James et al v. iMoney Tools LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
RIKKI JAMES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
IMONEY TOOLS, LLC dba TRANONT, a
Utah limited liability company,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Case No. 2:24-cv-00522-RJS
District Judge Robert J. Shelby
Before the court is Defendant iMoney Tools, LLC dba Tranont’s Motion for Attorney
Fees (Motion).1 For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are twelve minors2 who allege they were poisoned by ingestion or exposure to
dietary supplements sold by Tranont that were contaminated with harmful levels of heavy
metals.3 They initiated this action on July 26, 2024.4 They later filed a First Amended
Complaint5 and Second Amended Complaint.6 Tranont filed a Motion to Dismiss,7 which the
1 Dkt. 87, Motion for Attorney Fees (Motion).
2 Plaintiffs bring their claims through their guardians: Rikki James, as guardian for James Minors 1, 2, 3, and 4;
Priscilla Ambundo, as guardian for Ambundo Minor 1; Esther Gonzalez, as guardian for Gonzalez Minors 1, 2, and
3; Aimee Lloyd, as guardian for Lloyd Minor 1; Cheyenne Ware, as guardian for Ware Minor 1; Mattie Allgyer, as
guardian for Mattie Allgyer Minor 1; and Linda Allgyer, as guardian for Linda Allgyer Minor 1.
3 Dkt. 27, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 5 (“Plaintiffs are a group of young families that were poisoned by extreme
amounts of heavy metals in Tranont’s product.”).
4 See Dkt. 1, Complaint.
5 See Dkt. 14, First Amended Complaint.
6 Second Amended Complaint.
7 Dkt. 28, Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.
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court denied after hearing oral argument.8 Tranont subsequently answered the Amended
Complaint and brought several counterclaims against Plaintiffs, which Plaintiffs answered in
turn.9 The case then proceeded to discovery.
Plaintiffs provide specific allegations to support their claims: for example, they allege the
James Minors were diagnosed with lead toxicity,10 Ambundo Minor 1 was diagnosed with
“heavy metal toxicity,”11 Ambundo Minor 1’s guardian “was diagnosed with high amounts of
toxic metals,”12 “[a]ll three [Gonzalez Minors] underwent stool testing and heavy metal
testing,”13 and “Gonzalez Minor 3 . . . was diagnosed with heavy metal toxicity and gut
dysbiosis.”14
Since the case began, Tranont has repeatedly attempted to obtain the factual basis for
Plaintiffs’ allegations. On January 28, 2025, while the parties briefed Tranont’s Motion to
Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, Tranont sent Plaintiffs a letter asking for
documentation in support of their claims.15 Plaintiffs responded that such a request was
premature, and evidence would be provided in the normal course.16 On August 1, 2025,
Plaintiffs served their Initial Disclosures, stating they “will provide a production of documents
8 Dkt. 42, Memorandum Decision and Order; Dkt. 41, Minute Entry.
9 Dkt. 44, Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim; Dkt. 45, Amended Counterclaim;
Dkt. 46, Plaintiff’s and Counter Defendant’s [sic] Answer to Counterclaim.
10 Complaint ¶ 51 (“The diagnosis for [the James Minors] includes lead toxicity . . . .”); First Amended Complaint
¶ 51 (same); Second Amended Complaint ¶ 48 (“The diagnosis for the James Minors includes lead toxicity.”).
11 Complaint ¶ 70; First Amended Complaint ¶ 70 (same); Second Amended Complaint ¶ 58 (same).
12 Complaint ¶ 72; First Amended Complaint ¶ 72 (same); Second Amended Complaint ¶ 60 (same).
13 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 73; Complaint ¶ 86 (“All three [Gonzalez Minors] underwent stool testing, and
Gonzalez Minor 3 also had heavy metal testing performed.”); First Amended Complaint ¶ (“All three [Gonzalez
Minors] underwent stool testing, and Gonzalez Minor 3 also had heavy metal testing performed.”).
14 Complaint ¶ 85; First Amended Complaint ¶ 85 (same); Second Amended Complaint ¶ 72 (same).
15 Motion at 9; Dkt. 87-1, Declaration in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees (Martinez Declaration) ¶ 12.
