Halvorsen et al v. Cox et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
TRACIE HALVORSEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SPENCER COX as an individual and
official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:25-cv-00909-HCN-JCB
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
I NTRODUCTION1
Plaintiffs Tracie Halvorsen, Nancy Inman, Steven Huber, Wayne Wickizer, and Daniel
Newby (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)2 move for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 against counsel for: (1) Defendants Utah Governor Spencer Cox, Utah Lieutenant
Governor Deidre Henderson, and the State of Utah (collectively, “State Defendants”);
(2) Defendants Utah State Senator Curtis Bramble, Utah State Senator Daniel McCay, Utah State
Senator J. Stuart Adams, and Utah State House Representative Mike Schultz (collectively,
“Legislative Defendants”); (3) Defendant Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Matthew Durrant
(“Chief Justice Durrant”); (4) Defendants Robert Axson, Kim Coleman, and Chris Null, who all
are or were associated in some capacity with the Utah Republican Party (collectively, “URP
1 This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ECF
No. 21.
2 Sophie Anderson was named as a plaintiff in the complaint, ECF No. 1, but was later
voluntarily dismissed. ECF No. 80.
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Defendants”); and (5) Defendant Brian McKenzie (hereinafter, all Defendants (1)-(5),
collectively, “Defendants”).3 The URP Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ motion.4 For the
reasons explained below, the court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions and denies as moot the
URP Defendants’ motion to strike.
ANALYSIS
The court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions for three reasons. First, the court cannot
impose Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants’ counsel because Plaintiffs did not serve their
motion for Rule 11 sanctions on Defendants prior to filing it, as required by Rule 11(c)(2).
Second, even if Plaintiffs had properly served their motion for Rule 11 sanctions on Defendants
prior to filing it, Plaintiffs fail to show that Defendants’ counsel violated Rule 11(b). Third,
Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that Defendants’ counsel violated section 1927. Based on the denial
of Plaintiffs’ motion, the court denies as moot the URP Defendants’ motion to strike. Each issue
is addressed in turn below.
I. 	The Court Cannot Impose Rule 11 Sanctions Against Defendants’ Counsel Because
Plaintiffs Did Not Serve Their Rule 11 Motion on Defendants Prior to Filing It.
Because Plaintiffs failed to serve their motion for Rule 11 sanctions on Defendants prior
to filing it, the court cannot impose Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants’ counsel. A Rule 11
motion for sanctions “must be served . . . , but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if
the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately
3 ECF No. 100.
4 ECF No. 110.
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corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets.”5 The Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1993 amendment to Rule 11 further provide:
The motion for sanctions is not . . . to be filed until at least 21 days
(or such other period as the court may set) after being served. If,
during 	this 	period, 	the 	alleged 	violation 	is 	corrected, 	as 	by
withdrawing (whether formally or informally) some allegation or
contention, the motion should not be filed with the court. These
provisions are intended to provide a type of “safe harbor” against
motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to sanctions
on the basis of another party’s motion unless, after receiving the
motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge
candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a
specified allegation.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit requires strict adherence to the
safe-harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2).7
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they failed to serve their Rule 11 motion on Defendants prior
to filing it. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that Rule 11(c)(2)’s safe-harbor provision does not apply to
their motion for two meritless reasons.
First, Plaintiffs assert that they were not required to comply with the safe-harbor
provision because their motion also relied on section 1927 as a basis for sanctions. That
argument fails. Although true that section 1927 does not contain a safe-harbor provision,
Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that their simultaneous reliance on section 1927
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
7 Mellott v. MSN Commc’ns, Inc., 492 F. App’x 887, 888 (10th Cir. 2012) (“This court has held
that it is an abuse of discretion to grant Rule 11 sanctions if the defendant did not comply with
the safe-harbor provision.”); Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1191-93 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding
that the district court abused its discretion in granting a Rule 11 motion for sanctions when the
motion was filed without complying with the safe-harbor provision).
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somehow obviated the need to comply with Rule 11(c)(2)’s safe-harbor provision for their Rule
11 motion. Further, Plaintiffs ignore Rule 11(c)(2), which provides that a Rule 11 “motion for
sanctions must be made separately from any other motion.” Thus, Plaintiffs improperly
combined a request for sanctions under Rule 11 and section 1927 in the same motion.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that that they “invoked Rule 11(c)(1),” which, according to
Plaintiffs, means that they were not required to comply with Rule 11(c)(2).8 However, Plaintiffs
cite no authority for that position, which is not surprising because their tortured reading of Rule
11 is simply wrong. Rule 11(c)(1) provides:
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose
an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violated 	the 	rule 	or 	is 	responsible 	for 	the 	violation. Absent
exceptional 	circumstances, 	a 	law 	firm 	must 	be 	held 	jointly
responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or
employee.
As evidenced by the plain language of that provision, it governs what the court is permitted to do
when a Rule 11(b) violation is established; it says nothing about a party’s motion for sanctions.
Rule 11(c)(2), on the other hand, specifically applies to motions for sanctions. Indeed, that
provision is entitled, “Motion for Sanctions.” Further, it provides that the safe-harbor provision
therein applies to all Rule 11 motions.
In sum, Plaintiffs provide no support for their argument that Rule 11(c)(2)’s safe-harbor
provision does not apply to their Rule 11 motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ admitted failure to
comply with Rule 11(c)(2) requires the court to deny that motion.
8 ECF No. 119 at 4-5.
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II. 	Even if Plaintiffs Had Properly Served Their Rule 11 Motion on Defendants Prior to
Filing It, Plaintiffs Fail to Show That Defendants’ Counsel Violated Rule 11(b).
