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay.”38 However, “[i]f a party is partly to blame for
the delay, relief must be sought within one year under subsection (1) and the party's neglect must
be excusable.”39 “The broad power granted by clause (6) is not for the purpose of relieving a
party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices the party has made.”40 “The text and structure
of Rule 60 make clear that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in narrow
circumstances.”41
Mr. Young’s counsel admits that it was his fault for failing to serve the Complaint within
required timeframe: “Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges the delay in requesting issuance of the
summons and takes full responsibility for the resulting procedural lapse.”42 The circumstances
presented by Mr. Young’s counsel relate solely to the late issuance of the summons and his case-
management strategies, none of which is extraordinary. Mr. Young has not provided any
evidence, or case law, demonstrating “extraordinary circumstances” or “excusable neglect” that
37 Putnam v. Morris, 833 F.2d at 905 (citing Winters v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 776 F.2d 1304, 1305 (5th
Cir.1985)).
38 Pioneer Inv. Servs., 507 U.S. at 393.
39 Id.
40 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2864, p. 359 (citing
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S.Ct. 209, 211–12, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950)).
41 BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 211 (2025).
42 Motion at 4, ¶ 7.
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Motion for justifying relief under 60(b)(6) is “to prevent manifest injustice and allow this matter
to proceed on its merits.”43 The City’s Response clearly stated that Mr. Young’s reliance on Rule
60(b)(6) fails because he fails to identify any extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. Yet,
in Reply, Mr. Young raised no extraordinary circumstances.
Therefore, Mr. Young fails to establish extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.
4 	ORDER
In conclusion, this is a cautionary tale, but one that the Tenth Circuit has seen and warns
against: “The lesson to the federal plaintiff's lawyer is not to take any chances. Treat the [90]
days with the respect reserved for a time bomb.”44
Based on the foregoing, the Motion fails to establish good cause, excusable neglect, and
extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. Therefore, the Motion45 is DENIED.
Signed November 25, 2025.
BY THE COURT
________________________________________
David Nuffer
United States District Judge
43 Motion at 4.
44 Cox v. Sandia Corp., 941 F.2d 1124, 1126 (10th Cir.1991).
45 Docket no. 11.
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