Teece et al v. The United States Internal Revenue Service et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
REBECCA SUE TEECE; and RICHARD
KIMBALL TEECE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
TO DISMISS (DOC. NOS. 25 & 30)
Case No. 2:25-cv-00322
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Despite believing they opted out of paying taxes by notifying the IRS they were
nonresidents of the United States, Rebecca and Richard Teece assert they were
improperly prosecuted for tax evasion. Although the complaint is difficult to follow, the
claims at issue in this recommendation relate to this state criminal tax-evasion case.1
Proceeding without an attorney, the Teeces filed claims against the State of Utah, the
Utah Attorney General’s Office, Utah’s Third District Court, and the Utah State Tax
Commission (the State Defendants).2 They also brought claims against the Utah State
Bar Association and other defendants.3 Specifically, the Teeces allege the State
1 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 10–27.) Because the complaint does not include page
numbers, this recommendation refers to the CM/ECF pagination.
2 (Id. at 1, 10–26.)
3 (Id. at 1, 26–27.) The claims against the other defendants are not addressed in this
recommendation: the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of
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Defendants’ actions during the tax-evasion proceedings violated their constitutional
rights, violated state law, and “show a criminal enterprise”4—and they allege the Bar
operates as a foreign entity in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).5
The State Defendants and the Bar both move to dismiss the claims against them
for failure to state a claim.6 The State Defendants also contend the Teeces’ claims are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
some claims.7 Because the Teeces lack standing to assert, or are barred from
asserting, some of their claims—and they otherwise fail to state plausible claims against
these defendants—the undersigned recommends8 the district judge grant the motions to
dismiss.
the Treasury Division of the IRS, the Department of Justice, and Utah’s Herriman City
Police Department. As these defendants have not appeared in this case, they are not
the subjects of this recommendation.
4 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 22.)
5 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21.
6 (State Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (State Defs.’ Mot.), Doc. No. 25; Def. Utah State Bar’s
Mot. to Dismiss (Bar Def.’s Mot.), Doc. No. 30.)
7 (State Defs.’ Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 54; State Defs.’ Mot.,
Doc. No. 25.)
8 This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (See Doc. No. 39.)
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BACKGROUND
From the complaint,9 it appears the Teeces have believed since at least 2010
that they do not need to pay taxes.10 In 2010, the Teeces submitted a “Revocation of
Election” with the IRS, which they allege should have changed their status to
“nontaxpayers.”11 In 2020, the State of Utah initiated criminal proceedings against the
Teeces12 for felony tax evasion offenses committed between 2014 and 2019.13
9 This section addresses only the claims against the State Defendants and the Bar. The
complaint asserts a total of twenty-two claims. Eight claims relate to federal entities,
based on separate events. (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 4–10.) And three claims relate to the
Herriman City Police Department. (Id. at 15, 21–22.) These defendants, who have not
appeared in the case, are referenced only as needed.
10 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 4.) The IRS did not change their status and, at some point,
imposed “liens and levies” on the Teeces. (Id. at 4–5, 6–7.)
11 (Id. at 4.)
12 The complaint suggests criminal proceedings were brought against both Mr. and Ms.
Teece. It refers to “State of Utah Case #201904017” but does not provide much detail.
(See id. at 6, 23.) State court records indicate the criminal proceeding was only against
Ms. Teece, not Mr. Teece. Whether both the Teeces or only Ms. Teece faced
prosecution is immaterial; either way, the claims against the State Defendants and the
Bar fail for the reasons explained below.
13 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 4, 10); see also State of Utah A.G. v. Rebecca Teece, No.
201904017 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct., filed Apr. 8, 2020). Review of these records does not
require the motions to dismiss to be converted into motions for summary judgment. See
Brown v. City of Tulsa, 124 F.4th 1251, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2025) (explaining that in
addition to reviewing the allegations in the complaint on a motion to dismiss, courts may
consider “documents attached to the complaint as exhibits” and “matters subject to
judicial notice”); Hodgson v. Farmington City, 675 F. App’x 838, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished) (“Facts subject to judicial notice may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
This includes another court’s publicly filed records concerning matters that bear directly
upon the disposition of the case at hand.” (citation modified)); United States v. Ahidley,
486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting “discretion to take judicial notice of
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According to the complaint, the State Defendants’ actions during those proceedings,
through various individuals involved, “show a criminal enterprise.”14 In particular, the
complaint references Judge Linda Jones of Utah’s Third District Court, who presided
over the case, Assistant Utah Attorney General Holly Cocco, who prosecuted the case,
and two investigators for the Utah Tax Commission, Gregory Knight and Norman
Bernardo.15
Although the timeline of events is not entirely clear, the Teeces generally allege
the following. Utah’s Attorney General’s Office “failed to provide valid affidavits” during
the state criminal proceedings.16 Specifically, Mr. Knight submitted a probable cause
affidavit,17 and Mr. Bernardo submitted two affidavits related to “fraud and failure to file
taxes” during the proceedings.18 According to the Teeces, these submissions did not
qualify as affidavits under state law, but they also did not qualify as unsworn
declarations.19 Because Judge Jones allowed the “mislabeled” affidavits,20 the Teeces
publicly-filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear
directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”).