16 Motion at 9; Martinez Declaration ¶ 12.
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. . . which they intend to use in this matter in connection with these disclosures including medical
records, images showing health impacts of the use of Tranont’s products, and evidence of the
payment of medical expenses.”17
According to Tranont, the only relevant documents produced by Plaintiffs with their
Initial Disclosures were dental billing records for James Minors 1, 2, and 3; a hair analysis for
James Minor 1; and dental records and blood test results for Ambundo Minor 1.18 On August
27, 2025, Tranont served discovery requests on Plaintiffs and sent a letter to Plaintiffs the next
day requesting the documents identified in their Initial Disclosures.19 At a subsequent meet-and-
confer, Plaintiffs’ counsel would not commit to producing those documents by a date certain.20
On September 5, 2025, Tranont filed a Motion to Compel seeking the documents’ production.21
Plaintiffs opposed the Motion to Compel, arguing their responses to Tranont’s discovery requests
were not yet due and that documents supporting the allegations “will be produced.”22 According
to Tranont, no such documents were ever provided.23
On September 18, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw, citing
“irreconcilable differences” with some Plaintiffs and “other professional considerations.”24 On
October 8, 2025, the court granted the Motion to Withdraw over Tranont’s objection and stayed
17 Dkt. 87-4, Exhibit C at 6 ¶ 6.
18 Motion at 5; see also Martinez Declaration ¶ 16. Plaintiffs also produced a chiropractor’s letter and hair analysis
results for Rikki James, as well as blood test results for Priscilla Ambundo. Martinez Declaration ¶ 16.
19 Martinez Declaration ¶¶ 18–20.
20 Id. ¶ 21.
21 Dkt. 52, Short Form Discovery Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’ Production of Documents Identified in Initial
Disclosures and for Expedited Consideration.
22 Dkt. 53, Plaintiffs and Counter Defendants’ Response to Short Form Discovery Motion to Compel Plaintiffs’
Production of Documents Identified in Initial Disclosures and for Expedited Consideration at 3–4.
23 Motion at 6; see also Martinez Declaration ¶ 25.
24 Dkt. 57, Motion to Withdraw[] as Counsel at 2.
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the case for twenty-one days.25 The court also contemporaneously ordered Plaintiffs to show
cause by November 19, 2025, why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.26 After new counsel appeared for James Minors 1, 2, 3, and 4, but failed to respond
by the deadline set in the Order to Show Cause, the court dismissed the Second Amended
Complaint without prejudice.27 Tranont then filed the Motion for Attorney Fees, which is fully
briefed and ripe for review.28
LEGAL STANDARD
The court possesses the inherent authority to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings
by punishing abuses of the judicial process through the crafting and imposition of appropriate
sanctions.29 The Tenth Circuit instructs that “because of their very potency, inherent powers
must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”30 Central to that discretion “is the ability to
fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process,”31 including the
assessment of attorney fees.32
25 Dkt. 69, Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Withdrawal.
26 Dkt. 70, Order to Show Cause. The court issued the Order to Show Cause after Tranont pointed out that Plaintiffs
computed only $85,000 in collective compensatory damages in their Initial Disclosures. Dkt. 65, Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Extension of Deadline to Respond to Defendant’s First Set of Discovery at 5
n.3.
27 Dkt. 80, Order Dismissing Case. The court also denied as moot a Motion for Sanctions filed by Tranont after the
stay expired. Dkt. 74, Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice and Sanctions.
28 Dkt. 97, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Opposition); Dkt. 99, Reply in Support of
Motion for Attorney Fees (Reply).
29 See Farmer v. Banco Popular of N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1257 (10th Cir. 2015) (“A district court’s inherent power
to sanction reaches beyond the multiplication of court proceedings and authorizes sanctions for wide-ranging
conduct constituting an abuse of process.” (citation omitted)).
30 United States v. Akers, 76 F.4th 982, 993 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).
31 Id. (citation omitted).
32 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (citations omitted).
