Barbour v. Banda et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
BRANDON BARBOUR,
Plaintiff,
v.
GAVIN BANDA, in his individual capacity;
PROVO CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
and ROBERT TROMBLY, in his individual
capacity,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS CLAIMS AGAINST
ROBERT TROMBLY PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1915
Case No. 2:25-cv-00167
District Judge Ted Stewart
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Brandon Barbour filed this action without an attorney and without paying a filing
fee.1 The court temporarily granted Mr. Barbour’s motion to waive the fee and stayed
the case for screening.2 After screening Mr. Barbour’s complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and identifying deficiencies, the court invited Mr. Barbour to file an
amended complaint.3 Mr. Barbour filed an amended complaint, asserting claims against
police officer Gavin Banda, the Provo City Police Department, and prosecutor Robert
Trombly.4
1 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1; Mot. to Waive Filing Fee, Doc. No. 2.)
2 (Order Temp. Granting Mot. to Waive Filing Fee & Notice of Screening Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915, Doc. No. 5.)
3 (Mem. Decision and Order Permitting Am. Compl. & Temp. Granting Mot. to Waive
Filing Fee, Doc. No. 5.)
4 (Am. Compl., Doc. No. 9.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 15

2
Mr. Barbour’s amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief against
Mr. Trombly, and further opportunities to amend these claims would be futile.
Accordingly, the undersigned5 recommends the district judge dismiss Mr. Barbour’s
claims against Mr. Trombly with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Mr. Barbour is permitted to proceed with his claims against the Provo City Police
Department (properly construed as claims against the City of Provo) and Officer Banda
at this stage. In a separate order entered contemporaneously, the undersigned
authorizes service of process on these defendants.
LEGAL STANDARDS
When a court authorizes a party to proceed without paying a filing fee, the court
must dismiss the case if it determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.”6 In making this determination, the court uses the standard for
analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”8 The
court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views the allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
5 This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (See Doc. No. 12.)
6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
7 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
8 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 15

3
favor.9 But a court need not accept a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.10 “[A]
plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”11
Because Mr. Barbour proceeds without an attorney (pro se), his filings are
liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”12 Still, pro se plaintiffs must “follow the same rules of procedure that
govern other litigants.”13 For instance, a pro se plaintiff “still has the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”14 While courts must
make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,”15 courts “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s
behalf.”16
9 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
10 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
11 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
12 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
13 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
14 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
15 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
16 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 15

4
BACKGROUND
A. Original Complaint
Mr. Barbour’s claims relate to a March 2024 traffic stop and his subsequent
prosecution for a traffic infraction. Mr. Barbour’s original complaint named Officer
Banda and Mr. Trombly as defendants.17 Mr. Barbour checked boxes on the complaint
form indicating he was bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against these
defendants in their individual and official capacities.18 He alleged Officer Banda
followed him “without cause,” then pulled him over and cited him for a “traffic control
signal violation.”19 He asserted that during subsequent court proceedings, the
prosecutor, Mr. Trombly, offered him a plea deal which he declined.20 He contended
Mr. Trombly made this offer without reviewing the evidence and later told the judge he
needed to look over the discovery.21 Mr. Barbour alleged the discovery did not have
any “actual proof or evidence” to support the accusations against him, and the case was
ultimately dismissed by the prosecution based on video footage Mr. Barbour
submitted.22 On the section of the complaint form inviting Mr. Barbour to identify which
of his federal rights were violated, Mr. Barbour wrote: “Probable cause, search and
17 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Citations to this document refer to the CM/ECF pagination.
18 (Id. at 2–3.)
19 (Id. at 4, 7.)
20 (Id. at 4.)
21 (Id. at 4, 7.)
22 (Id.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 15

5
seizures, malicious prosecution[,] due process violations, equal protection, [and]
intentional misconduct.”23
The court screened Mr. Barbour’s complaint and found Mr. Barbour failed to state
a § 1983 claim.24 Specifically, the court found Mr. Barbour’s individual-capacity claims
against Mr. Trombly were barred by prosecutorial immunity, his official-capacity claims
against Mr. Trombly and Officer Banda failed because he did not establish municipal
liability, and his individual-capacity claims against Officer Banda lacked supporting
factual allegations.25 The court permitted Mr. Barbour to amend his complaint.26
B. Amended Complaint
Mr. Barbour’s amended complaint identifies the defendants as Officer Banda, in
his individual capacity; Mr. Trombly, in his individual capacity; and the Provo City Police
Department.27
The factual allegations in the amended complaint are as follows.28 On March 1,
2024, Officer Banda followed Mr. Barbour into his neighborhood and conducted a traffic
stop based on an alleged failure to stop at a stop sign. Officer Banda issued a citation
to Mr. Barbour, claiming he had failed to make a complete stop—which Mr. Barbour
23 (Id. at 3.)
24 (Mem. Decision and Order Permitting Am. Compl. & Temp. Granting Mot. to Waive
Filing Fee, Doc. No. 8.)
25 (Id. at 6.)
26 (Id. at 14.)
27 (Am. Compl. 1–2, Doc. No. 9.)
28 The factual allegations recited here are set forth on page 3 of the amended complaint.
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 15