14 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 22.)
15 (Id. at 4, 10.) The Teeces have not named these individuals as defendants in this
action.
16 (Id. at 10.)
17 (Id. at 11.) The complaint does not describe the contents of Mr. Knight’s affidavit.
18 (Id. at 11, 15.)
19 (Id. at 10–11.)
20 (Id. at 10.)
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contend the state criminal proceedings were a “sham” with no legal basis, evidence, or
probable cause.21
The Teeces also allege they sent letters to the Utah State Tax Commission and
Mr. Knight between 2015 and 2019, which Mr. Knight withheld during the criminal
proceedings.22 He did not include them in his affidavit and they were not produced in
discovery.23 And Mr. Bernardo sent the letters to the Teeces at the wrong address at
some point during the case.24 According to the Teeces, these letters show the Teeces’
“mens rea could not be established.”25 Because Mr. Knight and Mr. Bernardo illegally
withheld and tampered with this evidence, and because Ms. Cocco knew about it, the
Teeces claim their due process rights were violated.26 According to the complaint, had
the Teeces known about this missing material evidence, Ms. Teece would have never
entered a plea in abeyance.27
21 (Id. at 11.)
22 (Id. at 12.)
23 (Id.)
24 (Id. at 14.)
25 (Id. at 12.)
26 (Id. at 12–14 (referencing Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5 and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963)).)
27 (Id. at 13.)
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Specifically, Ms. Teece (while represented by counsel) agreed to a plea in
abeyance in March 2021, which Judge Jones accepted.28 The conditions of the
agreement required, among other things, that Ms. Teece file tax returns for 2013
through 2020 and make monthly restitution payments to the Utah State Tax
Commission.29 Apparently, she failed to abide by these terms. At some point after Ms.
Teece entered her plea, Mr. Bernardo submitted affidavits in support of an order to
show cause, which Judge Jones considered at a hearing in November 2021.30 The
affidavits stated the tax filings required by the plea in abeyance “were not filed.”31
However, the Teeces allege forms downloaded from the Utah State Tax Commission’s
website were filed, and “certified mail” showed the State of Utah and Utah Attorney
General’s Office received them.32
In December 2021, after the November hearing, Mr. Bernardo sent the Teeces a
letter.33 According to the complaint, he inaccurately claimed no payments had been
made on the plea in abeyance and the outstanding balance was $40,269.00.34 The
28 State of Utah A.G. v. Rebecca Teece, No. 201904017 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. Mar. 1,
2021) (minute order indicating the court would hold Ms. Teece’s guilty plea in abeyance
for thirty-six months, and identifying the conditions of the agreement).
29 Id. at 2.
30 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 11.)
31 (Id. at 15.)
32 (Id. at 15–16.)
33 (Id. at 14, 23–24.)
34 (Id.)
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complaint alleges Mr. Bernardo instead “cashed and withheld payments,” with “over
$6,000.00 missing.”35 The Teeces responded to Mr. Bernardo’s letter two weeks later,
providing a check which was deposited but not credited to the plea.36
In January 2022, Ms. Cocco requested a hearing regarding revoking the plea in
abeyance and placing the Teeces in custody.37 Judge Jones set a hearing for
January 21, 2022, and the Teeces received notice one week beforehand.38 Because
Ms. Teece was scheduled to be out of town the day of the hearing,39 she advised a
secretary40 “and awaited the link for the hearing.”41 But the Teeces’ email was hacked
two days before the hearing.42 And Ms. Teece had “no cell service” or internet
connection at the time of the hearing.43 Judge Jones issued a warrant for failure to
appear, and Ms. Cocco instructed Mr. Knight to arrest the Teeces.44
35 (Id. at 14.)
36 (Id. at 23.)
