Reyes Vasquez v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
FEDERICO REYES VASQUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; TODD M. LYONS, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of Immigration &
Customs Enforcement; MICHAEL
BERNACKE, in his official capacity as ICE
Field Officer Director and Warden in current
custody of Petitioner, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION AND DENYING
EMERGENCY MOTION
Case No. 2:25-cv-01146-JNP
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
On December 19, 2025, Petitioner Federico Reyes Vasquez filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), alleging he was being unlawfully confined in violation
of the Constitution and laws of the United States. ECF No. 2. Later, after Mr. Reyes Vasquez was
removed in violation of a court order issued on December 31, 2025, Mr. Reyes Vasquez filed an
Amended Petition. ECF No. 11. Respondents now argue that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the Amended Petition and that venue is improper. See ECF No. 31. For the
following reasons, the court denies the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Reyes Vasquez, a citizen of Mexico, alleges he entered the United States in 2005
without inspection. ECF No. 11 ¶ 38. Respondents allege Mr. Reyes Vasquez first entered illegally
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 1
of 18

2
in 2003 and was removed in March of that year. ECF No. 10 at 2–3. Respondents further allege
that around 18 months later, Mr. Reyes Vasquez was arrested in Utah. Id. at 4. He was then removed
again based on a reinstated order of removal. Id.
Recently, on December 19, 2025, Mr. Reyes Vasquez was arrested by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). ECF No. 11 ¶ 38. Respondents assert that ICE
detained Mr. Reyes Vasquez pursuant to a reinstated removal order, given his prior immigration
history. ECF No. 10 at 2; ECF No. 21 at 3.
Counsel for Mr. Reyes Vasquez, believing he was being held in West Valley City, filed a
habeas petition with this court, alleging Mr. Reyes Vasquez was being improperly detained without
a bond hearing. ECF No. 1 at 10. That same day, as the court now knows, Mr. Reyes Vasquez was
transported to Uinta County Detention Center in Wyoming. ECF No. 10 at 4; ECF No. 21 at 3.
On December 22, the court, seeking a response from Respondents before ruling on the
petition and seeking to preserve its jurisdiction and the status quo during the pendency of
proceedings, ordered Respondents not to remove Mr. Reyes Vasquez. ECF No. 4. Counsel for Mr.
Reyes Vasquez states that he immediately emailed the December 22 Order to Respondents. ECF
No. 11 ¶ 40.
However, on December 23, Mr. Reyes Vasquez was nevertheless removed in direct
violation of the court’s Order. He was first transferred to Florence, Arizona the morning of
December 23 and then within a few hours was removed to Mexico. ECF No. 21 at 5.
Counsel for Mr. Reyes Vasquez subsequently filed two motions: a motion for sanctions and
a motion for signing of I-918 Supplement B. ECF Nos. 8, 9. The sanctions motion asks the court
to require Respondents to explain why they should not be held in civil contempt and sanctioned
for violating the court’s December 22 Order. ECF No. 8. The I-918 Supplement B motion seeks to
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 2
of 18

