Liu v. Utah State University et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
TIANBIAO LIU,
Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a Utah
Governmental Entity, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO
AMEND
Case No. 1:24-cv-00087
District Judge Robert J. Shelby
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
This case arises from Defendant Utah State University (USU)’s Title IX investigation and
subsequent termination of Plaintiff Tianbiao Liu from his position as an associate professor.1
Before the court is Liu’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint.2 For the
reasons explained below, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the proposed Second Amended Complaint (Proposed
Complaint) attached to Liu’s Motion.3
In 2015, Liu acquired tenure as an associate professor at USU’s College of Science in the
Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry.4 As part of his professorial duties, Liu taught
1 Dkt. 14, First Amended Complaint.
2 Dkt. 56, Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Motion).
3 See Dkt. 56-1, Second Amended Complaint with Jury Demand (Proposed Complaint). Because USU challenges
the Proposed Complaint as futile, the court accepts Liu’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views them in
the light most favorable to him. See Beus Gilbert PLLC v. Donald L. Robertson Tr., 859 F. App’x 234, 237 (10th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Evans v. Diamon, 957 F.3d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 2020)).
4 Proposed Complaint ¶ 6.
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classes, conducted research, and led a research group of chemistry and biochemistry doctoral
students.5 He also served as a doctorate advisor and on the graduate committee that determines
whether and when a student is eligible to graduate.6
Around August 2018, Liu’s doctoral adviser recommended Liu help a prospective student
(Title IX Student) pursue her doctoral degree at USU.7 Title IX Student enrolled at USU in
Spring 2019 at Liu’s invitation.8 Title IX Student was a good student: smart, hardworking, and
eager to excel.9 However, she was also obstinate toward authority figures and struggled
completing tasks she should have been able to perform based on her past education.10 Liu did
his best to help Title IX Student, and she ultimately achieved great success, including first
authorship and numerous co-authorships in well-known peer-reviewed scientific journals.11
In October and November 2022, Title IX Student approached Liu on multiple occasions
to request he recommend her for early graduation.12 Liu did not believe she was a candidate for
early graduation and informed her he would not recommend her.13 Liu told Title IX Student she
could raise the matter with the Department’s head if she disagreed.14
On November 8, 2022, Title IX Student met with the Chemistry Department’s Graduate
Program Coordinator, Ms. Weatbrook.15 Title IX Student falsely told Weatbrook that Liu had
5 Id. ¶ 7.
6 Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
7 Id. ¶ 15.
8 Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
9 Id. ¶ 17.
10 Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
11 Id. ¶ 20.
12 Id. ¶¶ 21, 25.
13 Id. ¶¶ 22, 24, 26.
14 Id. ¶ 26.
15 Id. ¶ 27.
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previously agreed to her graduating early and that Liu refused to extend her visa unless she
agreed to not graduate early.16 “In reality, the Title IX Student’s Visa was never discussed with
Dr. Liu, and he had no control or involvement in her Visa.”17 Based on these allegations, Title
IX Student filed a complaint for sexual discrimination and a report of sexual misconduct and
retaliation.18 Weatbrook also submitted her own Title IX incident report of sexual discrimination
against Liu.19
On November 16, 2022, USU removed Liu from his teaching position and informed him
the Office of Equity would be conducting a Title IX investigation.20 USU informed Liu he was
strictly forbidden from (1) speaking with others affiliated with USU, except the Title IX
Investigator; (2) using his USU email account or telephone; (3) entering campus; and
(4) undertaking his responsibilities and privileges as a tenured professor.21 If Liu violated any of
these prohibitions, he could be terminated and his actions would be construed as retaliation
against Title IX Student.22 On December 1, 2022, USU’s Title IX Coordinator served Liu with
two Title IX complaints against him.23 While Liu was on leave, USU transferred Title IX
Student into a new research group, informed her she would be graduating early, and removed Liu