37 (Id. at 14, 17.)
38 (Id.)
39 (Id.)
40 (Id. at 17–18.) Specifically, the complaint indicates Ms. Teece told Christopher
Manberg’s secretary, but it does not indicate who Mr. Manberg is or explain his
involvement in this case.
41 (Id.)
42 (Id. at 18.)
43 (Id.)
44 (Id.)
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Mr. Knight then “performed a stakeout” and “monitored and observed the home”
to find and arrest Ms. Teece.45 On the morning of January 26, 2022, he saw her car.46
But according to the complaint, it was too dark to know who was driving.47 Mr. Knight
asked the Herriman Police Department to stop the vehicle and perform a “Terry” stop.48
When officers did so, Weston Teece (a minor at the time) was alone in the car.49
Herriman officers took Weston’s driver’s license and pulled him out of the car but did not
ask for the car registration or insurance, provide a reason for the stop, or read him his
Miranda rights.50 Mr. Knight then approached the car, explaining to the police officers
that he had an arrest warrant for a female.51 Although Herriman officers informed him
no female was present, Mr. Knight questioned Weston.52
45 (Id. at 18, 20.)
46 (Id. at 19.)
47 (Id.)
48 (Id.); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that, in accordance with
the Fourth Amendment, police officers may conduct brief, nonintrusive detentions during
a frisk for weapons or preliminary questioning, where they have “specific and
articulable” facts providing a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is
committing a crime).
49 (Id. at 19–20.) Although the pleadings at times refer to Weston as a minor, he is
presumably at least nineteen now. This event occurred three years ago, when Weston
had to be at least sixteen to legally drive a car alone.
50 (Id. at 19, 21.)
51 (Id. at 20.)
52 (Id.)
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After this incident, the Teeces submitted a request to the Utah State Tax
Commission pursuant to Utah’s Governmental Records Access and Management Act
(GRAMA)53 “for the actions of [Mr.] Knight.”54 The Tax Commission ignored the
GRAMA request after stating the Herriman Police Department would handle it.55
The Teeces also claim they discovered, at some point, that “the bonds from the
State Case had been converted into Stocks”56 and “were then traded in [Ms.] Teece’s
name on the stock market.”57 The Teeces claim they “exercised their Right of
Subrogation” to “several people related to the state case” who all failed to respond.58
They assert they never permitted the court to use Ms. Teece’s identity and have
“suffered damage from the trading of her name without authorization.”59 Specifically,
they allege the “State of Utah has made money”—approximately $255 million in a
“fund”—that “must be returned” to them.60
53 Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-2-201 et seq.
54 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 21.)
55 (Id.) It is unclear what became of the Teeces’ GRAMA request.
56 (Id. at 24.) Details about these alleged bonds are lacking in the complaint.
57 (Id.)
58 (Id.)
59 (Id.)
60 (Id.)
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Based on these allegations, the Teeces assert thirteen claims against the State
Defendants (Claims 9 through 21) and one claim against the Bar (Claim 22).61 First,
they claim the State Defendants: failed to follow state law for affidavits during the
criminal proceedings (Claim 9);62 failed to establish the required mens rea (Claim 10);63
violated due process rights (Claim 11);64 violated 18 U.S.C. § 242 during the
proceedings through false filings and issuing an arrest warrant (Claims 12 and 13);65
violated state stalking law (Claim 14);66 unlawfully arrested Weston Teece (Claim 15);67
violated state law by ignoring the Teeces’ GRAMA request (Claim 16);68 violated the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act69 (RICO) by acting as a criminal
enterprise during the state proceedings (Claim 17);70 violated the Fifth Amendment’s
61 (Id. at 10–27.)
62 (See id. at 10–12 (claiming Ms. Teece’s criminal case lacked probable cause but also
asserting state law violations, citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-701, 76-8-502, 76-8-
503(2), 76-8-501(4), 78B-18a-102(5), 76-8-510.5).)
63 (Id. at 12–14.)
64 (Id. at 14–15.)
65 (Id. at 15–20.)
66 (Id. at 20–21 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5).)
67 (Id. at 21.)
68 (Id. at 21–22 (referencing Utah Code Ann. § 63G-2-201).)
69 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
70 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 22–23.)
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Takings Clause71 by not accounting for plea payments (Claim 18);72 violated the right of
subrogation by stealing and using Ms. Teece’s identity in the stock market (Claim 19);73
took criminal actions for which there is no immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim
20);74 and violated Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics75 (Claim 21).76 In addition, the Teeces claim the Bar violated the Foreign
Agents Registration Act77 (FARA) (Claim 22) because the Bar and its members (Judge
71 U.S. Const. amend. V.
72 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 23–24.)
