Montelongo v. Snap Finance LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
VANESSA MONTELONGO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SNAP FINANCE, LLC a/k/a SNAP
FINANCE US a/k/a NEW SNAP FINANCE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNT I AND COUNT II OF
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Civil No. 2:25-cv-00401-DBP
Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On August 20, 2025, Defendant Snap Finance, LLC (“Snap” or “Defendant”) motioned
the court to dismiss Count I and Count II of Plaintiff Vanessa Montelongo’s (“Montelongo” or
“Plaintiff”) complaint (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff filed her opposition to the Motion
on September 17, 2025 (ECF No. 17), and Snap filed its reply on October 6, 2025 (ECF No.
21).
On November 18, 2025, the court heard oral argument on Defendant’s Motion.1 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court issued an oral ruling and indicated that a written decision
would follow. Consistent therewith, and for the reasons set forth herein, the court now issues
the following memorandum decision and order.
1 The parties in this case consented to United States Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead conducting
all proceedings, including entry of final judgment (ECF No. 15). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 73.
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As set forth more fully below, the court concludes Count I and Count II of Ms.
Montelongo’s complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and equitable tolling
does not apply. Count I of the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and Count II is dismissed
without prejudice, subject to the limitations described in this Order.
II. 	BACKGROUND
For purposes of Defendant’s Motion for dismissal, the court assumes the factual
allegations in the complaint are true, and views those allegations in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. The following facts are taken directly from Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).
Ms. Montelongo began working for Snap in May 2017 (Id. ¶ 11). From 2017 until
August 1, 2019, Plaintiff worked for Snap as an independent contractor (Id. ¶¶ 11, 66, 80-81).
In early 2018, while at a Snap event in Cancún, Mexico, Plaintiff alleges that Brandon West,
Snap’s Vice President of Field Sales, raped her (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 25). After the rape, Mr. West
discouraged Plaintiff from reporting the incident to local police and threatened her job (Id. at ¶¶
26-27).
Plaintiff alleges Snap knew, before this incident, Mr. West had a propensity for sexual
assault, and Snap was aware of two other women who had been assaulted by Mr. West (Id. at ¶
74). Ms. Montelongo reported Mr. West’s conduct to Snap internally (id. ¶ 37), to a Snap
attorney (id. ¶ 59), and to a human resources employee (id. ¶ 77). Plaintiff’s employment with
Snap was terminated on February 23, 2024 (Id. ¶ 63).
Ms. Montelongo filed her complaint against Snap on May 20, 2025 (Id.). In addition to
other claims, Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a state-law sexual assault and battery claim (“Count
I”) and a negligent retention and supervision claim (“Count II”). Count I identifies Mr. West as
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the actor whose conduct constitutes sexual battery. Count II incorporates only the paragraphs of
the complaint relating to the alleged 2018 rape and contends Snap negligently retained and/or
negligently supervised Mr. West despite prior knowledge of his alleged propensities.
Through its pending Motion, Defendant moves to dismiss Counts I and II as barred by
the four-year statute of limitations.2
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. Inc., 706 F.3d
1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013). To survive dismissal, a complaint must provide “enough facts to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face,” which requires “more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me accusation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
547, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
While a court generally must treat allegations as true, that is not the case for legal or
factual conclusions. Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.
2011). Indeed, “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to
state a claim on which relief can be based.” Cory v. Allstate Ins., 583 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). Rather, “a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support
each claim.” Collins, 656 F.3d at 1214.
2 Because the court dismisses both claims as barred by the statute of limitations, the court does
not address Snap’s alternative argument that Count I fails to state a viable claim for vicarious
liability because Mr. West’s alleged conduct was not within the scope of his employment.
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The court may dismiss a claim on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations if the
affirmative defense appears plainly on the face of the complaint itself. Fernandez v. Clean
House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2018).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
I. 	Count I – Sexual Assault and Battery
A. Count I Is Barred by the Four-Year Statute of Limitations
Utah imposes a four-year statute of limitations on claims for sexual assault and battery.
Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). Ms. Montelongo alleges Mr. West raped her in early 2018 while
she was at a Snap event in Cancún, Mexico (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 25). Plaintiff does not allege
further sexual assaults or misconduct by Mr. West after that incident. Ms. Montelongo’s action
against Defendant was filed on May 20, 2025, more than seven years after the alleged rape.
On the face of the complaint, Count I accrued in 2018, when the alleged assault
occurred. Consequently, the four-year limitations period expired in 2022, three years before
Plaintiff filed suit in 2025. Thus, based on the dates alleged in the complaint, Count I is
untimely and barred by the applicable limitations period.
B. Plaintiff Cannot Satisfy the Threshold Knowledge Requirement for Equitable
Tolling
The discovery rule is a judicially created doctrine which allows a party to avoid the
general rule that a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to run
“upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action . . . .” Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 85 (Utah 1981). However, before any discovery rule may toll a statute
of limitations, a plaintiff must make a threshold showing that “she did not know and could not
reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of action” in time to reasonably comply
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within the limitations period. O’Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah
1991); Stephenson v. Elison, 2017 UT App 149, ¶ 39, 405 P.3d 733 (citing McBroom v. Child,
2016 UT 38, ¶ 34, 392 P.3d 835). The Utah Supreme Court described this threshold showing as
a “definitional prerequisite” to any version of the discovery rule, statutory or judicial. Id.
Consequently, if a plaintiff knew or could reasonably have known of the operative facts within
time to reasonably file her claim, the analysis ends and tolling is categorically unavailable.
If a plaintiff can clear the threshold knowledge bar, Utah law recognizes two narrow
grounds for equitable tolling: (1) concealment by the defendant, and (2) exceptional
circumstances. Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Utah 1993). To invoke equitable tolling
based on concealment, a plaintiff must show “affirmative acts or active deception by the
[d]efendant to conceal the facts giving rise to the claim,” not simply a passive failure to act on
known allegations. Vigil v. City & County. of Denver, 162 F. App’x 809, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
To invoke equitable tolling based on exceptional circumstances, the plaintiff must show,
“without regard to any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of
action,” the case nonetheless “presents exceptional circumstances or causes of action where the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust.” O’Neal, 821 P.2d at 1143. In this
case, Ms. Montelongo contends the statute of limitations period for Counts I and II should be
tolled based on “exceptional circumstances”.
Utah courts have found exceptional circumstances only in rare cases, where plaintiffs
did not know and could not know of the facts giving rise to the cause of action in time to
reasonably comply with the limitations period. For example, in Myers v. McDonald, the Utah
Supreme Court confirmed the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim should
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be equitably tolled where the plaintiff guardians, despite searching diligently for their missing
ward, did not discover that he had been killed in a car accident until more than two years after
he went missing, and therefore had “no knowledge of the facts and circumstances of their
decedent’s death” until after the limitations period had run. 635 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah 1981).
Utah courts refuse to apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine when the plaintiff
had knowledge of the underlying facts on which the claim is based, notwithstanding various
reasons offered by the plaintiffs for why they did not file within the limitations period.
In O’Neal, the plaintiff sought to toll the statute of limitations based on abuse he
acknowledged that he had “always been aware of” but was “psychologically unable to reveal.”
821 P.2d at 1140. The Utah Supreme Court declined to equitably toll the limitations period,
explaining that “[t]he difficulty with O’Neal’s argument is that it seeks to have us apply the
balancing analysis suggested by the Myers case without first focusing on a prerequisite to any
application of the discovery rule—ignorance by the plaintiff to the facts giving rise to the cause
of action.” Id. 1144. The court reasoned that an “inability to reveal the abuse is not the same as
… not knowing of the abuse,” and contrasted that case with Myers, in which the court
recognized it had been “impossible for [the plaintiffs] to learn that the boy was dead within the
relevant period.” Id. at 1143.