3
certify Mr. Reyes Vasquez as a victim of a qualifying U-Visa crime. ECF No. 9. This motion asserts
that ICE’s conduct constitutes witness tampering and obstruction of justice, as removal prevented
Mr. Reyes Vasquez from attending his own habeas hearing. Id. at 2.
On December 29, Respondents filed a response to the court’s Order to Show Cause. ECF
No. 10. Respondents stated that “while [United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement]
was made aware of an order preventing removal by e-mail on December 22, 2025 at 4:21 p.m.
Mountain Standard Time and again on December 23, 2025 at 10:21 a.m., [ICE Enforcement and
Removal Operations (“ICE ERO”)] was not aware of the Court’s order before it transferred and
removed Petitioner.” ECF No. 10 at 5. ICE did however state, via an affidavit by Matthew Randall,
an ICE ERO Deportation Officer, that “ICE will coordinate with Petitioner’s attorney to facilitate
his return to the United States if Petitioner so chooses.” ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 18.
Also on December 29, counsel for Mr. Reyes Vasquez filed an amended petition. ECF No.
11. The Amended Petition asks the court to order Mr. Reyes Vasquez released from any continued
detention and to further order that Mr. Reyes Vasquez not be removed until the initial U-visa Bona
Fide Determination can be adjudicated. ECF No. 11 at 19.
At a hearing on December 31, counsel for Respondents acknowledged the removal was in
violation of the court’s Order and asserted Respondents were working with Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s
counsel to facilitate Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return to the United States. See ECF No. 38, at 6:17–19
(“We have told him we will facilitate his return to the United States should he want to return to the
United States.”). Counsel for Mr. Reyes Vasquez represented to the court that Mr. Reyes Vasquez
sought to be returned.
At the hearing, the court inquired if the petition had been filed in the correct district and if
it was the Government’s position that this court had jurisdiction over the petition. Id. at 9:24–10:3.
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 3
of 18

4
Counsel for Respondents stated at the time that Respondents were not contesting personal
jurisdiction or venue. Id. at 10:4–9 (“We’re not contesting personal jurisdiction and venue. The
timing again is close but I don’t have time to question the Court’s jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction[,] venue over Mr. Vasquez for purposes of this habeas petition.”); id. at 10:21–23 (“I
don’t have timing, we’re not questioning the Court’s jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and venue
over Mr. Vasquez.”).
The court also made clear at the hearing that it sought to ensure the proceedings were
returned to the status quo relative to the December 22 Order before addressing any substantive
issues. Id. at 3:20–4:1. Accordingly, the court ordered Respondents to facilitate Mr. Reyes
Vasquez’s return to the United States within 21 days of the hearing. It further held that facilitating
his return in this context meant providing to Mr. Reyes Vasquez either transportation to a port of
entry or financial support to reach a port of entry. ECF No. 13.
On January 9, 2026, Respondents submitted a status report. ECF No. 19. At that point,
little progress had been made on Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return. On January 19, Respondents filed
their response to the Amended Petition, and within that response, they included a motion to
dismiss. ECF No. 21. Respondents had evidently changed their position, arguing against the court’s
December 31 Order requiring them to facilitate Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return. Id.
Despite Respondents’ change of position, Respondents appeared to nevertheless be
working to facilitate Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return in compliance with the court’s Order. On January
21, Respondents filed a stipulated motion for extension of time to facilitate Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s
return. ECF No. 25. Respondents asserted that: “Petitioner’s counsel advised Respondents and
undersigned counsel that Petitioner can present himself at the Nogales [Port of Entry] on February
2, 2026, at which time it is anticipated he will be turned over to ICE ERO and detained within the
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 4
of 18

5
United States. He will be transferred to a detention location convenient to this Court in accordance
with the Court’s Order.” ECF No. 25 at 2. The court granted the extension, now requiring Mr.
Reyes Vasquez’s return by February 5, 2026. ECF No. 26.
On January 22, in their response to the motion for sanctions, Respondents raised for the
first time arguments challenging the court’s “venue jurisdiction.” ECF No. 27; ECF No. 29
(amended response). Respondents assert that (1) Mr. Reyes Vasquez was transferred to the Uinta
County Detention Center in Wyoming by 1:37 p.m. on December 19; and (2) Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s
original petition was filed on 5:13 p.m. on December 19. ECF No. 29 at 11. This timing, according
to Respondents, would render venue improper in this court.
On January 24, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 31.
On January 26, Counsel for Petitioner filed an “Emergency Order to Enforce Court Orders and
Compel Immediate Issuance of Parole Documentation.” ECF No. 36. On February 4, 2026, the
Government filed a response to the emergency motion, informing the court that arrangements have
been made for Mr. Reyes Vasquez to be returned to the United States by February 6. ECF No. 41.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal district courts “are limited to granting habeas relief ‘within their respective
jurisdictions.’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)). “The
plain language of the habeas statute . . . confirms the general rule that for habeas petitions
challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of
confinement.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443.
ANALYSIS
Across two separate motions to dismiss, Respondents raise a variety of arguments in an
effort to avoid complying with the court’s December 31 Order. Though Respondents have recently
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 5
of 18