73 (Id. at 24.) Claim 19, although entitled “Violation of Right of Subrogation and Identity
Theft,” does not appear to assert two distinct claims. (Id.) In Claim 19, the Teeces
allege the State Defendants violated Ms. Teece’s right of subrogation by using her
identity to make money. Subrogation is a state common law claim. See State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983, 985–86 (Utah 1996) (explaining
subrogation is “an equitable doctrine that allows a person or entity which pays the loss
or satisfies the claim of another under a legally cognizable obligation or interest to step
into the shoes of the other person and assert that person’s rights”).
74 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 24–25.) Claim 20 itself is not a distinct § 1983 claim—it
argues the State Defendants do not have immunity under the statute. But, as discussed
below, it appears the Teeces intended several of their other claims to be brought as
§ 1983 claims.
75 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
76 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 25–26.) There are no allegations suggesting Claims 9
through 22 are asserted against the Bar.
77 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21.
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Jones and Ms. Cocco) failed to register as foreign agents with the Department of
Justice.78 The Teeces seek nearly $100 million in damages.79
LEGAL STANDARDS
The State Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them under Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1) permits dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.80 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) may
mount either a facial or factual attack.81 In a facial attack, a party looks only to the
allegations in the complaint, assumes them to be true, and argues they fail to establish
jurisdiction.82 A factual attack goes beyond the allegations and adduces evidence to
challenge the court’s jurisdiction.83 The State Defendants mount a facial attack here,
78 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 26–27.) Because Claim 22 is premised on the allegation that
the Bar’s members did not register as foreign agents, it is only asserted against the Bar,
not the State Defendants—which, as government entities, cannot be considered
members of the Bar.
79 (See id. at 28–29 (requesting $10,500 from the Utah Tax Commission and “additional
tax taken,” $10,000 for fees paid to Ms. Teece’s criminal defense attorney, “$120,000
per year” for lost wages, $14,000,000 for FARA violations, $20,000,000 for “pain and
suffering, anxiety, fear, and civil rights violations,” and $60,000,000 in punitive damages
or half that amount if the Teeces no longer have to pay taxes).)
80 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
81 Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 2020); Rural Water Dist.
No. 2 v. City of Glenpool, 698 F.3d 1270, 1272 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012).
82 Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing
Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995)).
83 Id.; see also Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that when considering a factual attack, courts have “wide discretion to allow
affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed
jurisdictional facts” (citation omitted)).
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because they base their jurisdictional arguments solely on the allegations in the
complaint and state court records subject to judicial notice.84
Both the State Defendants and the Bar also move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”85 To avoid dismissal under this rule, a
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”86 At the motion to dismiss stage, courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations
as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.87 But a court need not accept a plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations as true.88 “[A] plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each
84 See Thurman v. Steidley, No. 16-cv-554, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85725, at *11 (N.D.
Okla. June 5, 2017) (unpublished) (concluding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss relying
on state court records subject to judicial notice presented a facial attack); Mackley v.
Davis, No. 1:13-cv-00129, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66115, at *4 (D. Utah Apr. 25, 2014)
(unpublished) (same); see also St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169,
1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Federal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of
proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” (citation modified)).
85 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
86 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
87 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
88 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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claim,”89 and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”90
Because the Teeces proceed without an attorney (pro se), their filings are
liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”91 Still, pro se plaintiffs must follow the same rules of procedure governing
other litigants.92 For instance, pro se plaintiffs still have “the burden of alleging sufficient
facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”93 While courts make some
allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of
various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity
with pleading requirements,”94 courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to
round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”95
89 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
90 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
91 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
92 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
93 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
94 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
95 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
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ANALYSIS
The State Defendants move to dismiss Claims 9 through 21 for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.96 Because the complaint fails to state
a claim against the State Defendants under federal law, these defendants have
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Teeces lack standing (in part), the State
Defendants’ motion should be granted. And because the complaint fails to state a claim
against the Bar under FARA, the Bar’s motion to dismiss Claim 2297 should be granted
as well. Each motion is analyzed in turn.
A. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss: Claims 9 through 21
The State Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims 9 through 21 should be granted.