Noting the O’Neal case was not one “where the victim has so repressed the memory of
the events that he or she has forgotten they occurred,” the court observed its refusal to toll the
statute of limitations was consistent with the majority of other courts that have addressed the
issue and “required by sound principles of judicial administration,” reasoning as follows:
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If we were to hold that a plaintiff who was aware of the facts constituting the
cause of action could claim the benefit of the discovery rule if that plaintiff could
show that some psychological problem prevented him or her from bringing suit
against a defendant—O’Neal’s position—we would open the door to all manner
of claims seeking to avoid the bar of statutes of limitations. If we are to make
principled decisions, we cannot create an exception to a statute of limitations for
O’Neal, an admittedly sympathetic figure, but deny the benefits of such judicially
created exception to a person who claims that some other psychological condition,
such as an overacute sense of embarrassment or a pathological fear of offending
another, prevented the bringing of his or her suit and justified application of the
discovery rule.
Id. at 1145 (citation omitted).
The court reached the same conclusion in Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt
Lake City, 2004 UT App 436. In that case, plaintiffs who alleged they had been sexually abused
by a Catholic high school teacher as students brought claims against various entities and
individuals who operated the high school. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 4. Although the plaintiffs “knew at the
time … that they had been abused and that they had suffered injury as a result,” id. ¶ 5, they
argued that they did not know about the defendants’ complicity in the abuse until decades later
when a news article published a detailed history of the abuse. Id. ¶ 20. The court declined to toll
the statute of limitations because it recognized it is the ability—not the willingness—to file suit
that determines whether tolling applies. Id. ¶ 28.
In Stephenson v. Elison, 2017 UT App 149, 405 P.3d 733, the plaintiff similarly brought
claims based on a teacher who had sexually assaulted him years earlier. Id. ¶ 2. According to
the plaintiff, when he initially met with the principal to report the assault, the principal made
him believe that “he had acted inappropriately and would be subject to discipline.” Id. ¶ 3. The
plaintiff admitted that he “factually comprehended at the time he had been sexually abused” but
argued he was “unable to fully comprehend the circumstances of his abuse … until the time
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[the] lawsuit was filed.” Id. ¶ 17.
When the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s
claims were time-barred, the plaintiff argued the court should delay deciding the motion and
allow the plaintiff to explore through expert discovery whether mental capacity and memory
repression might exist to support tolling the statute of limitations. See id. ¶ 14. Yet, the court
rejected these arguments, concluding, in part, that the allegations in the plaintiff’s own
complaint belied that he did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts underlying
the cause of action. Id. ¶¶ 39-40 (recognizing that “an admission of fact in a pleading is a
judicial admission and [] normally conclusive on the party making it”).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy the threshold showing required for equitable
tolling. Plaintiff’s complaint reflects that she was present for and knew about the alleged assault
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 25–30). Indeed, Plaintiff asserts she made a number of internal reports about
the alleged rape, including one in 2019 (id. ¶ 37), one to a human resources employee (id. ¶ 77),
and one to Snap’s internal legal counsel (id. ¶ 59). These allegations and admissions are
dispositive. Although Ms. Montelongo alleges she chose not to pursue legal action at the time
because she feared job retaliation, needed to preserve her income and benefits, and believed
reporting might be futile, she concedes that she always knew of the facts giving rise to her
cause of action (id. ¶¶ 26–30). Workplace concerns about reporting relate to internal reporting
mechanisms, not to the ability to file a lawsuit in court.
The court recognizes the serious nature of the allegations in this case. Yet application of
the statute of limitations in this case is dictated by clear precedent. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s
inability to satisfy the definitional prerequisite to application of the equitable discovery rule
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does not reflect on the seriousness of the underlying conduct alleged in the complaint.
Because Plaintiff cannot establish the threshold lack of knowledge showing, Count I of
her complaint must be dismissed. Given Ms. Montelongo’s admission that she had knowledge
of the alleged assault in 2018, Count I is dismissed with prejudice.