6
informed the court that it will have complied with the Order by February 6, the court nevertheless
addresses the motions. The arguments raised invoke, at times in a muddled fashion, subject matter
jurisdiction and venue, and the court addresses each in turn.
However, before diving into the merits of the arguments, the court finds it worthwhile to
briefly describe how subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue differ. It appears
to the court that Respondents’ briefing, viewed in the most favorable light, confuses these
principles repeatedly.
“‘Subject matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to hear a given type of case.’ ‘[I]t
represents the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.’”
City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 (10th Cir. 2017). It cannot be
waived, it can be challenged any time prior to final judgment, and district courts are obligated to
address their own subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Id. at 1093. The general habeas statute,
28 U.S.C. § 2241, grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus in
which a petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States. See Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2001).
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction represents the limits to a “court’s power to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351,
358 (2021). Objections to personal jurisdiction can be waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(h). Within the
habeas context, the so-called “immediate custodian rule” is often viewed as a matter of personal
jurisdiction. See Dufur v. United States Parole Comm’n, 34 F.4th 1090, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(“The immediate custodian rule implicates personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction;
likewise, the requirement to file in the district of confinement concerns venue, not subject matter
jurisdiction.”). The rule states that “the proper respondent” of a habeas petition “is the warden of
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 6
of 18

7
the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote
supervisory official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004); id. at 439 (reaffirming the
rule for challenges to present physical confinement).
Lastly, “[v]enue is defined as the appropriate district court in which to file an action.”
Presidential Hosp., LLC v. Wyndham Hotel Grp., LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1206 (D.N.M. 2018)
(quoting Whiting v. Hogan, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1282 (D.N.M. 2012)). Like objections to
personal jurisdiction, objections to venue can be waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(h). Within the habeas
context, the so-called “district of confinement” rule is often viewed as a matter of venue. See
Dufur, 34 F.4th at 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2022). The rule states that a writ of habeas corpus is “issuable
only in the district of confinement.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443.
With those three concepts delineated, the court turns to the arguments at hand.
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Respondents’ January 19 response to the Amended Petition, Respondents request that
the court “dissolve the restraining order of December 19, 2025, prohibiting Respondents from
removing Petitioner from the United States or transferring him from the District of Utah, and
rescind the parts of the Order of December 31, 2025, requiring Respondents to facilitate the return
of Petitioner to the United States and imposing attorney’s fees and costs on Respondents.”0F
1 ECF
No. 21 at 1–2. As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the local rules prohibit Respondents
from making a motion or cross-motion within their response brief; any motion must be separately
1 The court notes that the court’s December 31 Order requires that Respondents house Mr. Reyes
Vasquez “in a facility in which Respondents are able to make him available for further hearings on
this matter.” This order superseded the court’s instructions that Mr. Reyes Vasquez not be
transferred out of the District of Utah.
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 7
of 18