Claim 15 should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Teeces
lack standing to bring it. Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 20 should be dismissed as barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Where the complaint otherwise fails to state a claim for
relief under federal law, Claims 12, 13, and 21 should be dismissed with prejudice. And
the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the Teeces’ remaining state law
claims against the State Defendants: Claims 9, 14, 16, and 19.
1. 	Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Claims 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, and 20)
First, Claims 10, 11, 15, 17, 18, and 20 against the State Defendants should be
dismissed without prejudice on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, Claim 15 should be
96 (State Defs.’ Mot., Doc. No. 25.) Although the State Defendants also moved to
dismiss Claim 22, (id. at 21), that claim is only against the Bar, as noted above.
97 (Bar Def.’s Mot., Doc. No. 30.)
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dismissed because the Teeces lack standing to assert an unlawful arrest claim on
behalf of Weston Teece. And Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 20 should be dismissed
because they are barred by state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
a. 	The Teeces Lack Standing to Bring Claim 15
The Teeces lack standing to bring Claim 15 for Weston’s allegedly unlawful
arrest. The State Defendants contend the claim must be dismissed because the
Teeces cannot bring an unlawful arrest claim pro se on behalf of Weston. 98 In
response, the Teeces argue it is not a rule “that minor children are required to have
counsel.”99 And the Teeces note that “Weston Teece will be enjoining [sic] the case
and is seeking representation.”100
98 (State Defs.’ Mot. 10–11, Doc. No. 25.) The State Defendants also argue Mr. Teece
lacks standing to assert Claims 9 through 14 and 16 through 21 because they arise
from the criminal case against Ms. Teece, in which Mr. Teece was not a defendant. (Id.
at 8–10.) While the complaint only references a state court case number related to Ms.
Teece, the allegations relate to both Mr. and Ms. Teece. Even assuming the allegations
relate to both Mr. and Ms. Teece, such that they have standing, the Teeces fail to state
a plausible claim against the State Defendants as explained below.
99 (Answer & Rebuttal to State of Utah et al. Mot. to Dismiss (Opp’n), Doc. No. 35 at 15–
17.) Because the opposition does not include page numbers, this order refers to the
CM/ECF pagination. The Teeces’ opposition is difficult to follow; it is unclear whether
the Teeces oppose only the State Defendants’ motion or the Bar’s motion as well. The
title suggests the former. But the various references to the Bar suggest the latter. (Id.
at 52–53 (discussing the State Defendants’ arguments and seeming to argue that they
have stated a FARA claim against the Bar).)
100 (Opp’n, Doc. No. 35 at 17.) Weston has not joined this case.
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“For federal courts to have jurisdiction over an action, the party bringing the suit
must establish standing.”101 Standing includes two strands: “Article III standing, which
enforces the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement,” and “prudential standing
which embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”102
Article III standing requires the plaintiff to have suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly
traceable to the defendant and redressable by a favorable judgment.103 Prudential
standing “encompasses various limitations, including ‘the general prohibition on a
litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.’”104
The Teeces lack standing to assert Claim 15 for the alleged unlawful arrest of
Weston. “A party ‘must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’”105 Because Weston is not
a party to this case, and because the Teeces are not attorneys, they cannot pursue an
101 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (citation omitted); see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149,
157–58 (2014) (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing
standing.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
102 Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)).
103 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149,
1156 (10th Cir. 2005).
104 Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)).
105 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975)).
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unlawful arrest claim on Weston’s behalf.106 Accordingly, Claim 15 should be dismissed
without prejudice.
b. 	The Eleventh Amendment Bars Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 20
Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 20 are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The State Defendants contend they are immune to the Teeces’ claims under the
Eleventh Amendment, and Congress has not abrogated nor has Utah waived this
immunity.107 The Teeces contend the Constitution (and the rights it confers) is the
“supreme law of the land” that “cannot be overridden” by sovereign immunity.108 They
argue the State Defendants are “persons” and have waived their sovereign immunity
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act109 (UGIA).110
106 See Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1168; Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213
F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A litigant may bring his own claims to federal court
without counsel, but not the claims of others.”); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154
(10th Cir. 1986) (holding that, “under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1654, a
minor child cannot bring suit through a parent acting as next friend if the parent is not
represented by an attorney”); see also Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th
Cir. 2007) (holding a daughter could not bring suit on behalf of her legally incompetent
father “without the assistance of counsel,” even if she was his legal guardian).
107 (State Defs.’ Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 54 at 2–6.)
108 (Opp’n, Doc. No. 35 at 36.) The Teeces also make a series of arguments about
individuals who participated in the criminal proceeding (Judge Jones, Ms. Cocco, Mr.
