Whiting v. Carbon County et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
SPRING WHITING, an individual and
personal representative of the estate of SETH
RAVEN SNYDER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CARBON COUNTY, UTAH; SHERIFF JEFF
WOOD, in his individual and official
capacity; SERGEANT JORDAN NELSON,
in his individual and official capacity;
DEPUTY DEON GRAVETT, in his
individual and official capacity; DEPUTY
BRADLY JOHNSON, in his individual and
official capacity; DEPUTY EDWIN GAGE
MALMGREN, in his individual and official
capacity; SERGEANT LANCE SCOVILLE,
in his individual and official capacity;
DEPUTY MARK LARSEN, in his individual
and official capacity; DEPUTY VICTOR
TURNER, in his individual and official
capacity; AGENT STEVEN REGRUTO, in
his individual capacity,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING CARBON
COUNTY DEFENDANTS’
[15] MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 4:25-cv-00011-DN-PK
District Judge David Nuffer
Plaintiff Spring Whiting, as the personal representative of her son’s estate, filed this case
seeking damages arising out of the death of her son, Seth Raven Snyder, after he passed away
while in custody at the Carbon County Jail.1 Ms. Whiting alleges in her Complaint that Mr.
Snyder’s death in February 2024 was a direct and proximate result of the various defendants’
1 Complaint, docket no. 1, filed February, 16, 2025; see also [Carbon County Defendants’] Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Through Thirteenth Causes of Action with Prejudice
(“Motion”), 2, docket no. 15, filed April 21, 2025.
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mismanagement; failure to train, supervise, and discipline; and neglect of an incarcerated
individual’s medical condition.2
The Complaint alleges thirteen “counts,” or more properly “causes of action” against ten
defendants. Defendants fall into two major categories.
First, the defendants associated with Carbon County (“Carbon County Defendants”) are
Carbon County, Utah; Carbon County Sheriff Jeff Wood; Sergeant Jordan Nelson; Deputy Deon
Gravett; Deputy Bradly Johnson; Deputy Edwin Gage Malmgren; Sergeant Lance Scoville;
Deputy Mark Larsen; and Deputy Victor Turner.
Second, State of Utah Probation Officer Steven Regruto (“Agent Regruto”) is the only
defendant not associated with Carbon County. Unique allegations against him are in the ninth
cause of action, though he is a co-defendant in many others.
The causes of action and their associated defendants are:
Cause of Action 	Defendants
1 	Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Eighth and Fourth
Amendments – Deliberate Indifference to Medical needs
& Cruel and Unusual Punishment
All individual defendants in
their individual capacities,
and Carbon County
Defendants in their official
capacities
2 	Failure to Protect – Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 	All individual defendants in
their individual capacities and
Carbon County Defendants in
their official capacities
3 	Municipal Liability – (Monell Claim) – Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
Carbon County, Utah
4 	Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 	Defendant Sheriff Jeff Wood
in his individual capacity
5 	Violation of the Utah Constitution – Article 1, §§ 7, 9, -
Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
All individual defendants in
their individual capacities and
Carbon County Defendants in
their official capacities
2 See Complaint, docket no. 1, at 6–15.
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Cause of Action 	Defendants
6 	Unnecessary Rigor Under the Utah Constitution (Article
I, § 9)
All individual defendants in
their individual capacities and
Carbon County Defendants in
their official capacities
7 	Survivorship Claim Under Utah Law 	All defendants
8 	Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 	All defendants
9 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 	Defendant Agent Steven
Regruto in his individual
capacity
10 	Loss of Filial Relationship 	All defendants
11 	Negligence Under Utah Law 	All individual defendants and
Carbon County
12 	Gross Negligence Under Utah Law 	All individual defendants in
their individual capacities and
Carbon County in its official
capacity
13 	Wrongful Death Under Utah Law 	All individual defendants and
Carbon County
On April 21, 2025, the Carbon County Defendants filed a partial Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth causes of
action.3 Agent Regruto is not a party to this Motion and filed a separate motion to dismiss all
claims brought against him.4 On June 16, 2025, Ms. Whiting filed a response conceding
dismissal of her fourth and eighth causes without explanation, and that her state common law
claims “may not be brought against the individual defendants.”5 Although not explicitly
identified in her Response, a review of the Complaint indicates that those state law claims to be
dismissed against the individual Carbon County Defendants are the seventh, tenth, eleventh,
twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action.6
3 Motion, docket no. 15, at 1–2.
4 [Agent Regruto’s] Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support, docket no. 19, filed May 13, 2025.
