Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
LYNN D. BECKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH
AND OURAY RESERVATION; THE
UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL
BUSINESS COMMITTEE; UTE
ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:25-CV-643-DAK-DAO
Judge Dale A. Kimball
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Lynn D. Becker’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction [ECF No. 6], Defendants Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, the
Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee, and Ute Energy Holdings, LLC’s (collectively “the
Tribe”) Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 19] and Defendant Ute Energy Holdings LLC’s
Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Becker’s Complaint or Alternatively to Strike Redundant, Immaterial,
Impertinent, and Scandalous Matters In It [ECF No. 17]. On November 25, 2025, the court held a
hearing on the motions. At the hearing, David K. Isom represented Plaintiff, and Ben Fenner,
Ethan Tourtellotte, and J. Preston Stieff represented Defendants. The court took the motions under
advisement. After carefully considering the parties’ memoranda and arguments, as well as the
facts and law relevant to the pending motion, the court issues the following Memorandum
Decision and Order on the pending motions.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lynn Becker and the Tribe have an ongoing twelve-year dispute, involving five
other lawsuits in three separate court systems. This is the sixth lawsuit to grow out of the
long-standing dispute. The dispute stems from an Independent Contractor Agreement the Tribe
and non-Indian, Becker entered in 2005, under which Becker was to receive a salary and 2% of
“net revenue distributed to Ute Energy Holding, LLC, from Ute Energy, LLC.”
The Tribe operates its own tribal government, including an Energy and Minerals
Department that oversees approximately 1.3 million acres of trust lands. Prior to 2001, the Tribe’s
Business Committee managed the Tribe’s oil and gas deposits in a passive manner, which
consisted of waiting for oil and gas companies to contact the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for
permission to enter an oil and gas lease or development agreement on Tribal lands. In December
2001, the Tribe changed course to an active management methodology to actively market its
mineral assets.
In the early 2000s, Becker worked as a consultant for a private company and worked on
projects involving the Tribe. In 2004, Becker began working in the Tribe’s Energy and Minerals
Department, managing and developing tribal energy and mineral resources on the Tribe’s
reservation. Becker’s office was inside the tribal headquarters on the reservation. In April 2005,
the Tribe and Becker entered into the Independent Contractor Agreement (“the Agreement”)
referenced above, which was made retroactively effective as of March 1, 2004. The contract term
was for an initial period of twenty-four months, which could be extended in twelve-month periods.
On October 31, 2007, Becker resigned under the terms of the Agreement. Becker claims that he
was not paid according to the compensation terms in the Agreement. The Tribe claims that Becker
was part of a scheme to defraud it out of valuable interests in oil and gas and that Becker
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improperly retained a proprietary mapping system and geoseismic and geological data.
In 2013, Becker sued the Tribe in this federal district court, alleging that the Tribe breached
the Agreement and owed him royalties. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that Becker’s claims against the Tribe were state law
claims that did not depend upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed in Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe, 770 F.3d 944 (10th Cir. 2014).
Because there was no subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, Becker then filed suit
against the Tribe in Utah state court in December 2014. In July 2015, the state court rejected the
Tribe’s attempt to have the action dismissed on the grounds that the state court lacked jurisdiction
and that the Tribe was protected by tribal sovereign immunity. In 2016, while the state court case
was still proceeding, the Tribe sued Becker and Utah State District Court Judge Barry Lawrence in
federal district court to enjoin the state proceeding, asserting that the state court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the parties’ dispute. The Tribe also filed suit against Becker in Tribal Court seeking
declarations that the Agreement was void and that the Tribe’s purported waiver of sovereign
immunity in the Agreement was executed in violation of Tribal Law.
The federal district court initially dismissed the Tribe’s federal suit for lack of
federal-court-subject-matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the
Tribe’s claim that federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over a claim against Indians arising
on the reservation presents a federal question that sustains federal jurisdiction. Ute Indian Tribe of
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, et al. v. Lawrence, et al., 875 F.3d 539, 548 (10th Cir. 2017).
The district court then denied the Tribe’s requested preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the
state court proceedings, and the Tenth Circuit again reversed. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation, et al. v. Lawrence, et al., 22 F.4th 892 (10th Cir. 2022). The Tenth Circuit held
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that the Tribe was entitled to not only a preliminary injunction, but a permanent injunction. Id. at
909-10. The Tenth Circuit found that Becker’s state-court claims arose on the reservation, and
because the claims arose on the reservation, the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
absent congressional authorization. Id. at 906-07. While the district court had found that 25 U.S.C.