6
denied. The Provo Justice Court set an initial hearing on April 9, 2024. Before this
hearing, prosecutor Robert Trombly offered Mr. Barbour a plea deal. Mr. Barbour
rejected the offer and pleaded not guilty, based on his assertion of innocence and a lack
of supporting evidence. The court set a pretrial conference for May 6, 2024. During this
time, Mr. Barbour requested and received discovery from the prosecutor’s office,
consisting only of body camera footage from inside Officer Banda’s patrol vehicle. This
footage showed only the steering wheel and no footage of Mr. Barbour’s vehicle,
movements, or the alleged stop sign violation.
Before the pretrial conference, Mr. Trombly made a second plea offer “without
having reviewed or discussed the factual circumstances of the case.”29 Mr. Barbour
again declined. At the May 6 hearing, Mr. Trombly stated on the record that he
“need[ed] time to go over this case.”30 At no time before making these two plea offers
did Mr. Trombly review the evidence or verify the factual basis for the citation.
Mr. Barbour submitted his own dash camera footage demonstrating Officer
Banda “immediately followed [Mr. Barbour] after he legally passed, with no observable
violation occurring[,] and [Mr. Barbour] made a full and complete stop at the stop
sign.”31 After reviewing this footage, the Provo Prosecutor’s Office determined Mr.
Barbour had committed no violation and elected to dismiss the case “on evidentiary and
factual grounds.”32 After the dismissal, Mr. Barbour tried to file an internal misconduct
29 (Id. at 3.)
30 (Id.)
31 (Id.)
32 (Id.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 15

7
complaint against Officer Banda for falsifying a police report because Officer Banda’s
written report and citation “stated facts directly contradicted by the video evidence.”33
But a “Provo Police Department supervisor refused to accept the complaint, stating to
[Mr. Barbour]: ‘I don’t believe he did anything wrong.’”34
Mr. Barbour asserts six causes of action:
• 	In Count I, he claims Officer Banda violated his Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable seizure, by initiating the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion.35
• 	In Count II, Mr. Barbour asserts a claim for malicious prosecution against
Mr. Trombly, alleging he “proceeded without probable cause and offered
multiple plea deals before reviewing evidence.”36
• 	In Count III, Mr. Barbour claims his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights were violated because he was “deprived of his right a fair trial and
subjected to legal jeopardy without a factual basis.”37 He also asserts
“[f]ailing to recognize the insufficiency of evidence before offering plea
deals” undermined his rights, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).38
33 (Id.)
34 (Id.)
35 (Id. at 4.)
36 (Id.)
37 (Id.)
38 (Id.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 15

8
• 	In Count IV, Mr. Barbour asserts a claim for municipal liability, asserting
the Provo City Police Department “failed to adequately train and supervise
Officer Banda, who conducted an unlawful stop and filed a false report.”39
• 	In Count V, Mr. Barbour asserts a defamation claim against Officer Banda
and Mr. Trombly, based on “Officer Banda’s false report alleging [Mr.
Barbour’s] failure to stop, coupled with Trombly’s prosecution of a
baseless case.”40
• 	In Count VI, Mr. Barbour brings a “supervisory liability” claim against the
“Provo Police Department and Supervisors.”41 He asserts the Provo
Police Department “failed to train, supervise, and discipline” Officer Banda
“despite available evidence that he misrepresented material facts,” and he
claims “[t]his policy or custom of inaction contributed to the violation of
[his] rights.”42
Mr. Barbour seeks compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory relief.43
39 (Id. at 5.)
40 (Id.)
41 (Id.) The heading of this claim indicates it is asserted against the Utah County
Sheriff’s Department, but this appears to be a typographical error. The complaint
contains no allegations relating to the Utah County Sheriff’s Department, and the
allegations following this heading relate to the Provo City Police Department.
Accordingly, the court construes this claim as one against the Provo City Police
Department.
42 (Id.) These allegations refer to a “Deputy Pratt” rather than Officer Banda. Again, this
appears to be a typographical error, as the amended complaint contains no other
mention of a Deputy Pratt.
43 (Id. at 5–6.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
8 of 15