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Under the traditional “American Rule,” each party “pays his own attorney’s fees, win or
lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.”33 However, under an exception to the
American Rule, the court may “award attorney fees when a party’s opponent acts ‘in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’”34 The court must “make a finding of bad
intent or improper motive” before awarding fees,35 and only fees incurred as a result of the
misconduct may be awarded.36
The bad faith exception is construed narrowly and “resorted to only in exceptional cases
. . . when there is clear evidence that challenged actions [were] taken” in bad faith.37 It “requires
more than merely a finding that a claim was frivolous when brought.”38 Bad faith is present
“when the plaintiff has alleged a claim that is patently frivolous and that, like fraud, is also
opprobrious by nature and designed to cause embarrassment and humiliation.”39 The bad faith
inquiry looks to the party’s subjective intent.40
33 Kornfeld v. Kornfeld, 393 F. App’x 575, 578 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010)).
34 United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sterling Energy Ltd. v. Friendly Nat’l
Bank, 744 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984)).
35 Mountain W. Mines, Inc. v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 470 F.3d 947, 954 (10th Cir. 2006).
36 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 109–10 (2017).
37 FDIC v. Schuchmann, 319 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation modified).
38 Sterling Energy, 744 F.2d at 1437.
39 Id.
40 FTC v. Kuykendall, 466 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Sterling Energy, 744 F.2d at 1435).
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ANALYSIS
Tranont seeks attorney fees from the minor Plaintiffs’ guardians under the court’s
inherent authority.41 The court begins by examining the relevant conduct and then turns to
whether it constitutes bad faith.
I. 	The Court Concludes Plaintiffs’ Guardian Rikki James Acted in Bad Faith.
Tranont argues Plaintiffs’ guardians engaged in bad faith by (1) asserting meritless claims
for improper reasons, (2) invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction without a basis to do so, and
(3) failing to comply with their discovery obligations.42 The court finds most troubling the lack
of factual support for—and, in some instances, irreconcilable evidence with—Plaintiffs’
allegations as well as evidence demonstrating Rikki James’s improper motive in bringing this
lawsuit.43
41 Motion at 1. Tranont also seeks attorney fees for violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and under a
contract between Tranont and Plaintiffs’ guardians. Id. at 10 & n.4. Because the court awards fees under its
inherent authority, it declines to address these alternative grounds.
42 Id. at 1.
43 “When federal subject matter jurisdiction is challenged based on the amount in controversy requirement, the
plaintiffs must show that it does not appear to a legal certainty that they cannot recover the jurisdiction amount.”
Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Manganaro, 342 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). In
making this determination, the court need not rely only on what is alleged in the pleadings: if evidence developed in
the case satisfies the court “that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover” the jurisdictional amount, “the suit will
be dismissed.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (citations omitted). But
where one plaintiff has satisfied the amount in controversy requirement and complete diversity exists, the court may
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs’ claims “even if those claims are for less than the
jurisdictional amount.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549 (2005). Given several
Plaintiffs’ failure to provide any evidence in discovery that they suffered actual damages, Tranont’s questioning of
Plaintiffs’ basis for invoking the court’s jurisdiction is far from “baseless,” as Plaintiffs put it. See Opposition at 6–
9. But even Tranont admits it is possible that one Plaintiff could satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.
Reply at 8. While tenuous, the court thus concludes that it is not a legal certainty that Plaintiffs could not invoke the
court’s jurisdiction. For this reason, the court declines to consider the diversity jurisdiction issue when evaluating
the Motion for Attorney Fees.
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A. Insufficient evidence exists to support Plaintiffs’ claims.
Twelve Plaintiffs asserted claims against Tranont related to harms allegedly caused by its
products.44 Of the twelve, eight failed to produce any evidence in discovery in support of their
claims.45 For example, Plaintiffs allege “[a]ll three [Gonzalez Minors] underwent stool testing
and heavy metal testing,”46 and “Gonzalez Minor 3 . . . was diagnosed with heavy metal toxicity
and gut dysbiosis.”47 But Plaintiffs never produced any medical records for the Gonzalez
Minors to Tranont at any point in this litigation.48 The court is left to wonder how Plaintiffs’
counsel had a basis to draft specific, detailed allegations concerning these eight Plaintiffs if
indeed no evidence existed to support their claims.
Even more baffling is the existence of evidence that contradicts Plaintiffs’ allegations.