8
filed. DUCivR 7-1(a)(3). Ordinarily, the court would not address arguments made within an
improperly filed motion. However, because the arguments relate to subject matter jurisdiction, the
court sua sponte considers them.
Respondents argue that the court “lacks jurisdiction” to consider the Amended Petition
because Mr. Reyes Vasquez is no longer in custody, because the claims are now allegedly moot,
and because the claims allegedly do not challenge the detention of Mr. Reyes Vasquez. ECF No.
21 at 9. Each of these arguments relate to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
With respect to the first argument, Respondents assert that habeas relief is only available
when an individual “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). Because Mr. Reyes Vasquez is no longer in
active custody—having been improperly removed—Respondents argue this court no longer has
subject matter jurisdiction. Respondents’ argument appears to ask the court to sanction a strategy
in which ICE and the Government are able to wash their hands of a case and destroy a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction as long as they shuttle a petitioner out of the country, even if that
removal is in violation of a court order. In other words, the Government seeks to be able to benefit
from the conditions that they unilaterally and improperly created.
The court rejects this argument. In fact, Respondents undercut their own argument as well.
They note that the “in-custody” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner filed the habeas petition
before being removed. Mendoza v. Jeffers, 62 F. App’x 866, 867–68 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished)
(“Because Mendoza was still incarcerated when he filed his habeas petition, the ‘in custody’
provision of § 2241 was satisfied.”); Xing Jian Yu v. Sessions, No. 6:17-CV-06699-MAT, 2019 WL
4258892, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2019) (holding the same); So. V. Reno, 251 F.Supp.2d 1112,
1120 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding the same); Gonzalez v. I.N.S., No. 01 CIV. 6229 (HB), 2002 WL
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 8
of 18

9
31444952, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002) (holding the same). That was the case here. Cf. United
States v. Camick, No. 17-3006, 2017 WL 11811332, at *3 (10th Cir. May 22, 2017) (holding a
petitioner was not in custody when they filed their § 2255 motion after removal).
In response, Respondents contend that because the original petition was allegedly
withdrawn, and its detention-related claims were abandoned, there was a clear break in the
litigation that renders Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s prior custody insufficient to maintain subject matter
jurisdiction. The court also rejects this argument. While counsel for Mr. Reyes Vasquez did file a
motion to withdraw the petition, the court never granted the motion. In fact, the court granted only
a later motion to withdraw the motion to withdraw. See ECF No. 16. Further, while the parties do
not point the court to any case law directly addressing the issue, the court does not agree that
amending a petition, even when adding new claims, resets the clock in relation to the in-custody
requirement. As explained below, the court views the Amended Petition as still requiring the court
to examine the basis for Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s initial detention.
The court next considers whether the petition is moot. A non-citizen must “continue to have
a personal stake in the outcome” of his case “in order to satisfy the case or controversy requirement
of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.” Mendoza v. Jeffers, 62 F. App’x 866, 867 (10th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished) (citation modified). A deportation does not render an individual’s § 2241 moot if
there are “sufficient collateral consequences.” See Fonge v. Comfort, 62 F. App’x 266, 268 (10th
Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (citing Tapia Garcia v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1216, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2001)).
The Tenth Circuit has suggested that deportation alone satisfies the collateral consequence
requirement. See Jeffers, 62 F. App’x at 868 (unpublished).
More fundamentally, the court finds that the case is not moot because the court ordered
Respondents to facilitate Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return to the United States, which Respondents
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 9
of 18

10
agreed to do. The substantive issues within the Amended Petition remain live, and the court has
stated it will rule on them once Mr. Reyes Vasquez is returned. Despite Respondents’ arguments
that Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s Amended Petition has no merit, the petition remains active until this
court rules otherwise. See Noem v. Abrego Garcia, 145 S. Ct. 1017, 1018 (2025) (affirming a
District Court’s order requiring the Government to facilitate a deportee’s return “to ensure that his
case is handled as it would have been had he not been improperly sent to El Salvador”); D.V.D. v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 784 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406 (D. Mass. 2025) (stating “[c]ourts,
including district courts, regularly find that return is the appropriate remedy when a removal is
found to be unlawful” and listing cases).
The court acknowledges, however, the fact that Mr. Reyes Vasquez has amended his
petition adds a wrinkle to the analysis. The substance of his claims has significantly changed.
Respondents argue that Mr. Reyes Vasquez has abandoned his detention-related claims and that
his new claims attempt to challenge only his removal rather than his continued detention. ECF No.
21 at 11. Respondents thus argue those claims are not cognizable under habeas, depriving the court
of subject matter jurisdiction and rendering the case moot. Id.
At this point, the court does not read the Amended Petition to challenge only his removal.
To be sure, Mr. Reyes Vasquez requests that the court restore the status quo and prevent his removal
while he pursues a U-visa. ECF No. 11 at 6. But he also argues that his “continued detention or
exclusion” would “compound the original constitutional injury” relating to his right to access the
courts and his right to petition the government. Id. at 15, 16. He further argues that his continued
detention would contravene the Immigration and Nationality Act’s remedial framework. Id. at 18.
Ultimately, Mr. Reyes Vasquez is in part arguing that when he is returned to the United States, his
continued detention will be unlawful. See ECF No. 22 at 9. These claims thus require the court to
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 10
of 18