from her graduate committee.24
16 Id.
17 Id. ¶ 28.
18 Id. ¶ 31.
19 Id. ¶ 30.
20 Id. ¶ 34.
21 Id. ¶ 35.
22 Id. ¶ 36.
23 Id. ¶ 37.
24 Id. ¶ 38.
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Liu takes issue with many aspects of the Title IX investigation. Liu alleges he was
denied copies of evidentiary records and reports concerning the investigation.25 He also alleges
the Title IX Coordinator failed to pursue Liu’s own claim for retaliation against Title IX Student
for “speaking with prospective witnesses and collecting information on campus from students”
concerning her allegations against Liu.26 The investigation was also extended, and Liu alleges
the Title IX Coordinator failed to inform him of the basis of the extension, which Liu later
discovered was caused by Title IX Student’s desire to dismiss her claims against him.27
Eventually, USU dismissed the discrimination complaint but amended the sexual
misconduct complaint to include many of the allegations contained in the discrimination
complaint.28 Before any final hearing on the sexual misconduct claim, USU lifted many of its
restrictions on Liu.29 Liu was allowed to interact with students in his research group but was
strictly and directly supervised in his communications and interactions with students and
others.30 USU then discovered Liu had complained to members of his research group regarding
how the University was handling the Title IX investigation, and Liu was again barred from
campus.31 USU also informed Title IX Student of Liu’s communications and encouraged her to
file a separate formal complaint for retaliation, which she subsequently did.32
25 Id. ¶¶ 50–53.
26 Id. ¶¶ 39–40.
27 Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
28 Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
29 See id. ¶ 54.
30 Id.
31 Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
32 Id. ¶¶ 57–58.
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A preliminary Title IX hearing was held on October 4, 2023.33 The presiding officer
informed Liu the purpose of the hearing was primarily to determine whether Liu had treated
“Title IX Student differently because of her sex.”34 Shocked and confused, Liu advised the
officer the discrimination complaint had been dismissed.35 The presiding officer disagreed and
told Liu the issues to be heard was whether Liu had treated Title IX Student differently based on
her sex and whether Liu engaged in sexual misconduct.36
USU scheduled a Title IX grievance hearing for April 16, 2024.37 On February 23, 2024,
USU issued Liu a Notice of Intent to Commence Sanction Proceedings.38 The notice explained
USU’s intent to sanction Dr. Liu with dismissal.39 It set forth allegations that were all raised by
Title IX Student in her complaint:40 Liu (1) violated USU Policy 403 by rampantly and seriously
mistreating graduate students through intimidation, threats, and action and creating a toxic and
highly negative graduate education environment;41 (2) mistreated international graduate students
under his supervision; (3) subjected students to unreasonable hours and enforced those hours by
intimidation; and (4) improperly leveraged the power imbalance between himself and his
students.42 The notice also referenced Liu’s involvement in the Title IX process, his exercise of
33 Id. ¶ 61.
34 Id. ¶¶ 60–62.
35 Id. ¶¶ 62, 63.
36 Id. ¶¶ 64, 65.
37 Id. ¶¶ 66–67.
38 Id. ¶ 68.
39 Id. ¶ 69.
40 Id. ¶ 156.
41 Id. ¶ 157. Policy 403 governed the standards of conduct that faculty members must abide by. See id. ¶¶ 140, 141.
For example, Policy 403.2.3.3.1 stated, “Faculty members do not harass or discriminate on the bases of sex.” Id.
¶ 182 (citation modified).
42 Id. ¶¶ 158–60.
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his rights under Title IX, and his contesting the allegations.43 Despite the Title IX grievance
hearing having not yet occurred, the notice stated, “It’s improbable that the many witnesses
interviewed at different times in different contexts, were all untruthful in the same way so your
denials of wrongdoing lack credibility.”44 By this time, USU had removed Liu’s professional
profile from the University website.45
The Title IX grievance hearing began on April 12, 2024 and concluded on April 30,
2024.46 The grievance hearing panel issued a preliminary finding Liu had not violated Title IX
by engaging in discrimination, sexual misconduct, or retaliation.47 Liu was still suspended at
this time.48
While the grievance hearing was ongoing, on April 16, 2024, USU conducted an
investigation on the Notice of Intent to Commence Sanction Proceedings.49 The investigation
heavily relied on Title IX Student’s allegations and the conclusions of the Title IX Coordinator
who had conducted the investigation.50 A formal sanction hearing was held on May 30 and 31,
2024.51 During this proceeding, USU did not allow Liu’s attorney to speak or question witnesses
and did not provide Liu with language interpretation services.52 On June 29, 2024, USU
dismissed Liu for violating USU Policy 403 and for violating the administrative leave