For example, Plaintiffs allege the James Minors were diagnosed with lead toxicity.49 But a hair
analysis conducted on James Minor 1—the only testing of the James Minors provided by
Plaintiffs—indicates a lead level “in the green.”50 The court thus fails to understand how
Plaintiffs had a good faith basis to allege a lead toxicity diagnosis for the James Minors when
filing the pleadings. Plaintiffs further allege the James Minors “experience[d] a significant
health decline” after consuming Tranont’s products, which had a “devastating” impact on them
“both physically and mentally.”51 But a doctor of chiropractic who treated Ms. James for years
44 See Second Amended Complaint.
45 Motion at 6 (citing Martinez Declaration ¶ 17).
46 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 73.
47 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 72.
48 See Motion at 6 (citing Martinez Declaration ¶ 17).
49 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 48 (“The diagnosis for [the James Minors] includes lead toxicity . . . .”).
50 Sealed Motion for Attorney Fees at 4–5 (citing Martinez Declaration ¶¶ 16–17, 21, 25); see also Dkt. 89-2,
Exhibit D at JAMES000013.
51 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 45.
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concluded that the James Minors were “consistently healthy, with no history of illness under
[his] care.”52 Plaintiffs do not address this discrepancy in their Opposition, which leads the court
to conclude they lacked a good faith basis to make such an allegation.
Plaintiffs also allege Ambundo Minor 1 was diagnosed with “heavy metal toxicity.”53
The medical records produced to Tranont indicate Ambundo Minor 1 received two blood tests:
the first showed an elevated lead level, but the second (taken two weeks later) showed a lead
level in the normal range. The doctor opined this discrepancy may have resulted from
“contamination” at the test site or from low iron levels, which can cause increased lead
absorption.54 While the first test perhaps provides some basis to bring a claim on Ambundo
Minor 1’s behalf, the court is unclear—and Plaintiffs do not address in their Opposition—how a
single test result without any further comment justifies alleging that Ambundo Minor 1 was
diagnosed with heavy metal toxicity.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges Ambundo Minor 1’s guardian “was diagnosed
with high amounts of toxic metals” on May 19, 2023.55 But the test results produced in
discovery from that day indicate this allegation is false. There is no evidence that a doctor
diagnosed Priscilla Ambundo with “high amounts of toxic metals”; the doctor states in a note,
“[t]hese all look good.”56
In Opposition to Tranont’s Motion, Plaintiffs produced additional evidence they provided
to their counsel before bringing this suit, including (1) photographs exhibiting tooth decay in six
52 Dkt. 89-4, Exhibit F. Ms. James produced this record to Tranont in a separate action. Martinez Declaration ¶ 16.
53 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 58.
54 See Dkt. 89, Sealed Motion for Attorney Fees at 5; see also Dkt. 89-2, Exhibit D at JAMES000011.
55 Second Amended Complaint ¶ 60.
56 See Dkt. 89-2, Exhibit D at JAMES000002–4.
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unidentified Plaintiffs,57 and (2) questionnaires completed by eleven Plaintiffs’ guardians
explaining that Plaintiffs had ingested or been exposed to Tranont’s products and subsequently
experienced significant health problems.58 The court has reviewed the provided photographs and
notes the signs of dental decay are obvious and severe, but it fails to understand how
photographs of six unidentified Plaintiffs provide more than minimal support for the specific
diagnoses and injuries alleged by Plaintiffs—as well as how those injuries are connected to
Tranont.
The pattern of absent and conflicting evidence described above coupled with Plaintiffs’
discovery conduct leads the court to infer that Plaintiffs’ counsel at best blindly trusted the
answers provided in the questionnaires while drafting the Complaint but failed to conduct any
further investigation before filing suit.59 And given the paucity of evidence provided to support
their claims—especially after Plaintiffs were on notice of the specific allegations challenged by
57 Opposition at 6; see also Dkt. 97-2, Declaration of R. Jeremy Adamson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees (Adamson Declaration) ¶ 7 (citing Dkts. 97-10–15, Exhibits 8–13).
58 Opposition at 6; see also Adamson Declaration ¶¶ 5–6 (citing Dkts. 97-3–9, Exhibits 1–7). Plaintiffs also argue
they retained an expert, David K. Humphrey, to review laboratory test results of Tranont’s products and Plaintiffs’
medical records. Opposition at 6. Humphrey concludes “that the heavy metals found in the Defendant’s products
were at dangerous levels,” and “there is a credible medical basis to show that Plaintiffs have experienced serious
harm as a result of the exposure to the heavy metals found in Defendant’s products.” Opposition at 6; see also Dkt.