11
consider whether the asserted basis for his initial detention was valid and whether continued
detention under that basis would be unlawful. Though these types of claims are not always
meritorious, they are cognizable under habeas. See Dimmick v. Bourdon, 769 F. App’x 616, 618–
19 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“In this circuit, a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration
of his confinement and seeks immediate release or a shortened period of confinement, must do so
through an application for habeas corpus.” (citation modified)); Imran v. Harper, No. 25-30370,
2026 WL 93131, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (unpublished) (stating “district courts have subject-
matter jurisdiction to review § 2241 petitions challenging the lawfulness of a noncitizen’s
detention”); Francois v. Garcia, 509 F. Supp. 3d 668, 671 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“The ‘instructive
principle’ is that challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought under
habeas . . . .”). The court retains jurisdiction until it determines those claims to be insufficient to
sustain jurisdiction. See Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018) (stating
“courts ‘always have jurisdiction to determine [their] jurisdiction’”).
For the reasons above, the court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the
Amended Petition.
II. 	Venue
In their filed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Respondents argue that because Mr.
Reyes Vasquez was already in the District of Wyoming when the original petition was filed with
this court, “the court never had jurisdiction over this case and it should be dismissed.” ECF No.
31 at 2.
Respondents are vague as to the basis of this jurisdictional argument. Respondents first cite
to the Supreme Court’s language in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, which states that “[t]he plain language of
the habeas statute . . . confirms the general rule that for habeas petitions challenging present
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 11
of 18

12
physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.” 542 U.S.
426, 443 (2004). They then point to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which notes that if a court lacks
jurisdiction—traditionally, subject matter jurisdiction—it shall transfer the action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631. The court would be thus left to conclude that Respondents’ motion is attempting to litigate
subject matter jurisdiction, if not for Respondents’ invocation of the district-of-confinement rule.
Courts have held that the district-of-confinement rule is not a limitation on subject matter
jurisdiction, but rather a venue consideration. See Khalil v. Joyce, 771 F. Supp. 3d 268, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2025); Dufur v. United States Parole Comm’n, 34 F.4th 1090, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(“The immediate custodian rule implicates personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction;
likewise, the requirement to file in the district of confinement concerns venue, not subject matter
jurisdiction.”); see also Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434 n.7 (“The word ‘jurisdiction,’ of course, is capable
of different interpretations. We use it in the sense that it is used in the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241(a), and not in the sense of subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court.”); Al-Pine v.
Richerson, 763 F. App’x 717, 721 n.4 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (agreeing that jurisdiction
with respect to the district-of-confinement rule is not a question of subject matter jurisdiction).
While the actual motion to dismiss does not mention venue, Respondents’ related briefing
responding to the motion for sanctions sheds light on the actual, or at least the more proper, basis
for their argument. In their response to the motion for sanctions, Respondents assert that the court’s
original December 22 Order was valid “only if the Court had venue jurisdiction at the time the
petition was filed.” ECF No. 29 at 11. They then note that “Respondents’ counsel did not have
sufficient information to challenge venue at the December 31, 2025, OSC hearing.” Id.
Despite this response more directly invoking venue, Respondents’ argument remains
confused, perhaps explaining their self-styled “venue jurisdiction” argument. But the reality that
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 12
of 18