5 Plaintiff’s Opposition to [Carbon County] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Response”) at 7, docket no. 25, filed
June 16, 2025.
6 See generally Complaint, docket no. 1, at 6–15.
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Defendants filed their Reply on July 30, 2025.7 As stated above, Plaintiff has already
conceded to dismissal of the state common law claims asserted against the Carbon County
individual defendants. As to the outstanding state-law claims against the Carbon County
Defendants in their official capacities, those defendants have formally withdrawn their motion..8
Therefore, as Carbon County Defendants explain in their Reply: “[T]he only remaining claims
that need to be decided by the Court in this motion are the Monell Liability claim and the state
common law claims asserted against the Carbon County individual defendants.”9
In summary, Carbon County Defendants and Ms. Whiting acknowledge that the only
remaining claim to be decided on this Motion is Ms. Whiting’s third cause of action for
“Municipal Liability (Monell Claim) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” brought against Defendant Carbon
County (“Carbon County”) (“Monell Claim”).10
After careful review of the parties’ briefing and the Complaint, the Defendants’ Motion
IS GRANTED and Plaintiff’s third cause of action is DISMISSED.
Table of Contents
1. 	BACKGROUND FACTS ................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Events at Four Corners Community Behavioral Health ............................................... 5
1.2 Transfer from Castleview Hospital to Carbon County Jail........................................... 5
2. 	LEGAL STANDARD......................................................................................................... 7
3. 	DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 8
3.1 Whiting’s Third Cause of Action (Monell Claim) Is Insufficiently Pleaded................ 8
3.1.1 Speculating on Results of Discovery Is Not Enough ................................... 11
3.1.2 Deliberate Indifference is Not Adequately Pleaded..................................... 12
3.1.3 Alleging a Single Incident is Not Enough to Plead a Monell Claim ........... 14
3.2 Whiting Is Given Leave to Amend Her Complaint .................................................... 15
ORDER ......................................................................................................................................... 15
7 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Through Thirteenth Causes of Action with Prejudice (“Reply”), docket no. 27, filed June 30, 2025.
8 Id. at 2.
9 Id. at 3.
10 Id. at 2–3.
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1. 	BACKGROUND FACTS
The background facts relevant to Mr. Snyder’s death began on February 16, 2024, when
at 7:24 a.m. he reported to Four Corners Community Behavioral Health (“Four Corners”) for his
daily methadone dosage.11
1.1 Events at Four Corners Community Behavioral Health
The Complaint further details that Mr. Snyder, while at Four Corners, had vomited blood,
purposefully hit his head against the wall of the facility, admitted that he had attempted suicide
by drinking bleach the day before, and was using methamphetamine.12 In response, Four Corners
then transported Mr. Snyder to Castleview’s Hospital Emergency Department (“Castleview”)
where he was seen by Dr. David Farkas.”13 During treatment at the hospital, Four Corners
reported the incident to Mr. Snyder’s Adult Probation and Parole officer, Defendant Agent
Steven Regruto.14 The Complaint alleges that Agent Regruto then, “[i]n complete disregard for
[Mr. Snyder’s] medical and psychological needs at the time [. . .] callously ordered that [Mr.
Snyder] be incarcerated for probation violation.”15 Mr. Snyder was then taken into police
custody16 and transported by the police to the Carbon County Jail.17
1.2 Transfer from Castleview Hospital to Carbon County Jail
At approximately 2:20 p.m. Mr. Snyder entered into “Holding Cell 3 of the Carbon
County Jail in Price, Utah.”.18 Later that same date, at approximately 10:57 p.m., Mr. Snyder