§ 1322 provided such authorization, the Tenth Circuit explained that § 1322 requires tribal consent
to state-court jurisdiction, and tribal consent is obtained only by holding a special election under
25 U.S.C. § 1326. Id. Because the Tribe never provided such consent, the Tenth Circuit found that
the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 907. Due to the particular circumstances of
the appeal, the Tenth Circuit ordered the district court to permanently enjoin the state-court
proceedings. Id.at 909-10.
While the Tribe’s lawsuit seeking to enjoin the state-court proceedings was pending,
Becker again sued the Tribe in federal court seeking to enjoin the tribal court proceedings. The
district court preliminarily enjoined the Tribal Court proceedings. In 2017, the Tenth Circuit
reversed that injunction. Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, 868
F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2017). At the Tenth Circuit, the Tribe contended that the
tribal-exhaustion rule, which ordinarily requires a federal court to abstain from determining the
jurisdiction of a tribal court until the tribal court has ruled on its own jurisdiction, deprived the
district court of jurisdiction to determine the tribal court’s jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit did not
agree that the rule was jurisdictional but agreed that the district court should have abstained on the
issue. Id. at 1203-05. The Tenth Circuit found that although the Agreement contains a waiver of
the tribal-exhaustion rule, Becker had not shown a likelihood of success based on the validity of
the waiver. Id. at 1204. Becker argued that the exhaustion rule does not apply because it is clear
that the tribal court would lack jurisdiction to hear the dispute. But the Tenth Circuit stated that “in
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the context of this case that argument does not present any additional issues. Mr. Becker has not
disputed that if the Contract is void, then the tribal court has jurisdiction and the exhaustion rule
applies. And the Tribe has not disputed that if the Contract is valid, then it waived the exhaustion
rule.” 	Becker failed to adequately counter the Tribe’s contention that the entire Agreement,
including the waiver, was void because it did not receive federal-government approval, as is
required for contracts transferring property held in trust for the Tribe by the federal government.
Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that if there is law exempting the Agreement from the requirement of
federal approval, Becker did not provide it to the court. In addition, in response to Becker’s
argument that even if the Agreement required federal approval, the waiver provision is enforceable
because it is severable under the Agreement’s severability clause, the Tenth Circuit found that the
waiver provision was not severable in an agreement void ab initio even if it contains a severability
clause. Id. Because Becker did not meet his burden, the Tenth Circuit held that the exhaustion rule
applies and the Tribal Court should consider in the first instance whether it has jurisdiction. Id. at
1205.
On remand, the district court again preliminarily enjoined the Tribal Court proceedings and
enjoined the Tribal Court’s orders from having preclusive effect in other proceedings. In 2021, the
Tenth Circuit reversed again, concluding that the tribal exhaustion rule required the district court
to dismiss Becker’s federal lawsuit without prejudice. Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and
Ouray Reservation, 11 F.4th 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 2021). The Tenth Circuit recognized that the
Agreement “expressly purported to waive the Tribe’s sovereign immunity and to have all disputes
settled in a non-Indian court. Nevertheless, the Tribe has raised serious questions regarding the
validity of the contract as a whole, as well has the validity of the purported waiver of sovereign
immunity in particular. Out of respect for tribal self-government and self-determination, we
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conclude that the questions the Tribe has raised regarding the validity of the Agreement, as well as
the threshold question of whether the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute, must
be resolved in the first instance by the Tribal Court itself.” Id. at 1150. Becker’s waiver argument
is only applicable if the Agreement itself is determined to be valid. Id.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that since the last Tenth Circuit ruling, “the Tribal Court has
determined that it has jurisdiction over the Tribe’s suit against Becker and has also agreed with the
Tribe that the Agreement is void under both federal and tribal law.” Id. The Tenth Circuit stated
that because of the district court’s injunction, however, appellate review of the decision was not
complete. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that until such appellate review was complete, and tribal court
system had a full opportunity to evaluate the claims, “federal courts should not intervene.” Id.
“’If [and when] the Tribal Appeals Court upholds the lower court’s determination that the tribal
courts have jurisdiction, [Becker] may challenge that ruling in the District Court.’” Id. Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit instructed the District Court to dismiss Becker’s case without prejudice.