Knight, and Mr. Bernardo), their liability, and whether they have qualified immunity. (Id.
at 40; see also id. at 35 (arguing “the actors were not innocent” and “are the
perpetrators of the violations of law” that “should be prosecuted for their willful actions”);
id. at 36–37 (arguing that this case is about redressing “the actions of the persons who
were acting in violation of the law”).) As those individuals are not named defendants in
this case, these arguments are irrelevant.
109 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-201.
110 (Opp’n, Doc. No. 35 at 34; Pls.’ Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Opp’n, Doc. No. 55 at 1–6.)
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The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against a state and “state agencies that
act as arms of the state,”111 unless the state waives its sovereign immunity or Congress
abrogates it through legislation.112 Here, the State Defendants include the State of
Utah, Utah’s Attorney General’s Office, Utah’s Third District Court, and the Utah State
Tax Commission. Each of these defendants has Eleventh Amendment immunity.113
And neither of the exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity—waiver or
congressional abrogation—applies here.
First, Utah has not waived its sovereign immunity.114 The Teeces argue waiver
based on the UGIA’s general consent-to-suit provision for injuries caused by the
111 Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1559 (10th Cir. 1992).
112 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“[A]n unconsenting State is
immune from suits brought in federal courts by [its] own citizens as well as citizens of
another State.”); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (“Unless a
State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it,
however, a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief
sought.”).
113 See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573, 576 (1946)
(holding a lawsuit against the Utah State Tax Commission was a suit against the state
barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Malstrom v. Utah Att’y Gen. Office, No. 1:18-cv-
00013, 2019 WL 1114884, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 11, 2019) (unpublished) (“The Utah
Attorney General’s Office is an arm of the State of Utah.”); Bloomquist v. Utah, No.
2:16-cv-34, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141601, at *6 (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2016) (unpublished)
(explaining Utah’s Third Judicial District Court is an “arm[] of the state and thus immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment”), R. & R. adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
140819 (D. Utah Oct. 11, 2016).
114 Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999)
(explaining in § 1983 action that “Utah has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute”); see also Anderson v. Herbert, 745 F. App’x 63, 69 (10th Cir.
2018) (unpublished) (explaining Utah has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
against civil-rights suits).
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negligence of an employee acting within the scope of his employment.115 But this
statute waives immunity to suits brought in Utah state courts.116 And “a state’s consent
to be sued in the state’s own courts does not serve to waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity.”117 Indeed, the “UGIA expressly does not waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity.”118 Where the Teeces fail to demonstrate Utah has waived Eleventh
Amendment immunity, this exception does not apply.
Second, there is no congressional abrogation for Claims 10, 11, 17 and 20.
(Claim 18 is addressed separately below.) In Claims 10, 11, and 20, the Teeces
generally assert constitutional civil rights violations under § 1983.119 But Congress did
115 (Pls.’ Suppl. Br. in Supp. of Opp’n, Doc. No. 55 at 1 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-
G-7-301(2)(i)).
116 See Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1554 n.17 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming the Tenth
Circuit’s prior holding that the UGIA waives sovereign immunity to suit in state court, but
not in federal court, including the statute’s general waiver as to “actions for injuries
caused by the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of his employment”).
117 Id. (quoting Richins v. Industrial Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1974)).
118 See Catalyst Campus for Tech. & Innovation, Inc. v. Brown, No. 1:24-cv-00059,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194399, at *8 n.64 (D. Utah Sept. 29, 2025) (unpublished)
(discussing Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-202(2), which provides that “[n]othing in this
chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a
governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law”).
119 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 13 (Claim 10 alleging withholding of evidence regarding
Ms. Teece’s lack of mens rea violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)); id. at 14
(Claim 11 alleging “withholding of evidence” and attempting to arrest Ms. Teece without
“statutory authority” “has violated due process”); id. at 24–25 (Claim 20 referencing
§ 1983 and arguing Mr. Knight and Mr. Bernardo do not have qualified immunity under
the statute).)
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not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted § 1983.120 In
Claim 17, the Teeces assert the State Defendants violated RICO through a “criminal
enterprise” of embezzlement and fraud.121 But RICO likewise does not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity.122
Finally, Claim 18 is similarly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In Claim 18,
the Teeces assert the Utah State Tax Commission violated the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause by failing to account for payments made on Ms. Teece’s plea in
abeyance.123 But takings claims against a state or its agencies are “barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity . . . , as long as a remedy is available in state court.”124 And the
120 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S.