11 Complaint, docket no. 1, at 3, ¶15.
12 Id. at 4, ¶¶ 16–17.
13 Id. at 4, ¶ 18.
14 Id. at 4, ¶ 19.
15 Id. at 4, ¶ 20.
16 Id. at 4, ¶ 21.
17 Id. at 4, ¶ 24.
18 Id. at 3, ¶ 11.
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died in his cell.19 In her Complaint and Response, Ms. Whiting argues that Carbon County is
liable because of its policies, customs, and practices implemented by its Sheriff, Defendant Jeff
Wood.20 These policies, customs, and practices included “a. Failure to train jail personnel on
medical crises, withdrawal symptoms, and suicide prevention; b. Failure to supervise staff to
ensure compliance with medical monitoring policies; [and] c. Failure to discipline officers who
violated policies on inmate safety and wellness checks.”21
The Complaint alleges that “[t]hese failures created a pattern and practice of
unconstitutional conduct, making inmate death foreseeable.”22 The Complaint asserts that
“Defendant Sheriff Jeff Wood failed to maintain proper suicide prevention protocols, which
would have mandated heightened monitoring for high-risk individuals” like Mr. Snyder.23
Instead, Ms. Whiting asserts that these failures created a pattern and practice implemented by
Defendant Sheriff Jeff Wood that allowed Mr. Snyder to be “left largely unattended.”24 Despite
headcounts and knowing that he had just been picked up from Castleview Hospital, after a
medical release, “no one ever spoke another word to him [after arrival at the jail]. No special
monitoring. Nothing.”25 The Complaint alleges that Carbon County’s Jail “provided only
perfunctory monitoring, allowing [Mr. Snyder’s] condition to deteriorate for hours.”26 When
checks were conducted, the Complaint alleges that they were “merely part of a standard
19 Id. at 5, ¶¶ 28–29.
20 See id. at 2, 5, ¶¶ 6, 25; see also Response, docket no. 25, at 4, ¶ 25.
21 Complaint, docket no. 1, at 7, ¶ 46.
22 Id. at 7, ¶ 47.
23 Id. at 5, ¶ 25.
24 Id. at 5–7, ¶¶ 25–27, 28, 46- 47.
25 Id. at 4, ¶ 24.
26 Id. at 5, ¶ 26.
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‘headcount’ and did not involve any meaningful assessment of [Mr. Snyder’s] well-being.”27 The
Complaint further alleges that “[j]ail staff was only required to ‘visually observe’ [Mr. Snyder],
in passing.”28
When Mr. Snyder’s body was discovered the “effects of Liver [sic] Mortis [were] present
throughout his body.”29 The determined cause of death by the medical examiner was
“Methamphetamine and Methadone toxicity.”30 It also noted that there was severe damage to his
“gastrointestinal tract and other internal organs, consistent with the toxic effects of bleach.”31
2. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”32 “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleaded factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”33 Stating a cause of
action requires “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest [that a policy or custom
exists] . . . [and provide] enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
a [policy or custom].”34
27 Id. at 5, ¶ 27.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 5, ¶ 30.
30 Id. at 5, ¶ 31.
31 Id. at 5, ¶ 32.
32 Employees' Ret. Sys. of Rhode Island v. Williams Companies, Inc., 889 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
33 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
34 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
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A well-pleaded complaint survives a motion to dismiss even when “it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.”35 The facts, however, must be well-pleaded and sufficient to demonstrate “plausibility
of entitlement to relief.”36 In determining whether a “complaint states a plausible claim is
context specific.”37 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”38 “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of “‘further factual enhancement.’”39 Legal conclusions may be included in
a complaint but “must be supported by factual allegations.”40
3. 	DISCUSSION
Carbon County seeks dismissal of Ms. Whiting’s third cause of action, her Monell Claim,
for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.41
3.1 Whiting’s Third Cause of Action (Monell Claim) Is Insufficiently Pleaded
Ms. Whiting alleges in her Complaint that Carbon County maintains “policies, customs,
and practices that were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of inmates,
including:” the failure to train, supervise, and discipline employees.42 A well-pleaded complaint
alleging municipal liability must show three elements: “(1) official policy or custom[,] (2)
35 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
36 Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010).
37 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
38 Id.
39 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
40 Id.
41 Motion, docket no. 15, at 2; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
42 Complaint, docket no. 1, at 7, ¶ 46.
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causation, and (3) state of mind.”43 To the extent that the Complaint is attempting to “[allege] a
custom or policy by the Defendants’ failure to act, [it] must plausibly allege there is a pattern of
deliberate indifference to situations like [that alleged in the complaint].”44 As explained below,
Ms. Whiting’s Monell Claim fails to meet the first element and the Motion is GRANTED.
Carbon County’s Motion asserts that the Complaint fails to “allege[] a single specific
custom or policy, let alone facts showing a direct causal link between the unidentified custom or
policy and the constitutional violation alleged.”45 Carbon County also argues dismissal is proper
because “it is improper to infer an official policy—the necessary predicate for Monell liability—
from only one instance of alleged misconduct.”46 Carbon County is correct.
The Supreme Court in Monell held that “a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”47 Rather, “it is when execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.”48 “A challenged practice may be deemed an official policy
or custom for § 1983 [governmental actor] purposes if it is a formally promulgated policy, a
well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a [governmental actor] policymaker, or
deliberately indifferent training or supervision.”49 A policy or custom may take the form of:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement;
43 Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 962 F.3d 1204, 1239 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Schneider v.
City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013)); see also Crowson v. Washington County State
of Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1184 (10th Cir. 2020).