97-1, Declaration of David K. Humphrey, JD ¶¶ 49–68. In Reply, Tranont points out that Humphrey is a lawyer and
businessman, not a scientist or medical doctor, who reviewed testing done in August and September of 2025—over
a year after Plaintiffs brought suit. Reply at 3. The court find’s Humphrey’s conclusions irrelevant for two reasons.
First, it would have been impossible for Humphrey’s review to have any bearing on counsel’s decision to file suit
given it was conducted over a year later. Second, Plaintiffs make no argument to establish Humphrey’s expertise,
including why his background as an attorney and owner of a laboratory business or his methodology are sufficient to
satisfy the Daubert test. See Opposition; United States v. Hunt, 63 F.4th 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2023) (providing
Daubert factors).
59 Compare, e.g., Dkt. 97-5, Exhibit 3 (describing how three Gonzalez Minors provided stool samples and one
Gonzalez Minor also underwent heavy metal testing), with Complaint ¶ 86 (“All three [Gonzalez Minors] underwent
stool testing, and Gonzalez Minor 3 also had heavy metal testing performed.”).
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Tranont—the court is left to conclude that no such evidence exists, and this action was frivolous
from the beginning.60
B. Sufficient evidence exists to conclude Rikki James acted in bad faith.
Having found Plaintiffs’ guardians brought a frivolous case, the court now turns to
whether they engaged in bad faith conduct. Here, there is clear evidence that at least one
guardian, Rikki James, brought this case for improper reasons. Tranont has provided messages
sent by Ms. James to a third party related to this suit and other cases she has brought against
Tranont.61 In those messages, Ms. James states:
• 	“We will see if they’re even around long enough to finish this case[.]”62
• 	“Their day will come.”63
• 	“I haven’t showed them or released a thing on purpose.”64
• 	Maybe they have better insurance than what we think they have and if they do then great
otherwise I just don’t wanna be the one putting the bill . . . they don’t have the money to
pay their lawyers.”65
• 	“[W]hen we find out what kind of insurance they have if it’s some sort of miracle and
they actually have good insurance then we can move forward on the class action, but if
they have shit insurance then . . . we know we’re not gonna get any sort of payout
anyway I just don’t know if it’s worth it[.]”66
60 An attorney who makes baseless allegations after failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry violates Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Tranont correctly notes it may not bring a sanctions motion under
Rule 11 given the court has dismissed the operative pleading. Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006).
And while the court may initiate a Rule 11 inquiry sua sponte, it may not award attorney fees to Tranont were it to
do so. Wright v. CompGeeks.com, 429 F. App’x 693, 697–98 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208
F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000)). Under these circumstances, the court cautions Plaintiffs’ attorneys who signed
the pleadings that compliance with their professional obligations and the rules is mandatory to ensure the integrity of
the judicial process.
61 See Motion at 7–8; see also Martinez Declaration ¶¶ 5, 35 & Dkts. 87-10–15, Exhibits I–N.
62 Dkt. 87-10, Exhibit I.
63 Dkt. 87-11, Exhibit J.
64 Dkt. 87-12, Exhibit K.
65 Dkt. 87-13, Exhibit L.
66 Dkt. 87-14, Exhibit M.
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• 	“My lawyers are going to help you guys say whatever because they are yeah I mean that
they’re idiots.”67
Taken together, these messages—along with the apparently false information provided to her
lawyers before initiating this lawsuit and refusal to meaningfully participate in discovery—are
“clear evidence”68 Ms. James had an improper motive in bringing this action, which the court
concludes was “designed to cause embarrassment and humiliation.”69 Accordingly, the court
finds the bad faith exception applies and will grant Tranont’s Motion with respect to Ms. James.
Because Tranont has not provided any evidence relating to the subjective intent of the other
Plaintiffs’ guardians, the court denies the Motion with respect to them.