13
Respondents’ argument is one of venue, rather than subject matter jurisdiction, is critical for three
reasons. First, a court’s orders are binding and valid even if venue is later determined to be
improper. See In re AP Indus., Inc., 117 B.R. 789, 797 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“It is an axiom of
the first order that venue statutes are not jurisdictional. For this reason, although a subject matter
jurisdiction objection cannot be waived, a venue objection can be. Consequently, a court can have
subject matter jurisdiction to issue orders and judgments even if venue is improper.” (internal
citations removed)); Fressadi v. Glover, No. CV-16-03260-PHX-DJH, 2017 WL 5705830, at *4
(D. Ariz. Sept. 14, 2017) (“Because venue is not jurisdictional, [the first court] had jurisdiction to
render rulings in the case unless, and until, it ordered a change of venue. . . . All rulings prior to
the change in venue are valid.”). Respondents’ arguments that the court’s December 22 Order was
invalid thus lacks merit.
Second, if a court determines venue is improper after the issue is properly raised, it
maintains the discretion to either transfer the case or dismiss the case, discretion that the court has
yet to exercise here. Third, objections to improper venue may be deemed waived. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b).
Mr. Reyes Vasquez argues that Respondents waived any objections to venue, both at the
December 31 hearing and based on their litigation conduct. ECF No. 30 at 2–3. Respondents
disagree. They assert that they did not explicitly waive venue at the December 31 hearing; rather,
Respondents’ counsel only “advised that he did not have sufficient information at the time to
challenge jurisdiction.” ECF No. 31 at 4.
Courts generally agree that the district-of-confinement rule, as a venue condition, can be
waived. See, e.g., Padilla, 542 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Because the immediate-
custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules are like personal-jurisdiction or venue rules, objections
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 13
of 18

14
to the filing of petitions based on those grounds can be waived by the Government.”); Dufur v.
United States Parole Comm’n, 34 F.4th 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“But as this court has held,
and as the Supreme Court has strongly suggested, the immediate custodian rule and the habeas
venue rule are waivable.”); Surratt v. United States, No. 3:04-CR-250-19, 2014 WL 2013328, at
*4 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014), aff'd, 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015) (allowing the Government to
waive objections to a habeas petition not filed in the district of confinement); Kanai v. McHugh,
638 F.3d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, any challenge to habeas proceedings based on this
language in § 2241(a) is waived if not timely asserted.”).
“A habeas respondent thus forfeits” the venue defense “by failing to raise [it], and a district
court, sua sponte, may properly decline to enforce [it].” Dufur, 34 F.4th at 1097. It is appropriate,
then, to consider when a Respondent is deemed to have failed to raise venue as a defense such that
the objection is waived. Of course, in traditional civil litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12 requires any motion asserting an improper venue defense to be made within a motion filed prior
to the responsive pleading or within the responsive pleading itself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). In a similar
fashion, courts have considered venue arguments waived in the habeas context if Respondents did
not challenge venue in their answer to the petition. See, e.g., Efren Contreras Hernandez,
Petitioner, v. Kristi Noem, Sec'y Dep't of Homeland Sec., et al., Respondents., No. 5:25-CV-03453-
SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 166902, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026); Moore v. Olson, 368 F.3d 757,
760 (7th Cir. 2004) (ruling “the defense of improper venue was forfeited when it was omitted from
the custodian’s opening brief”).
Having determined that the district-of-confinement rule can be waived, and when waiver
is generally held to apply, the court now examines if Respondents in this case waived their
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 14
of 18