43 Id. ¶ 70.
44 Id. ¶ 71.
45 Id. ¶ 72.
46 Id. ¶¶ 76, 79.
47 Id. ¶ 80.
48 Id. ¶ 81.
49 Id. ¶ 70.
50 Id. ¶ 78.
51 Id. ¶ 82.
52 Id. ¶¶ 83–84.
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prohibitions by speaking with one or more students about allegations pending before the Office
of Equity.53
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 23, 2024, Liu filed his Complaint.54 On September 13, 2024, Defendants
moved to dismiss Liu’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and breach of an implied-in-fact contract
claim.55 On July 22, 2025, the court heard oral argument and issued an oral ruling dismissing the
§ 1983 claims with prejudice and dismissing the contract claim without prejudice.56 On
September 18, 2025, Liu filed his Motion seeking leave to amend the Complaint to add four
causes of actions under various theories of contract liability against USU.57 The Motion is fully
briefed and ripe for review.58
LEGAL STANDARD
“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”59 “The purpose
of the Rule is to provide litigants the maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its
merits rather than on procedural niceties.”60 Leave to amend should be granted unless the party
opposing the motion shows “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
53 Id. ¶ 86.
54 Dkt. 1, Complaint.
55 Dkt. 26, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief May Be Granted
(Motion to Dismiss). The Motion did not seek dismissal of Liu’s Title IX claim against USU. See id.
56 Dkt. 53, Minute Order; Dkt. 59, Amended Corrected Minute Entry.
57 Motion. Initially, Liu brought this suit against USU and four of its employees. Complaint ¶¶ 2–6. The sole
remaining defendant in the Proposed Complaint is USU. See Proposed Complaint.
58 Dkt. 57, Defendants’ Response and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to File a Second Amended
Complaint (Opposition); Dkt. 60, Plaintiff’s Reply re: [Dkt. 56] Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint.
59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
60 Minter v. Prime Equipment Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
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opposing party . . . [or] futility of amendment.”61 Leave to amend is within the sound discretion
of the trial court.62
ANALYSIS
USU argues the Motion should be denied as untimely and futile.63 The court considers,
and rejects, each argument in turn.
I. 	The Motion to Amend Is Timely.
USU first argues the Motion is untimely.64 The court is not persuaded.
Lateness generally does not justify denying leave to amend.65 However, “untimeliness
alone [can be] a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend, especially when the party filing the
motion has no adequate explanation for the delay.”66 Here, Liu filed the Motion sixteen months
after the initial Complaint and two months after the court dismissed the implied-in-fact contract
claim without prejudice.67 USU argues amendment is untimely because Liu has no adequate
explanation for the delay, and he knew or should have known the facts upon which the proposed
amendments are based.68 USU’s untimeliness argument heavily relies on the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank.69 There, the plaintiff sought
61 Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see Castleglen, Inc. v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 984 F.2d 1571, 1584–85 (10th Cir. 1993).
62 Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Minter, 451 F.3d at 1204 (explaining that whether to grant leave to amend “is
within the discretion of the trial court” (citation omitted)).
63 Opposition at 8–17.
64 Id. at 8–10.
65 Minter, 451 F.3d at 1205.
66 Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation modified); see also Minter, 451
F.3d at 1205–06 (explaining the Tenth Circuit “focuses primarily on the reasons for the delay. . . . [D]enial of leave
to amend is appropriate when the party filing the motion has no adequate explanation for the delay.” (citation
modified)).
67 See Motion; Complaint; Minute Entry.
68 Opposition at 8–10.
69 893 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Opposition at 8–10.
