Eliason v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION
KYLIE M. ELIASON and BRITTNIE L.
ELIASON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER DAY SAINTS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GRANTING [26, 27] MOTIONS TO
DISMISS AND RECOMMENDING
PLAINTIFFS BE DESIGNATED AS
RESTRICTED FILERS
Case No. 1:25-cv-00021-HCN-CMR
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero
This matter is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (ECF
24). Plaintiffs Kylie M. Eliason (Kylie) and Brittnie L. Eliason (Brittnie) (collectively,
Plaintiffs) filed their Complaint (ECF 1) in this matter on February 19, 2025. Before the court
is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 26) filed by Defendants the Corporation of the President of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Kirton McConkie, and Dallin Oaks (collectively,
Church Defendants). Also before the court is a Motion to Dismiss (ECF 27) filed by Defendants
Spencer Cox and the State of Utah (collectively, State Defendants). Having carefully considered
the relevant filings, the court finds that oral argument is not necessary and will decide the
Motion on the basis of written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(g). For the reasons set forth below,
the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motions to Dismiss (ECF 26, 27) be GRANTED and
Plaintiffs be designated “restricted filers.”
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring claims against all Defendants for civil conspiracy, theft, intentional
and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, request for accounting, declaratory judgment
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action to determine trustee, punitive damages, and vicarious liability (Compl. at 16–29).
Plaintiffs also bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with economic
relations, 	and 	negligence 	against 	Defendants 	Lisa 	Stephens, 	Bryan 	Stephens, 	Craig
McCullough, and Kirton McConkie; violation of duties as trustee against Defendant Lisa
Stephens; and conflict of interest against Defendants Craig McCullough and Kirton McConkie
(id.). In the caption of the Complaint, it appears that Kylie and Brittnie are attempting to bring
this action on behalf of “The Estate of Max and Joyce Eliason” (Compl. at 1). Kylie is alleged
to be a “Trustee” and “Beneficiary,” and Brittnie is alleged to be a “Beneficiary” (id.). While
the caption only lists Brittnie and Kylie as Plaintiffs, the body of the Complaint under “Parties,
Jurisdiction, and Venue” lists others as Plaintiffs including their father Brett Eliason (Brett),
who is the son of Max and Joyce, and his wife Veronique Eliason (Veronique) (id. at 6).1
On March 14, 2025, Church Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss (ECF 26) seeking
dismissal of the Complaint on various grounds including pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs’ lack of standing
and that this action was actually brought by Brett. On the same day, State Defendants filed their
Motion to Dismiss (ECF 27) also seeking dismissal on several grounds including lack of
standing and that this action was brought by Brett. On March 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a
Response (ECF 29) to Church Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 26), and Church
Defendants thereafter filed a Reply (ECF 34).2 No response was filed to State Defendants’
1 Brett has been designated as a vexatious litigant, Eliason v. The Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints et al., No. 2:23-cv-00785, 2024 WL 2750826 (D. Utah May 29, 2024), and Veronique has been
designated as a restricted filer, Eliason v. Cox, No. 1:24-CV-00148, 2024 WL 4696669 (D. Utah Nov. 6, 2024).
2 On April 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an additional “Response” (ECF 35). Given that briefing on Church Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF 26) is complete, this filing appears to be an unauthorized sur-reply. Local Rule 7-1 makes
clear that “[u]nless ordered otherwise, the court will not consider additional memoranda.” DUCivR 7-1(a)(9). Despite
Plaintiffs’ pro se status, they are still obligated to follow the rules and procedures of this court. See Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218. The court therefore declines to consider this filing in making its determination.
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Motion to Dismiss (ECF 27), and the time for doing so has passed. See DUCivR 7-
1(a)(4)(A)(iii) (“A response to a motion must be filed within 28 days after service of the
motion.”).3
II. 	DISCUSSION4
a. 	Lack of Standing
Defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have
failed to establish standing. Federal courts “are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction.” Gad
v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2015). Because of this, “there is a presumption
against [this court’s] jurisdiction, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
proof.” Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2005). To establish jurisdiction,
the plaintiff “must ‘allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction’ and ‘must support
[those facts] by competent proof.’” United States ex rel Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., 971 F.2d
548, 551 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936)).