44 Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996).; see Complaint, docket no. 1, at ¶¶ 46 (a)–(c), 47.
45 Motion, docket no. 15, at 2.
46 Reply at 3.
47 Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
48 Id.
49 Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770.
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(2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not
authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law;
(3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority;
(4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for
them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these
policymakers' review and approval; or
(5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure
results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.50
Ms. Whiting’s Complaint and Response rely on the fifth category of policy or custom.
Ms. Whiting argues that her Monell claim, specifically at paragraphs 21–30, 25–27,
46(a)–(b) of her Complaint, is sufficiently plead to survive the Motion.51 The alleged facts
identified by Ms. Whiting in support of her Monell Claim are as follows:
45. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.
46. Carbon County maintained unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices
that were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of inmates,
including:
a. Failure to train jail personnel on medical crises, withdrawal symptoms,
and suicide prevention;
b. Failure to supervise staff to ensure compliance with medical monitoring
policies;
c. Failure to discipline officers who violated policies on inmate safety and
wellness checks.
47. These failures created a pattern and practice of unconstitutional conduct,
making inmate deaths foreseeable.
48. Defendant’s inaction violated Seth’s constitutional rights.
49. As a result, Plaintiff suffered damages.52
Ms. Whiting also argues in her Response that paragraphs 25 through 27 also contain factual
allegations to support her Monell Claim:
25. Defendant Sheriff Jeff Wood failed to maintain proper suicide prevention
protocols, which would have mandated heightened monitoring for high-risk
individuals, such as Seth.
50 Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1145 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Crowson, 983 F.3d at
1184).
51 Response, docket no. 25, at 3–5.
52 Complaint, docket no. 1, at 7–8, ¶¶ 45–49.
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26. Therefore, while in custody, Seth was left largely unattended and the jail staff
provided only perfunctory monitoring, allowing Seth’s condition to deteriorate
unnoticed for hours.
27. When checks were conducted, they were merely part of a standard
“headcount” and did not involve any meaningful assessment of Seth’s well-being.
Jail staff was only required to “visually observe” Seth, in passing.53
These factual allegations are threadbare and do not identify any written or promulgated
policies, customs, or practices.54 Here, Ms. Whiting has failed to state a § 1983 claim for liability
pursuant to a failure to train, supervise, or discipline theory. Ms. Whiting’s Complaint does not
contain sufficient allegations of inadequate training, supervision, and discipline regarding
medical crises, withdrawal symptoms, and suicide prevention. The allegations are threadbare and
speculative without such factual enhancements. Specifically, the Complaint fails to allege what
training, supervision, or discipline officers received or should have received, how it was
deficient, or why or how the need for more or different or supervision was obvious. Instead, Ms.
Whiting claims that the alleged constitutional violation is indicative of a failure to train or
supervise.
3.1.1 Speculating on Results of Discovery Is Not Enough
Ms. Whiting in her Response argues that “any further detail regarding the County’s
policies and practices can be appropriately developed during discovery.”55 Ms. Whiting does not
cite to any case law in support of this argument. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint
must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide ‘plausible grounds’ that discovery will
reveal evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations.”56 More specifically, the Tenth Circuit
53 Id. at 5, ¶¶ 25–27; see also Response, docket no. 25, at 3–5.
54 Complaint, docket no. 1, at 7, ¶ 46.
55 Response, docket no. 25, at 5
56 Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (“Factual
allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”) (“And, “Asking
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explains that a court is to “look[s] to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine
whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.”57
At this stage of the litigation, the court’s task is “to stay within the four corners of the
[Complaint].”58 The Complaint may not rely on “potential future discovery to rescue the
inadequacies in his attempt to allege facts stating a claim upon which relief may be granted.”59
On a motion to dismiss, the standard is “whether the complaint's allegations support an asserted
cause of action, not whether evidence that may be discovered in the future could support an
asserted cause of action.”60 A bare assertion that facts might materialize later through discovery
is insufficient.61
3.1.2 Deliberate Indifference is Not Adequately Pleaded
To the extent that the Complaint is attempting to allege “custom or policy comprised a
failure to act, he or she must demonstrate the municipality's inaction resulted from “deliberate
indifference to the rights” of the plaintiff.”62 A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
‘for its failure to train or supervise [or discipline] . . . unless . . . [its] policymakers ‘can
for plausible grounds does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the allegations].”)).
57 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2007).