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leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.70 The district court denied
leave because “the proposed amendment was untimely,” “would substantially broaden the issues
for trial,” and “the factual basis for the claim was known to the plaintiff at the time the complaint
was filed.”71 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding amendment was untimely because it was
sought “a year and half after the complaint was filed,” nine months after summary judgment, and
“only a few months before the case was scheduled for trial on the sole remaining issue.”72
This case is distinguishable from Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. The Motion comes
during the case’s earliest stages and soon after the court granted dismissal of some claims.73
Discovery has not been scheduled, much less conducted.74 Indeed, the statute of limitations for
the additional causes of action does not run until, at the earliest, the end of 2026.75 Further, the
Proposed Complaint does not substantially broaden the underlying dispute. It adds no new
parties—and in fact reduces the number of defendants from five to one.76 Each added cause of
action is related to the implied-in-fact contract claim the court dismissed without prejudice.77
And any delay was caused by waiting on the court’s dismissal ruling.78 “How the court would
rule in relation to the individual defendants’ motion, particularly where they raised qualified
immunity, created a natural stall in a case’s progression.”79 Accordingly, USU fails to establish
70 Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co., 893 F.2d at 1184.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1185.
73 See Motion; Motion to Dismiss.
74 See Motion at 3.
75 See id. at 5–6 (citing Utah Code § 78B-2-307(1)).
76 See Proposed Complaint.
77 See id.; First Amended Complaint.
78 Motion at 3.
79 Id.
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untimeliness in light of the minimal delay, limited scope of the amendments, and Liu’s
explanation.
II. 	Amendment Is Not Futile.
Defendants argue granting leave to amend is futile.80 Amendment is futile if the
proposed amended pleading “would be subject to dismissal.”81 A complaint is subject to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”82 A complaint is not subject to dismissal when it “state[s] a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face,” that is, when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”83 “But
specific facts are unnecessary; the claimant needs only to provide fair notice of the claim and its
grounds.”84 The court accepts all “well-pled factual allegations” as true and views “them in the
light most favorable” to the non-movant.85
Under Utah law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are (1) the existence of a
contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach by the other party, and
(4) damages.86 USU argues Liu fails to allege (1) the existence of a written or implied-in-fact
contract and (2) the existence of a breach.87 The court addresses each argument in turn.
80 Opposition at 11–17.
81 Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’rs Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999).
82 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
83 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified).
84 Beus Gilbert, 859 F. App’x at 237 (citation modified).
85 Id. (citation modified) (quoting Evans, 957 F.3d at 1100).
86 Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 342 P.3d 224, 230–31 (Utah 2014).
87 Opposition at 11–17.
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A. 	The Proposed Complaint Plausibly Alleges a Contract Between Liu and USU.
USU argues the Proposed Complaint fails to plausibly allege a written or implied-in-fact
contract between Liu and USU. The court disagrees.
USU argues the Proposed Complaint fails to plausibly allege a written contract exists
because Liu has failed to produce copies of the written instruments to which the Complaint
refers.88 However, Rule 12(b)(6) does not require attaching a written contract. Instead, the
standard requires enough facts to allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”89—here, that a written contract exists and
Defendants breached the contract. Liu satisfies this standard.
The court finds it reasonable to infer an express contract exists from the following
allegations in the Proposed Complaint: “USU and Dr. Liu entered into written instruments that
acknowledged his position as a tenured faculty member.”90 “These written instruments further
incorporate USU’s policies, procedures, and processes that relate to faculty and tenured faculty
members.”91 USU Policy 407 governed the “terms under which USU was permitted to
reprimand Dr. Liu, place him on probation, suspend his employment, reduce his rank, or dismiss
his employment.”92 Specifically, Policy 407 required Liu be given “written notice initiating
sanction proceedings”; an opportunity “to respond in writing to the allegations”; and “a formal
hearing . . ., where evidence is received and the faculty member has the opportunity to present
evidence and witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses.”93 These are not
88 Id. at 13.
89 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
90 Proposed Complaint ¶ 138.
91 Id.
92 Id. ¶ 140.
93 Id. ¶ 141 (citation modified).
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formulaic recitals of the elements of a breach of contract claim but rather facts that plausibly
allege a contract exists.94
USU also argues the Proposed Complaint fails to plausibly allege an implied-in-fact
contract exists.95 This argument too is unpersuasive. “An implied contract may arise from . . .