356, 365 (1990) (“The State and arms of the State, which have traditionally enjoyed
Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983.”).
121 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 22 (alleging State Defendants’ actions show “a criminal
enterprise” and Mr. Bernardo committed embezzlement and fraud by not crediting Ms.
Teece’s plea in abeyance account).)
122 Snedeker v. Colorado, No. 24-1173, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 6158, at *3 (10th Cir.
Mar. 17, 2025) (unpublished) (“We lack any precedents stating that RICO has
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Stephens v. Child Support Servs. of Okla.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78873, at *8–9 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 24,
2025) (unpublished) (explaining RICO does not contain any “express limitations on state
sovereign immunity”).
123 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 23–24.) The complaint does not clearly state whether
Claim 18 is under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Utah’s
Constitution. In their opposition, the Teeces argue they assert this claim under both.
(Opp’n, Doc. No. 35 at 49.) But because the Teeces’ federal claims should be
dismissed, the court should not exercise jurisdiction over Claim 18 to the extent it is
asserted under Utah’s Constitution, as explained below.
124 Williams v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 928 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2019); see also id. at
1214 (holding an inmate’s takings claim against the Utah Department of Corrections for
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Tenth Circuit has confirmed: a “takings claim may be brought in Utah state court.”125
Accordingly, Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 20 against the State Defendants are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed without prejudice.126
2. 	Failure to State a Claim Under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Claims 12 and 13)
Next, Claims 12 and 13 fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted
under 18 U.S.C. § 242. Claims 12 and 13 assert the State Defendants violated
18 U.S.C. § 242 by filing and considering false affidavits during the criminal proceedings
and issuing an arrest warrant.127 But this criminal statute “does not create a private civil
withheld interest on his prisoner account funds “must be dismissed based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity”).
125 Id. at 1213–14 (citing Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730, 735 (Utah
2010) (addressing Fifth Amendment takings claim); Utah Code § 63L-3-102(1)
(recognizing a “Constitutional taking” as “a governmental action that results in a taking
of private property so that compensation to the owner of the property is required by:
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States” (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
126 See Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that because
Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional, dismissals on this basis should be
without prejudice). Because these claims are jurisdictionally barred, the court need not
address the parties’ arguments as to the merits. See Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family
Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “state sovereign immunity
is a threshold jurisdictional issue” that must be addressed “first when it is asserted by a
defendant” and courts need not reach the merits of claims barred by sovereign
immunity).
127 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 15–20.)
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cause of action,”128 as the State Defendants correctly note.129 Accordingly, Claims 12
and 13 fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed
with prejudice.
3. 	Failure to State a Bivens Claim (Claim 21)
Next, the complaint fails to state a claim under Bivens. In Claim 21, the Teeces
contend the State Defendants violated Bivens by “acting without authority to collect
taxes” and issuing a warrant “without proper notice to hold the hearing.”130 But Bivens
created an implied cause of action for damages against federal officials for
constitutional violations.131 Because the Teeces bring Claim 21 against state entities,
not federal officials, Claim 21 fails to state a plausible claim for relief and should be
dismissed with prejudice.132
128 Houck v. Gurich, 515 F. App’x 724, 724–25 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(unpublished); see also Henry v. Albuquerque Police Dep’t, 490 F. App’x 272, 273 (10th
Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (explaining that the holding that 18 U.S.C. § 242 “do[es] not
provide for a private civil cause of action” rests “on settled law”).
129 (State Defs.’ Mot. 17–18, Doc. No. 25.) The Teeces contend the “civil statute” for
these claims is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Opp’n, Doc. No. 35 at 45.) However, § 1983 claims
against the State Defendants are barred for the reasons explained above.
130 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 25–26.)
131 See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022) (explaining Bivens “authorized a
damages action against federal officials” for certain constitutional violations).
132 In their opposition, the Teeces acknowledge Bivens is inapplicable. (Opp’n, Doc.
No. 35 at 50 (“Defendants are correct, Bivens is only for federal officials.”).) They
argue, however, that they meant to assert a “Bivens equivalent” claim against the Utah
State Tax Commission and note “the closest equivalent” is § 1983. (Id.) But a § 1983
claim against the Utah State Tax Commission would be barred, as explained above.