9
ANALYSIS
Mr. Barbour’s claims against Mr. Trombly are addressed first, then the claims
against Officer Banda and the Provo City Police Department. As explained below, Mr.
Barbour’s amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Mr.
Trombly because the asserted claims are barred by prosecutorial immunity. Where
further opportunities to amend these claims would be futile, the undersigned
recommends the district judge dismiss Mr. Barbour’s claims against Mr. Trombly with
prejudice. But Mr. Barbour’s claims against Officer Banda and the Provo City Police
Department (properly construed as claims against the City of Provo) are sufficient to
survive screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
A. Claims Against Mr. Trombly
Mr. Barbour’s individual-capacity claims and supporting allegations against Mr.
Trombly in the amended complaint are largely the same as those in the original
complaint, and they fail for the same reason: the claims are barred by prosecutorial
immunity.44
“State prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity against suits brought
pursuant to § 1983 for activities intimately associated with the judicial process, such as
44 As noted, Mr. Barbour brings only individual-capacity claims against Mr. Trombly in
the amended complaint. To the extent the original complaint asserted official-capacity
claims against Mr. Trombly, these claims are abandoned because Mr. Barbour did not
reassert them in the amended complaint. See Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Okla., 107 F.4th 1121, 1137 (10th Cir. 2024) (“An amended complaint
supersedes a prior complaint and renders it of no legal effect. Failing to replead a
claim, when given leave to do so, ordinarily constitutes abandonment when an
amended complaint is filed.” (citation modified)).
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
9 of 15

10
initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.”45 This protects prosecutors’ “decisions to
prosecute, their investigatory or evidence-gathering actions, their evaluation of
evidence, their determination of whether probable cause exists, and their determination
of what information to show the court.”46 Prosecutors enjoy such immunity “even if it
leaves ‘the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor
whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.’”47
Mr. Barbour asserts claims against Mr. Trombly for malicious prosecution
(Count II), Fourteenth Amendment due process violations (Count III), and defamation
(Count V).48 In support of these claims, he alleges Mr. Trombly proceeded without
probable cause, offered plea deals before reviewing evidence, failed to recognize the
insufficiency of the evidence, and prosecuted a “baseless case.”49 But Mr. Trombly’s
decision to prosecute, evaluation of probable cause, evaluation of the evidence, and
decision to make plea offers are all activities intimately associated with the judicial
process. Therefore, these activities are protected by prosecutorial immunity, and Mr.
45 Carbajal v. McCann, 808 F. App’x 620, 631 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (quoting
Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also Blair v. Osborne, 777
F. App’x 926, 929 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“Prosecutorial immunity bars claims
for damages against a prosecutor sued in her individual capacity.”).
46 Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Republic, Kan., 582 F.3d 1155, 1164
(10th Cir. 2009).
47 Carbajal, 808 F. App’x at 631 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427
(1976)).
48 (Am. Compl. 4–5, Doc. No. 9.)
49 (Id.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
10 of 15

11
Barbour’s claims based on these activities are barred.50 Mr. Barbour fails to allege any
action by Mr. Trombly outside the scope of prosecutorial immunity.51 Accordingly, Mr.
Barbour fails to state a claim for relief against Mr. Trombly.
“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it
is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be
futile to give him an opportunity to amend.”52 The court previously notified Mr. Barbour
his claims against Mr. Trombly were barred by prosecutorial immunity and gave him an
opportunity to amend them.53 Based on the amended complaint, it is apparent Mr.
Barbour cannot prevail on the facts alleged, and further opportunities to amend these
50 See Stein v. Disciplinary Bd., 520 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Deciding
whether to bring charges—which necessarily includes an evaluation of whether there
has been sufficient investigation to support charges—is a quintessential prosecutorial
function protected by absolute immunity.”); Arnold v. McClain, 926 F.2d 963, 967 (10th
Cir. 1991) (noting absolute prosecutorial immunity protects plea negotiations); Van
Deelen v. City of Eudora, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229 (D. Kan. 1999) (“[The prosecutor]
is entitled to absolute immunity for his prosecutorial actions in reviewing and evaluating
the evidence found in the police offense reports and witness statements, in determining
that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, and in deciding
to file charges.”); Chacon v. Watson, No. CIV 03-438, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28252,
at *21 (D.N.M. May 6, 2004) (unpublished) (“A prosecutor’s decision regarding dismissal
of charges is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because it is intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
51 As noted in the prior order, Mr. Barbour also cannot state a § 1983 claim for failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady, where his case was dismissed before trial.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding suppression of material
exculpatory evidence violates due process); Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310
(10th Cir. 1999) (explaining courts have “universally” concluded the right to a fair trial is
not implicated, and no § 1983 cause of action for a Brady violation exists, where the
charges were dismissed before trial).
52 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (citation omitted).
53 (See Mem. Decision & Order Permitting Am. Compl. & Temp. Granting Mot. to
Waive Filing Fee 6–8, 14, Doc. No. 8.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
11 of 15