15
objections to venue. The court first looks to what was said at the December 31 hearing—the
importance of which the parties dispute:
THE COURT:
So just to be clear, though, there -- is it the position of the United States that
the petition was filed in the correct district and that this Court in fact has jurisdiction
over this petitioner and this writ?
BY MR. FERRE, COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS:
We’re not contesting personal jurisdiction and venue. The timing again is
close but I don’t have time to question the Court’s jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction
venue over Mr. Vasquez for purposes of this habeas petition.
BY THE COURT:
The last time that we had one of these, apparently ICE had taken him across
the border to Wyoming within 30 minutes of -- but before the petition was filed and
so I had no jurisdiction but that is not the case here.
BY MR. FERRE:
I don’t have –
BY THE COURT:
To your knowledge.
BY MR. FERRE:
Sorry, Your Honor. I don’t have details to suggest Your Honor doesn’t have
jurisdiction. The same process followed here is that when he was detained, he was
then processed here locally and then immediately transferred to Wyoming. I don’t
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 15
of 18

16
have timing, we’re not questioning the Court’s jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction
and venue over Mr. Vasquez.
The court finds that Respondents did not unambiguously waive their venue defense here. While
Mr. Ferre did not explicitly limit his statements that he was not contesting venue to apply only to
the December 31 hearing, it is reasonable to view his statements as only informing the court that
he did not yet have the necessary information to determine if a venue objection was proper.
What is unambiguous, however, is Respondents’ failure to raise a venue objection in any
of their responsive pleadings. Respondents filed their answer to the original petition on December
29 and their answer to the Amended Petition on January 19, and neither answer raises any objection
to venue or personal jurisdiction. ECF Nos. 10, 21. That alone supports a finding that the objection
is waived.
The court also finds that allowing a belated objection is not warranted. Respondents are
the best positioned party to acquire the relevant information relating to venue. After all, it was the
Government that transferred Mr. Reyes Vasquez from Utah to Wyoming (then back to Utah, then
to Arizona, then to Mexico). The transfer to Wyoming took place on December 19. The court gave
Respondents until December 29—ten days after the petition was filed—to submit their responsive
pleading. If they needed additional time, they could have filed a motion for an extension. See 28
U.S.C. § 2243 (allowing for extensions up to twenty days for good cause). After the hearing on
December 31, Respondents let another twenty-two days pass before they first raised any objection
to venue. In that time, Respondents filed two unrelated motions for extensions of time, two status
reports, and their second responsive pleading (responding to the Amended Petition and improperly
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 16
of 18

17
attempting to move for a motion to dismiss). Respondents have been litigating this petition as if
venue is proper, and the court finds that they have waived any objection to venue.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
With the court having determined Respondents’ arguments fail, Respondents must comply
with the court’s binding December 31 Order to Facilitate Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return. As this court
has made clear to both parties, the principal issue facing the court is a question of process. Mr.
Reyes Vasquez filed a habeas petition before this court, and this court temporarily ordered him not
to be removed from the United States while it considered his claims. If Respondents had adhered
to the Order, it is more than likely that the court would have by now ruled on the merits of the
petition. Instead, Respondents acted in violation of the Order, and the status quo has not yet been
restored.
Given this history, it is incumbent upon Respondents to remedy these procedural violations
before the case can proceed. The court is heartened to hear that Respondents aim to soon finish
facilitating Mr. Reyes Vasquez’s return. But as is worth underscoring, when a court exercises
jurisdiction over a petitioner’s claims, Respondents may not “deport first, litigate later.” Whatever
the merits of the claims, Mr. Reyes Vasquez had a right to due process and judicial review, and he
now is seeking to vindicate that right.
For the above reasons, the court hereby ORDERS that Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED. ECF No. 31.
Finally, given this Order and that Respondents have filed briefing asserting Mr. Reyes
Vasquez will be returned to the United States by February 6, the court DENIES Mr. Reyes
Vasquez’s Emergency Motion, ECF No. 36, and extends the deadline to facilitate Mr. Reyes
Vasquez’s return to February 6, 2026.
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 17
of 18

18
Signed February 5, 2026.
BY THE COURT
______________________________
Jill N. Parrish
United States Chief District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-01146-JNP Document 42 Filed 02/05/26 PageID.<pageID> Page 18
of 18