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4. 	State Law Claims (Claims 9, 14, 16, and 19)
The Teeces’ remaining claims against the State Defendants all arise under state
law. Specifically, the Teeces assert the State Defendants failed to follow state law
regarding affidavits (Claim 9),133 committed stalking (Claim 14), violated GRAMA
(Claim 16), and violated the right of subrogation after stealing and using Ms. Teece’s
identity to make money (Claim 19).134 Where all the Teeces’ federal claims should be
dismissed, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims.135 Therefore, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss
Claims 9, 14, 16, and 19 without prejudice.
133 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 10–12 (claiming state law violations, citing Utah Code
§§ 78B-5-701, 76-8-502, 76-8-503(2), 76-8-501(4), 78B-18a-102(5), 76-8-510.5).)
134 (Id. at 10–12, 20–22, 24–25.) The State Defendants contend these claims are
barred by Utah’s UGIA, which provides that government entities and employees are
immune from suit for injuries resulting from the exercise of governmental functions
unless that immunity is waived. (State Defs.’ Mot. 11, Doc. No. 25 (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-7-201).) This immunity argument need not be addressed, where the
complaint fails to state a federal claim against the State Defendants and the court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
135 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (providing for supplemental jurisdiction over related state law
claims “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction”); Estate of
Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“District courts do not otherwise have jurisdiction to hear pendent state law claims but
for their intertwinement with claims over which they have original jurisdiction.”); Smith v.
City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all
federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”).
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B. The Bar’s Motion to Dismiss
Finally, the Bar’s motion to dismiss Claim 22 should be granted. In Claim 22, the
Teeces assert the Bar violated FARA because the Bar and its members—Judge Jones
and Ms. Cocco—have failed to register as foreign agents with the Department of
Justice.136 The Bar argues FARA does not permit private enforcement and the
complaint includes no factual allegations supporting any such claim against the Bar.137
The Teeces contend they state a FARA claim against the Bar because it is “chartered to
a foreign entity” and is an “organization which has foreign influences.”138
FARA was enacted “[t]o protect the national defense, internal security, and
foreign relations to the United States.”139 The statute “requires any ‘agent of a foreign
principal’ to register with the Department of Justice.”140 And “foreign principal” means
foreign governments, persons, political parties, and businesses.141 Further, the statute
is enforced by the government, through injunctions, to prevent violations or compel
compliance or criminal prosecution for violations.142 It does not permit private
136 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 26–27 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 611, et seq.).)
137 (Bar Def.’s Mot. 5, Doc. No. 30.)
138 (Opp’n, Doc. No. 35 at 55.)
139 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 469 (1987).
140 Att’y Gen. of U.S. v. Wynn, 104 F.4th 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting 22 U.S.C.
§ 612(a)).
141 See id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(b)).
142 Doiban v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 527, 545 (2024) (citing Wynn, 104 F.4th
at 351).
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enforcement.143 As the Bar correctly notes, there are no allegations in the complaint to
support finding the Bar is a “foreign principal” subject to FARA’s registration
requirements. And there is no basis for the Teeces’ attempt to privately enforce FARA’s
requirements. Accordingly, Claim 22 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and should be dismissed with prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned recommends granting the State Defendants’ motion to
dismiss,144 (i) dismissing Claim 15 without prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction; (ii) dismissing Claims 10, 11, 17, 18, and 20 without prejudice as barred by
the Eleventh Amendment;145 (iii) dismissing Claims 12, 13, and 21 with prejudice for
failure to state a claim;146 and (iv) declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Claims 9, 14, 16, and 19 arising under state law and dismissing these claims without
143 Id.
144 (Doc. No. 25.)
145 See Colby, 849 F.3d at 1278 (noting that because Eleventh Amendment immunity is
jurisdictional, dismissals on this basis should be without prejudice).
146 Dismissing these claims for failure to state a claim with prejudice is appropriate,
given there is no cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the Teeces cannot assert a
Bivens claim against state defendants, and any amendment would be futile, as noted
above. See Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Dismissal of a
pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an
opportunity to amend.” (citation modified)).
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prejudice. The undersigned also recommends granting the Bar’s motion to dismiss147
Claim 22 with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.148
The Teeces have the right to object to this Report and Recommendation within
fourteen days, and failure to object may be considered a waiver of objections.149
DATED this 27th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
147 (Doc. No. 30.)
148 Because the Teeces are unable to enforce FARA in a private civil cause of action,
dismissing Claim 22 with prejudice is appropriate as it is obvious an opportunity to
amend would be futile. See Oxendine, 241 F.3d at 1275.
149 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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