58 Duran v. Colbert, 2023 WL 2742738, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2023).
59 See id. (“Second, Plaintiff is again relying on potential future discovery to rescue the inadequacies in his attempt
to allege facts stating a claim upon which relief may be granted. As explained above, the Court's role here is not to
get ahead of this stage of litigation, in which the sole question is whether the factual allegations stated equate to the
elements of a cause of action.”).
60 Id.
61 See Duran, 2023 WL 2742738, at *2 (citing Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The
nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after
taking those allegations as true.”)).
62 Jenkins, 81 F.3d at 994; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379-89 (1989).
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reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need’ for further training or
supervision.’”63 Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated
when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to
act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously
or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. In most instances, notice can
be established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct. In a
narrow range of circumstances, however, deliberate indifference may be found
absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a
highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality's action or
inaction, such as when a municipality fails to train an employee in specific skills
needed to handle recurring situations, thus presenting an obvious potential for
constitutional violations. Thus, “[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a
‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious' choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our
prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.”64
The Complaint alleges that the failure to train, supervise, and discipline “created a pattern
and practice of unconstitutional conduct, making inmate deaths foreseeable.”65
Carbon County argues that the Complaint fails to establish factual assertions of an
official policy or a pattern of tortious conduct.66 In her Response to the Motion, Ms.
Whiting argues that all that is required to establish a custom, policy, or practice is “one
application . . . to satisfy fully Monell’s requirement that a municipal corporation be held
liable only for constitutional violations resulting from the municipality’s official
policy.”67
Ms. Whiting claims she has “satisfied this requirement” by alleging a “failure to
implement adequate suicide prevention protocols, the use of only perfunctory visual
checks for high-risk inmates, and the lack of any policy requiring reassessment after
63 Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir.2010) (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390).
64 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).
65 Complaint, docket no. 1, at 7, ¶ 47.
66 Motion, docket no. 15, at 4.
67 Response, docket no. 25, at 5 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480–482 (1986)).
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hospital discharge . . . .”68 This is insufficient. The Complaint does not include any
factual allegations or enhancements alleging an “official policy,” pattern of tortious
conduct, or a deliberate or conscious decision made by the County which would
constitute a policy. Therefore, her claims of deliberate indifference are insufficiently
pleaded.
3.1.3 Alleging a Single Incident is Not Enough to Plead a Monell Claim
There are “limited circumstances” in which the failure to train “may rise to the level of an
official government policy for purposes of § 1983.”69 It is not enough to simply point out “[t]hat
a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained” or “that an injury or accident could have
been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the
particular injury-causing conduct.”70 Such arguments “could be made about almost any
encounter resulting in injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to enable to respond
properly to the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal.”71 Simply put, even
“adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes[.]”72 The Tenth Circuit has explained
that absent a “pattern,” deliberate indifference can be found “if a violation of federal rights is a
‘highly predictable’ or ‘plainly obvious’ consequence of a municipality's action or inaction, such
as when a municipality fails to train an employee in specific skills needed to handle recurring
situations, thus presenting an obvious potential for constitutional violations.”73
68 Response, docket no. 25, at 5; see also Complaint, docket no. 1, at 7, ¶ 47.
69 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011).
70 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390–91.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 391.
73 Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 1998).
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The allegations in paragraph 46 are conclusory and not factual allegations showing a
pattern. The allegations in paragraphs 25-27 are facts in this case alone, not showing a pattern.
Therefore, the Motion74 is GRANTED without prejudice as to the third cause of action.
3.2 Whiting Is Given Leave to Amend Her Complaint
Because this order dismisses the Monell Claim for failure to state a claim, and because
she may be in possession of facts to make sufficient allegations, and because the death of Mr.
Snyder is such a significant event, Ms. Whiting will be granted leave to amend her complaint
within 28 days of this order.
Ms. Whiting shall file her amended complaint consistent with this Order,
a. 	if she desires, to amend allegations in her third cause of action to render it sufficient;
and
b. 	to effectuate her concessions to
i. 	dismiss Count IV (Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
ii. 	Count VIII (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress); and
iii. 	her state common law claims against the individual defendants in
(a) Count VII (Survivorship Claim Under Utah Law) and
(b) Count X (Loss of Filial Relationship).75
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and finding good cause therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion76 is GRANTED. The third cause of action is
DISMISSED without prejudice. With Ms. Whiting’s concessions, her fourth, eighth, and state
74 Motion, docket no. 15.
75 Response at 7, docket no. 25.
76 Id.
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common law claims asserted against the Carbon County individual defendants in the seventh,
tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action are DISMISSED with prejudice.
Signed January 28, 2026.
BY THE COURT
________________________________
David Nuffer
United States District Judge
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