Barbour v. Guerra et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
Brandon Barbour,
Plaintiff,
v.
FNU Guerra, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR IFP
AND DISMISSING AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Case No. 2:25-cv-00166-DBP
Chief Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
Brandon Barbour who is proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging various civil rights
violations and ineffective assistance of counsel.1 The court temporarily granted Barbour’s
Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and stayed the case for
screening.2 The court screened Barbour’s Complaint and after setting forth its deficiencies,
ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.3 Barbour filed an Amended Complaint on
October 10, 2025.4 As set forth herein, Barbour’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a
plausible claim for relief. The court therefore dismisses this matter and grants the Motion for
Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis.5
1 Complaint, ECF No. 1. Mr. Barbour currently has three other civil rights cases pending before this court: Barbour
v. Banda et al. Case No. 2:25-cv-167 DAO, Barbour v. Pratt et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-168 DAO, and Barbour v.
McChesney et al. Case No. 2:25-cv-169 CMR.
2 Order Temporarily Granting Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 5.
3 Memorandum Decision and Order, ECF No. 8.
4 Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9. The Amended Complaint names as Defendants Officer Tavo Guerra, Officer
Jake Laycock, Officer Zach Hansen, Officer Ethan Simmons, Officer Cayden Booth, Judge Dennis Porter,
Prosecutor James Hansen, Public Defender H.D. Gailey, the City of American Fork, and the Utah Driver License
Division.
5 ECF No. 2.
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BACKGROUND
Barbour initially used a form civil rights complaint bringing this case under 28 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging Defendants violated his civil rights in a variety of ways.6 Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is in all material respects identical to his original Complaint. “Plaintiff brings this
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, denial of access to courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and
municipal liability under Monell.”7 According to Plaintiff, all these alleged violations, arise from
“from an unlawful traffic stop, DUI arrest, and prosecution in American Fork, Utah ….”8
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint provides as follows.
On May 7, 2023, Plaintiff was stopped for speeding. Plaintiff was “lawfully driving …
53-mph in a 35-mph zone.”9 During the stop, Defendant Officer Layclock claimed to smell
alcohol although the claim was “uncorroborated and implausible” according to Barbour.10 The
Officers administered “approximately seven separate tests” before obtaining results. Despite the
problems with testing, and Plaintiff “chewing his fingernails and placing fingers in his mouth
less than two minutes before the final test”, the Officers and Prosecutor used the .110 blood
alcohol result as reliable evidence.11 Plaintiff admitted to consuming “a shot and a beer” but the
“tainted Intoxilyzer and odor claim” failed to establish “corpus delecti.”12
6 See Complaint, ECF No. 1.
7 Amended Complaint at 1, ECF No. 9.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 10.
10 Id. at 2.
11 Id. at 2-3.
12 Id. at 3. Corpus delicti is a Latin phrase that in English means "the body of the crime." The phrase is interpreted to
require a “body” of evidence needed in establishing a crime.
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Barbour claims multiple issues with the traffic stop and at trial, where presumably he was
convicted. First, there was no probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and any subsequent
search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. Next, he sought to stay the court
proceedings, but Judge Porter denied the stay as untimely “obstructing [Plaintiff’s] appellate
rights.”13 Third, there were problems with the evidence at trial and his counsel allowed the state
to present tainted evidence. Fourth, Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant Gailey, told Plaintiff “there’s
nothing we can do”, which aligned his counsel with state actors to present the tainted evidence,
including the breath test that was the centerpiece of the state’s case.14 Finally, at sentencing,
Judge Porter “denied reinstatement of Plaintiff’s license, stating Plaintiff ‘put everyone in
danger’ without evidentiary basis.”15 All of this resulted in Plaintiff losing employment
opportunities, incurring fines, impound fees, and suffering reputational harm, emotional distress,
and housing instability.
Plaintiff alleges certain Defendants violated the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, Monell liability against American Fork, judicial misconduct, fabrication of
evidence, and malicious prosecution. Barbour seeks compensatory damages not less than
$10,000,000, punitive damages, and “expungement or correction of records resulting from acts
found unconstitutional.”16
LEGAL STANDARDS
When a court authorizes a party to proceed without paying a filing fee, the court must
dismiss the case if it determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 6.
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granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”17 In
determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for relief under § 1915, the court uses the
standard for analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 To avoid dismissal under this rule, a complaint must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”19 The court accepts well-
pleaded factual allegations as true and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.20 But a court need not accept
a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.21 “A plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations
to support each claim,”22 and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”23
Because Barbour proceeds pro se without an attorney, his filings are liberally construed
and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”24 However, pro
se plaintiffs must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.”25 For
example, pro se plaintiffs still have “the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based.”26 Although courts make some allowances for a pro se
plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
18 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
19 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)).