For federal courts to have jurisdiction, “the party bringing the suit must establish standing.”
Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane County, 632 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show
both “Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement, . . .
3 Plaintiffs’ failure to timely respond is grounds for granting State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 27). See
DUCivR 7-1(f) (“[F]ailure to respond timely to a motion may result in the court granting the motion without further
notice.”). However, in light of Defendants’ overlapping arguments, the court will nonetheless consider the arguments
presented in Plaintiff’s Response (ECF 29) in considering both Motions to Dismiss.
4 Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the court construes their pleadings liberally and holds them to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991). However, it is not the court’s function to assume the role of advocate on behalf of pro se litigants. See id. “This
liberal treatment is not without limits, and ‘this court has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules
of procedure that govern other litigants.’” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Garrett v.
Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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and prudential standing[,] which embodies ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.’” Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S.
at 11). Under the prudential standing doctrine, a plaintiff “must assert [her] own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest [her] claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Prudential standing prevents a plaintiff from “raising another
person’s legal rights.” Wilderness Soc’y, 632 F.3d at 1168 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984)). If a plaintiff fails to establish standing, a court must dismiss the case. See United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Here, Church Defendants ask the court to strike or dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiffs
lack standing and cannot represent the interests of others (ECF 26 at 11). Similarly, State
Defendants argue Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this case on behalf of the estate of another
(ECF 27 at 10). The court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiffs cannot represent the estate(s) of
others, and they do not appear to be alleging any claims on behalf of themselves. While a duly
appointed personal representative may sue on behalf of a decedent’s estate, a “personal
representative’s authority commences with his or her appointment.” Pierucci v. Pierucci, 2014 UT
App. 163, 331 P.3d 7, 17 (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-3-103, 75-3-701)). Plaintiffs have the
burden of establishing that they are the personal representatives of the referenced estate to have
standing. But there are no well-pled allegations, evidence, or other documents that reflect or
establish that they have been appointed as the personal representatives. Without legal standing,
“litigants cannot sue in federal court to enforce the rights of others.” VR Acquisitions, LLC v.
Wasatch Cnty., 853 F.3d 1142, 1146 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing RMA Ventures Cali. V. SunAmerica
Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1073 (10th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to meet
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their burden to establish standing, and their Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
b. 	Restricted Filer Designation5
Church Defendants argue that this action was actually brought by Brett, the father of
Brittnie and Kylie, to circumvent his vexatious litigant order (ECF 26 at 13). State Defendants
similarly argue that this action was brought by Brett to evade detection by the court (ECF 27 at 6).
The court agrees that this action appears to be an improper attempt by Brett to circumvent the prior
orders of this court through Brittnie and Kylie. In addition, this action is similar to two other
lawsuits where Plaintiffs were named parties, but such matters were previously dismissed. This
action therefore also appears to be duplicative.
“[T]he right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional and there is no
constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.”
Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Federal
courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully
tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” Id. In determining whether filing
restrictions should be imposed, courts may consider whether the litigant has a history of filing
duplicative lawsuits. See United States v. Kettler, No. 91-3011, 1991 WL 94457, at *6 (10th Cir.
June 3, 1991) (citing Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2nd Cir. 1986)). As set
forth below, the abusive and duplicative litigation warrants a filing restriction against the Plaintiffs
in this matter.
5 Even though the court recommends dismissal, the court “may still impose filing restrictions” on Plaintiffs for their
conduct in this and other cases. Eliason, 2024 WL 2750826, at *5.
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Since 2020, Brittnie and Kylie, as well as Brett and Veronique, have filed two other cases
in this district (which have all been dismissed), each bringing similar claims based on the same
allegations as this action:
• 	Eliason et al. v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
et al., No. 1:20-cv-00024, ECF 1 (filed Feb. 26, 2020) (alleging the “Lawyers of The LDS
Church” used “Kirton and McConkie [to] embezzle the estates of Max and Joyce Eliason”).