The Tribal Court action between the parties began in 2016, was enjoined by the federal
district court several times, and is ongoing. In March 2017, the Tribal Court denied Becker’s
Motion to Dismiss the action, denied the Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted the
Tribe leave to amend its Complaint. Becker’s Motion to Dismiss argued that the Tribe had waived
sovereign immunity in the Agreement and had agreed to dispute resolution in federal district court
or any other court of competent jurisdiction of the federal courts lacked jurisdiction. Relying on
the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 770
F.3d 944 (10th Cir. 2014), dismissing Becker’s first action against the Tribe in federal court for
lack of federal question jurisdiction, the Tribal Court stated that “it turns out the federal court
lack[ed] jurisdiction.” The tribal court found that it had jurisdiction, recognizing that it was at an
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early stage in the litigation. The court noted the Tenth Circuit’s decision finding that “it is not clear
that the Agreement waived the Tribe’s right to pursue its suit against Becker in the tribal court”
because the “court of competent jurisdiction” language in the Agreement could include the Tribal
Court and that the waiver language may be void ab initio for failure to obtain federal government
approval for the Agreement. Therefore, the court found that if the Agreement was void, the Tribal
Court clearly had jurisdiction under the consensual relationship exception, and, if the Agreement
was not void, the Tribal Court could still have jurisdiction under the “court of competent
jurisdiction” language in the Agreement. The court further noted that if the parties had wanted to
explicitly exclude any tribal court jurisdiction, they could have stated so in the Agreement. On
June 9, 2017, the Tribal Court declined to stay the suit in Tribal Court on grounds of comity.
In December 2017, the Tribal Court addressed another motion to dismiss by Becker and
another motion for partial summary judgment by the Tribe. The court denied both motions.
Becker’s motion to dismiss argued that under Section 1-2-3(5) of the Ute Law and Order Code, the
Tribal Court could not be a “court of competent jurisdiction” as agreed to by the parties because
both parties could not sue in Tribal Court. The Tribal Court, however, stated that it did not read
“court of competent jurisdiction” so narrowly. The court, again, noted that the parties could have
explicitly excluded Tribal Court jurisdiction but did not do so. Therefore, the court concluded that
Section 1-2-3(5) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the pending lawsuit.
On the Tribe’s motion for partial summary judgment that the Agreement could not waive
sovereign immunity because the waiver was not in the resolution approving Becker’s Agreement,
as required by Section 1-8-5 of the Ute Law and Order Code, the court found that the language of
waiver in the Agreement which was incorporated into the resolution was sufficient to comply with
Section 1-8-5’s requirement. The court noted that the Agreement has an Article entitled “Limited
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Waiver of Sovereign Immunity; Submission to Jurisdiction,” which the court assumed the
members of the Business Committee would have read before approving of the Agreement.
Therefore, the court denied the Tribe’s motion and also denied Becker’s motion because tribal
court was likely a court of competent jurisdiction.
In a decision the next day, the Tribal Court addressed the Tribe’s pending motions for
partial summary judgment on whether the Agreement was void ab initio under federal law and
void ab initio under Ute Indian Tribal law, Becker’s motion for additional discovery and motion to
compel, the Tribe’s motion for protective order, and the Tribe’s motion to dismiss Becker’s
counterclaims. The court denied all pending motions without prejudice and set a scheduling order
allowing for discovery and briefing on the Tribe’s motion on whether the Agreement was void ab
initio under federal law, which it stated the court would decide before addressing any other claim.
In February 2018, the Tribal Court decided the Tribe’s motion for partial summary
judgment on whether the Agreement was void ab initio under federal and tribal law and a motion
to reconsider whether the Tribe had waived tribal sovereign immunity in the Agreement. Becker
had moved to compel additional discovery, renewed his motion to dismiss, and requested that the
Tribal Court defer to the Utah state court action as a matter of comity.
The Tribal Court found that it had jurisdiction over Becker based on Montana exceptions
for jurisdiction over non-Indians who enter into consensual relationships with the Tribe or whose
activities upon tribal lands imperil the Tribe’s political integrity, economic security, or health and
welfare. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). The court noted that the federal
district court had also found that the Tribal Court possessed jurisdiction over the action based on
Becker’s relationship with the Tribe. The court noted on comity that it is limited to situations
where two tribunals simultaneously possess concurrent jurisdiction and no court had issued a final
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judgment as to jurisdiction over this action.