20 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
21 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
22 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation modified).
23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (citation modified).
24 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
25 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified).
26 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
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syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,”27 courts
“will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a
legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”28
DISCUSSION
Barbour cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for his claims. Section 1983 provides a
recovery device for violations of federal rights in certain circumstances.29 “To establish a cause
of action under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) deprivation of a federal right by (2) a
person acting under color of state law.”30 As explained below, Barbor fails to state a § 1983
claim. Barbour’s claims against the officers lack supporting factual allegations and requisite
specificity, prosecutorial immunity bars claims against the prosecutor, judicial immunity bars
claims against the judge in this case, and under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (if a judgment has
been entered) or the Younger abstention doctrine (if the cases are ongoing) this court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking review of state court judgments.”31
First, Barbour’s official-capacity claims against the Defendant officers fail because
Plaintiff does not identify any official policy or custom giving rise to a constitutional injury.32
Any individual-capacity claims also fail because Plaintiff offers no factual development or
explanation supporting the conclusory allegations that the officers conspired together to bring
27 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
28 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2017) (describing § 1983
generally).
30 Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988).
31 Bisbee v. McCarty, 3 F. App’x 819, 822 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (citing Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1982); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923)).
32 See Fisher v. Koopman, 693 F. App’x 740, 746 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“An official capacity suit against
a municipal official like a police officer is treated as a suit against the municipality.”).
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more charges, were falsifying claims that Barbour was speeding, or acting in any other
outrageous manner. To state a claim in federal court, Barbour “must offer specific factual
allegations to support each claim.”33 Barbour’s unsupported and conclusory allegations that the
officers violated his civil rights are insufficient.
Next, a “prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
acting within his or her jurisdictional scope.”34 Nothing before the court in Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint indicates the prosecutor here was not acting within the jurisdictional scope of their
responsibilities. “A prosecutor acts within the prosecutorial function anytime he or she is
involved in the judicial process, i.e., presenting the state's case.”35 Based on the current record,
this is exactly what occurred in the underlying matter.
A similar outcome is mandated for Judge Porter who presided over Plaintiff’s
proceedings. A judge is generally immune from suit for money damages or under § 1983
provided the judge has not acted in clear absence of jurisdiction.36 Nothing in Plaintiff’s
Complaint indicates judicial immunity should not apply in this instance. Further, “[a] long line of
[Supreme Court] precedents acknowledge[] that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for
money damages.”37
33 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC, 656 F.3d at 1214; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
34 Summers v. Sjogren, 667 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Utah 1987); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96
S.Ct. 984, 993, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1975) (state prosecuting attorney's use of perjured testimony does not give rise to
suit under § 1983 because of immunity).
35 Id. at 1434.
36 See Vasquez v. Arnold, 48 F.3d 1233, 1995 WL 91148, at *1 (10th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); see also Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (judge generally immune from suit for money damages); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356-360 (1978) (judge immune from suit under 1983 provided he has not acted in “clear absence of all
jurisdiction”); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.1994) (same)
37 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (collecting cases).
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Plaintiff names Stevens Gailey as a Defendant in both his individual and official
capacities. Mr. Gailey is an attorney and who represented Plaintiff during the trial process.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail as to either official or individual claims against him.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims relate to those ongoing proceedings, they are
barred by the Younger38 abstention doctrine and to the extent Plaintiff is appealing the decision
against him in state court that is prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine provides that most federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking
review of state court judgments.39 The exception being the Supreme Court may hear such cases.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes cases brought by state court losers complaining of
injuries caused via state court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings
commenced.40 A review of a state court judgment must proceed to the state's highest court, and
then be brought before the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.41 A claim
that is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment is also barred by the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine.42 Such claims may be dismissed with prejudice as recently held by the Tenth
Circuit.43 To the extent that each of the Plaintiffs claims are an appeal from their state court
judgments, those claims are be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
38 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
39 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
40 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
41 See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991).
42 Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Wideman v. Colorado, 242 F. App'x 611, 614
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding appellant's claims barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they were “little more than
thinly disguised efforts to overturn, or at least call into question the validity of, the rulings entered against him” in
state court).
43 King v. Marquez, No. 25-1259, 2025 WL 2758045, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (dismissing a plaintiff’s action
with prejudice as it violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
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For these reasons Barbour’s Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal.44 There is
nothing in the facts before the court that provide a viable claim.
ORDER
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.45 Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for failing to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, and for being frivolous under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.46
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 4 December 2025.
Dustin B. Pead
United States Magistrate Judge
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
45 ECF No. 2.
46 See King, 2025 WL 2758045 at *2.
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