II. 	Count II – Negligent Retention and Supervision
Count II alleges negligent retention and supervision. The same four-year statute of
limitations that applied to Cout I applies to Plaintiff’s negligence claims. Utah Code § 78B-2-
307(4).
A. Count II Is Barred by the Four-Year Statute of Limitations
Count II incorporates paragraphs 1-31 and 66-80 of the Complaint, which relate
exclusively to the alleged rape by Mr. West in 2018 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 81). Count II alleges “Snap
knew or should have known at the time that Montelongo was raped by West that he posed a
danger” and “Snap continued to employ West, thereby breaching its duty of care to
Montelongo” (Id. ¶¶ 82, 84).
The elements of negligent retention and supervision require: (1) that the employer knew
or should have known that its employee posed a foreseeable risk of harm; (2) that the employee
inflicted such harm; and (3) the employer’s negligence proximately caused the injury. Jensen v.
Gale, 2014 WL 7246948, at *5 (D. Utah 2014).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew or should have known of the danger Mr. West
posed based on alleged incidents with other employees prior to 2018, that Mr. West allegedly
inflicted harm in 2018, and that Snap’s alleged failure to act proximately caused injury to
Plaintiff in 2018. Yet, based on Plaintiff’s own allegations, all three elements of Count II were
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satisfied in 2018. Thus, like Count I, barring tolling or some other doctrine that extends the
statute of limitations, Count II expired in 2022.
B. The Continuing Violation Doctrine Does Not Apply
To counter the argument that the statute of limitations period has expired, Ms.
Montelongo asserts that the continuing violation doctrine applies to Count II. The continuing
violation doctrine “applies when the plaintiff’s claim seeks redress for injuries resulting from a
series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful act, as opposed to conduct that is
a discrete unlawful act.” Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 993 (10th Cir. 2022).
However, as the Tenth Circuit emphasized, “an important caveat to the continuing violation
doctrine . . . is that it is triggered by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from
the original violation.” Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
Here, Snap’s 2018 alleged failure to supervise or terminate Mr. West after learning of
his propensities was a discrete unlawful act. However, Plaintiff’s alleged ongoing injuries—
including continued exposure to Mr. West in the workplace—do not transform that completed
tort into a continuing violation. The fact that Mr. West may have remained employed following
the alleged assault constitutes the continuing ill effects of the original negligent retention, not
continuing unlawful acts.
Moreover, Count II as pleaded names only Mr. West and Ms. Montelongo cannot
extend Count II’s timeliness by pointing to conduct by other employees when Count II is
limited to only negligent retention and supervision of Mr. West (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 81–85).
C. Count II is Dismissed Without Prejudice
The Court finds that Count II fails to state a timely claim as presented in the pending
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Complaint. The negligent retention claim related to Mr. West and the 2018 alleged assault is
time-barred for the same reasons as Count I—it is a discrete act that occurred in 2018, and
Plaintiff had knowledge of all facts necessary to bring the claim within the statute of limitations
period.
Although skeptical that amendment can cure the deficiencies raised, the Court exercises
caution before dismissing claims with prejudice and is willing to afford Plaintiff the opportunity
to seek leave to amend Count II. In doing so, the court makes no finding that any motion for
leave to amend, should Plaintiff elect to file one, would be granted or that any such amendment
would ultimately succeed.
Out of an abundance of caution, the Court dismisses Count II without prejudice. If Ms.
Montelongo believes she can cure the deficiencies identified in this Order, she may file a
motion for leave to amend within the timeframe that will be identified in the parties’ Scheduling
Order.
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ORDER
For the reasons stated on the record at the November 18, 2025 hearing and set forth
herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Snap’s Motion (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. 	Count I (Sexual Assault and Battery) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. 	Count II (Negligent Retention and Supervision) is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
3. 	Consistent with the court’s Order to Propose Schedule (ECF No. 3), the parties are
hereby ORDERED, no later than December 18, 2025, to meet and confer and file a
stipulated Motion for Scheduling Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of December, 2025
Dustin B. Pead
United States Magistrate Judge
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