On the issue regarding waiver of sovereign immunity, the court reversed the prior decision
because it did not find Yazzie v. Ute Indian Tribe, the decision relied on by the prior judge, to be
persuasive authority because the Yazzie court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction but
then proceeded to make substantive determinations. The Tribal Court also disagreed that allowing
incorporation by reference actually complied with Section 1-8-5’s requirement and that there was
a factual basis for assuming that the Business Committee had notice. Therefore, the court found
that the Tribe had not waived sovereign immunity.
With respect to whether the Agreement was void ab initio, the Tribal Court noted that it
was undisputed that the Agreement was never authorized or approved by the federal government.
The court explained that because it was undisputed that the revenue upon which Becker’s 2%
interest was to be calculated came from oil and gas production on land held in trust by the United
States for the Ute Tribe, the Agreement needed federal approval. The court relied on substantial
case law and experts presented by the Tribe on Indian mineral development and federal Indian law
to determine that the Agreement was subject to federal review and approval, either under IMDA or
25 U.S.C. § 177. Absent such approval, the court found the Agreement void ab initio.
This decision was issued by a new tribal court judge. Becker claims that the Tribe
terminated Judge Weathers, the judge who issued the first decision, when he ruled against the
Tribe. However, the Tribe states that the contract it had with the Northwest Intertribal Court
System expired and Judge Weathers, who was part of that network, was no longer retained. The
Chief Judge of the Ute Indian Tribal Court reassigned the case to a new judge after the contract
with the prior court system expired.
The February 2018 decision was made in between the two rulings by the Tenth Circuit in
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the Becker federal case attempting to enjoin the Tribal Court. As noted above, at one point, the
federal district court ruled that these findings and conclusions had no preclusive effect and stayed
the Tribal Court proceedings. But the Tenth Circuit reversed the federal court and allowed the
Tribal Court proceedings to continue.
The Tribal Court scheduled a four-day bench trial to commence on April 28, 2025. In
March 2025, attorney Frances Bassett filed an emergency motion to vacate the trial setting due to
the impending death of her mother. The Tribal Court granted the motion and directed the Tribe’s
counsel to coordinate with the court and opposing counsel in rescheduling the trial and entering an
amended scheduling order. The Tribe’s counsel verified that the earliest date the Tribal courtroom
was open and that Judge Pechota and all expert witnesses were available for a rescheduled trial
would be September 22-25, 2025. On August 4, 2025, the Tribe sent Becker’s attorney an
amended pretrial order for his review. Becker, however, on that same date, filed this new federal
lawsuit. Becker moved this court for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Tribal Court action and
for a declaration that Becker did not need to exhaust his tribal remedies and/or that he had
exhausted them. The Tribe filed a formal request for trial setting two days later. On August 12,
2025, Becker filed an objection to the trial setting and a motion to recuse Judge Pechota. The
recusal motion has been certified to another Tribal Court judge for decision.
The parties disagree on whether the Tribal Court has held that Section 1-2-3(5) deprives
the tribal court of jurisdiction over Becker’s counterclaims. The Tribe asserts that the Tribal Court
has repeatedly denied Becker’s arguments regarding Section 1-2-3(5). Becker asserts that the
Tribe and the Tribal Court agreed that the claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under
Section 1-2-3(5). Because his claims were withdrawn, Becker asserts that he cannot appeal the
claims to a higher Tribal Court and the claims are exhausted. This assertion, however, appears to
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ignore the fact that Becker’s claims are part of an overall case that involves several other claims
and that his claims may be impacted by the decisions made regarding the other claims. It is
undisputed that the Tribal Court action has not been fully resolved at the district court level, and no
Tribal Court decisions have been appealed within the Tribal Court system.
Becker’s Complaint in this new federal action asserts eight claims for relief: (1) declaratory
judgment that no further Tribal Court exhaustion is required because the Tribal Court action is
violative of the express jurisdictional prohibitions of Section 1-2-3(5); (2) declaratory judgment
that no further Tribal Court exhaustion is required because any further exhaustion would serve no
purpose other than delay; (3) declaratory judgment that no further Tribal Court exhaustion is
required because the assertion of Tribal Court jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass Becker
and is being conducted in bad faith; (4) declaratory judgment that Resolution 18-118 is void and
contemptuous; (5) breach of contract; (6) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (7)
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit; (8) knowing and reckless negligence manifesting a
knowing and reckless indifference to Becker’s rights.