personnel policies . . . .”96 “Personnel policies create an implied contract if the employer
communicates a ‘promise of employment under certain terms’ to the employee and the employee
performs under the offer.”97 A complaint plausibly alleges an implied contract by paraphrasing
the material terms.98 “Attaching the policy [is] unnecessary” at the pleading stage.99
Here, the Proposed Complaint implies Liu promised to work for USU and comply with
university policies, and USU promised to employ Liu and comply with university policies. The
Complaint alleges, “Dr. Liu and USU would sign a ‘role statement’ which itemized the
respective percentage of time relative to general duties that Dr. Liu was expected to direct his
professional endeavors.”100 Liu agreed to comply with USU’s policies and procedures when he
was originally hired.101 During the course of Liu’s employment, Liu and USU interacted with
94 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
95 Opposition at 14–15.
96 Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 502 (Utah 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v.
Kranendonk, 424 P.3d 897 (Utah 2018).
97 Beus Gilbert, 859 F. App’x at 237–38 (quoting Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001–02 (Utah
1991)). Here, the Tenth Circuit held the complaint plausibly stated an implied-in-fact contract because the factual
allegations implied the following key promises: (1) the employer promised to work for the University-employer and
relinquish ownership of any discoveries, and (2) the University promised to employ the employee, support his
research, and distribute income to employees making discoveries subject to the University’s ownership. Id. at 237–
39.
98 Id. at 238.
99 Id.
100 Proposed Complaint ¶ 210.
101 Id. ¶ 208.
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each other in accordance with those same policies and procedures.102 USU’s policies and
procedures required USU to (1) provide actual and sufficient notice before terminating a tenured
professor for cause,103 (2) hold a formal hearing where the professor is provided language
interpretation services before termination,104 and (3) weigh and view the evidence from the
formal hearing with an eye towards maintaining the professor’s employment.105 Policy 407 also
required USU to maintain, to the maximum extent possible, the confidentiality of all information
regarding allegations of sexual harassment, and “in the event the allegations . . . are not
substantiated, all reasonable steps will be taken to restore the reputation of the accused faculty
member.”106 Contrary to USU’s contentions, the court finds these allegations particularly and
specifically identify the policies at issue.107 Accordingly, the Proposed Complaint plausibly
alleges an implied contract between USU and Liu.
B. 	The Proposed Complaint Plausibly Alleges USU Committed a Breach.
Finally, USU argues Liu fails to allege a breach of contract.108 The court disagrees. Liu
alleges facts that suggest USU breached in several ways. For example, USU placed Liu on
suspension without providing him written notice and without first completing the formal
reprimand procedures required by Policy 407.109 And USU decided to terminate Liu prior to the
102 Id. ¶¶ 211–12.
103 Id. ¶ 216.
104 Id. ¶ 217.
105 Id. ¶¶ 218–19.
106 Id. ¶¶ 175–76 (quoting Policy 407).
107 See Opposition at 16 (“Plaintiff then goes on to allege that Defendant breached this implied-in-fact contract by
failing to abide by certain USU policies, none of which are particularly or specifically identified by Plaintiff.”).
108 Id. at 15 (“Plaintiff has not alleged he was ever denied compensation for his services.”); id. at 16 (“Plaintiff’s
argument . . . could be best summed up as Plaintiff formed an implied-in-fact contract with Defendant which
Defendant subsequently breached when Defendant violated several undefined and unidentified policies.”).
109 Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 143–48.
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completion of the required formal procedures.110 During the formal hearing, USU did not
provide language interpretation services as required and did not allow Liu’s counsel to question
witnesses as required.111 USU violated the contract’s confidentiality terms by allowing Liu’s
colleagues and graduate students to be aware of the allegations immediately following his
suspension.112 The court finds these allegations plausibly allege USU breached the contract.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS the Motion.113 Liu may file within
seven days of this Order the Second Amended Complaint attached to the Motion.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge
110 Id. ¶ 220.
111 Id. ¶¶ 162, 217.
112 Id. ¶ 178.
113 Dkt. 56.
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