Even if Plaintiffs had complied with Rule 11(c)(2)’s safe-harbor provision, their Rule 11
motion fails on its merits because they fail to demonstrate that Defendants’ counsel violated Rule
11(b). Rule 11(b) provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating
it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
of litigation;
(2) 	the 	claims, 	defenses, 	and 	other 	legal 	contentions 	are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, 	modifying, 	or 	reversing 	existing 	law 	or 	for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
belief or a lack of information.9
“[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and . . . streamline
the administration and procedure of the federal courts.”10
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(4).
10 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
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The Tenth Circuit has instructed district courts that “[t]he award of Rule 11 sanctions
involves two steps. The district court first must find that a pleading violates Rule 11. The second
step is for the district court to impose an appropriate sanction.”11 Under the first step, the court
employs a standard of objective reasonableness, which is “‘intended to eliminate any
“empty-head pure-heart” justification for patently frivolous arguments.’”12 Rule 11 “require[s]
litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions.”13 For the second
step, a Rule 11 sanction “must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”14
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ counsel committed Rule 11(b) violations by ignoring
and misrepresenting legal precedent in Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs further assert
that the URP Defendants’ counsel violated Rule 11(b) by requesting an award of attorney fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in the URP Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Neither argument is
persuasive.
First, the court has considered the arguments in Defendants’ motions to dismiss and
concluded that they are meritorious. Indeed, the court has recommended that Defendants’
motions to dismiss be granted and that this case be dismissed with prejudice.15 Thus, it logically
follows that the court does not view the arguments in Defendants’ motions to dismiss as violative
of Rule 11(b).
11 Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
12 Id. at 1320 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment).
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
15 ECF No. 120.
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Second, Plaintiffs’ conclusory arguments about the URP Defendants’ counsel
“weaponizing” section 198816 fail to show a Rule 11(b) violation. Although Plaintiffs obviously
disagree with the URP Defendants’ counsel’s strategic choice to request an award of attorney
fees under section 1988—which specifically authorizes such awards—Plaintiffs fail to show that
the request violated any provision of Rule 11(b). Because Plaintiffs have failed to show that
Defendants’ counsel violated Rule 11(b), Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions under that rule fails on
its merits.17
16 ECF No. 100 at 9.
17 In their combined opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, the State Defendants, the
Legislative Defendants, and Chief Justice Durrant request an award of reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred in connection with Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 114 at 10-11.
Rule 11 allows for a such an award to a party who prevails against a motion for sanctions. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. (“[T]he filing of a motion for
sanctions is itself subject to the requirements of [Rule 11] and can lead to sanctions. . . . [T]he
court may award to the person who prevails on a motion under Rule 11—whether the movant or
the target of the motion—reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in presenting
or opposing the motion.”). Although the court has concerns with Plaintiffs’ positions and
arguments in this case to date, the court declines to exercise its discretion to impose sanctions
against them under Rule 11 in this instance out of an abundance of caution for their pro se status.
Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that when deciding whether to
impose Rule 11 sanctions on a pro se party, the court must “construe matters differently for the
litigant, as [the court] give[s] pro se litigants liberal treatment, precisely because they do not
have lawyers”); Vidal v. AHC of Aurora, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-00746-SKC, 2018 WL 10947922, at
*2 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2018) (declining to award Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff based, in
part, on the plaintiff’s pro se status, despite the plaintiff’s claims being “without merit”); Banks v.
Opat, No. 5:15-CV-03093-HLT-KGS, 2018 WL 11678279, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 16, 2018)
(“Considering Plaintiff’s pro se status—and although the arguments raised by Plaintiff in his
motion to strike lack merit and may be deemed frivolous—the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to award [Rule 11] sanctions against Plaintiff here.”); Spreitzer v. Woodall, No. 1:12-
CV-00206-ABJ, 2014 WL 12625789, at *1 (D. Wyo. Mar. 3, 2014) (“Courts customarily give
pro se litigants the benefit of the doubt when it comes to [Rule 11] sanctions.” (citation
modified)); Alexander v. Everson, No. 05-1129-JTM, 2005 WL 2035041, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 23,
2005) (declining to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff based, in part, on the plaintiff’s
pro se status, even when the “plaintiff’s claims might well be deemed frivolous”); see also Fed.
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III. 	Plaintiffs Fail to Demonstrate That Defendants’ Counsel Violated Section 1927.
Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants’ counsel violated section 1927, which permits
the court to impose sanctions against counsel who “multipl[y] the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously.”18 More specifically, section 1927 sanctions may be imposed
against counsel who, among other things: (1) “intentionally act without a plausible basis”;
(2) engage in “conduct that, viewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless disregard
of [counsel]’s duties to the court”; (3) act “recklessly or with indifference to the law”; (4) engage
in conduct that is “bent on misleading the court”; and (5) “act[] in the teeth of what [counsel]
know[] to be the law.”19
Plaintiffs base their motion for sanctions under section 1927 on the same arguments they
used to support their Rule 11 motion. Accordingly, for the same reasons the court relied upon
above to conclude that Plaintiffs’ Rule 11 motion fails on its merits, the court concludes that
Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions under section 1927 likewise fails.
IV. 	The Court Denies as Moot the URP Defendants’ Motion to Strike.
Because the court has denied Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, the court need not address
the URP Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ motion. Accordingly, the URP Defendants’
motion to strike is denied as moot.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (providing that “the court has
sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often arise in pro se
situations” when deciding whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions (citation modified)).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see also Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir.
2008) (providing that section 1927 was designed “to compensate victims of abusive litigation
practices”).
19 Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1511-13 (10th Cir. 1987) (citation modified omitted); see
also Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1342 (10th Cir. 1998).
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O RDER
For the reasons stated above, the court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. 	Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions20 is DENIED.
2. 	The URP Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions21 is
DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 23rd day of January 2026.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
20 ECF No. 100.
21 ECF No. 110.
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