12
claims would be futile. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge
dismiss Mr. Barbour’s claims against Mr. Trombly with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Claims Against Officer Banda and the Provo City Police Department
Based on a review of the amended complaint, Mr. Barbour is permitted to
proceed with his claims against Officer Banda and the Provo City Police Department.
The court previously found the original complaint did not adequately allege
Officer Banda lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop because Mr.
Barbour merely alleged Officer Banda pulled him over for a traffic violation—and a traffic
violation gives an officer reasonable suspicion to make a stop.54 But Mr. Barbour’s
amended complaint includes new allegations to support his Fourth Amendment claim
against Officer Banda. Specifically, he alleges Officer Banda conducted a traffic stop
based on an alleged failure to stop at a stop sign, even though Mr. Barbour made a
complete stop at the stop sign.55 This new allegation is sufficient to permit Mr. Barbour
to proceed on his Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Banda at this stage. Where
at least one claim against Officer Banda is adequate to survive screening under § 1915,
the court will permit service of the amended complaint on Officer Banda.
Likewise, Mr. Barbour’s municipal liability claim against the Provo City Police
Department is permitted to proceed. Construing Mr. Barbour’s pleadings liberally, this is
54 (Id. at 11–12); see also United States v. Martinez, 910 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir.
2018) (“[A] traffic stop is justified if the officer observes or reasonably suspects a traffic
or equipment violation.”).
55 (Am. Compl. 3, Doc. No. 9.)
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
12 of 15

13
effectively a claim against the City of Provo.56 The court previously found the original
complaint did not state a claim for municipal liability because Mr. Barbour did not allege
any official policy or custom gave rise to a constitutional injury.57 In his amended
complaint, Mr. Barbour alleges the Provo Police Department failed to train, supervise,
and discipline Officer Banda despite available evidence that he misrepresented material
facts.58 And he alleges a supervisor later refused to allow him to file a complaint about
Officer Banda, stating he (the supervisor) did not believe Office Banda had done
anything wrong.59 Although somewhat conclusory, these allegations relate to the
requirements of municipal liability.60 They are sufficient, at this stage, to allow the
claims to be served on the City of Provo.
56 A police department is not a separate legal entity subject to suit. See Kojima v. Lehi
City, No. 2:13-cv-00755, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92072, at *10–11 (D. Utah July 14,
2015) (unpublished). But some courts have construed pro se complaints against a
governmental subdivision as asserting a claim against the main governmental entity.
See, e.g., Faircloth v. Wilcox, No. 2:24-cv-00807, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213388, at *1
n.2 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 2024) (unpublished) (“Plaintiff actually names Salt Lake County
Sheriff’s Office as the defendant. However, the sheriff’s office is not an entity that can
sue and be sued. Thus, an official-capacity claim is construed to be against the main
governmental entity, Salt Lake County.” (citations omitted)); Tyler v. Utah, No.
2:07-cv-00004, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103769, at *8 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2008)
(unpublished) (“[T]he Court construes Plaintiff’s claim against the Sheriff’s Office as a
claim against Salt Lake County itself.”). The undersigned adopts this approach for
purposes of the § 1915 screening in this case.
57 (See Mem. Decision & Order Permitting Am. Compl. & Temp. Granting Mot. to
Waive Filing Fee 9, Doc. No. 8.)
58 (Am. Compl. 3, Doc. No. 9.)
59 (Id.)
60 Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires “(1) the existence of an official
policy or custom; (2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the
constitutional injury; and (3) that the defendant established the policy with deliberate
indifference to an almost inevitable constitutional injury.” Soto v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
13 of 15

14
The decision to allow service of the amended complaint on Officer Banda and the
City of Provo is not an assessment of the ultimate merits of Mr. Barbour’s claims—nor
does it prevent these defendants from filing motions to dismiss. The undersigned
merely declines to recommend sua sponte dismissal of the claims against these
defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) at this stage.
RECOMMENDATION
Because Mr. Barbour’s amended complaint fails to state a plausible claim for
relief against Mr. Trombly, and further opportunities to amend would be futile, the
undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss Mr. Barbour’s claims against Mr.
Trombly with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mr. Barbour has the right to
of Caddo Cnty., 748 F. App’x 790, 793–94 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (citation
omitted). The “municipal policy or custom” may take one of the following forms:
(1) 	a 	formal 	regulation 	or 	policy 	statement; 	(2) 	an 	informal 	custom
amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written
law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of
employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final
policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to
whom authority was delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and
approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so
long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that
may be caused.
Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted).
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
14 of 15

15
object to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days, and failure to object
may be considered a waiver of objections.61
Mr. Barbour is permitted to proceed with his claims against the Provo City Police
Department (properly construed as claims against the City of Provo) and Officer Banda
at this stage. In a separate order entered contemporaneously, the undersigned
authorizes service of process on these defendants.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Case 2:25-cv-00167-TS-DAO Document 15 Filed 01/09/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
15 of 15