DISCUSSION
Becker moves for a preliminary injunction under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In response, the Tribe filed a Motoin to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. Under Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party moving for a preliminary injunction “must
establish that four equitable factors weigh in its favor: (1) it is substantially likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) its threatened injury
outweighs the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory
Distribution, LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009). It is the moving party’s burden to
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demonstrate that these factors weigh in its favor. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182,
1188-89 (10th Cir. 2003). A preliminary injunction may be granted “only when monetary or other
traditional legal remedies are inadequate, and ‘the right to relief [is] clear and unequivocal.’” First
Western Capital Mngmt Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
Because Becker’s ability to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits is related to
the Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss, the court will discuss them together. Becker argues that he is likely
to succeed in showing that no further exhaustion duty exists. The Tenth Circuit recognized in
Becker’s previous federal court action that the exhaustion of tribal remedies is not jurisdictional
and can be limited if some well-recognized exceptions exist. “The tribal-exhaustion rule states that
‘absent exceptional circumstances, federal courts typically should abstain from hearing cases that
challenge tribal court jurisdiction until tribal court remedies, including tribal appellate review, are
exhausted.’” Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, et al., (10th Cir.
2022) (quoting Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2011).
However, the Supreme Court “has acknowledged that exhaustion is not required: (1) ‘where an
assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith’; (2)
‘where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions’; or (3) ‘where
exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s
jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21. The Supreme Court has also held
that tribal exhaustion may be excused “’where it is clear that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction and
that judicial proceedings would serve “no purpose other than delay.”’” Id. (quoting Thlopthlocco
Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10 th Cir. 2014).
Becker argues that there is no exhaustion duty where any such exception is shown and that
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he is likely to show three of these exceptions: (1) the Tribal Court action violates the jurisdictional
prohibition in Section 1-2-3(5) of the Ute Tribe Law & Order Code; (2) because the Tribal Court
lacks jurisdiction, any exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose other than delay; and (3)
the assertion of Tribal Court jurisdiction here is motivated by a desire to harass Becker and is being
conducted in bad faith.
The Tribe, however, moves for dismissal because the issues raised in Becker’s Complaint
have already been litigated and he has lost three times in the Tenth Circuit. It is clear that the state
law contract and equitable claims Becker raises in his Complaint have previously been dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, 770 P.3d 944 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Becker I”). The mere passage of time and increased
complexity of the dispute between the parties cannot resurrect these claims. Therefore, the court
dismisses the breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust
enrichment, quantum meruit, and knowing and reckless negligence claims for lack of federal court
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Becker I.
Becker’s declaratory judgment claims are governed by previous Tenth Circuit decisions in
this ongoing dispute. , In Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 868 F.3d
1199 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Becker II”), the Tenth Circuit held that the tribal exhaustion rule applies
and that Becker had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the exhaustion issue. Id. at
1205. In the third case, Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 11 F.4th
1140 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied 143 S. Ct. 273 (2022) (“Becker III”), the Tenth Circuit held that
the exhaustion rule still applied: “Becker has not yet obtained appellate review of the Tribal
Court’s conclusions. Until [such] appellate review is complete, the Tribal Courts have not had a
full opportunity to evaluate the Tribe’s claims and federal courts should not intervene.” Id. at 1150
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(cleaned up). Becker now asks this court to take jurisdiction over the dispute before the Tribal
Court has held a trial or any appeal has occurred in the Tribal Court system. The court cannot do
so. The Tenth Circuit has stated that the tribal exhaustion rule applies until the parties have
completed the appellate process in Tribal Court. “At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies
means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the
lower tribal courts.” Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 17.
While Becker claims that the Tribe’s exhaustion claims are gutted by the Tribal Court’s
rulings, the opposite is true. An appeal has not happened in Tribal Court and several issues ruled
on by the Tribal Court are fundamental to the dispute. The November 2024 decision in Tribal
Court dismissed Becker’s counterclaims on the merits, not on account of jurisdiction. The court
dismissed Becker’s counterclaims based on sovereign immunity, statute of limitations, and failure
to join the United States as a necessary party. These rulings on the merits are appealable to the
Tribal Court of Appeals.
Becker’s Complaint relies on exceptions to tribal court exhaustion identified in Iowa
Mutual. He asserts that the Tribal Court action violates express jurisdictional prohibitions in Tribal
law, that exhaustion would serve no other purpose than delay, and that the assertion of Tribal Court
jurisdiction is done in bad faith and motivated by an intent to harass him. The Tenth Circuit already
rejected these claims in Becker II and Becker III. The Tenth Circuit specifically stated that Becker
had not persuaded it that any of the narrow exceptions applied in this case. Moreover, the court has
reviewed all the rulings from the Tribal Court and has found them thorough and well-reasoned
decisions. There is no basis for finding that a reconsideration of one issue, and a difference of
opinion between two judges on the relevance of a case, amounts to bad faith or harassment.