II. 	After Adjustment, the Attorney Fees Sought by Tranont Are Reasonable.
District courts in the Tenth Circuit use the “lodestar” approach to determine the
reasonableness of a request for attorney fees. To calculate the lodestar, the court multiplies
(1) counsel’s hours reasonably spent on the litigation by (2) a reasonable hourly rate.70 Under
this approach, the party requesting the fees—Tranont—has the burden “to prove and establish
the reasonableness of each dollar, each hour, above zero.”71 Tranont must also provide evidence
supporting the hours worked and the claimed rate.72 Where this is found lacking, “the district
court may reduce the award accordingly.”73 Further, while the court may only shift attorney fees
67 Dkt. 87-15, Exhibit N.
68 Schuchmann, 319 F.3d at 1250.
69 Sterling Energy, 744 F.2d at 1437.
70 See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2000); Derma Pen,
LLC v. 4EverYoung Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-00729-DN, 2019 WL 2929525, at *2 (D. Utah July 8, 2019), aff’d, 999 F.3d
1240 (10th Cir. 2021); see also John Bean Techs. Corp. v. B GSE Grp., LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00142-RJS, 2023 WL
6164322, at *17 (D. Utah Sept. 21, 2023).
71 Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1986).
72 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
73 Id.
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“incurred because of the misconduct at issue,” this but-for standard “permits a trial court to shift
all of a party’s fees” where “a plaintiff initiates a case in complete bad faith.”74
A. Reasonable Hours
In assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s claimed hours, the court considers whether
counsel has provided adequate billing records, exercised billing judgment, and spent a reasonable
number of hours on each task.75
The fee applicant must submit to the court “meticulous, contemporaneous time records
that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are sought, all hours for which compensation is
requested and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks.”76 Tranont’s counsel from Dorsey
& Whitney LLP have submitted detailed time records and billing statements.77 Counsel’s
records show they spent two hundred and forty hours litigating this case.78 Plaintiffs do not raise
any specific challenges to the billing entries or any general concerns with the records’
adequacy.79 Accordingly, the court determines the hours are supported by adequate billing
records.
Next, the court must ensure Tranont’s counsel properly “exercised billing judgment.”80
“Billing judgment consists of winnowing the hours actually expended down to the hours
74 Goodyear Tire, 581 U.S. at 108–11.
75 Webb v. County of Stanislaus, No. 2:21-MC-00696-JNP-JCB, 2022 WL 1288857, at *4 (D. Utah Apr. 29, 2022).
76 Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998).
77 See Martinez Declaration ¶¶ 37–63; Dkt. 87-16, Invoices; Dkt. 87-17, Time Entries; Dkt. 87-18, Adjusted Invoices
and Hours Billed.
78 Martinez Declaration ¶ 46; Dkt. 87-16, Invoices; Dkt. 87-17, Time Entries; Dkt. 87-18, Adjusted Invoices and
Hours Billed.
79 See generally Opposition.
80 Case, 157 F.3d at 1250 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reasonably expended.”81 In doing so, counsel “should make a good faith effort to exclude from a
fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”82
While Tranont’s counsel do not specifically address whether they exercised billing
judgment,83 the court has reviewed the billing entries and concludes the redactions are sufficient
to demonstrate Tranont’s counsel exercised proper billing judgment. The court next turns to the
factors set forth in Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 23384 and Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp.,
Inc.85 to determine whether the resulting award is reasonable or warrants further adjustment.
First, the Case factors support the fees sought by Tranont. While some elements of the
litigation were straightforward, there were also many complex legal and factual disputes. Most
significantly, Plaintiffs’ failure to meaningfully participate in discovery deprived Tranont of the
ability to prepare its defense, requiring it to maneuver by filing motions seeking appropriate
relief. And having reviewed the billing records, given there were so few attorneys on this case,
the court finds little potential for duplication of services.
The Johnson factors lend further support to the reasonableness of Tranont’s fee request.
While the court need not discuss every Johnson factor,86 several are particularly relevant here.
As documented by counsel’s meticulous billing records, counsel spent significant time and labor
81 Id. (citation omitted).
82 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
83 See Martinez Declaration.
84 157 F.3d at 1250 (providing four factors to analyze in the reasonableness inquiry: (1) “the complexity of the
case”; (2) “the number of reasonable strategies pursued”; (3) “the responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the
other side”; and (4) “the potential duplication of services”).