This matter was dismissed “with prejudice” in September of 2020 (ECF 71); and
• 	Eliason et al. v. Kirton McConkie PC et al., No. 2:24-cv-00115, ECF 1 (filed Feb. 12,
2024) (alleging Kirton McConkie among others conspired with other defendants “to
wrongfully gain control of the assets of Joyce Eliason and Max Eliason”). This matter was
dismissed in August of 2024 (ECF 42).
Brittnie and Kylie’s present case and the above-named cases bear striking resemblance to
numerous cases filed by their father Brett who was designated a vexatious litigant on May 29,
2024 in this district by Judge Ted Stewart, based on Brett’s “lengthy history” of filing abusive and
duplicative lawsuits “related to the handling of Mr. [Brett] Eliason’s parents’ estate and subsequent
litigation.” Eliason, 2024 WL 2750826, at *5–6. In the two cases listed above, which were filed
before Brett was designated as a vexatious litigant, Brett, Veronique, Brittnie, and Kylie were joint
plaintiffs. After the court warned Brett it would restrict his filings, Veronique filed then two cases
raising similar claims and allegations. Eliason v. United States of America et al., No. 1:24-cv-
00095 (filed June 3, 2024 and dismissed Oct. 1, 2024); Eliason v. Cox et al., No. 1:24-cv-00148
(filed Sept. 16, 2024 and dismissed Nov. 6, 2024). Veronique was also designated as a restricted
filer because her “cases seem to reflect an attempt to circumvent Brett’s filing restrictions.” Eliason
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v. Cox, No. 1:24-CV-00148, 2024 WL 4700872, at *3 (D. Utah Oct. 16, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-00148, 2024 WL 4696669 (D. Utah Nov. 6, 2024).
Despite listing Brittnie and Kylie as the Plaintiffs, Brittnie and Kylie’s filings are
consistently written from Brett’s perspective—repeatedly referring to “my parents’ estate” despite
being the grandchildren (Compl. at 5). The Complaint also identifies Brett’s email and phone
number that is associated with his other federal filings (See ECF 26 at 3). In the body of the
Complaint, Brett is also listed as a Plaintiff (as well as Veronique) (Compl. at 6). Given the
duplicative allegations about Brett’s parents’ estate (which caused the court to restrict Brett’s filing
privileges), and the fact that Brittnie and Kylie’s Complaint here appears to be written by Brett (or
at least written on his behalf), Brittnie and Kylie’s Complaint in the present case seems to reflect
an attempt to circumvent Brett’s filing restrictions much like Veronique’s cases. Moreover, the
claims here are similar to the claims in the above two cases, which have both been dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the district judge
GRANT the Motions to Dismiss (ECF 26, 27) and DISMISS Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Based on Brittnie and Kylie’s history of abusive and duplicative litigation, the undersigned
FURTHER RECOMMENDS the district judge enter an order imposing the following filing
restrictions for any new action Brittnie and Kylie seek to file pro se (without an attorney):
(1) requiring Brittnie and Kylie to file a motion with the Clerk of Court requesting leave to
file a pro se action, with the proposed complaint attached;
(2) requiring the motion to include a list of all of Brittnie and Kylie’s current
and previously filed lawsuits;
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(3) requiring the motion to include a notarized affidavit from Brittnie and Kylie reciting
the issues each seeks to present and including a short discussion of the legal basis
asserted for the claims;
(4) requiring the affidavit include an assertion that, to the best of Brittnie and Kylie’s
knowledge, the claims do not relate in any way to the estate of Max and Joyce Eliason,
and are not otherwise duplicative of her or Brett Eliason’s prior cases in this district;
(5) requiring the Clerk of Court to send the referenced materials to a magistrate judge for
review to determine whether the complaint relates in any way to the estate of Max and
Joyce Eliason, is duplicative of her or Brett Eliason’s prior cases in this district, or is
otherwise without merit;
(6) requiring the magistrate judge to forward the proposed complaint to the Chief District
Judge for further review; and
(7) concluding that only with the review and consent of the Chief District Judge the
proposed complaint may be filed.
NOTICE
Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being sent to all parties who are
hereby notified of their right to object. Within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy,
any party may serve and file written objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object
may constitute a waiver of objections upon subsequent review.
DATED this 20 February 2026.
Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero
United States District Court for the District of Utah
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