Moreover, that issue is something that can be brought up in an appeal in the Tribal Court system.
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Becker cannot keep bringing the same issues before this court. Becker needs to abide by Becker II
and Becker III.
Furthermore, since Becker II and III, there is no new evidence of delay or bad faith in
Tribal Court. Earlier delays in Tribal Court were frequently caused by this court enjoining
proceedings and the Tenth Circuit needing to review such decisions. Becker sought those delays,
and the Tenth Circuit has already addressed those delays. Becker’s contentions regarding the delay
of the April 2025 trial date are without merit. The April 2025 trial needed to be rescheduled
because one of the attorney’s needed to attend to the imminent death of her mother. The earliest
time the court, Tribe, and experts could reschedule the trial was September 22-25, 2025. Becker
takes issue with the Tribe contacting the court to find a new trial date, but it is customary, at least at
this court, for parties to call the court to inquire about the court’s trial schedule and availability.
This type of everyday interaction is not nefarious. Moreover, by filing the present federal court
action, Becker is now the one delaying proceedings in Tribal Court. It does not make sense to let
Becker begin the same suit over and over in federal district court regarding exceptions to the tribal
exhaustion rule. It is disruptive to the parties’ resolution of the dispute.
Becker II and Becker III govern the present action, and the court dismisses this case
without prejudice until Becker exhausts his Tribal remedies through the tribal district court and
appellate process. Becker III, 11 D.4th at 1150 (“’If [and when] the Tribal Appeals Court upholds
the lower court’s determination that the tribal courts have jurisdiction, [Becker] may challenge that
ruling in District Court.’ In the meantime, we conclude that the proper course of action is to
remand to the district court with directions to dismiss Becker’s federal action without prejudice.”)
Therefore, the court grants the Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss Becker’s declaratory judgment claims
without prejudice as well.
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Because the court has determined that Becker’s state court claims and his declaratory
judgment claims should be dismissed, he fails to meet his burden of demonstrating a likelihood of
success on the merits. Accordingly, Becker cannot demonstrate that complying with the Tenth
Circuit mandates is causing him irreparable harm. And, allowing a new federal action to begin
prior to the current Tribal Court action concluding is contrary to the public interest of following the
mandate from higher courts. Therefore, the court denies Becker’s motion for preliminary
injunction.
The Tribe asks for Becker’s Complaint to be stricken because it is replete with scurrilous,
offensive, and objectionable allegations, including ad hominem attacks on the Tribe, the Tribe’s
counsel, and Tribal Court judges. The Tribe recognizes that motions to strike are generally
disfavored. However, “the disfavored character of Rule 12(f) is relaxed somewhat in the context of
scandalous allegations and matters of this type often will be stricken from the pleadings in order to
purge the court’s files and protect the subject of the allegations.” 5A C. Wright and A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure (Civil) 2d, § 1382, at 714 (1990). The Tribe asks for the entire
Complaint to be stricken because there is no factual or legal predicate for Becker’s claims and the
Complaint is an affront to the dignity of the court which has mandated that he complete tribal
proceedings. Hohensee v. Watson, 188 F. Supp. 941, 943 (M.D. Pa. 1959). Alternatively, the Tribe
asks for specific allegations to be stricken from the Complaint— Paragraphs 31-36, 54-62, 63-93,
and 94-133.
The court does not find that there are grounds for striking the entire Complaint. And, while
the court agrees that Paragraphs 31-36, 54-62, 63-93, and 94-133 are speculative and lack support,
the Tribe has adequately countered the allegations with evidence demonstrating their lack of merit.
Therefore, the court does not find that it is necessary to strike the paragraphs.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, Plaintiff Lynn D. Becker’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction [ECF No. 6] is DENIED, Defendants Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation, the Uintah and Ouray Tribal Business Committee, and Ute Energy Holdings, LLC’s
(collectively “the Tribe”) Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 19] is GRANTED, and
Defendant Ute Energy Holdings LLC’s Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Becker’s Complaint or
Alternatively to Strike Redundant, Immaterial, Impertinent, and Scandalous Matters In It [ECF
No. 17] is DENIED. Becker’s action is dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this 11 th day of February 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_________________________________________
DALE A. KIMBALL,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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