85 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) (providing twelve factors to analyze in the reasonableness inquiry: (1) “the
time and labor required”; (2) “the novelty and difficulty of the questions”; (3) “the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly”; (4) “the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case”; (5) “the
customary fee”; (6) “whether the fee is fixed or contingent”; (7) “time limitations”; (8) “the amount involved and the
results obtained”; (9) “the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney”; (10) “the ‘undesirability’ of the case”;
(11) “the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client”; and (12) “awards in similar cases”).
86 See Uselton v. Com. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854 (10th Cir. 1993).
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on this case over the last year and a half. The lawyers who billed the bulk of the time charged to
Tranont are experienced litigators who proved to be capable advocates. Their meticulous
attention to the record by questioning whether Plaintiffs’ failed to adequately establish subject
matter jurisdiction ultimately resulted in dismissal of this case. Having considered the rest of the
Johnson factors, the court concludes these factors either support the reasonableness of Tranont’s
requested fees or have little bearing on the present case. The court therefore declines to further
reduce Tranont’s fee award.
B. Reasonable Rates
The court next reviews the reasonableness of Tranont’s claimed hourly rates. As the fee
applicant, Tranont has the burden to prove “the requested rates are in line with those prevailing
in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
reputation.”87 In contrast to the broad discretion generally afforded to district courts in assessing
attorney fees, the Tenth Circuit cautions district courts not to “ignore[] the parties’ market
evidence and set[] an attorney’s hourly rate using the rates [they] consistently grant[].”88
Moreover, courts may not use their “own knowledge to establish the appropriate rate unless the
evidence of prevailing market rates . . . is inadequate.”89
In this case, counsel charged Tranont between $330 and $695 per hour for their
services.90 The relevant community for determining the reasonableness of counsel’s requested
fee is the Salt Lake City legal market, where Plaintiffs filed suit.91 Tranont provides the mean
87 See Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (1996) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)).
88 Case, 157 F.3d at 1255 (citation modified).
89 United Phosphorus, 205 F.3d at 1234 (citations omitted).
90 See Martinez Declaration ¶ 52.
91 See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating the relevant market consists of “the area in which
the litigation occurs” or “the area in which the court sits”).
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standard rates for partners, associates, and paralegals according to Thomson Reuters Peer
Monitor.92 The rates charged by counsel are either below or only slightly above these mean
standard rates.93 The court concludes this market evidence, along with counsel’s Declaration
that the rates charged are reasonable,94 is sufficient to establish counsel charged reasonable
hourly rates based on the “skill, experience, and reputation” they brought to this case.95
C. The Lodestar
The court now returns to its calculation of the lodestar, which is presumptively
reasonable.96 The court calculates the lodestar is $138,615.50.97 However, mindful that “the
amount and impact of a monetary sanction should depend on the seriousness of the violation and
where the fault lies,” the court finds a further reduction necessary.98 Here, Tranont has provided
sufficient evidence to demonstrate Ms. James acted with bad faith in bringing this suit. And
because the case was infected with Ms. James’s conduct from its inception—that is, the case
would not have been brought but for Ms. James’s conduct—the court finds it appropriate to shift
Tranont’s fees for the entirety of the litigation of this case to Ms. James. However, the court is
not persuaded that Ms. James should bear responsibility for all fees sought by Tranont where she
only appeared as guardian for four of the twelve Plaintiffs. To take her relative fault into
92 Martinez Declaration ¶¶ 56–62; Dkt. 87-19, Exhibit S.
93 Compare Martinez Declaration ¶ 52, with Exhibit S.
94 Martinez Declaration ¶ 51.
95 Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11; see also Case, 157 F.3d at 1257 (“The quality of the lawyer’s performance in the case
should also be considered.” (citation omitted)).
96 Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010).
97 Martinez Declaration ¶ 52; Dkt. 87-16, Invoices; Dkt. 87-17, Time Entries; Dkt. 87-18, Adjusted Invoices and
Hours Billed.
98 Turnbull v. Wilcken, 893 F.2d 256, 259 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
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account, the court finds it equitable to assign Ms. James one-third of the fees. Accordingly, the
court reduces the lodestar by two-thirds and awards Tranont $46,205.17 in fees from Ms. James.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Tranont’s Motion.99
SO ORDERED this 9th day of February, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge
99 Dkt. 87.
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